Resetting the India-U.S. partnership in uncertain times

The Hindu

18-06-2025

Just a few months ago, India and the United States appeared poised to deepen what had been described as the defining partnership of the 21st century. Prime Minister Modi had met President Donald Trump early in his second term. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar was present at the inauguration. There was bipartisan goodwill in Washington and strategic optimism in New Delhi. The relationship seemed to rest not on convenience, but on a grander wager: shared democratic values, converging geopolitical interests, and a mutual ambition to shape the emerging world order.
A drift that is serious
Today, however, there is growing unease in New Delhi. Not a rupture, but a perceptible drift; subtle yet serious. A series of tactical and rhetorical signals from Washington suggest a partnership at risk of being undermined by volatility, policy incoherence, and a disconcerting return to older habits of mind. The sense of strategic convergence is dimming. In this context, Mr. Trump's decision to host a lunch on June 18 for Field Marshal Asim Munir, the chief architect of Pakistan's praetorian politics and sectarian rhetoric, has sent a disquieting signal to India, not least because it blurs the line between counter-terrorism partnership and political expediency.
This drift, however, is not irreversible. The structural logic of the partnership remains robust. What is required now is a reset, not of fundamentals, but of tone, clarity, and mutual commitment.
Several recent developments have triggered India's discomfort. Perhaps most jarring has been the return of outdated 'hyphenation': treating India and Pakistan as equivalent strategic concerns. In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Mr. Trump spoke of India and Pakistan in the same breath, offered mediation on Kashmir, and warned of nuclear escalation. For Indian policymakers who have invested years in decoupling India's rise from the India-Pakistan binary, such language was diplomatically regressive.
On the economic front, signals have been equally disconcerting. Even as Mr. Trump announced that 'our deal with China is done', he reportedly discouraged Apple's CEO from expanding manufacturing in India; warning that companies that 'go to India' may face difficulties in accessing the U.S. market. For Indian officials advancing a 'China-plus-one' strategy and projecting India as a manufacturing hub, the message was undermining.
Immigration policy, too, has become a point of friction. The H-1B visa regime, long a cornerstone of India-U.S. technological cooperation, now appears vulnerable to political posturing and protectionist rhetoric. The consequences risk fraying the connective tissue that binds Silicon Valley to Indian innovation ecosystems.
Most concerning is the apparent warming in Washington's approach toward Pakistan. When the United States Central Command (CENTCOM) Commander, General Michael Kurilla, described Pakistan as a 'phenomenal partner' in counterterrorism, it represented an extraordinary characterisation of an institution long associated with nurturing cross-border terrorism.
Why is this drift occurring? First, the Trump administration's transactional approach places short-term gain over long-term alignment. India's strategic culture — patient, layered, and civilisational — sits uncomfortably with Washington's preference for the quick deal. The American impulse to monetise diplomacy can often jar with India's more strategic-based lens on geopolitics. In addition, Mr. Trump's diplomatic style remains as intriguing as ever: part showman, part salesman, and unpredictable. He may dazzle one moment and denounce the next, making it difficult for partners, even the closest, to navigate the terrain of trust and expectation.
Second, a segment of the U.S. national security establishment continues to view Pakistan as a familiar, if flawed, partner, especially in the context of Afghanistan and counterterrorism. Despite a history of duplicity, there remains a deep-seated nostalgia for the 'known devil', whose strategic utility, however diminished, is still overstated. Meanwhile, India's strategic autonomy is often misconstrued as fence-sitting rather than a principled assertion of sovereignty.
Third, structural asymmetries in influence and communication persist. India's rise is real, but its institutional footprint in Washington lags behind its ambitions.
This is reflected in a troubling misunderstanding of India's strategic intentions. Critics such as Ashley Tellis argue that India suffers from 'great-power delusions' and that the relationship falters because India's ambitions outstrip its capabilities. This diagnosis is flawed. India does not suffer from delusions of grandeur; it suffers from the patient weight of becoming. Its desire to chart an independent course reflects not confusion but strategic clarity shaped by history and sovereignty. The real risk lies not in India's aspirations but in Washington's impatience with partners who do not mirror American methods or priorities.
India must take the lead
What then must be done? Both countries must act decisively to prevent further drift.
India should not overreact. Tactical irritants must not obscure deeper strategic alignment. Defence cooperation, Quad initiatives, intelligence sharing, and convergent interests from the Indian Ocean to the Pacific remain strong foundations. But dramatic responses will only exacerbate misunderstanding. Quiet, persistent, and calibrated diplomacy must remain the preferred method. India should broaden and deepen its engagement in Washington beyond traditional diplomacy, leveraging Congress, policy think tanks, and Indian American diaspora as vectors of strategic advocacy.
Domestically, India must accelerate internal economic reforms, not to satisfy any foreign expectations but to reinforce the logic of investment, manufacturing, and long-term confidence. Regulatory clarity and infrastructure modernisation remain the best arguments for India as a global production hub. On the trade front, officials on both sides are cautiously exploring a modest but meaningful bilateral arrangement before the July 9 deadline.
Immigration concerns must be reframed as shared opportunities. The H-1B regime is not a concession to India, but an instrument of mutual innovation. The movement of skilled talent, the collaborative ecosystems of tech entrepreneurship, and the potential for co-creating the next generation of frontier technologies should be at the centre of the India-U.S. conversation.
The need to rediscover the basis of ties
For the U.S., the burden is equally significant. Washington must abandon Cold War framings and recognise that treating Indian manufacturing and talent mobility as threats is self-defeating. If the Indo-Pacific strategy is to endure, it must be matched by concrete investments in India's regional capacity-building initiatives.
More fundamentally, both countries must rediscover the moral purpose of their partnership. This is not merely about balancing China or accessing markets. At its best, the India-U.S. relationship is about shaping a democratic, pluralist, and rules-based world order. The arc of India-U.S. relations has never been linear. In 1998, after the Pokhran tests, who could have imagined the level of alignment achieved just a decade later? By 2005, the two countries had stunned the world with the landmark civil nuclear agreement: an audacious act of strategic trust that rewrote the rules of global diplomacy.
That moment reminds us of what is possible when political courage meets mutual respect. As U.S. President Bush once said, 'The world will see what two great democracies can do when they trust each other.' It is precisely that spirit we must summon again today. As this writer wrote in the introduction to Engaged Democracies (co-edited, more than two decades ago), the 'real test of the partnership is not how it behaves in moments of celebration, but how it endures in times of stress'.
The question then is not, as Walter Russell Mead provocatively asked recently, will Trump lose India? The better question is: will both countries squander a generational opportunity to build a democratic concert in Asia? The answer must be no. This turbulence should serve not as an epitaph, but as a summons to renewal. If clarity, commitment, and candour return to the conversation, the arc of the India-U.S. relationship can still bend — not just toward engagement, but toward enduring partnership and, perhaps once again, toward history-making trust.
Amitabh Mattoo is Professor and Dean, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. He has served on India's National Security Council Advisory Board