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Korea Herald
7 days ago
- Politics
- Korea Herald
[Editorial] Mixed messages
Seoul's fractured view on Pyongyang could sow strategic confusion amid rising tensions The notion of a country's main enemy — or 'jujeok' in Korean — is not just symbolic rhetoric. It is the fulcrum around which national defense policy, military readiness and diplomatic posture revolve. Yet the Lee Jae Myung administration's incoming ministers are offering strikingly divergent views on North Korea's status. In a region where miscalculation can lead to catastrophe, the lack of clarity is not a luxury South Korea can afford. During confirmation hearings this week, Unification Minister nominee Chung Dong-young described North Korea not as an enemy but as a 'threat.' Labor Minister nominee Kim Young-hoon echoed that assessment, distancing himself from the 'main enemy' label. By contrast, Defense Minister nominee Ahn Gyu-back offered a resolute view, stating that the North Korean regime and military are indeed South Korea's principal adversary. This inconsistency is not merely semantic. The designation of North Korea as South Korea's main enemy first appeared in the 1995 Defense White Paper under President Kim Young-sam, following the North's threats to turn Seoul into a 'sea of fire.' While subsequent governments shifted between hard-line and conciliatory stances, most notably under Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in, the Yoon Suk Yeol administration reinstated the enemy designation in 2022. Now, Seoul risks retreating from this stance just as Pyongyang has explicitly emphasized its own hostility. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un last year formally declared the South a 'primary foe,' rejecting unification and dismantling the inter-Korean reconciliation framework. Since then, the North has accelerated weapons development, severed communication channels and deepened military ties with Russia. To overlook these developments or downplay their implications is to misread the strategic environment. Chung's statements suggest the new administration may be preparing a significant policy pivot. He proposed suspending joint military drills with the United States as a confidence-building measure, citing the 2018 model. He also raised the idea of renaming the Ministry of Unification to the Ministry of the Korean Peninsula, a move he claims would signal flexibility. Yet such proposals, absent careful coordination or broad consensus, could project confusion rather than pragmatism. Strategic ambiguity has long characterized inter-Korean policy, but frequent shifts weaken credibility. South Korea's defense posture cannot oscillate with each political transition. Doing so emboldens adversaries and complicates coordination with allies, particularly Washington. North Korea has repeatedly exploited policy vacillations, alternating between provocation and dialogue to gain time for weapons advancement. Calls to revive the 2018 military accord — annulled by the North and later suspended by Seoul — underscore this risk. South Korea honored the agreement despite repeated violations by the North, including missile launches, GPS jamming and trash balloon campaigns. Restoring such an accord without preconditions could repeat a pattern of unreciprocated concessions. What is missing from the current debate is a sober reflection on the record of past engagement. Chung attributes the sinking of the ROKS Cheonan in 2010 and Yeonpyeongdo shelling to the Lee Myung-bak administration's hawkish posture, yet similar provocations occurred under liberal governments. North Korea has pursued escalation to secure leverage regardless of the South's tone. This is not to dismiss the value of diplomacy. Efforts to reduce tensions must continue, but only with a clear-eyed understanding of the other side's intentions. Engagement should be mutual, measured and anchored in deterrence. One-sided overtures, whether symbolic or substantive, can be as risky as belligerence. If the Lee government intends to revise its stance toward Pyongyang, it must do so with unity, transparency and strategic rationale. Fragmented messaging — especially on foundational concepts like the main enemy — undermines trust both at home and among allies. In a geopolitical landscape marked by intensifying tensions, Seoul cannot afford ambiguity in its security doctrine.
