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Daily Mirror
26-06-2025
- Daily Mirror
Pilot's final words as jet with 146 holidaymakers crashed into Tenerife mountain
Dan-Air's Flight 1008 was carrying 146 passengers from Manchester to Tenerife, in the Canary Islands, when it crashed into a mountain after a tragic communication error Tenerife is a top holiday destination for Brits seeking sun, sea and sand. However, on 22nd March 1977, a horrific tragedy occurred when a passenger flight heading to Tenerife North airport, then known as Los Rodeos Airport, crashed, resulting in the death of all 583 people on board. Tenerife has two airports, but Tenerife North is notoriously challenging for pilots due to its altitude of 2,000ft. This, coupled with weather conditions such as cloud cover, can make visibility particularly difficult. Tragedy struck again just three years after the 1977 disaster. At 9.20am on 25th April 1980, Dan-Air's Flight 1008 left Manchester Airport bound for Tenerife. The plane was mainly filled with British holidaymakers eager to enjoy the sunny beaches and beautiful landscapes of the Canary Islands, reports the Daily Record. The flight crew included three seasoned pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Along with them were five flight attendants, making the total number of passengers and crew on board 146. For three hours, the flight went smoothly until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. Gale-force winds from an unexpected quarter meant flights were rerouted to Runway 12, causing a headache for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34. With another aircraft already homing in on the same strip, the risk of a mid-air collision loomed large. Lacking radar support, Camin had to fall back on old-school tactics, directing each flight along a set path. At 1:18 pm, he realised the Dan Air crew needed to circle to give the preceding plane space to touch down safely on Runway 12. But with no standard holding pattern for that runway, Camin had to think on his feet. He told Flight 1008 to maintain a left-hand circuit, looping until the coast was clear. Camin radioed First Officer Firth, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan's response was a terse "Roger", neglecting to echo Camin's directive—a move that might have prevented the looming tragedy. Yet when Camin said "turn to the left," he meant to signal continuous left turns, not a single leftward manoeuvre. This critical miscommunication led the crew to make a fatal error in judgement. Camin, who had originally cleared the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a seemingly minor but critical error. Captain Whelan, baffled by the unexpected directive to maintain a holding pattern absent from his charts, instinctively made a left-hand turn to a heading of 150 degrees, believing that this was what the controller intended. Flying over mountainous regions where the minimum safe altitude was pegged at 14,500 feet posed a grave risk for their safety. Barely a minute and six seconds prior to the tragedy, one pilot remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" and noted that it didn't align with the runway in any way. The cockpit voice recorder captured the crew's escalating concern, but no one challenged the instructions from control. Believing the aircraft to be safely over water following his impromptu holding pattern, Controller Camin approved a further descent of 1,000 feet, unbeknownst to him that the plane was dangerously nestled among the peaks. In the face of uncertain orders from Camin, Captain Whelan admitted to his co-pilot, "I don't like that." His co-pilot queried, moving deeper into confusion, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?". It was then that the automated ground proximity warning system blared within the cockpit, spurring them with the command to "pull up, pull up!". In a last-ditch effort to avoid disaster, Captain Whelan interrupted his current manoeuvre, sharply veering right instead of continuing leftward, under the impression that it would enable them to skirt the imminent threat. Upon the alarm sounding, the usual procedure would be to "pull up" to gain enough height to avoid any terrain. Co-pilot Firth, after examining the chart, realised the captain's choice was misguided and suggested they consider other options. Flight Engineer Carey's urgent words, "let's get out of here," were captured on the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Despite Carey's warning, Captain Whelan continued with the sharp right manoeuvre, leading to a drop of 300 feet. Spanish investigators concluded in their report that this very action sealed the fate of the aircraft, eliminating any chance of escaping the calamity. The final chilling words from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" were recorded before the CVR fell silent. Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its catastrophic fate as it collided with La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 metres) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantly, with wreckage strewn down the mountainside. The tail section was flung hundreds of metres further, finally coming to rest in a ravine where it broke apart. Small fires broke out amidst the scattered debris, and Tenerife North Airport was jolted by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years. Rescue teams arrived at the mountain within hours, but it was immediately apparent that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash. The scene was so horrific not a single intact human body could be found, and many victims couldn't be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's error, Spanish investigators placed all the blame on the Dan Air crew. However, British investigators argued the controller should have recognised earlier that the closeness of the two planes would cause a problem, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and avoid any confusion among the crew. They further contended the controller shouldn't have issued an untried and non-standard holding pattern, but they admitted the Dan Air crew didn't question the controller's instructions or ask for clarification. The British team also criticised Camin's decision to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. If the holding pattern had been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet. Receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain, who was unable to see due to dense fog and cloud, decided to turn right. However, this decision led to the plane crashing directly into the mountain. In this critical moment, the standard procedure for pilots would have been to climb to a higher altitude. A single missing letter in one word ultimately led to the chain of events culminating in the tragic crash. Crucially, the controller's use of "turn" instead of "turns" was pivotal in causing the tragic crash. Following the accident, the investigation brought to light the critical need for explicit and standardised communication across all aspects of flight. This included procedures for holding patterns. The incident demonstrated the importance of precise communication between pilots and air traffic controllers. To prevent misunderstandings, pilots needed to reiterate the instructions provided by air traffic controllers. Despite the catastrophe, the airline, Dan Air, was able to bounce back, continuing to operate until its eventual acquisition by British Airways in 1992. Sadly, although this incident claimed the most lives in the history of a British aircraft, the memory of the tragic loss of 146 lives on Dan Air Flight 1008 seems to have faded away over the past four and a half decades.
Daily Record
26-06-2025
- Daily Record
Pilot's horrifying final words before deadly crash on flight from UK to Tenerife
The chilling final words of those in the cockpit of a doomed flight demonstrate the panic that took place in the last moments before the British plane crashed into a Tenerife mountain — killing all on board Tenerife is one of the most popular holiday hot spots for Brits hoping for sun, sea and sand. However, on March 22, 1977, tragedy struck when a passenger flight heading towards Tenerife North airport, then Los Rodeos Airport, plummeted from the sky, killing all 583 people on board. The island of Tenerife has two airports but Tenerife North can be notoriously difficult for pilots to navigate. It sits at an altitude of 2,000ft, which can make it a notably difficult airport for pilots to navigate, especially when weather conditions include cloud cover, making visibility trickier than normal. Just three years after the 1977 disaster, tragedy struck for a second time. At 9.20am on 25th April 1980, Dan-Air's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport bound for Tenerife. The flight was primarily filled with British holidaymakers seeking the sunny beaches and stunning landscapes of the Canary Islands. The flight crew consisted of three experienced pilots - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and flight engineer Raymond Carey, 33. Alongside them were five flight attendants, bringing the total number of passengers and crew on board to 146. For three hours, the flight proceeded without incident until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds were blowing in from an unusual direction, meaning air traffic was being diverted to Runway 12 instead of the usual landing strip. However, this created a problem for air traffic controller Justo Camin, 34, as there was already another plane heading towards the same runway, putting the two aircraft at risk of a mid-air collision. Without the aid of radar, Camin was forced to rely on procedural methods to manage air traffic and he instructed each plane to follow a predetermined route. At 1:18 pm, Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew into a holding pattern to allow the plane ahead to land safely on Runway 12. However, there was no established holding pattern for this runway, so Camin had to improvise. He instructed Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern, making turns until the other flight was clear. