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Daily News Egypt
28-05-2025
- Politics
- Daily News Egypt
Is Egypt Truly Arab?
Is Egypt truly Arab? At first glance, the question seems simple. Yet at its core, it is complex and profound, reflecting a long legacy of cultural, political, and social intersections. Identity is not a national ID card or a slogan raised above institutions; it is an accumulated outcome of successive cultural and societal layers. Just as a person cannot be reduced to their name, Egypt cannot be reduced to a mere geographical or linguistic label. Throughout its history, Egypt has undergone multiple identity transformations. What makes it unique, however, is that it has never been fully absorbed into any foreign identity. Take Pharaonic civilization, for example. Despite its grandeur, it revolved around the concept of the 'return of the soul,' where science and technology served a deeply spiritual doctrine. Then came the Greek civilization. The Greeks introduced the notion of 'reasoning' into Egyptian thought, enhancing its geometry, logic, and philosophy. This marked a major shift from revering myth to revering intellect. Under successive occupations, Roman, Arab, Ottoman, and British, Egypt was, more often than not, a province within a larger empire. During these times, identity was rarely a pressing issue, as Egyptians were part of a broader imperial whole, blurring the sense of national identity. The contours of Egyptian identity began to crystallize with the birth of the modern state under Muhammad Ali. For the first time, Egypt shifted from a subordinate province to a relatively autonomous entity. Egyptians were called upon to participate in building a nation, through education, labor, and agriculture, and this gave rise to a sense of national identity. The Egyptian Revolution of 1919 marked a turning point. For the first time, a clear national discourse emerged, built around the idea of 'pure Egyptian-ness.' This deeply rooted the concept of the 'Egyptian nation' in popular consciousness. Later, during the 1950s and 1960s, Arab nationalism flourished. But at its core, it was more of a political project than a cultural identity. It originated in the Levant, particularly among secular Christian thinkers, who sought to construct an alternative identity to counter Ottoman dominance and neutralize religion in politics. In Egypt, Arab nationalism was less a natural expression of identity and more a political tool used by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in his confrontations with the West. It was a strategic umbrella aimed at countering initiatives like the Baghdad Pact, a dream of Egyptian imperial leadership over Arabic-speaking countries. Arab nationalism was not rooted in Egyptian soil. Rather, it was a political mask the state wore for a time to serve geopolitical interests. If it had been a genuine cultural project, why did it stop at language? Why didn't it encompass the distinct social and economic characteristics that define each Arab country? The truth is that Egypt cannot be confined to a single identity. Defining Egypt solely as Arab is a gross oversimplification of its rich and multilayered essence. Egypt is not only an Arab country; it is also African, Middle Eastern, Mediterranean, Islamic, Christian, Pharaonic, and modern. It is all of these things at once, yet none alone defines it completely. What best reflects the genius of the Egyptian character is its ability to absorb all incoming cultures and produce its own unique version of each. Just as Egypt introduced a moderate model of Islam, it also crafted a colloquial dialect that blends classical Arabic with local vernacular. Egypt is the only country in the world that overlooks Africa through Nubia, Asia through the Sinai Peninsula, Europe through Alexandria, and the Arab Desert through its oases. It is a rare intersection point of cultures, geography, and history. The great Egyptian thinker Gamal Hamdan once wrote: 'Egypt, in its net composition, is half European, one-third Asian, and one-sixth African.' This statement encapsulates the complex reality of Egypt's hybrid identity. I believe Egypt needs no qualifying descriptors that diminish its stature. It does not require labels that confine it to being 'Arab' or 'Islamic' or any such limited classification. Egypt is simply Egypt. Just as we do not refer to France as the 'European Secular Catholic French Republic,' or to the United States as the 'English Protestant Capitalist Western American Republic,' we need not call Egypt the 'Arab African Middle Eastern Mediterranean Islamic Christian Egyptian Republic.' Egypt is Egypt, no more, no less. It is a central pivot in the heart of the world, transcending narrow definitions and proving that its true identity lies in its ability to encompass diversity without losing itself. Dr Ramy Galal is an Egyptian senator, writer, and academic specializing in public management and cultural policies. He has authored studies on cultural diplomacy, the orange economy, and restructuring Egypt's cultural institutions. Galal holds a PHD degree from Alexandria University, a master's degree from the University of London, and Diploma From the University of Chile. A former adviser and spokesperson for Egypt's Ministry of Planning. He was also the spokesperson for the Egyptian Opposition Coalition.