Yomiuri Shimbun
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Yomiuri Shimbun
Strengthening Defense Capabilities: China's Provocative Actions Cannot be Ignored
Chinese military aircraft have repeatedly engaged in dangerous flights in the skies surrounding Japan. This could lead to an accidental collision. It cannot be ignored. Japan also needs to strengthen its vigilance against Russia and North Korea, which are deepening their military cooperation. Strengthening defense capabilities in light of the worsening security environment is an urgent issue. The ruling and opposition parties must discuss concrete measures for that purpose. On July 9 and 10, a fighter-bomber of the Chinese military came as close as 70 meters to an Air Self-Defense Force intelligence-gathering aircraft over the high seas in the East China Sea. The ASDF aircraft was engaged in surveillance operations. China's National Defense Ministry issued a statement claiming that the approach was due to the ASDF aircraft having intruded several times into the air defense identification zone set by China. It asserted that the response by the Chinese aircraft was completely legitimate and reasonable. The site was over the high seas, where free flights are allowed under international law. There was no flaw in the operations of the ASDF aircraft. It is inexcusable to make assertions as if the ASDF aircraft was in violation of international law. Last month, too, a Chinese military aircraft flew abnormally close to a Maritime Self-Defense Force patrol plane over the western Pacific Ocean. Japan has expressed 'grave concerns' to China over each of these incidents, but the response of the Chinese side lacks sincerity. It is necessary for Japan to strongly protest and demand an apology, not just express concerns. China has engaged in a series of provocative activities around the Senkaku Islands in Okinawa Prefecture. Its recent military operations likely indicate that Beijing is attempting to make its effective control of the region an established fact. This perception is reflected in the 2025 edition of Japan's Defense White Paper, released on July 15. The white paper indicates a strong sense of caution for the first time, as it analyzes that the China Coast Guard and the Chinese military have been conducting joint drills in a drive to improve their operational capabilities in gray-zone situations, where the boundary between peacetime and contingency is unclear. If a remote island is occupied by armed fishermen from another country, the Japanese government will be forced to make a difficult decision as to whether the Japan Coast Guard will respond to the situation or the Self-Defense Forces will be mobilized. The JCG and the SDF should maintain close communication to deal with all possible situations. Despite the various issues to be addressed, it is hard to say that strengthening defense capabilities has become a point of contention during the ongoing House of Councillors election campaign. The United States has been demanding that its allies and other countries significantly increase their defense spending. Japan may also be pressed to enhance its defense budget in the future. Japan must strengthen its defense capabilities at its own discretion and work to deepen the alliance. It is important for the ruling and opposition parties to discuss what a defense burden commensurate with national power should be like. (From The Yomiuri Shimbun, July 16, 2025)
Japan Forward
09-07-2025
- Politics
- Japan Forward
Japan's 2025 Defense White Paper – Hoping for a Surprise
Japan's 2025 Defense White Paper will soon be formally approved by Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba's Cabinet. It's not quite fair to say that if you've seen one White Paper, you've seen them all. But one can pretty much anticipate what's coming – while hoping for something noteworthy. The White Papers accurately describe the military/political threats to Japan. And for some years now, the White Papers have explicitly declared the People's Republic of China as the main problem. Also, in recent years, the White Papers have expressed concern over Chinese and Russian military cooperation and activities ー in the region and around Japan. Taiwan will get a mention as a potential flash point, threatening Japan's and regional security. But there will be no specific mention of Japanese support to improve Taiwan's defenses. That's left up to the United States ー although Japan's aid to the Philippines (that will be mentioned in the White Paper) is intended to contribute to Taiwan's defense. When it comes to Taiwan, Tokyo is leaving the hard work up to the Americans. It would be nice if the White Paper says otherwise. Although the White Papers competently lay out the threats facing Japan, they come up short on the 'what to do about it' front. It's not that they don't try. 2024 Defense White Paper However, typically, White Papers call for buying some of this and some of that ー as if buying more and specific hardware will solve Japan's defense problems and frighten off enemies. There will be some more ships and more aircraft on order. Also, in recent years, its long-range missiles have been the big thing. This is the so-called 'counterstrike capability' that is the panacea for Japan's defense. The White Paper needs to ー but probably won't ー describe a comprehensive, coherent plan for