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The Mainichi
5 days ago
- Business
- The Mainichi
Japan consortium developing misinformation-fighting AI model
TOKYO (Kyodo) -- A Japanese consortium involving Fujitsu Ltd. is developing a fact-checking platform using artificial intelligence, seeking to counter the type of online misinformation often seen during disasters and around elections. The group of nine organizations -- including the National Institute of Informatics, NEC Corp. and academic institutions -- aims to complete the system by the end of fiscal 2025. The AI will analyze, collect supporting data and assess the authenticity of information online. "It involves lots of checking when you want to ascertain truth on your own, but the system could help us make quick judgments," said Dai Yamamoto, a senior project director at Fujitsu. In late May, Yamamoto tried the system during its development, entering the statement, "A group of foreign thieves went to quake-hit areas immediately after the Noto earthquake," and asking it to verify. A few seconds later, a message judging the statement as "False" popped up. The system backed its assessment with a newspaper article, saying it found information that contradicted the claim. It also concluded the reliability of the news organization that published the report was "high." The system, which uses a large language model specializing in fighting false information, is being developed with 6 billion yen ($40 million) in funding provided by the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization, a government agency. Using the platform, even "deepfakes" -- images and videos featuring real people but created by AI -- can be detected as it spots characteristics that tend to be overlooked, according to the developers. The move comes as concerns grow about the dissemination of online disinformation and misinformation, such as fake videos of disasters, and their negative impact at times of crisis.
Time of India
08-07-2025
- Automotive
- Time of India
How Xiaomi succeeded where Apple failed
HighlightsXiaomi Corp., led by founder and chairman Lei Jun, has successfully diversified into car manufacturing, launching its second electric vehicle, an SUV, and receiving over 289,000 orders within an hour, significantly outperforming Apple's failed car project. Xiaomi's success in the electric vehicle market is attributed to its strategic approach in learning from established automakers like Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co. and Great Wall Motor Co., along with aggressive recruitment of top talent from these companies. Despite early success with its electric vehicles, Xiaomi's production remains on a boutique scale compared to industry leaders like BYD Company Limited and Toyota Motor Corporation, with plans for global expansion starting in 2027. Lei Jun, founder and chairman of Xiaomi Corp., the only tech company to have successfully diversified into carmaking, couldn't resist. Speaking at a triumphant launch event in Beijing late last month for Xiaomi's second electric vehicle, a long-anticipated SUV, Lei pointedly mentioned Apple Inc., which spent a decade and $10 billion trying to make a car before giving up last year. 'Since Apple stopped developing its car, we've given special care to Apple users,' he said, noting that owners of the American giant's iPhones would be able to seamlessly sync their devices to Xiaomi's vehicles. The not-so-subtle dig was followed by a flex: Xiaomi then said it had received more than 289,000 orders for its new sport utility vehicle within an hour of its announcement, more than its first EV, a sedan launched in March 2024. Xiaomi succeeding where Apple failed has burnished Lei's reputation, made his company one of the most valuable in China and shaken up both the tech and automobile industries. The collapse of Apple's moonshot car program has only underscored the effectiveness of Xiaomi's grounded approach, which took inspiration from proven designs from Tesla Inc. and Porsche Automobil Holding SE while staying true to the affordable ethos that's made it a cult brand for Gen Z consumers. Crucially, it also launched into the most fertile EV ecosystem in the world — China. With state subsidies, existing charging infrastructure and a ready-made supply chain, Xiaomi had a structural tailwind Apple lacked. Xiaomi declined to comment for this story. Lei and Xiaomi's 'charisma, brand recognition and ecosystem cannot be underestimated,' Yale Zhang, the managing director of Shanghai-based consultancy Automotive Foresight, said. 