Latest news with #China-watchers
Mint
10-07-2025
- Business
- Mint
Is China's deflation signalling stagnation?
Next Story Mint Editorial Board Producer prices dropped sharply in June; China could slip back into deflation at the retail level too. Amid trade turmoil, its economy faces a rough ride. Let's keep watch and look for opportunities. Beijing has used state money to support demand, but prices dropping beyond real estate, where a bubble popped some years ago, suggest slumps across sectors. Gift this article As countries turn inward, the damage that trade reversals can do to economies may have begun to show in China. Its data shows it has replaced exports to the US with shipments elsewhere to quite an extent lately, but its demand weakness within seems to be getting worse. As countries turn inward, the damage that trade reversals can do to economies may have begun to show in China. Its data shows it has replaced exports to the US with shipments elsewhere to quite an extent lately, but its demand weakness within seems to be getting worse. Also Read: Mint Quick Edit | Deflation is bad news for China's economy On Wednesday, the country reported a 3.6% drop in producer prices this June, marking the biggest fall in about two years. Consumer prices edged 0.1% higher last month, but it also meant China was a whisker away from slipping back into deflation at the retail level. Beijing has used state money to support demand, but prices dropping beyond real estate, where a bubble popped some years ago, suggest slumps across sectors. China is vulnerable to weak import demand globally and may find it hard to avert a slowdown as shipments lose pace amid tariff turbulence. Also Read: Stay vigilant: China's economic woes could spill over Some China-watchers see it headed the way of Japan, where deflation heralded stagnation in the 1990s. But the economic lessons of that era have been learnt and Beijing has greater strategic autonomy than Tokyo did. As China's rival, India must watch Beijing's moves even as it explores new opportunities for cooperative rivalry with it. Topics You May Be Interested In Catch all the Business News, Market News, Breaking News Events and Latest News Updates on Live Mint. Download The Mint News App to get Daily Market Updates.
Scroll.in
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Why China is searching for the next generation of ‘heroes'
A tour guide competition was held in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in late May. This was not some fun contest. According to Chinese state media, it was a carefully conceived effort to 'attract and cultivate a group of politically firm and professionally skilled storytellers of heroes and martyrs in the new era'. It symbolises the ambitious and far-reaching campaign launched by the Chinese state to revive the country's pantheon of national heroes and martyrs. The aim is to unite and mobilise the nation in what Chinese leadership see as the crucial final phase in the quest to become a modern global superpower. On the same day as the Wuhan competition, but 750 miles further inland in Sichuan province, children from a kindergarten gathered with martyrs' family members to engage in traditional crafts. The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist party, the People's Daily, explained how this activity helped 'pass on the torch of heroes' to young generations. And two weeks earlier, in China's eastern province of Shandong, representatives from the official state news agency, Xinhua, attended an immersive training session on hero spirit. By coming ' face to face ' with heroes of the past, the trainees were able to grasp the 'spirit' that had guided the extraordinary deeds of these ordinary people. This 'facing up' to past heroes increasingly takes place through digital means. Thanks to developments in AI, and with the help of universities, museums and various government units, numerous Chinese people have now been 'reunited' or become 'acquainted' with family members martyred decades ago. Activities such as these have become commonplace in recent years. They are encouraged, guided and overseen by an expanding architecture of laws and regulations. There are at least two reasons why the campaign to build a new 'spirit' of heroism and sacrifice requires attention beyond China-watchers. Memory politics The first reason is the increasingly global reach of the campaign. Just as China's economic statecraft is affecting global trade and finance, so too are Chinese memory politics spreading across the globe and reshaping the transnational memory landscape. Beijing has become an active sponsor of commemorations that are concerned more with shaping the future than looking into the past. Recent examples include Victory Day celebrations in Moscow and Minsk, and joint commemorations in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, of the Chinese 'martyrs' of Nato's bombing of the Chinese embassy there in 1999. China is also fostering bilateral memory partnerships in south-east Asia and Africa. And it has even resorted to memory diplomacy in seeking improved relations with the US by invoking the spirit of Sino-US cooperation during the second world war. China's historical statecraft operates globally in the legal realm, too. Laws have come into effect that aim to promote patriotism and spread ' core socialist values ' among Chinese communities worldwide. Chinese embassies and consulates are