Russia Today
25-05-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Africa: Legacy of the Great Leaders
RT Presents a Project Featuring Descendants of Mandela, Lumumba, and Nasser RT presents a project about the leaders of Africa's anti-colonial struggle On Africa Liberation Day, May 25, 2025, RT is releasing a special video project titled African Legacy (Africa: Legacy of the Great Leaders) dedicated to the continent's leaders whose fight against colonialism and efforts to unite African peoples changed the course of history. The children and grandchildren of legendary figures, including Patrice Lumumba, Nelson Mandela, Gamal Abdel Nasser, Samora Machel, Julius Nyerere, Kenneth Kaunda, Oliver Tambo, and Steve Biko, share stories about their ancestors and their contributions to Africa's liberation and development. They also speak about the importance of preserving historical memory as modern Africa once again faces various challenges, and how the new generation must continue the work of their great forebears in order to move forward, toward prosperity and unity. 'Today history repeats itself. The same powers that once dictated to Africa whom it should call friend and whom it should call enemy are trying to do so once again. They paint Russia as a villain, just as they once did with the Soviet Union. But we must remember the lessons of the past. Those who truly supported Africa's liberation are not the ones who plundered our lands, who assassinated our leaders, or who imposed crippling debts upon us,' says Roland Lumumba, son of Congolese national liberation movement leader and the first prime minister of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba. Participants of the project note that Russia has always supported their peoples' struggle for freedom and justice, and that the USSR played a pivotal role in helping African nations break free from colonial dependence. Today, partnership with Russia opens new opportunities for the continent's countries based on shared values, respect for sovereignty, and a vision of a multipolar world. 'With Russia, we see opportunities for trade, technology exchange and development that will help Africa grow independently and sustainably. By working with Russia, we can secure support that respects Africa's right to shape its own destiny and economic future,' states Ndileka Mandela, granddaughter of the legendary anti-apartheid fighter, former South African president, and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Nelson Mandela.
Asharq Al-Awsat
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Amr Moussa to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mubarak Was a Patriot
Former Secretary-General of the Arab League Amr Moussa told Asharq Al-Awsat that the first ten years of the current century were disastrous in Egypt. Hosni Mubarak had aged and lost interest in governing the country. Mubarak and Hereditary Rule Asked about Mubarak's ties with former Presidents Anwar Sadat and Gamal Abdel Nasser, Moussa said: 'Mubarak believed that what Anwar Sadat had done was right. And he used to love Abdel Nasser a lot.' Asharq Al-Awsat asked him if the end of Mubarak's term was painful. Moussa replied: 'Yes of course. He wasn't as bad as pictured. This man was a patriot and knew what he was doing. He wasn't at all naïve.' 'The issue that his son could become his heir was not accepted by anyone ... Mubarak did not want for his son to rule Egypt, which is not an easy task. It's a huge and very complicated country, and the presidency requires a lot of experience,' Moussa said. Mubarak Loved Elegance and Joking Was Mubarak interested in his personal elegance? Moussa replied: "Yes. He knew what to wear with what, and he valued elegance greatly.' 'He also had a way of looking at people, and he was often right about that.' "He was Egyptian par excellence. He loved sarcasm and listening to jokes. He would laugh very energetically and loudly when something amused him, surrounded by a group of humorous people. And then, suddenly, the president would return,' said Moussa. "He used to wake up early and sit in a pleasant little kiosk in the garden, reading the newspapers and the reports sent to him by various agencies, taking his time. After finishing, he would be fully briefed on many different matters." Policymaker Moussa had sometimes implied that he was a policymaker, not just an executor of policies. 'First of all, the Foreign Minister must be one of the policy makers ... If he is merely an executor, then he will have no role in the history of diplomacy or in politics, nor will he have the influence that a Foreign Minister is supposed to have like taking initiative, thinking, and acting quickly,' said Moussa. 'This, in my opinion, was the case. However, I cannot claim that I was one of the makers of Egyptian policy. But I certainly contributed to many political steps and political thinking. For example, what were the priorities? A priority was to make the Middle East a nuclear-free zone. This was the work of Egyptian diplomacy, which I headed, and I was committed to this issue.' Advice to Assad on Lebanon Pullout Asked if Mubarak had advised Syrian President Bashar Assad to withdraw his forces from Lebanon after the assassination of Lebanon's Prime Minister Rafik Hariri, Moussa said: "I don't know, I was Arab League Secretary General back then. I advised.' But Moussa said that when he went to Beirut to offer his condolences to the Hariri family, he visited Damascus to meet with Assad. 'I asked him if he was ready to withdraw the Syrian army. He said: Yes,' according to Moussa, who also said Assad clearly stated that the Arab League chief can officially announce the Syrian stance to the media. Yet, as soon as he returned to Cairo, the Syrian government spokesman denied Moussa's claim that Assad had promised a pullout of Syrian forces from Lebanon. The regime later retracted his statement. Asked about the reasons for Hariri's assassination, Moussa said that the former prime minister was 'bigger than Lebanon. He was a huge Arab personality that could have met the president of the United States and of France anytime he wanted.' Moussa confirmed that Hariri had complained to him about Syria's relationship with him.
