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Forbes
27-03-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
The Triple Tap Raid On the Engels Bomber Base Cost Russia $9.6 Billion
The result of a Ukrainian deep strike. Ukrainian defense ministry photo On the morning of March 20, Ukrainian drones targeted the Russian air force bomber base at Engels for the third time in 10 weeks. According to the Ukrainian general staff, the resulting blast destroyed 96 Kh-101 cruise missiles—some of Russia's best munitions for striking Ukrainian cities. Launched by Tupolev Tu-95 and Tu-160 heavy bombers, each Kh-101 travels as far as 560 miles with a 1,000-pound warhead. The general staff in Kyiv claimed planners in Moscow had designated the targeted Kh-101s for raids on Ukrainian cities this month and next. Those 96 destroyed missiles accounted for two months of production at the Raduga Design Bureau munitions factory near Moscow. Each Kh-101 costs at least $10 million. That means the strike on Engels may have carried a price tag of $9.6 billion—not counting the additional damage to fuel storage and other facilities at the base. As explosions rocked the base and smoke billowed into the sky on March 20, Engels was 'facing serious difficulties,' the Ukrainian Center for Strategic Communication quipped. Indeed, the difficulties began two months ago. On Jan. 8, Ukrainian drones flew at least 400 miles to strike in Saratov near Engels. The blasts triggered a blaze at a sprawling depot containing as much as 800,000 tons of fuel. The fire finally burned itself out, or firefighters extinguished it, after six days. Hours later on Jan. 14, drones struck a second time. 'There will be no rest for the wicked,' Stratcom warned. Maybe. In fact, the damage at Engels can be repaired. Raduga might be able to ramp up production of new Kh-101s. And Ukraine may struggle to acquire enough deep-strike munitions to sustain repeated strikes on Engels. Saratov burns following a Ukrainian deep strike. Via Supernova Ukraine has developed a dizzying array of long-range unmanned aerial vehicles, including some based on modified sport planes that can range 800 miles with hundreds of pounds of explosives. It has also developed a 600-mile version of its iconic Neptune cruise missile—and recently deployed it for the first time. Kyiv has devoted a significant portion of this deep-strike arsenal to attacks on Russian munitions depots such as the one at Engels. But the raids, which often produce towering fireballs that lend themselves to dramatic social media posts, may be more gratifying to the Ukrainians than they are militarily effective. According to Ukrainian analysis group Frontelligence Insight, more than half of the observed Ukrainian strikes between September and February—many of them aimed at munitions stocks—'had limited impact' as crews rushed to fix the afflicted facilities and Russian industry adapted to compensate for lost production. Attacking more often, and with heavier munitions than lightweight attack drones, might inflict lasting damage, Frontelligence Insight concluded. But Ukraine doesn't get enough of the best foreign-made deep-strike munitions—British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles, similar French-made SCALP missiles and American-made ATACMS rockets—to mount an intensive campaign targeting Russian logistics. And it doesn't yet build enough similar munitions, including Neptunes, on its own. It's not for no reason that, in recent months, Ukrainian strike planners have shifted their aim—and are now launching more drone attacks on Russia's delicate, and economically vital, oil infrastructure. They're hoping the damage to the oil industry will ultimately have greater impact than the damage to weapons depots. Even if the depot strikes look better on camera.
Forbes
26-03-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Ukraine's Drones And Missiles Hit Russia Where It Hurts: The $189-Billion Oil Industry
A Ukrainian attack drone prepares to launch. Unmanned Systems Forces photo Back in August, workers broke ground for a new drone factory in Oryol Oblast, in western Russia 100 miles from the Ukrainian border. Four months later, the factory was ready to churn out Shahed one-way attack drones, one of Russia's main munitions for bombarding Ukrainian cities. But Ukrainian intelligence was watching. And on Dec. 26, Ukrainian air force Sukhoi Su-24 bombers flung several British-made Storm Shadow cruise missiles at the factory. 'As a result of the strike, a storage, maintenance and repair facility for Shahed kamikaze drones, consisting of several reinforced concrete shelters, was destroyed,' the Ukrainian general staff reported. A follow-up attack on Jan. 26 compounded the damage. In total, at least 200 Shaheds burned. But does it really matter? Russian factories produce nearly 1,000 Shaheds a month, each ranging farther than 900 miles with a 110-pound warhead. In destroying 200 drones, the Ukrainians may have slightly reduced the pace of Russia's attacks on Ukrainian cities for a few weeks or months. Overall, Ukraine's campaign of deep strikes targeting munitions depots and factories hundreds of miles inside Russia has yielded mixed results. Yes, they may have offered some relief to bombarded civilians. More broadly, however, 'air-launched cruise missiles were often out of sequence with combat operations,' explained Michael Kofman, a senior fellow in the Russia and Eurasia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. Sure, the Oryol raids may have spared a few Ukrainians, but they and other deep strikes on the most explosive targets—even the most visually impressive ones that produce towering fireballs and dramatic videos that circulate on social media—haven't altered the fundamental problem facing Ukrainian and Russian forces. 