Japan's defense. That would include proper and adequate hardware, more personnel, better force organization, command and control, funding, war stocks, reserve force, logistics, casualty handling, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), etc. Those are all things that make the Japan Self Defense Force (JSDF) more, rather than less, of the sum of its parts. And watch to see if the White Paper discusses how JSDF and United States forces will operate together more effectively — including combat operations? It probably won't, other than platitudes about Japan's new Joint Operations Command representing a sea change of some sort. There will also be a discussion of improving the terms of service and living conditions of JSDF personnel, as there always is. It's well-intentioned, but it won't be drastic enough to solve JSDF's severe manpower problems. What would? A huge pay increase. Much better housing. Decent pensions and something akin to the American GI Bill that offers lifetime benefits for veterans. And a little respect for JSDF personnel from Japan's ruling class would be nice. Defense Minister Gen Nakatani (right) and US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. March 29, Ogasawara Village, Tokyo. The White Paper will also describe Japan's efforts to strengthen relationships with other friendly nations through formal agreements, exercises, and exchanges. These are positive developments ー especially given Japan's longtime refusal to do much on this score until recent years. But it's not enough to really bolster Japan's defense. The US military tie-up is still indispensable. Japan's missile defense and space operations will get a mention ー and this is a true bright spot. Japan has quietly developed a real capability here. All in all, the successive White Papers are clearly written and accurately describe threats facing Japan. But the prescriptions are, overall, piecemeal and don't usefully address Japan's fundamental defense shortcomings. Do everything in the White Paper, and Japan and the JSDF still wouldn't be able to fight a war ー or at least not very well. Since the Ministry of Defense has no real experience in this, it would do well to consult with people who do.. Asking USINDOPACOM to send over a few good war planners would be a start. And then White Papers might be more interesting. Author: Grant Newsham Grant Newsham is a retired US Marine officer and former US diplomat. He is the author of the book When China Attacks: A Warning To America . Find his articles on JAPAN Forward .
AllAfrica
12-06-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
Goodbye to all that? Trump's America and Australia's choice
Even the most ardent supporters of the alliance with the United States – the notional foundation of Australian security for more than 70 years – must be having some misgivings about the second coming of Donald Trump. If they're not, they ought to read the two essays under review here. They offer a host of compelling reasons why a reassessment of the costs, benefits and possible future trajectory of the alliance is long overdue. And yet, notwithstanding the cogency and timeliness of the critiques offered by Emma Shortis and Hugh White, it seems unlikely either of these will be read, much less acted upon, by those Shortis describes as the 'mostly men in suits or uniforms, with no democratic accountability' who make security policy on our behalf. White, emeritus professor of strategic studies at the ANU, was the principal author of Australia's Defense White Paper in 2000. Despite having been a prominent member of the defence establishment, it is unlikely even his observations will prove any more palatable to its current incumbents. Shortis, an historian and writer, is director of the Australia Institute's International & Security Affairs Program. She is also a young woman, and while this shouldn't matter, I suspect it does; at least to the 'mostly men' who guard the nation from a host of improbable threats while ignoring what is arguably the most likely and important one: climate change. To Shortis's great credit, she begins her essay with a discussion of a 'world on fire' in which the Trump administration is 'locking in a bleaker future.' This matters for both generational and geographical reasons. While we live in what is arguably the safest place on the planet, the country has the rare distinction of regularly experiencing once-in-100-year floods and droughts, sometimes simultaneously. If that's not a threat to security, especially of the young, it's hard to know what is. It's not one the current government or any other in this country has ever taken seriously enough. White gives a rather perfunctory acknowledgement of this reality, reflecting an essentially traditional understanding of security – even if some of his conclusions will induce conniptions in Canberra. While suggesting Trump is 'the most prodigious liar in history', White thinks he's done Australia a favor by 'puncturing the complacency' surrounding the alliance and our unwillingness to contemplate a world in which the US is not the reliable bedrock of security. Shortis doubts the US ever was a trustworthy or reliable ally. This helps explain what she calls the 'strategy of pre-emptive capitulation', in which Australian policymakers fall over themselves to appear useful and supportive to their 'great and powerful