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan replied with a simple "Roger", failing to repeat back Camin's instructions. If he had done so, the impending disaster could have been averted. However, when Camin instructed them to "turn to the left," he intended to say "turns to the left," indicating the direction the crew should take while navigating the holding pattern. But without the crucial 's', the crew interpreted this as "turn to the left." Camin, who had also cleared the flight for an altitude of 5,000 feet, made a minor yet critical mistake. Captain Whelan, perplexed by the sudden instruction to enter a holding pattern not displayed on any of his charts, made a single turn to the left, aligning with a heading of 150 degrees, convinced this was the controller's intention. They were now flying over mountainous terrain, where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. Just one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots remarked, "bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." The cockpit voice recording clearly showed the crew's growing unease, yet no one questioned the controller's instructions. Controller Camin, assuming the plane was over the sea in his improvised holding pattern, allowed the aircraft to descend another 1,000 feet, oblivious to the fact that it was actually in the midst of the mountains. Captain Whelan expressed his concerns about Camin's instruction to his co-pilot in the cockpit, saying, "I don't like that." His co-pilot responded, "they want us to keep going more round, don't they?" At this point, the automatic ground alarm sounded in the cockpit, warning them to "pull up, pull up!" In an desperate bid to evade the looming mountainous terrain, Captain Whelan abruptly aborted his left turn for a drastic right turn. He had the impression this manoeuvre would allow them to bypass the impending obstacle. Ordinarily, upon hearing the alarm, the appropriate reaction would be to "pull up" in an attempt to gain as much altitude as necessary to clear any nearby landforms. Co-pilot Firth, upon scrutinising the chart, realised the captain's decision was ill-judged and proposed alternative actions. The words "let's get out of here," voiced by Flight Engineer Carey, resonated through the cockpit voice recorder (CVR). Despite the engineer's advice, Captain Whelan persisted with the sharp right direction, which resulted in a descent of 300 feet. Spanish investigators stated unequivocally in their findings that this very movement eradicated any hope for averting disaster. Warnings from Flight Engineer Carey, "bank angle, bank angle!" echo as the last recorded words before the CVR goes silent. Dan-Air Flight 1008 met its tragic end as it crashed into La Esperanza at an elevation of 5,450 feet, a mere 92 feet (28 metres) shy of the peak. The collision decimated the majority of the aircraft instantaneously, scattering debris along the side of the mountain. The rear section of the plane hurtled several hundred metres, eventually crashing to earth, plummeting into a ravine, and disintegrating. Scattered small fires ignited amongst the dispersed wreckage and Tenerife North Airport was jarred by the crash alarm for the second time in just over three years. Rescue teams reached the mountain within hours but it was immediately clear that none of the 146 passengers on board had survived the crash. The scene was so devastating not a single intact human body could be found and many of the victims could not be definitively identified. While acknowledging the air traffic controller's mistake — Spanish investigators placed the entirety of the blame on the Dan Air crew. However, British investigators contended the controller should have recognised sooner the proximity between the two planes would pose an issue, allowing him to implement a standard holding pattern and prevent any confusion amongst the crew. They further argued the controller should not have issued an untested and non-standard holding pattern, but conceded the Dan Air crew did not question the controller's instructions or seek clarification. The decision by Camin to allow flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet also drew criticism from the British team. Had the holding pattern been designed in accordance with official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been set at 7,000 feet. Upon receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - unable to see due to fog and cloud - opted to make a right turn, which tragically led them directly into the mountain. Typically, crews are expected to ascend as high as possible in response to such an alarm. What remains undisputed, however, is the omission of a single letter in a word triggered the series of events that ultimately resulted in the crash. Had the controller used "turns" instead of "turn", the tragic crash could have been averted. The investigation into the crash led to an increased emphasis on clear, standardised procedures across all flight operations, including holding patterns. The incident underscored the importance of unambiguous communication between air traffic controllers and pilots, with a particular focus on pilots repeating instructions from Air Traffic Control to eliminate any potential misunderstandings. Despite the tragedy, Dan Air managed to bounce back and continued operations until 1992 when it was acquired by British Airways. Even though it marked the largest loss of life on a British aircraft, the memory of Dan Air Flight 1008 and the 146 lives tragically lost that day seems to have faded over the last 45 years.