required to locate Chinese martyrs buried in their host jurisdictions, and erect and maintain memorials for them. They are also expected to organise commemorations involving local Chinese diasporic and expat communities. Recent laws have been used to detain Chinese citizens living abroad. One example is Chinese artist Gao Zhen. Gao had been a permanent US resident for 13 years when he was detained in China in 2024 for his critical depictions of Mao Zedong a decade earlier. Gao was charged with the crime of 'slandering China's heroes and martyrs' under a law that did not exist when he created and exhibited his artwork. The second reason why China's martyrs and heroes campaign matters globally is possibly more disturbing. China has become an example of a growing body of cases where state actors seek to shape and control historical memory. With several democracies beginning to show signs of democratic backsliding, the Chinese case is one of many that show that polar distinctions between 'liberal' and 'illiberal' systems are untenable. Perhaps the most obvious example of a democracy in democratic recession is the US. Donald Trump, a constitutionally elected president, is relying on a series of executive orders to consolidate power and hamper critical debate. One such directive, issued late in Trump's first term, entails a proposal to build a so-called 'national garden of American heroes'. The proposal was revived recently with an executive order on 'restoring truth and sanity to American history'. The order aims to remove what the administration deems divisive and anti-American ideologies from national museums and public monuments. Washington's efforts to control how history is presented seem to come straight out of Beijing's playbook. In 2020, during his July 4 address, Trump claimed: 'Our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values, and indoctrinate our children.' These words eerily resemble those used previously by Chinese president Xi Jinping to justify his campaign against what he calls 'historical nihilism' – attempts to 'destroy' the Chinese nation by eradicating its history. Memory laws have also been adopted across Europe. The European Parliament, for example, has codified its own historical interpretations of the causes of the second world war in an attempt to counter what it labels Russian disinformation. The causes and consequences of war have always been and will continue to be hotly debated among historians, and there is no need for the EU's bureaucracy to unilaterally 'resolve' these debates. A problem with these bureaucratic efforts to codify historical interpretation is that they feed memory wars and fuel escalation. Even more damaging is that they emulate authoritarian practices of 'dictating' history and restricting debate. These examples show that distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes are not as pristine as is often claimed. Increasingly, global memory practices are evolving and possibly converging on a fluid spectrum between these two poles. China's new hero cult is an important case for shedding light on these dynamics.
Newsweek
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Newsweek
China's Disappearing Generals Put Questions Over Xi's Grip
Based on facts, either observed and verified firsthand by the reporter, or reported and verified from knowledgeable sources. Newsweek AI is in beta. Translations may contain inaccuracies—please refer to the original content. China's powerful Central Military Commission has shrunk to its smallest size in decades under the leadership of Xi Jinping, a Newsweek analysis shows, with analysts saying it highlights the personalisation of his control - and efforts to make the military combat-ready. The changes come at a critical time for China as it rivals the United States in military and economic terms amid the ever-present question as to whether it will seek to take over democratic Taiwan, which Communist Party leader Xi has repeatedly said he wants to incorporate as what he sees as an integral part of China. Yet scores of changes in security and other political positions, including in China's top military leadership, have also brought the dismissal of persons seen as Xi loyalists, raising speculation among some China-watchers of a challenge to the most powerful grip that any leader has held since the era of party strongmen Deng Xiaoping and Mao Zedong. "I think it's a definite sign of Xi Jinping's attempts to personalize the control over the military," said Jaehwan Lim, a professor of international politics at Japan's Aoyama Gakuin University. "I think that it's kind of becoming pathological, an extension of his personalization of the control of the military... His agenda is the strengthening of the PLA, is combat readiness. That's his pretty clear agenda," Lim said. Beijing's embassy in Washington did not respond to a request for comment. An email to the address of the spokesperson for China's Ministry of Defense on the ministry website was rejected by the ministry server. Newsweek's analysis showed that the Central Military Commission had now been reduced to five members after last week's dismissal of Admiral Miao Hua which was reported by state media – the lowest number since Mao Zedong's Cultural Revolution in the 1960s and 70s when it had five members. But the status of commission vice-chairman General He Weidong is unclear as he has not been mentioned in state and party