Asharq Al-Awsat
03-05-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Beyond a Leaked Audio Recording of Nasser
The release of an audio recording of a conversation between Gamal Abdel Nasser and Muammar Gaddafi has shocked and angered many, perhaps even creating a crisis of conviction. The year he died, Nasser did not hide his exasperation with the radicals calling for war, ripping into the zealots, showing contempt for them and their maximalist demands, and stressing that he preferred to avoid war and seek a peaceful resolution for the conflict. Nonetheless, only those who had believed in the image manufactured for him should be surprised. He had long been portrayed as a living breathing blend of sanctity and insanity: he boldly defended 'the Arab nation's interests in liberation and progress,' paying no mind to the balance of power or the costs of war, and he kept the fight without regard for the humiliating lessons of the 1967 defeat. However, the real Nasser was neither of those things. It is true that he endorsed the famous 'Three No's' of the Khartoum Summit and came out with slogans like 'What was taken by force can only be regained by force.' When he was not addressing 'the masses,' however, he accepted United Nations Resolution 242, and later, the Rogers Plan. Both opened the door to peace, whereby the territories that had been occupied would be given back in return for the recognition of the right of every country in the region to exist, without exception. We also know that Nasser's reputation for militancy did not shield him from the insults and accusations of treason that roared through the armed Palestinian factions' demonstrations in Amman to denounce his 'treasonous and cowardly positions.' As for the last act of his life, it was convening an emergency Arab League Summit to end the Jordanian civil war whose eruption sufficed to convince a seasoned politician like Nasser that open warfare with Israel was futile and senseless. Noting the Egyptian roots of this behavior could help us liberate the naïve militant narrative around the Palestinian cause from its lies. Attention to this matter provides insights into how positions on the question were often linked to broader societal and political structures in the Arab world, and by extension, to legitimacy. In other words, the Egypt Nasser governed had been more socially cohesive than any of the Levantine countries nearby, and its state traditions went back further than those of other countries in the region. This reflects a causal relationship between countries' social and national cohesion, as well as the foundations of their regimes' legitimacy, and their inclination to turn to realism and diplomacy when possibilities and opportunities narrow. If a lack of legitimacy helps explain the Syrian and Iraqi Baathists' intransigence with regard to the Palestinian cause, which they sought to make into a substitute source of legitimacy, the same cannot be said of Egyptian Nasserism. Despite establishing the model for the police state of the Arab world, it could be credited with real achievements, or it was at least successfully portrayed as deserving credit for achievements: from the nationalization of the Suez Canal and 'repelling the Tripartite Aggression' (1956) to unifying with Syria (1958) to the role Nasser began playing on the global stage after the 1955 Bandung Conference. His record meant that Nasser had less of an incentive to shore up his legitimacy through the Palestinian cause than the similar regimes to his. One cannot but notice that the two sides were not equally reliant on appropriating and "representing" the Palestinian cause. One important dimension of the Palestinian armed struggle that Fatah launched is its split from Nasserism, which was no longer seen as the 'pan-Arab path' to 'liberating Palestine.' Nonetheless, Nasserism did not wage a civil war against the Palestinians in response to this rupture, nor did it assassinate their leaders or establish militant groups to rival Fatah. That is precisely the course of action that Baathist regimes in Damascus and Baghdad took, creating factions to rival Fatah (like al-Saiqa and the Arab Liberation Front) and orchestrating a long list of assassinations. While in Nasserism's 'response to the defeat,' the slogan of 'liberating Palestine' was replaced by that of 'erasing the ramifications of aggression,' the state discourse in Syria (and Iraq) was brimming with calls for 'a war for popular liberation' that Assad's defense minister, Mustafa Tlass, excelled at. After 1973, retrieving Egyptian territory and an end to the conflict came to define the approach of Nasser's successor, Anwar Sadat, whereas Hafez al-Assad sought to incite civil wars, both Lebanese and Palestinian, to obtain 'arenas' for a frozen conflict with Israel for his regime. We could also speak of the deeper background of Nasser's divergence from the Syrian and Iraqi radicals, as well as some Palestinian factions. Between the forties and seventies, the 'Arab nationalism' of the Asian Levant was tainted by rabid rhetoric that was crowned by the Baath Party. In Egypt, where Arab nationalism had never been at the center of traditional political culture, Nasser embraced it in pursuit of a developmental and geopolitical vision that could not afford not to weigh gains and losses. This approach was probably one factor behind Egypt's early ventures into 'clandestine diplomacy' aimed at reaching a peace deal with Israel which Syria did not do. From British MP Richard Grossman's meeting with Nasser at Ben-Gurion's request to the 'Alpha Plan,' then the 'Gamma Project,' and to the mediation efforts of Nahum Goldmann and Yugoslav President Tito in 1958, the diplomatic pursuits never stopped. These are not reasons to shower Nasser with praise. Rather, they highlight a lack of knowledge and sentimental frivolity that the Egyptian leader had played an immensely important role in instituting.