'It's a big influence on young consumers who have filled their homes with Xiaomi products. When it comes time to buy an EV, they naturally think of Xiaomi.' But building cars is a far more complex, capital-intensive challenge than making phones or rice cookers. It requires mastering safety regulations, global logistics and production at scale, all while competing against legacy automakers with long histories and large model lineups. Any international expansion will also require navigating complex geopolitical landscapes. As one of the first tech giants to actually manufacture a car, Xiaomi is in uncharted territory. Apple's failings Apple's car project, internally dubbed Project Titan , failed in large part because it wasn't just an EV — it was at one point an attempt to leapfrog the auto industry with a fully autonomous, Level 5 self-driving machine. Its goals were lofty and the direction constantly shifting, the result being over a decade of effort with nothing to show. Lei, 55, was comparatively stingy with time and resources and staked his personal reputation on the endeavour, claiming that making cars would be his 'last entrepreneurial project.' Xiaomi's public narrative is that Lei and his team learned by visiting multiple Chinese automakers, including Zhejiang Geely Holding Group Co. and Great Wall Motor Co., and talked to more than 200 industry experts in some 80 meetings. The reality is also that he used Xiaomi's reputation as an innovative consumer behemoth to get close to China's large carmakers and pick off their top talent. Geely and its billionaire founder Li Shufu welcomed Lei to the automaker's research institute in Ningbo in the months leading up to Xiaomi's announcement that it would enter the car business to discuss topics, including potential collaboration. It's Geely lore that Lei added the WeChat contacts of many staff at the institute, including then-director Hu Zhengnan. Hu later joined Shunwei Capital Partners, the investment firm co-founded by Lei. Recruitment tactics Xiaomi headhunters also courted Geely staff intensely, according to people familiar with the matter. While it's common for talent to move between companies in the same industry, it was unusual to see this level of aggressiveness around recruitment, the people said, asking not to be identified discussing information that's private. Geely didn't respond to a request for comment. Hu, known for his love of the German luxury marque Porsche, was one of the team members credited as being instrumental to developing Xiaomi's EV business, Lei said at the SU7 launch in 2024. Lei added that Hu left his previous employer after his contract ended. Other executives who joined Xiaomi came from companies including BAIC Motor Corp., BMW AG, SAIC-GM-Wuling Automobile Co. — the General Motors Co. joint venture with SAIC Motor Corp. and Wuling Motors Holdings Ltd. — and auto supplier Magna Steyr LLC. Besides assembling top Chinese automaking talent, Lei made a prescient bet on investing in a self-controlled supply chain — insulating Xiaomi's operation from manufacturing vagaries. This came from painful lessons learned in Xiaomi's early smartphone-producing days, when external suppliers would cut off components unpredictably. In 2016, some members of Xiaomi's supply chain team displeased Samsung Electronics Co. representatives and the South Korean firm threatened to halt supply of its industry-leading AMOLED screens. To mend the fractured relationship, Lei flew to Shenzhen to meet with Samsung's China head at the time. The pair drank five bottles of red wine during their dinner meeting, according to a Xiaomi company biography, and Lei also made multiple trips to Samsung's headquarters in South Korea to apologise and negotiate the resumption of supply. Representatives from Samsung declined to comment. After Xiaomi went into the carmaking business, it invested into almost all parts of the EV supply chain, from batteries and chips to air suspension and sensors. It pumped more than $1.6 billion via Shunwei or other Xiaomi-led funds into over 100 supply chain companies between 2021 and 2024, according to data compiled by Chinese analytics firm Zhangtongshe and Bloomberg. The components from some of the companies that Xiaomi invested in have ended up in its cars, such as lidars from Hesai Technology Co. and onboard chargers and voltage converters from Zhejiang EV-Tech Co. With the 10 billion yuan ($1.4 billion) it committed to the first phase of its EV venture, Xiaomi also built its own factory, rather than going down the contract manufacturing route that some Chinese makers, including Nio Inc. and Xpeng Inc., did when they started out. 'Among tech companies that now build electric vehicles, those who previously had hardware products seem to be more successful than those who only had software products or information services,' said Paul Gong, UBS Group AG's head of China autos research. Copycat allegations Despite its early success, there are many who argue Xiaomi's one-hit car is copied from elsewhere — and that a sole successful vehicle does not a successful auto producer make. Lei's aggressive approach has also raised hackles in China's car industry. Yu Jingmin, vice president of SAIC's passenger car division, reportedly described Xiaomi's approach as 'shameless' in a critique of the SU7 resembling Porsche. The SU7 has been colloquially dubbed 'Porsche Mi' by netizens. SAIC didn't respond to questions about Yu's remarks. Xiaomi's design team, led by former BMW designer Li Tianyuan, has defended the SU7's aesthetics, emphasising that the choices were driven by aerodynamic efficiency and performance benchmarks. In late March, there was another setback after a fatal accident involving the SU7. The car had its advanced driver assistance technology turned on before the crash, which afterwards led to authorities reining in the promotion and deployment of the technology. The usually vocal Lei kept a low profile on social media for more than a month post the March accident. He returned to more active engagement in May with a missive that said this period of time was the most difficult in his career. Fortunately for Xiaomi, its consumer base is sticky. Known as 'Mi Fans,' the loyal customers have played a pivotal role in the company's rise. Xiaomi cultivated this fandom early on by prioritising user feedback, and the grassroots allegiance has helped it build strong brand equity, especially in China. The SU7 has remained a top-selling model even after the accident in March. Indeed, dealers have reported that nearly 50% of customers plump for the SU7 without comparing it to other brands. 