friend.' Former prime minister John Howard's activation of the ANZUS alliance in the wake of September 11 and the disastrous decision to take part in the war in Iraq is perhaps the most egregious example of this unfortunate national proclivity. White reminds us that all alliances are always transactional. Despite talk of a 'history of mateship', it's vital to recognize if the great power doesn't think something is in its 'national interest', it won't be doing favors for allies. No matter how ingratiating and obliging they may be. While such observations may be unwelcome in Canberra, hopefully they won't come as a revelation. Although White is one of Australia's most astute critics of the conventional wisdom, sceptics and aspiring peace-builders will find little to cheer in his analysis. A good deal of his essay is taken up with the strategic situations in Europe and Asia. The discussion offers a penetrating, but rather despair-inducing insight into humanity's collective predicament: only by credibly threatening our notional foes with nuclear Armageddon can we hope to keep the peace. The problem we now face, White argues, is the likes of Russia and China are beginning to doubt America's part in the 'balance of resolve.' During the Cold War, both sides were confident about the other side's ability and willingness to blow them to pieces. Now mutual destruction is less assured. While some of us might think this was a cause for cautious celebration, White suggests it fatally undermines the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons. Even before Trump reappeared, this was a source of angst and/or uncertainty for strategists around the world. The principle underpinning international order in a world in which nuclear weapons exist, according to White, is that a nuclear power can be stopped, but only by an unambiguous demonstration of willingness to fight a nuclear war to stop it. Trump represents a suitably existential threat to this cheery doctrine. Europeans have belatedly recognised the US is no longer reliable and they are responsible for their own security. Likewise, an ageing Xi Jinping may want to assure his position in China's pantheon of great leaders by forcibly returning Taiwan to the motherland. It would be an enormous gamble, of course, but given Trump's admiration for Xi, and Trump's apparent willingness to see the world carved up into 19th-century-style spheres of influence, it can't be ruled out. If there's one thing both authors agree on it's that the AUKUS nuclear submarine project, the notional centrepiece of Australia's future security is vastly overrated. It's either a 'disaster' (Shortis) or 'insignificant' (White). Likewise, they agree the US is only going to help Australia if it's judged to be in America's interest to do so. Recognizing quite what an ill-conceived, ludicrously expensive, uncertain project AUKUS is, and just how unreliable a partner the US has become under Trump, might be a useful step on the path to national strategic self-awareness. Shortis thinks some members of the Trump administration appear to be 'aligned with Russia.' Tying ourselves closer to the US, she writes, 'does not make us safer.' A major rethink of, and debate about, Australia's security policy is clearly necessary. Policymakers also ought to take seriously White's arguments about the need to reconfigure the armed forces to defend Australia independently in an increasingly uncertain international environment. Perhaps the hardest idea for Australia's unimaginative strategic elites to grasp is that, as White points out, Asia's future, and Australia's, will not be decided in Washington. It will be decided in Asia. Former prime minister Paul Keating's famous remark, 'Australia needs to seek its security in Asia rather than from Asia' remains largely unheeded. Despite plausible suggestions about developing closer strategic ties with Indonesia and even cooperating with China to offer leadership on climate change, some ideas remain sacrosanct and alternatives remain literally inconceivable. Even if we take a narrow view of the nature of security – one revolving around possible military threats to Australia – US Defense Secretary Pete Hesgeth's demands for greater defence spending on our part confirm White's point that, it is classic Trump to expect more and more from allies while he offers them less and less. This is the dead end into which our 'America First' defence policy has led us. Quite so. Australia's strategic elites have locked us into the foreign and strategic policies of an increasingly polarised, authoritarian and unpredictable regime. But as Shortis observes, we cannot be confident about our ability, or the world's for that matter, to 'just ride Trump out', and hope everything will return to normal afterwards. It is entirely possible the international situation may get worse – possibly much worse – with or without Trump in the White House. The reality is American democracy may not survive another four years of Trump and the coterie of startlingly ill-qualified, inhumane, self-promoting chancers who make up much of his administration. Both authors think attempts to 'smother' a serious national debate about defence policy in Australia (White), and the security establishment's obsession with secrecy (Shortis), are the exact opposite of what this country needs at this historical juncture. They're