Latest news with #CivilProcedureCode


Morocco World
7 hours ago
- Politics
- Morocco World
Morocco's Constitutional Court Rejects Key Parts of Civil Procedure Reform
Rabat – Morocco's Constitutional Court has ruled that several key provisions in the newly proposed Civil Procedure Code are unconstitutional. The law, known as Law 23.02, was referred to the Court by the President of the House of Representatives last month to ensure its compatibility with the 2011 Constitution. Although much of the proposed text was approved, the Court struck down a number of critical articles, saying they undermine judicial independence, legal clarity, and the right to a fair trial. The decision marks a setback for Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi, whose ministry spearheaded the reform process. Article 17 – Undermining legal finality The Court rejected the first paragraph of Article 17, which allows the public prosecutor to request the cancellation of final court rulings. The court said this violates the principle of legal certainty, which is a core element of the right to a fair trial. Letting prosecutors reopen closed cases, they argued, 'harms the principle of legal certainty.' The Court added that it would unjustifiably interfere with the stability of judicial decisions. Article 84 – Delivery of court summonses The Court also rejected the fourth paragraph of Article 84, which allows court summonses to be delivered based on assumptions, like someone simply claiming to be the recipient's agent or a family member appearing to be over 16. The Court said this created legal uncertainty and could harm the right to a fair trial. It ruled that such vague rules violate the Constitution, so this part and other related articles were declared unconstitutional. Article 90 – Remote hearings without clear rules The last paragraph of Article 90 allows for remote court hearings, such as through video conferencing. While the Court acknowledged the usefulness of such tools, it said the article did not include enough guarantees to protect the rights of defendants and litigants, particularly their ability to participate fully and understand proceedings. Articles 107 and 364 – Gagging lawyers The Court found that the last paragraph both of Articles 107 and 364 because they said parties have the right to get a copy of the Royal Commissioner's legal opinions without being allowed to respond to them. The Court explained that the right to defend oneself is essential in a fair trial, and parties must be able to comment on all opinions affecting the case. Blocking any response to these opinions unfairly limits the defense and violates the constitutional right to equal defense, so these parts were ruled unconstitutional. Article 288 – Technical error with legal consequences Article 288 was declared unconstitutional because it referred to the wrong legal article. It pointed to Article 284, which deals with who is responsible for keys to sealed doors, instead of Article 285, which explains the proper procedures to follow when a will or other documents are found sealed. This mistake made the law unclear and confusing, violating the constitutional requirement that laws must be clear and understandable. Article 339 – Silent rulings are not acceptable The Court invalidated Article 339, which would allow judges to issue decisions without providing written reasoning in certain cases. The Court firmly stated that all judicial decisions must include a legal explanation, as required by the Constitution, to allow for transparency and possible appeal. Articles 408 and 410 – Ministerial overreach on case transfers One of the most strongly worded rejections concerned Articles 408 and 410, which give the Minister of Justice the power to transfer cases between different courts or regions. The Court said this violates the principle of judicial independence and could be used to pressure judges or manipulate outcomes. The Court stressed that case management decisions must remain in the hands of the judiciary, not the executive branch, which includes the government and the Minister of Justice. Only judicial authorities, like the Prosecutor General at the Court of Cassation, have the right to oversee the proper conduct of trials and request such referrals. Giving this power to the Minister of Justice, a member of the executive, violates the independence of the judiciary and goes against constitutional principles. Articles 624 and 628 – Digital justice must remain judicial Finally, the Court struck down Articles 624 and 628, which would have given the Justice Ministry control over the digital infrastructure used by courts and the authority to assign judges to use it. The Court ruled that these responsibilities belong to the Higher Council of the Judiciary (CSMJ), not the Ministry. While the constitution allows cooperation between branches of government, judicial work must remain fully independent, the court says. 'The mere 'coordination' with the mentioned governmental authority (the ministry of justice) regarding it is considered a violation of the principle of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, as established by Articles 1 and 107 of the Constitution,' says the court. Tags: civil procedureouahbipolitics
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Business Standard
2 days ago
- Politics
- Business Standard