'A significant number of older consumers are buying the SU7 for their children, indicating that the model has built trust among more conservative buyers thanks to its safety and quality,' said Rosalie Chen, a senior analyst from investment research firm Third Bridge. Small scale Xiaomi has set a delivery target of 350,000 units in 2025, up from its previous goal of 300,000, buoyed by demand for the newly launched YU7 and a ramp-up in production. The starting prices for the SU7 sedan, at 215,900 yuan ($30,100), and its SUV, at 253,500 yuan, make them competitive alternatives to models like Tesla's Model 3 and Model Y. The EVs are also showing financial promise. Xiaomi posted record revenue for the first quarter this year, driven by car and smartphone sales. Its EV division is expected to turn profitable in the second half of 2025, Lei said in an investor meeting in June. But even if the popularity of Xiaomi's EVs can spring beyond the company's devoted base, production is still on a much more boutique scale. China's top car brand, BYD Co., sold around 4.3 million EVs and hybrids last year, many overseas, while Tesla moved about 1.78 million vehicles globally. Toyota Motor Corp., the world's No. 1 automaker, sold some 10.8 million vehicles and boasts a lineup of approximately 70 different models. Lei doesn't seem to be prioritising the mass market of below $20,000 yet, which drives significant volume and is where BYD dominates, Automotive Foresight's Zhang said. Without a lineup in that segment, Xiaomi cars will remain niche purchases for middle to higher-income consumers and Xiaomi may face the same risks as Tesla, which is seeing its sales slump exacerbated by a narrow consumer base and limited models. Nonetheless, Lei seems buoyed by Xiaomi's early wins and is now looking at global expansion. Xiaomi will consider selling cars outside China from 2027, he said last week. Success or otherwise, the European Union, the US and Turkey have all slapped tariffs on Chinese EVs, but Xiaomi wants to set up a R&D centre in Munich and may test sales starting in European markets such as Germany, Spain and France when the time is right, Chinese media 36Kr reported in April. 'Xiaomi is a latecomer to the auto industry,' Lei admitted on Weibo in June. But, he said, in a market driven by technology and innovation and the rising global influence of China's EV culture, 'there are always opportunities for latecomers.'
Axios
08-04-2025
- General
- Axios
Final city water report: Richmond's water crisis worsened by miscommunication
Richmond released its final third-party after-action report about what happened during the city's water crisis. The big picture: The 94-page report, which came out last week, builds on the 15-page preliminary one the city shared in February. Both are from HNTB Corp., the Kansas City-based infrastructure firm the city hired, which visited the Richmond plant over three days in late January. State of play: HNTB makes clear in its final report that the lack of emergency protocols inside the plant, plus poor planning, training and communication, turned an equipment failure issue into a full-blown crisis. Zoom in: "There were several communication deficiencies," both internal and external, throughout the day on Jan. 6, according to the report, including: A failure to "adequately convey" to the counties the severity of the issues at the plant until sometime between 1 and 2pm, 8 hours after the initial outage. There was no clear communications structure for staff responding to the issues at the plant, which caused workers to only communicate in small groups. The poor communication led to plant staffers incorrectly reporting to the city that a backup generator had been started and was operational. It wasn't, and the HNTB says they couldn't trace the origin of the claim, only noting that it was widely shared. "A misrepresentation like this likely caused a false sense of security by City and regional leaders early on in the crisis," per the report. Other notable findings: There was "little proactive action" taken by staff at the plant to prepare for the storm or a possible power outage, despite the state and city being under a state of emergency. The lack of storm planning included a failure to test backup equipment that could be needed in the event of a power outage. The plant's internal organizational structure at the time added to staff's confusion because it was unclear which department should've been responding to what became multiple failures inside the plant.
