Latest news with #EGAT
Bangkok Post
17-07-2025
- General
- Bangkok Post
Inside EGAT's Dam Tunnel Safety Mission
A dam is a colossal structure built to store water for multiple purposes. But during natural disasters—whether powerful storms or earthquakes—many people may wonder: could the dam break, crack, or leak? How is such a massive structure monitored and maintained? EGAT's Dam Maintenance Mission Dams play a crucial role in national water management. They help store and slow water flow, mitigating flood risks, reducing seawater intrusion, and supporting agricultural irrigation. In addition, they generate electricity as a byproduct of controlled water release. Given their importance, dam safety must be regularly and rigorously inspected. The Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT) is responsible for overseeing 14 dams nationwide. Specialised personnel known as Dam Safety Officers monitor, measure, inspect, and maintain these dams on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis to ensure safety for nearby communities and the general public. From Crest Walks to Tunnel Inspections The inspection process begins with visual checks. At major dams such as Srinagarind and Vajiralongkorn, Dam Safety Officers first walk along the dam crest—an embankment more than 140 metres high (equivalent to a 40-storey building)—to look for signs of settlement or abnormalities in the rockfill slope. They also use the Dam Safety Remote Monitoring System (DS-RMS) to track dam behaviour, collecting data that is visualised in graphs showing safety status under normal, earthquake, and flood conditions. The safety level is categorised into three statuses: normal, warning, and watch. From the crest, officers descend stairways equal in height to a 15-storey building to reach the dam tunnel, a confined space nearly 600 metres wide at the foundation. There, they inspect the concrete structure and utilise various instruments to ensure all readings remain within safety standards. Inspections Beneath the Surface In addition to land-based inspections, EGAT also performs underwater checks. Its team of trained divers carries out inspections at depths of up to 60 metres, in dark waters with high pressure. All divers undergo annual training and assessments to ensure they are physically and mentally prepared for demanding underwater tasks such as welding or equipment installation. Currently, EGAT has nearly 50 certified divers. In areas that are inaccessible to divers, Remotely Operated Vehicles (ROVs) are deployed to survey, collect data, and support future maintenance planning. Ensuring the safety and stability of dams is no simple task. It requires highly trained specialists with dedication, resilience, and technical expertise. These individuals may seem like small components in a vast system, but their role is essential to preserving the strength of Thailand's dams—ensuring that they continue to provide reliable energy, protect communities, and sustain lives for generations to come.
Int'l Business Times
20-06-2025
- Business
- Int'l Business Times
Thailand's Gas Gamble: How Policy Missteps and Private Gains Drive Up Power Bills
A bolt of lightning strikes the outskirts of Bangkok as the city skyline is pictured from the King Power Mahanakhon skyscraper in Bangkok on October 22, a nation where more than two-thirds of electricity is generated by gas-fired plants, Thailand's deepening reliance on expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports is not just an energy strategy—it's a growing burden on its people. As global LNG prices spike and domestic gas output dwindles, questions are mounting over whether energy policy mismanagement and elite profiteering have come at the expense of the average Thai household. At the center of this complex web lies Gulf Energy Development Public Company Ltd., a powerful conglomerate helmed by Thailand's richest man, Sarath Ratanavadi. Together with the state-owned PTT Group, Gulf has secured long-term rights to import, store, and distribute LNG under lucrative government contracts. And while energy prices for consumers rise, so too do the profits of these well-connected corporate giants. The Cost of Policy Paralysis The roots of the crisis trace back to delays and dysfunction in the management of Thailand's domestic gas fields. The Erawan and Bongkot concessions in the Gulf of Thailand—once key pillars of the country's energy independence—saw production plummet following administrative upheavals. Chevron, which had operated Erawan since 1981, was ousted in 2021 in favor of a state-backed bidder, PTTEP. The handover was anything but smooth. By 2022, output from Erawan had dropped by over 50%. Despite promises from successive energy ministers to fast-track exploration and development, a combination of bureaucratic gridlock and deliberate policy choices has led Thailand to import nearly a third of its gas as LNG, compared to under 5% in 2011. These LNG imports are often priced at two to seven times more than domestically produced gas. In 2022, LNG hit a jaw-dropping $38.66 per million BTU, while Thai-sourced gas was only $5.51. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) reports that LNG imports surged 34% in 2023 alone. The financial toll on Thailand's state utility, EGAT, has been staggering—losses of 150 billion baht ($4.3 billion) between late 2021 and the end of 2022. A Tale of Two Winners: Gulf and PTT Gulf Development, once a challenger to PTT's monopoly, now appears to be its most strategic partner. The two firms jointly operate the Gulf MTP LNG Terminal, one of the country's main LNG import facilities. The terminal's capacity is set to double from 5 to 10.8 million tons annually. Gulf was granted its import license in 2020, becoming only the second private player after EGAT. Since then, the firm has expanded its influence across the LNG supply chain—from procurement to regasification to pipeline distribution. Critics argue that the system has been gamed to benefit a handful of actors. Two senior officials within the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), which oversees procurement policy, previously held advisory or executive roles at Gulf and PTT. The appearance of conflict of interest has eroded public trust in regulatory oversight. "This is a classic case of regulatory capture," said an IEEFA analyst who requested anonymity. "You have regulators with corporate ties making decisions that steer the country toward imported gas, which just happens to benefit their former—or future— employers." The Public Pays the Price The fallout is increasingly visible in Thai households and businesses. Electricity prices have remained elevated despite a fall in global LNG prices in 2024. EGAT, which purchases over 85% of Gulf's power output, absorbs the higher input costs, eventually passing them down to consumers. Small businesses, already recovering from the pandemic, have seen utility bills cut into margins. Rural provinces have protested rolling blackouts and unaffordable tariffs. Meanwhile, Gulf's profits have soared, bolstered by long-term contracts and a guaranteed buyer in EGAT. The government's response has been muted. While officials acknowledge rising costs, they continue to cite energy "security" and global volatility as justification for their reliance on LNG. Yet, a growing chorus of energy economists and civil society groups argue that the crisis is self-inflicted. "Thailand had the resources," said Dr. Nakornthap, a respected energy expert. "What it lacked was the political will and administrative competence to develop them." What Lies Ahead With elections on the horizon and household discontent simmering, energy policy is emerging as a political flashpoint. Some opposition leaders are calling for a full audit of LNG contracts and regulatory appointments. Others propose reforms that would prioritize domestic exploration and overhaul procurement transparency. As the Thai people pay for these missteps at the meter, the broader lesson may echo beyond Bangkok: in energy policy, inaction and insider influence can be just as costly as imported gas © Copyright IBTimes 2024. All rights reserved.