Prior court approval needed for public interest suits under Section 92: SC
The Supreme Court on Tuesday said a prior nod from court was needed to file a lawsuit under the provision dealing with public charities of the Civil Procedure Code as the action was launched on behalf of public beneficiaries and that too in public interest. The top court issued directions on the legal issues and dismissed an appeal filed by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which challenged the maintainability of a suit against it under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). Section 92 of the CPC deals with lawsuits relating to public charitable or religious trusts and permits legal action to be taken in cases of alleged breaches of trust, or when the court's direction is needed for the trust's administration. A suit under Section 92 of the CPC is a representative suit of a special nature since the action is instituted on behalf of the public beneficiaries and in public interest. Obtaining a grant of leave' from the court before the suit can be proceeded with, acts as a procedural and legislative safeguard in order to prevent public trusts from being subjected to undue harassment through frivolous suits being filed against them and also to obviate a situation that would cause a further wastage of resources which can otherwise be put towards public charitable or religious aims, a bench comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan said. Writing 168-page, Justice Pardiwala, however, pointed out at the stage of grant of leave, the court neither adjudicates upon the merits of the dispute nor confers any substantive rights upon the parties. A trust can be said to have been created for a public purpose' when the beneficiaries are the general public who are incapable of exact ascertainment. Even if the beneficiaries are not necessarily the public at large, they must at least be a classified section of it and not a pre-ascertained group of specific individuals, it said. The special nature of the suit under Section 92 requires it to be filed fundamentally on behalf of the public for the vindication of public rights, it said. Therefore, courts must go beyond the reliefs and also give due regard to the object and purpose for which the suit is brought. The true nature of the suit must be determined on a comprehensive understanding of the facts of the matter and a hard-and-fast rule cannot be made for the same, it said. (Only the headline and picture of this report may have been reworked by the Business Standard staff; the rest of the content is auto-generated from a syndicated feed.)


Hindustan Times
2 days ago
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Prior nod of court needed for filing lawsuit by public beneficiaries in citizens' interest: SC
New Delhi, The Supreme Court on Tuesday said a prior nod from court was needed to file a lawsuit under the provision dealing with public charities of the Civil Procedure Code as the action was launched on behalf of public beneficiaries and that too in public interest. Prior nod of court needed for filing lawsuit by public beneficiaries in citizens' interest: SC The top court issued directions on the legal issues and dismissed an appeal filed by a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, which challenged the maintainability of a suit against it under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Section 92 of the CPC deals with lawsuits relating to public charitable or religious trusts and permits legal action to be taken in cases of alleged breaches of trust, or when the court's direction is needed for the trust's administration. 'A suit under Section 92 of the CPC is a representative suit of a special nature since the action is instituted on behalf of the public beneficiaries and in public interest. Obtaining a 'grant of leave' from the court before the suit can be proceeded with, acts as a procedural and legislative safeguard in order to prevent public trusts from being subjected to undue harassment through frivolous suits being filed against them and also to obviate a situation that would cause a further wastage of resources which can otherwise be put towards public charitable or religious aims,' a bench comprising Justices J B Pardiwala and R Mahadevan said. Writing 168-page, Justice Pardiwala, however, pointed out at the stage of grant of leave, the court neither adjudicates upon the merits of the dispute nor confers any substantive rights upon the parties. 'A trust can be said to have been created for a 'public purpose' when the beneficiaries are the general public who are incapable of exact ascertainment. Even if the beneficiaries are not necessarily the public at large, they must at least be a classified section of it and not a pre-ascertained group of specific individuals,' it said. The special nature of the suit under Section 92 requires it to be filed fundamentally on behalf of the public for the vindication of public rights, it said. 'Therefore, courts must go beyond the reliefs and also give due regard to the object and purpose for which the suit is brought. The true nature of the suit must be determined on a comprehensive understanding of the facts of the matter and a hard-and-fast rule cannot be made for the same,' it said. This article was generated from an automated news agency feed without modifications to text.