Daily Mail
01-05-2025
- General
- Daily Mail
Pilot's chilling final words on board flight from Manchester to Tenerife moments before largest loss of life in British aviation history
The final words of the pilot flying a British aircraft that crashed into the Tenerife mountains and killed 146 is haunting people 45 years on. The three pilots on board had years of experience under their belt but the rugged terrain and poor weather around the airport has made it a notoriously difficult place to land. Only three years before the Dan-Air flight 1008 crashed, the worst aviation disaster in history tragically took place at Tenerife North when two planes collided on the run way, killing 583 people - partly due to poor visibility. But in 1980, a change in wind direction forced Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and Flight Engineer Raymond Carey, 33, to alter their landing plan and come in from the opposite side. A tragic miscommunication in instructions then left the pilots asking one minute and six seconds before the crash 'b****y strange hold, isn't it?'. As they dropped below the safe height of 14,500ft for the mountains, one pilot responded 'it doesn't parallel with the runway or anything'. Having taken off from Manchester earlier that morning, the flight experienced no difficulty on the journey over the continent. With winds typically coming across the Atlantic to the west, on April 25 1980 there was a change in direction, forcing the popular airliner to come in using the opposite runway. There was not a single body that was found intact and most remains could not be identified Another aircraft was ahead of the doomed flight and controller Justo Camin, 34, could see they were dangerously close to colliding mid-air. He had to tell each flight how to fly along a predetermined route thanks to a lack of radar but improvised a holding pattern for the Dan Air flight. Flight 1008 was told to enter a left-hand holding pattern and continue to make turns until the other flight was out of the way: 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' But this is where Mr Camin's instructions proved fatal - he had meant to say 'turns' rather than 'turn' and had sent the plane onto a collision course. So Captain Wheelan only made one small turn instead of the 150 degrees required for the holding pattern, heading straight for the mountain side invisible through the fog. The recording from the cockpit shows the team begin to get uneasy and experts believe if they had asked the air controller to clarify the instructions there might have been time to veer themselves off their path to destruction. Mr Camin, thinking the plane is over the sea, tells Flight 1008 that they can continue descending another 1,000ft, expecting them to slowly come in over the runway. Captain Whelan says to his cop-pilot: 'I don't like that.' He responds: 'They want us to keep going more round, don't they?' Seconds later, the automatic ground alarm begins blaring 'pull up, pull up!' Captain Whelan quickly turns into a sharp right instead of pulling up as co-pilot Firth suggests other routes after reading the charts. Flight engineer Carey tells them 'let's get out of here' as Captain Whelan continues turning to the right as they continued to lose 300ft of altitude. This was the last chance for the plane to save itself from its tragic fate. The flight engineer begins shouting 'bank angle, bank angle!' before the CVR cuts out as the plan slams headlong into La Esperanza. Debris was scattered across the mountain range and the tail section careened onwards for several hundred metres before plummeting into a ravine. There was not a single body that was found intact and most remains could not be identified. At 5,450ft, the plane was only 92ft from the summit and it obliterated instantly. Spanish investigators tried to pin all the blame on the Dan-Air crew despite admitting fault with the controller's instructions while the Brits argued Mr Camin should have used a published holding pattern that kept flights at 7,000ft and realised earlier there was a problem with between the separation of the two planes. They did acknowledge however that the Dan-Air crew should have queried the controllers instructions or requested clarification. After the tragedy, a standardised procedure for all flight operations was established as well as the need for clear communication between pilots and air traffic controllers that is repeated. Dan-Air, which has popular during the 60s and 70s, was able to recover from the disaster before it was taken over by British Airways in 1992.