'Both sides struggled to overcome a prepared defense,' Kofman observed. While deep strikes may have 'shaping effects on enemy forces,' Ukrainian brigades are 'often not in a position to capitalize on them.' It isn't particularly helpful for the Ukrainian air force to blow up, say, a Russian field army's entire stock of heavy mortar rounds if the adjacent Ukrainian army corps is boxed in by minefields or lacks the manpower to mount an offensive and exploit the dip in the Russians' short-term ammunition stocks. Ukrainian Su-24s launch Storm Shadows. Ukrainian air force capture In that sense, a major part of Ukraine's deep strike campaign—the raids targeting military supply—is impressive but far from decisive. According to Ukrainian analysis group Frontelligence Insight, more than half of the observed Ukrainian strikes between September and February 'had limited impact.' Drones and missiles may have struck a few Russian factories and depots and triggered a few frightening blazes, but firefighters eventually extinguished the flames and workers eventually rebuilt. All the while, Ukrainian forces were still incrementally losing ground in eastern Ukraine. Attacking more often, and with heavier munitions, might inflict lasting damage. But Ukraine doesn't get enough of the best foreign-made deep-strike munitions to mount a sustained and intensive campaign on Russian logistics. And it doesn't yet build enough similar munitions on its own. It's not for no reason that, in recent months, Ukrainian strike planners have shifted their aim—and are now mounting more raids targeting Russian oil infrastructure. And not just any oil infrastructure, but refineries in particular: the beating chemical hearts of the Russian economy ... and any war effort that economy sustains. 'As these are more technically complex and expensive structures, their importance for the Russian oil refining industry and exports of oil products is also higher, and they are more difficult and expensive to restore,' Frontelligence Insight explained. Recent raids on refineries have cost Russia between $658 million and $863 million, Frontelligence Insight estimated. But Russia's total revenue from oil exports in 2024 was $189 billion. So far, the oil attacks are also too infrequent and insufficiently destructive to inflict the kind of economic damage that could alter the course of Russia's 37-month wider war on Ukraine. That could change. 'To enhance the effect of the strikes, Ukrainian troops should conduct regular attacks on large unique cracking units at modern Russian refineries,' Frontelligence Insight advised, citing economist Vladimir Milov. The cracking units, which break down crude oil into useful products, are delicate and complex and extremely difficult for Russian industry to replace under the current sanctions regime. Frequent and precise strikes might prevent them from being repaired, Milov told the analysis group. Maybe that would accomplish what the deep strikes on munitions depots haven't accomplished—and hurt Russia badly enough to end the war on terms that favor Ukraine.
Forbes
21-03-2025
- Politics
- Forbes
Ukraine Lost Too Many Tanks In Kursk
A destroyed Ukrainian M-1 in Kursk. Russian state media capture Since Russia widened its war on Ukraine 37 months ago, Russian forces have lost no fewer than 3,200 tanks in combat, according to an unofficial tally by the open-source analysts with the Oryx collective. Ukrainian forces have lost around 950 tanks. That translates into a 3.4-to-1 loss ratio favoring Ukraine. But in the eight-month battle for Kursk in western Russia, the Russians wrote off 66 tanks, while the Ukrainians gave up 55. That's a mere 1.2-to-1 ratio favoring Ukraine. In other words, nearly even. That's bad news for Ukraine, which according to one recent analysis needs to inflict three times as many losses on Russia as Russia inflicts on Ukraine in order to degrade the Russian military faster than Russia degrades the Ukrainian military. The Ukrainians were hitting that critical benchmark prior to their August invasion of Kursk in western Russia. During the invasion, which ended in a Ukrainian retreat last week, the Russians gave as good as they got, knocking out or capturing more tanks than the Ukrainians could afford to lose. The Ukrainian armed forces went to war in February 2022 with around 1,000 active tanks—mostly ex-Soviet T-64s and T-72s. After losing around 950 tanks to Russian action, receiving another 850 or so tanks as donations from their allies and fetching others from long-term storage in Ukraine, the Ukrainians still have … at least 1,000 tanks. The Russian armed forces went to war three years ago with around 3,500 active tanks—T-72s, T-80s and T-90s—and have lost 3,200 to Ukrainian action. Russian industry builds 500 or 600 new tanks a year—too few to make good losses—but the Kremlin also has access to thousands of stored tanks, many of them T-62s and T-54s dating from the 1960s and '50s, respectively. A captured Russian T-90 in Kursk. Via Lost_WarInUA The two armies' respective main sources for replacement tanks mean the Ukrainian tank corps is gradually becoming more modern as it takes delivery of more Western-made tanks including German-made Leopard 1s and Leopard 2s and American-made M-1s. By contrast, the Russian tank corps is getting less modern as it inducts hundreds of older tanks, some 60 or even 70 years old. At the time of the Ukrainian retreat from Kursk last week—a departure precipitated by an elite Russian drone group deploying to the oblast and bombarding Ukraine's main supply line—Ukrainian tankers had already achieved local tank superiority in some areas. But not in Kursk, a veritable graveyard for armored vehicles owing to the relatively small scale of the battlefield in the oblast, the high concentration of Russian and Ukrainian forces and, most critically, the sheer number of explosive drones patrolling overhead. Destroying roughly as many tanks as they lost in the oblast, the Russians deprived Kyiv of a badly needed victory. According to Frontelligence Insight, a Ukrainian analysis group, a 1-to-1 loss ratio is 'an unfavorable scenario for Ukraine in a war of attrition, given its smaller initial stockpile and limited ability to replace lost vehicles.'