Asharq Al-Awsat
30-04-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
The Most Dangerous Aspect of Abdel Nasser's Recordings
A leaked recording of a 17-minute conversation from August 1970 between the late Egyptian President, Gamal Abdel Nasser, and Muammar Gaddafi, in which they discuss the conflict with Israel and the Palestinian cause, has discredited ideas and movements that long had fed off 'another' version of Abdel Nasser. Yes, there were two sides to Abdel Nasser. As Mr. Mamdouh Al-Muhaini noted in an article on these pages, the sensible Abdel Nasser, whom we hear in the leaked clip, buried the other version of him that stirred emotions and inflamed passions at the time, leading to Arab disaster. As Mr. Abdulrahman al-Rashed wrote in his article, Abdel Nasser 'kept chasing his slogans until he became, in practice, a hostage of the monster he had created, the radicalized street demanding more boisterous speeches and statements.' Much has been said and will be said about that recording, which shocked Abdel Nasser's followers. At one point, he tells Gaddafi: 'Leave us alone... When are we supposed to fight and where would we get weapons from? Those who seek war and liberation should go ahead. How are you going to liberate Tel Aviv? The Jews are ahead of us; I'm telling you.' Abdel Nasser adds that the Israelis 'are superior to us on land. And they're superior in the air. I'm not saying this because I'm defeatist. I'm saying that if we really want to achieve a goal, we must be realistic. How are we going to achieve it?' 'If achieving that goal is unlikely... then we're stepping away from the whole thing. Leave us be. We support a defeatist peace of surrender. And I can accept that with a clear conscience. Those of you who want to wage a war should go ahead and do that.' Yes, all of the above is indeed shocking to Nasserists. He himself repeatedly points to this in the recording. Fully aware of the potential repercussions, he was afraid. He was afraid to embark on a peace process and afraid to speak rationally for fear of clashing with the 'monster' he had created, as Mr. al-Rashed put it. The most alarming segment of the recording (and this is not to downplay the significance of the statements that shocked his followers) is his apathy about Jordan's stability. Indeed, says that he hoped the 'fedayeen' take over Jordan so everyone could see what King Hussein would do. He went on to say that if the 'fedayeen' were to rule Jordan, they would then have to face the realities of fighting Israel, thereby understanding how difficult it really is to achieve anything through war or armed struggle. I say that this is the most alarming because it reveals how, driven by personal desires, Abdel Nasser engaged recklessly and arrogantly with the regimes. Meanwhile, journalists and intellectuals have romanticized, on weak grounds, the reasoning of the military officers who destroyed Iraq, Syria, and others. Meanwhile, Abdel Nasser was speaking purely out of rivalry, a thirst for power, and contempt for the stability of neighboring states. I say this is the most alarming because anyone who has reflected on the destruction of those countries now finds that Iraq, Syria, South Yemen, and others are no longer part of the region. Those who had once vowed to throw Israel into the sea ended up devastating their own countries and the Palestinian cause. And here we are today. We fear for the viability of a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders. Borders that, as Abdel Nasser said in the recording, would cancel out the demands of 1948. Today, the real question is: can a deal that returns to the 1967 border even still be achieved after the events of October 7, 2023? So, where are the ideologues now? Where are those who once celebrated the fall of regimes or supported Yahya Sinwar; what do they have to say about the revelations? Who is willing to learn the lesson?