Irish Daily Mirror
30-04-2025
- Irish Daily Mirror
Pilot's eerie warning moments before Spain plane crash that killed 146 people
Tenerife North, formerly Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located at an elevation of 2,000 ft making it a particularly challenging airport to fly in and out from. The weather is often cloudy - sometimes creating poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea. The deadliest example of how conditions can be catastrophic for pilots is the on-ground collision of two planes on March 27, 1977, partly due to poor visibility. The infamous airport disaster still retains the title of being the worst crash in aviation history - costing 583 people's lives. But another tragedy befell the island, just three years later. In the 1970s and 1980s British airline Dan-Air rose to become the largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. At 9.20am on April 25 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport for Tenerife. It was mostly filled with holidaymakers looking to escape for the sunny beaches and dramatic landscapes of the Canary Islands. There were three experienced pilots on board - Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, co-pilot, First Officer Michael Firth,33 and flight engineer 33 year old Raymond Carey. There were also five flight attendants on board, bringing the total number of occupants on board to 146. For three hours, all was well until the crew began their descent at 1pm local time. The winds usually came from across the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. The controller Justo Camin, 34, could not give the go ahead to the usual descent procedure as there was an aircraft in front also heading to Runway 12 - and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. Due to the non-availability of radar at the airfield, Camin managed traffic movements procedurally - instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route. Just after 1.18pm Camin realised he needed to put the Dan Air crew in a holding pattern while the plane ahead could land safely on Runway 12. But there was a problem - there was no holding pattern for that runway - so Camin improvised. He wanted Flight 1008 to enter a left-hand holding pattern and remain in this holding pattern - making turns - until the other flight was out of the way. In response to First Officer Firth's position report, Camin said, 'Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly.' After receiving the message, the captain replied, "Roger" without repeating what Camin had told them to do. If Whelan had done this, the impending catastrophe may have been avoided. When Camin told them: 'turn to the left,' he actually meant to say 'turns to the left,' describing the direction in which the crew were to fly around the holding pattern. But without the 's,' this transmission sounded to the crew 'turn to the left.' Camin who also cleared the flight to an assigned altitude of 5,000 feet, had made a small but significant error. Captain Whelan, confused by the latest unexpected instruction to go into a holding pattern which didn't appear on any of his charts - made only one turn to the left onto a heading of 150 degrees, believing that's what the controller told him to do. They were now in a mountainous area where the minimum safe height is 14,500ft. At one minute and six seconds before the crash, one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." It was clear from the cockpit voice recording, the crew was getting uneasy but nobody queried the instructions with the controller. The controller Camin, believing the plane to be out over the sea on his improvised holding pattern, had allowed the aircraft to descend another thousand feet. He had no idea the plane was in the middle of the mountains. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. However the usual response to the alarm would be to "pull up" and go as high as possible to clear surrounding terrain. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Let's get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. The Spanish investigators later said that this one manoeuvre destroyed any chance of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated most of the plane instantaneously, sending shattered debris across the mountainside. The tail section continued onward for several hundred meters before it slammed against the ground, plummeted into a ravine, and broke apart. Tiny fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport. Within hours, rescuers made the trek up the mountain, but it was immediately obvious that none of the 146 people on board had survived the crash. Not one single complete human body could be found and the remains of many of the people on board could not be conclusively identified. Although admitting the controller's error, Spanish investigators lay all the blame on the Dan Air crew. The British investigators argued that the controller should have realised earlier that the separation between the two planes would be a problem, so that he could have utilised a published holding pattern - preventing the crew from getting confused. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query the controller's instructions or request clarification. They also criticided Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. Usually crew are expected to pull up and go as high as possible -as the alarm demands What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash. If the controller had said "turns" and not "turn" the crash may never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardised procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner, 45 years on, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not as well remembered as it should be - and the 146 people who lost their lives that fateful day.
Daily Record
29-04-2025
- Daily Record
Pilot's chilling mistake causing deaths of 146 Brits