media reports since March, though his name is still on the website. Without He, it would have only four members. Chinese leader Xi Jinping shakes hands with the widow of China's former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang, at Xu's funeral service in Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing, Sunday, June 8, 2025.... Chinese leader Xi Jinping shakes hands with the widow of China's former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission Xu Qiliang, at Xu's funeral service in Babaoshan Revolutionary Cemetery in Beijing, Sunday, June 8, 2025. (Xie Huanchi/Xinhua via AP) More The status of He has added to growing speculation over political maneuvring and a possible internal challenge to Xi that strengthened this week with the announcement from China's Politburo of a new "Central Committee decision-making and coordination body" to "enhance the centralized and unified leadership of the CPC Central Committee over major initiatives." The Politburo announcement warned the members of the 205-person Central Committee – Xi is a member – against "taking over others' functions or overstepping boundaries." Xi presided over the meeting but, tellingly, was not given the by-now customary designation as the "core", and China-watchers are divided on whether the body would weaken or strengthen Xi's grip. "We do not have any clear, unequivocal signs of a political crisis. We have the echoes of something happening in the depths of CCP politics," said Peter Mattis, President of the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington, D.C.-based political research and analysis organization. "I think the key issue is that people conflate power-struggle with Xi losing power. Xi could struggle and win," Mattis said. Fate of Xi Loyalists While on the surface the military reshuffles point to even more centralized control, some analysts have noted that Xi loyalists are among those who have been removed. Admiral Miao Hua had been consistently promoted by Xi and had served alongside him in Fujian province for years. Miao had been placed under investigation on suspicion of "serious disciplinary violations" last November, according to China's Ministry of Defense spokesperson Wu Qian. Two more admirals close to Miao who had also been promoted by Xi – Li Hanjun and Li Pengcheng – were also purged, Andrew S. Erickson and Christopher H. Sharman of the China Maritime Studies Institute of the U.S. Naval War College wrote on July 1. Lim believed that the changes could be about giving greater autonomy to the military, known as the People's Liberation Army, to make it more effective. "The PLA welcomes his moves, his military reforms, because they just want to focus on seeing their combat readiness rather than being mobilized to do something else. One sort of message he wants to send to the military is like, extreme autonomy to the military. So autonomy is the key word here," Lim said. Others, however, question whether Xi could be facing disaffection from other elite members of the Party and some members of the military, Chinese and foreign observers say. Xi is general secretary of the CCP, chairman of its Central Military Commission that controls the military, the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and state president. Xi's consolidation of power became evident with his appointment to a third term as CCP leader in 2022 – breaking a custom of serving only two terms. The term is scheduled to end in 2027 but no successor has been identified. Reliable signs of any shift in power would only emerge from a regular meeting of the CCP Central Committee known as the Fourth Plenum that is expected in August, said an analyst in China who requested anonymity for fear of retribution. No date has been set for the meeting. Ideas that a serious pushback is underway – a kind of "slow-motion coup" set in motion by party elites including former CCP leaders – are being circulated by Chinese political exiles, including one with the moniker "Lao Deng", who has posted dozens of videos that receive hundreds of thousands of views on his channel, "Lao Deng Starts Talking". In the videos, the Canada-based farmer and dissident discusses information about meetings that he says insiders in China are sending him – party and security service members, including high-ranking political secretaries. But in a telephone interview, he declined to provide Newsweek with evidence to support his assertions. In the complex world of CCP politics, clues to power can lie in carefully chosen words. The analyst in China said that the use of the word "coordination" to describe the work of the new organization "can only mean that things can no longer be decided just by one person," and thus was a crimp on Xi. "If there are different opinions among the policymakers, this agency will come forward to coordinate and listen to collective opinions. This will be the new decision-making principle," the analyst said. Different Opinions Not so, said exiled journalist Zhao Lanjian who lives near Washington, D.C. and who publishes on the X social media platform. Zhao told Newsweek the June 30th Politburo announcement should be read as an increase in Xi's power. Not only had Xi not lost power, but he was using the changes announced by the politburo to ensure he has people in the places he wants, said Zhao. "So-called sideline theory" or "coup theory" were based on speculation and a lack of understanding of CCP