International Business Times
20-06-2025
- Business
- International Business Times
Thailand's Gas Gamble: How Policy Missteps and Private Gains Drive Up Power Bills
In a nation where more than two-thirds of electricity is generated by gas-fired plants, Thailand's deepening reliance on expensive liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports is not just an energy strategy—it's a growing burden on its people. As global LNG prices spike and domestic gas output dwindles, questions are mounting over whether energy policy mismanagement and elite profiteering have come at the expense of the average Thai household. At the center of this complex web lies Gulf Energy Development Public Company Ltd., a powerful conglomerate helmed by Thailand's richest man, Sarath Ratanavadi. Together with the state-owned PTT Group, Gulf has secured long-term rights to import, store, and distribute LNG under lucrative government contracts. And while energy prices for consumers rise, so too do the profits of these well-connected corporate giants. The Cost of Policy Paralysis The roots of the crisis trace back to delays and dysfunction in the management of Thailand's domestic gas fields. The Erawan and Bongkot concessions in the Gulf of Thailand—once key pillars of the country's energy independence—saw production plummet following administrative upheavals. Chevron, which had operated Erawan since 1981, was ousted in 2021 in favor of a state-backed bidder, PTTEP. The handover was anything but smooth. By 2022, output from Erawan had dropped by over 50%. Despite promises from successive energy ministers to fast-track exploration and development, a combination of bureaucratic gridlock and deliberate policy choices has led Thailand to import nearly a third of its gas as LNG, compared to under 5% in 2011. These LNG imports are often priced at two to seven times more than domestically produced gas. In 2022, LNG hit a jaw-dropping $38.66 per million BTU, while Thai-sourced gas was only $5.51. The Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis (IEEFA) reports that LNG imports surged 34% in 2023 alone. The financial toll on Thailand's state utility, EGAT, has been staggering—losses of 150 billion baht ($4.3 billion) between late 2021 and the end of 2022. A Tale of Two Winners: Gulf and PTT Gulf Development, once a challenger to PTT's monopoly, now appears to be its most strategic partner. The two firms jointly operate the Gulf MTP LNG Terminal, one of the country's main LNG import facilities. The terminal's capacity is set to double from 5 to 10.8 million tons annually. Gulf was granted its import license in 2020, becoming only the second private player after EGAT. Since then, the firm has expanded its influence across the LNG supply chain—from procurement to regasification to pipeline distribution. Critics argue that the system has been gamed to benefit a handful of actors. Two senior officials within the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC), which oversees procurement policy, previously held advisory or executive roles at Gulf and PTT. The appearance of conflict of interest has eroded public trust in regulatory oversight. "This is a classic case of regulatory capture," said an IEEFA analyst who requested anonymity. "You have regulators with corporate ties making decisions that steer the country toward imported gas, which just happens to benefit their former—or future—employers." The Public Pays the Price The fallout is increasingly visible in Thai households and businesses. Electricity prices have remained elevated despite a fall in global LNG prices in 2024. EGAT, which purchases over 85% of Gulf's power output, absorbs the higher input costs, eventually passing them down to consumers. Small businesses, already recovering from the pandemic, have seen utility bills cut into margins. Rural provinces have protested rolling blackouts and unaffordable tariffs. Meanwhile, Gulf's profits have soared, bolstered by long-term contracts and a guaranteed buyer in EGAT. The government's response has been muted. While officials acknowledge rising costs, they continue to cite energy "security" and global volatility as justification for their reliance on LNG. Yet, a growing chorus of energy economists and civil society groups argue that the crisis is self-inflicted. "Thailand had the resources," said Dr. Nakornthap, a respected energy expert. "What it lacked was the political will and administrative competence to develop them." What Lies Ahead With elections on the horizon and household discontent simmering, energy policy is emerging as a political flashpoint. Some opposition leaders are calling for a full audit of LNG contracts and regulatory appointments. Others propose reforms that would prioritize domestic exploration and overhaul procurement transparency. As the Thai people pay for these missteps at the meter, the broader lesson may echo beyond Bangkok: in energy policy, inaction and insider influence can be just as costly as imported gas.