Time of India
3 days ago
- Business
- Time of India
SC stays Madras HC order in Testbook suit against Google Play Store billing
Academy Empower your mind, elevate your skills The Supreme Court on Monday stayed the Madras High Court 's order that allowed continuation of the proceedings on the Testbook Edu Solutions ' petition against Google India Digital Services ' updated payment policies relating to its proprietary Google Play Store A bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan stayed the HC's June 11 order that dismissed Google 's petition filed under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows a court to reject a plaint at the initial HC had dismissed Google's contention that Testbook's suit was barred under the Competition Act, 2002, and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007. The HC had held that Testbook's suit contained contractual issues that fell within its jurisdiction and could not be dismissed on the which operates over 700 mobile applications for government exam preparation, had challenged the search engine giant's Google Play Billing System and User Choice Billing, which mandate service fees ranging from 15% to 30% from application developers. Google's policies amounted to a unilateral novation of its agreement with application developers, and they were contrary to public policy and imposed undue economic duress on the developers, Testbook told the SC that the Testbook's suit was barred under the Competition Act, which expressly ousts civil jurisdiction in respect of matters within the domain of the Competition Commission of India (CCI) and the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). Further, the allegations concerning the Payment and Settlement Systems Act are solely within the purview of the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), as the sectoral regulator, it counsel Harish Salve, appearing for Google, said that the single judge of the HC held that the plaint filed by Testbook is maintainable despite the Division Bench of the same HC conclusively ruling that identical claims by other similarly placed parties were barred under Section 61 of the Competition Act, 2002, and the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.'The impugned judgment is therefore an outlier decision, rendered contrary to binding precedent, which should be corrected by the SC. It also implicates important issues of principle, including the exclusive scope of the powers of two specialist regulators: the Competition Commission of India and the Reserve Bank of India, conferred by statute. Not only are these exclusive powers important as a matter of regulatory coherence and principle, they also exist to avoid fragmented or inconsistent outcomes and floods of individual suits concerning the same contract: one which the CCI is in fact already examining in a pending investigation,' Google stated in its objected to the maintainability of the connected suits under Order Vll Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, saying the Division Bench had upheld the rejection of the connected suits filed by similarly placed mobile app developers, explicitly holding that claims stemming from allegations of abuse of dominant market position fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the CCI and not that of the civil courts on account of Section 61 of the Competition Act.'The Testbook plaint is materially identical in its allegations, reliefs, and cause of action to these previously rejected connected suits, particularly the plaint filed by another app developer, Nasadiya Technologies,' the tech giant stated.
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Business Standard
3 days ago
- Business
- Business Standard
SC stays Madras HC order allowing Testbook's suit against Google billing
Supreme Court has put a pause on a Madras High Court order that allowed ed-tech firm Testbook to go ahead with its case against Google over billing policies on the Play Store Rimjhim Singh New Delhi The Supreme Court (SC) on Monday stayed a Madras High Court order that had allowed a civil suit filed by ed-tech firm Testbook Edu Solutions against Google India to proceed, Bar and Bench reported. The stay was granted by a Bench comprising Justices JB Pardiwala and R Mahadevan, while hearing an appeal filed by Google challenging the High Court's earlier ruling dated June 11. HC had rejected Google's plea to dismiss suit In its June order, the Madras High Court had dismissed Google's plea under Order VII Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Code, which allows a court to reject a plaint at the initial stage. Google had sought dismissal of the suit on the ground that it was barred under the Competition Act and the Payment and Settlement Systems (PSS) Act. Testbook's challenge to Google billing rules Testbook, which operates over 700 mobile applications that provide government exam preparation services, filed the civil suit in July 2023. The company challenged Google's billing policies, including the Google Play Billing System (GPBS) and User Choice Billing (UCB), which impose service fees ranging from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. Testbook argued that these billing models amounted to a "unilateral novation" of its agreement with Google. It claimed the policies violated public policy and exerted undue economic pressure on developers. The firm said it could face revenue losses of up to 26 per cent, and alleged that Google had built its market position by offering services for free in earlier years. In its suit, Testbook also took objection to Clause 15.3 of Google's Developer Distribution Agreement (DDA). This clause limits the legal remedies available to developers, stating that their only option in case of disagreement is to stop using the Play Store. Testbook described the clause as "arbitrary" and claimed it violated the Indian Contract Act. Google's defence Google had argued that the civil suit should be dismissed because the issues raised fell within the domain of the Competition Act and the PSS Act. It also pointed out that similar suits by other developers had previously been rejected by the high court. The tech company relied on past judgments and an exclusive jurisdiction clause in the DDA to make its case, the news report said. High court found Testbook's case distinct The Madras High Court, however, had found Testbook's claims different from earlier cases. It held that the issues raised were specific to Testbook and involved personal contractual grievances, including waiver and tortious interference, rather than competition law violations. It also rejected Google's arguments based on the PSS Act and the jurisdiction clause in the agreement. With the SC now staying the high court's order, proceedings in the civil suit have come to a temporary halt. The apex court will now examine whether contractual disputes of this nature can be heard in civil courts despite arguments of statutory bar under other laws.