right. Several senior members of Australia's security community have assured me if I only knew what they did I'd feel very differently about our strategic circumstances. Really? One thing I do know is that we're spending far too much time – and money! – acting on what Shortis describes as a 'shallow and ungenerous understanding of what 'security' really is.' We really could stop the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza if Xi had a word with Putin and the US stopped supplying Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the weapons and money to slaughter women and children. But climate change would still be coming to get us. A bushfire in the Grampians National Park, Victoria. Photo: State Control Centre / AAP via The Conversation More importantly, global warming will get worse before it gets better, even in the unlikely event that the 'international community' (whoever that may be) agrees on meaningful collective action tomorrow. You may not agree with all of the ideas and suggestions contained in these essays, but in their different ways they are vital contributions to a much-needed national debate. An informed and engaged public is a potential asset, not something to be frightened of, after all. Who knows, it may be possible to come up with some genuinely progressive, innovative ideas about what sort of domestic and international policies might be appropriate for an astonishingly fortunate country with no enemies. Perhaps Australia could even offer an example of the sort of creative, independent middle power diplomacy a troubled world might appreciate and even emulate. But given our political and strategic elites can't free themselves from the past, it is difficult to see them dealing imaginatively with the threat of what Shortis calls the looming 'environmental catastrophe.' No wonder so many of the young despair and have little confidence in democracy's ability to fix what ails us. Mark Beeson is adjunct professor, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Korea Herald
26-03-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
N. Korea may use nuclear test to gain edge in talks: US intel chief
North Korea is likely ready to conduct another nuclear test to gain the upper hand in potential nuclear negotiations, US Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard warned Tuesday, citing Pyongyang's expanding strategic weapons program and growing partnership with Russia as additional factors strengthening its leverage over Washington. 'North Korea is probably prepared to conduct another nuclear test on short notice and continues to flight test ICBMs to demonstrate their increasing capabilities as leverage in future negotiations,' Gabbard said in a written statement submitted for a congressional hearing held Tuesday by the US Senate Intelligence Committee. Gabbard said North Korean leader Kim Jong-un is building both strategic and conventional military capabilities to threaten US forces, regional allies and even the US homeland — an attempt to "bolster North Korea's leverage and stature, defend the regime and achieve at least tacit recognition as a nuclear weapons power." Gabbard further pointed to Kim's deepening ties with Russia as a means of supporting those ambitions during her congressional testimony, delivered on the occasion of the annual threat assessment report released by the US intelligence community. 'Kim's recently cemented strategic partnership with Russia supports these goals by providing him greater financial, military and diplomatic support; reduced reliance on China and the need to defer to Beijing's terms for support; and providing North Korean forces and weapons systems authentic warfighting experience,' Gabbard said. "Kim views his strategic weapons advances since 2019, deepening ties with Russia, and North Korea's economic durability as strengthening his negotiating position against Washington's demands for denuclearization and lessening his need for sanctions relief." If carried out, the test would mark North Korea's seventh nuclear experiment. Six previous tests were conducted between 2006 and 2017. In response, South Korea's Defense Ministry on Wednesday reaffirmed its readiness to counter such threats in coordination with the United States. 'North Korea has completed preparations for an additional nuclear test and is believed to be capable of conducting one at any time, depending on Kim Jong-un's decision,' the ministry said in a statement. It added that South Korean and US intelligence authorities are 'closely tracking relevant developments through close coordination in response to changes in North Korea's nuclear-related activities and capabilities,' emphasizing the allies' joint defense posture. According to South Korea's 2022 Defense White Paper — the most recently released by Seoul — North Korea is believed to have secured approximately 70 kilograms of plutonium, enough to produce nine to 18 nuclear warheads, in addition to a considerable stockpile of highly enriched uranium. As part of its readiness posture, Seoul and Washington conducted the 11-day Freedom Shield exercise in March, a large-scale annual military drill that incorporated scenarios reflecting threats based on analysis of North Korea's evolving military strategy, its cooperation with Russia and emerging tactics in modern warfare, including nuclear threats and drone attacks.