politics, Zhao said. Xi Jinping is displayed on a screen watching as Type 99A2 Chinese battle tanks take part in a parade commemorating Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, held in front of Tiananmen Gate... Xi Jinping is displayed on a screen watching as Type 99A2 Chinese battle tanks take part in a parade commemorating Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, held in front of Tiananmen Gate in Beijing on Thursday, Sept. 3, 2015. (AP Photo/Ng Han Guan, File) More Henry Gao, a law professor at the Singapore Management University, said that the situation was unclear. But he said that the new decision-making organization announced by the Politburo raised questions about Xi's dominance. "I read this more as a sign of Xi being forced to share more power, as the new institution is unnecessary otherwise, especially if you put this together with the purge of his allies in the army," Gao said via email. "I believe we will require more time to observe and understand how this new body will operate in practice, as well as its relationship to existing structures like the Politburo and its Standing Committee," Gao said. Internal political turmoil is normal for the CCP, said Mattis, who has tracked apparent challenges to Xi since the leader launched an ongoing anti-corruption campaign near the beginning of his rule. "These have arisen periodically, including 2014-2015, 2017, 2022. This latest round feels like it has been building since last summer," Mattis said. "The seeds of an existential political crisis are embedded deeply within the CCP, and we have had one such crisis at least every political generation. And Xi is effectively into his second political generation," he said. "The CCP's elites compete for power, not so much policy. They all agree on restoring their version of China to a forgotten glory, and they largely agree how that should be done. The Party's elite, however, do not agree on whose hand should guide the party-state," Mattis said.
AllAfrica
01-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
China is not alone in building a new cult of heroes and martyrs
A tour guide competition was held in the central Chinese city of Wuhan in late May. This was not some fun contest. According to Chinese state media, it was a carefully conceived effort to 'attract and cultivate a group of politically firm and professionally skilled storytellers of heroes and martyrs in the new era.' It symbolizes the ambitious and far-reaching campaign launched by the Chinese state to revive the country's pantheon of national heroes and martyrs. The aim is to unite and mobilize the nation in what the Chinese leadership sees as the crucial final phase in the quest to become a modern global superpower. On the same day as the Wuhan competition, but 750 miles farther inland in Sichuan province, children from a kindergarten gathered with martyrs' family members to engage in traditional crafts. The official newspaper of the Chinese Communist party, the People's Daily, explained how this activity helped 'pass on the torch of heroes' to young generations. And two weeks earlier, in China's eastern province of Shandong, representatives from the official state news agency, Xinhua, attended an immersive training session on hero spirit. By coming 'face to face' with heroes of the past, the trainees were able to grasp the 'spirit' that had guided the extraordinary deeds of these ordinary people. This 'facing up' to past heroes increasingly takes place through digital means. Thanks to developments in AI, and with the help of universities, museums and various government units, numerous Chinese people have now been 'reunited' or become 'acquainted' with family members martyred decades ago. Activities such as these have become commonplace in recent years. They are encouraged, guided and overseen by an expanding architecture of laws and regulations. There are at least two reasons why the campaign to build a new 'spirit' of heroism and sacrifice requires attention beyond China-watchers. A boy places flowers on a monument at the Shanghai Longhua Martyrs Cemetery. Photo: Alex Plavevski / EPA The first reason is the increasingly global reach of the campaign. Just as China's economic statecraft is affecting global trade and finance, so too are Chinese memory politics spreading across the globe and reshaping the transnational memory landscape. Beijing has become an active sponsor of commemorations that are concerned more with shaping the future than looking into the past. Recent examples include Victory Day celebrations in Moscow and Minsk, and joint commemorations in the Serbian capital, Belgrade, of the Chinese 'martyrs' of Nato's bombing of the Chinese embassy there in 1999. China is also fostering bilateral memory partnerships in south-east Asia and Africa. And it has even resorted to memory diplomacy in seeking improved relations with the US by invoking the spirit of Sino-US cooperation during the second world war. China's historical statecraft operates globally in the legal realm, too. Laws have come into effect that aim to promote patriotism and spread 'core socialist values' among Chinese communities worldwide. Chinese embassies and consulates are required to locate Chinese martyrs buried in their host jurisdictions and to erect and maintain memorials for them. They are also expected to organize commemorations involving local Chinese diasporic and expat communities. Recent laws have