Tenerife North Airport , once known as Los Rodeos Airport, is one of the island's two international airports and is located 2,000 ft above sea level, making it a particularly tough airport to fly in and out from. The weather conditions often creates poor visibility caused by the winds blowing up off the sea, reports the Mirror . The most terrifying example of how deadly these conditions can be came on March 27, 1977, when two planes collided on the runway, partly due to poor visibility. The crash remains the worst in aviation history, with 583 lives lost. However, another disaster hit the island just three years later - involving a British jet. In the 1970s and 80s, Dan-Air had become the UK's largest independent airline in the United Kingdom. On 9.20am on April 25, 1980, the popular airline's Flight 1008 departed Manchester Airport for Tenerife. On board were mostly British tourists looking to escape the UK for the sunny beaches and stunning landscapes of the Canary Islands. The flight was crewed by three experienced pilots, Captain Arthur Whelan, 50, First Officer Michael Firth, 33, and Flight Engineer Raymond Carey, 33, plus five cabin crew, bringing the total number of occupants to 146. For most of the three-hour flight, everything went to plan, until the descent at 1pm local time. Winds normally blow in from the Atlantic to the west, but on this day they were coming from the opposite direction, meaning that the opposite runway was in use - Runway 12. Controller Justo Camin, 34, was unable to use the normal descent procedure because another aircraft was ahead, also lining up for Runway 12 and the two planes were getting dangerously close to colliding mid-air. With no radar to guide him, Camin had to manage traffic using set instructions, instructing each aircraft in turn to fly along a predetermined route. At 1.18pm, Camin decided to put the Dan-Air flight into a holding pattern to give the other plane time to land safely. However, Runway 12 had no publishing holding patten - so Camin improvised. He told the crew to enter a left-hand holding pattern and stay in it, circling, until the other aircraft had cleared. When First Officer Firth radioed in their position, Camin replied: "Roger, the er, standard holding pattern overhead Foxtrot Papa is inbound heading one five zero, turn to the left, call you back shortly." Captain Whelan simply answered: "Roger" - without repeating the instructions back. Had he done so, the disaster might have been avoided. Camin had said "turn to the left," when he actually meant "turns to the left", a small but crucial mistake that confused the crew. The captain was now trying to follow a holding pattern that didn't exist on any chart and misread the order as a single turn to the left onto heading 150. That one turn sent them into mountainous terrain where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500ft - nearly triple their current height. At one minute and six seconds before the crash , one of the pilots is heard saying, " Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" adding, " It doesn't parallel with the runway or anything." The cockpit audio shows the crew were uneasy, but no one radioed air traffic control to double check. Controller Camin, thinking the jet was safely circling out at sea, told them to descend another 1,000ft. He didn't realise they were heading straight for the hills. Captain Whelan queried Camin's instruction with his co pilot in the cockpit. "I don't like that." "They want us to keep going more round, don't they?" said his co-pilot. At this point, the automatic ground alarm was heard on the cockpit "pull up, pull up!" In a desperate attempt to avoid the mountain, Captain Whelan flipped out of his left turn into a steep right turn. The captain believed that he could avoid the terrain by turning right. Co-pilot Firth, looking at the chart realised, it was the wrong course of action and made other suggestions to the captain. "Lets get out of here," Flight Engineer Carey is heard saying on the CVR. Captain Whelan continued to steer the plane steeply to the right, losing 300 feet of altitude in the process. Spanish investigators later said that one desperate turn wrecked any hope of escape. Flight Engineer Carey was heard warning: 'Bank angle, bank angle!' And then the CVR cut out. Dan-Air flight 1008 slammed headlong into the side of La Esperanza at an altitude of 5,450 feet, just 92 feet (28 meters) below the summit. The impact obliterated the plane. Debris scattered across the slopes, and the tail section was hurled into a ravine before shattering. Small fires erupted from the pulverized wreckage and for the second time in just over three years, the dreaded crash alarm sounded at Tenerife North Airport . Rescuers reached the site within hours, but the scene was devastating. No one had survived. Not a single intact body was found. Some victims were never even identified. Spain admitted the controller had made a mistake - but blamed the British crew entirely. UK investigators hit back, saying Camin should've realised sooner there was a conflict and used a published holding pattern. British investigators added he should not have issued an unpublished and untried holding pattern but they accepted that the Dan Air crew did not query the controller's instructions or request clarification. They also criticized Camin's decision to clear flight 1008 to descend to 5,000 feet. Had the holding pattern been designed according to official regulations, the minimum altitude should have been 7,000 feet. After receiving a ground proximity warning, the captain - who could not see in the fog and cloud - decided to conduct a turn to the right, which actually took them straight into the side of the mountain. What is not in dispute, however is that the omission of a single letter in a word set off the chain of events that ultimately led to the crash . If the controller had said "turns" and not "turn" the crash would never have happened. The crash findings prompted a renewed focus on clear, standardized procedures for all flight operations, including holding patterns. It also highlighted the need for clear communication between air traffic controllers and pilots - and ensuring pilots repeat Air Traffic Control instructions so there is no room for misunderstandings. Dan Air was able to recover from the accident and continued flying until 1992 when it was taken over by British Airways. Despite being the largest loss of life on a British airliner , on its 45th anniversary, Dan Air Flight 1008 is not as well remembered as it should be - and the 146 people who lost their lives that fateful day.