been used to detain Chinese citizens living abroad. One example is Chinese artist Gao Zhen. Gao had been a permanent US resident for 13 years when he was detained in China in 2024 for his critical depictions of Mao Zedong a decade earlier. Gao was charged with the crime of 'slandering China's heroes and martyrs' under a law that did not exist when he created and exhibited his artwork. Other countries, including traditional democracies, have also sought to shape and control historical memory. Phot: Will Oliver / EPA The second reason why China's martyrs and heroes campaign matters globally is possibly more disturbing. China has become an example of a growing body of cases in which state actors seek to shape and control historical memory. With several democracies beginning to show signs of democratic backsliding, the Chinese case is one of many that show that polar distinctions between 'liberal' and 'illiberal' systems are untenable. Perhaps the most obvious example of a democracy in democratic recession is the US. Donald Trump, a constitutionally elected president, is relying on a series of executive orders to consolidate power and hamper critical debate. One such directive, issued late in Trump's first term, entails a proposal to build a so-called 'national garden of American heroes.' The proposal was revived recently with an executive order on 'restoring truth and sanity to American history.' The order aims to remove what the administration deems divisive and anti-American ideologies from national museums and public monuments. Washington's efforts to control how history is presented seem to come straight out of Beijing's playbook. In 2020, during his July 4 address, Trump claimed: 'Our nation is witnessing a merciless campaign to wipe out our history, defame our heroes, erase our values and indoctrinate our children.' These words eerily resemble those used previously by Chinese president Xi Jinping to justify his campaign against what he calls 'historical nihilism' – attempts to 'destroy' the Chinese nation by eradicating its history. Memory laws have also been adopted across Europe. The European Parliament, for example, has codified its own historical interpretations of the causes of the Second World War in an attempt to counter what it labels Russian disinformation. The causes and consequences of war have always been and will continue to be hotly debated among historians, and there is no need for the EU's bureaucracy to unilaterally 'resolve' these debates. A problem with these bureaucratic efforts to codify historical interpretation is that they feed memory wars and fuel escalation. Even more damaging is that they emulate authoritarian practices of 'dictating' history and restricting debate. These examples show that distinctions between authoritarian and democratic regimes are not as pristine as is often claimed. Increasingly, global memory practices are evolving and possibly converging on a fluid spectrum between these two poles. China's new hero cult is an important case for shedding light on these dynamics. Vincent K.L. Chang is an assistant professor of the history and international relations of modern China at Leiden University. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Spectator
12-06-2025
- Business
- Spectator
Porn Britannia, Xi's absence & no more lonely hearts?
OnlyFans is giving the Treasury what it wants – but should we be concerned? 'OnlyFans,' writes Louise Perry, 'is the most profitable content subscription service in the world.' Yet 'the vast majority of its content creators make very little from it'. So why are around 4 per cent of young British women selling their wares on the site? 'Imitating Bonnie Blue and Lily Phillips – currently locked in a competition to have sex with the most men in a day – isn't pleasant.' OnlyFans gives women 'the sexual attention and money of hundreds and even thousands of men'. The result is 'a cascade of depravity' that Perry wouldn't wish on her worst enemy. In business terms, however, OnlyFans is a 'staggering success', according to economics editor Michael Simmons. 'Britain's sex industry brings in far more to the economy than politicians are comfortable admitting'; OnlyFans might just be Britain's most profitable tech start-up. 'If we are going to wage a moral war on porn,' Simmons argues, 'we should at least be honest about what we're sacrificing.' Louise and Michael joined the podcast to discuss further (1:21). Next: could Xi Jinping's time be up? Historian Francis Pike writes about the unusual absence of China's President Xi. China-watchers have detected some subtle differences from the norm in Chinese media, from fewer official references to Xi to changes in routine politburo meetings. So, could Xi Jinping be forced to step down? And if so, who is on manoeuvres and why? Francis joined the podcast alongside former diplomat Kerry Brown, professor of China Studies at King's College London (22:31). And finally: is the era of the lonely hearts ad coming to an end? Tony Whitehead provides his notes on lonely hearts columns this week, writing about how, 330 years after they first appeared in print in Britain, they may soon disappear. Francesca Beauman – who literally wrote the book on the subject, Shapely Ankle Preferr'd – and Mark Mason join the podcast to provide their favourite examples, from the serious to the humorous (35:13). Hosted by William Moore and Lara Prendergast. Produced by Patrick Gibbons.
