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Arab News
a day ago
- Politics
- Arab News
The poisons of power balances
The first component of wisdom is a precise assessment of the balance of power. It is indispensable in war, revolution or a coup d'etat. The balance of power is an almost inescapable consideration that cannot easily be written out of the equation. Ignoring it usually leads to catastrophic consequences, but while force wins wars, it does not necessarily guarantee durable stability. Vladimir Putin read the balance of power. He knew that the West would yell after waking up to see Russian tanks erasing what it called an international border with Ukraine. However, NATO would not risk sending troops to defend a country that is not a member of the alliance. The US would impose sanctions and make threats, but it would not send its forces and risk raising the specter of a third world war. He calculated correctly and now his army is continuing to devour more territory, having already secured control over the lands annexed by Russia. However, history shows that coercion and subjugation cannot become the basis for lasting stability. The people of the Middle East have their own long and painful history with the balance of power. In 1967, Gamal Abdel Nasser did not dwell on the regional balance of power or its equations. His announcement of the closure of the Straits of Tiran and decision to mobilize Egypt's army drove Israel to launch the war that led to the occupation of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights — a war that only deepened the glaring imbalance of power in the region. Anwar Sadat concluded that Egypt could not tolerate the occupation of Sinai. He coordinated with Hafez Assad and waged the war of 1973. Despite the achievements of the Egyptian army, the course of the war ended up being a stark reminder of the balance of power's painful dictates. Sadat realized that Sinai could not be taken back by force; accordingly, he chose to accept the facts on the ground, eventually recovering the land through the Camp David Accords. Assad launched a vicious campaign against Sadat, but he too quietly accepted the harsh logic of the balance of power and understood that forcefully reclaiming the Golan Heights was impossible. Instead, he opted to compensate for this loss. 'Recovering' Lebanon was within reach and he managed the country and consolidated the presence of his forces. This is what makes the two-state solution, a cause that Saudi Arabia has played an active and influential role in pursuing, so important. Ghassan Charbel When Fatah fired its first shot on the first day of January 1965, Yasser Arafat was dreaming of reclaiming all his people's occupied land with the barrel of his gun. His long and bitter battles taught him cruel lessons about the realities of the balance of power from Tel Aviv to Washington. That is how we got the scene of Arafat shaking hands with Yitzhak Rabin in the Rose Garden of the White House, and why we saw him accept the dream of a state on part of this land and the painful concession of the rest. From his residence in France, Ayatollah Khomeini spoke candidly to Saddam Hussein's envoy. He told him that the overthrow of the 'infidel Baath regime' was the second item on his agenda, after toppling the shah's regime. Khomeini's dream was to take down Saddam's regime, especially when Iran gained the upper hand in the war with Iraq. However, the balance of international power did not allow Khomeini to realize his dream and he was ultimately forced to swallow the bitter poison and accept a ceasefire. Saddam, for his part, ignored the realities of the balance of power when he ordered his forces to invade Kuwait. He did not consider the need to avoid an American invasion of Iraq, framing the event as 'a battle for the dignity of the nation,' as Yemen's former foreign minister Abu Bakr Al-Qirbi told our newspaper. Let us leave the past and turn to the present. When the Israeli air force began destroying the weapons of 'Assad's army,' President Ahmad Al-Sharaa had no choice but to accept the constraints of the balance of power. This imbalance only deepened after Israel succeeded in driving Iran out of Syria and dealt a painful blow to Hezbollah and its leadership in Lebanon. When the crisis erupted in Sweida, Al-Sharaa found himself with no option but to heed the balance of power's dictates once again. President Joseph Aoun, along with his government, is now experiencing the bitterness of this power balance and its shifts following 'the flood.' Israeli drones continue to violate Lebanese airspace, carrying out targeted assassinations. The president knows that disarming Hezbollah is the condition that the US and international community have demanded of Lebanon for reconstruction and aid. We must not forget the poisons of the balance of power and the constraints they have imposed on the Palestinian Authority. Since Hamas' attack on Oct. 7, 2023, Israel has been in a frenzy of vengeance and the pursuit of victory. There is no denying that its war machine, with backing from the US, succeeded in crushing Gaza, asserting control over multiple regions' airspace and carrying out incursions into Syrian and Lebanese territory. The current balance of power is clear: the Palestinians are not well placed to reclaim their rights by force, neither now nor in the foreseeable future. The same can be said of Syria, which must prioritize building a state of institutions that preserves unity and coexistence, opening the door to stability and prosperity. Lebanon's Hezbollah is similarly incapable of launching a new war against Israel, neither now nor in the foreseeable future. Faced with imbalances of this magnitude, the weaker side has no real options. It can only turn to international legitimacy. The principles of international legitimacy offer protection from the injustices currently imposed by the balance of power. It is also essential for addressing the key issue: the injustice inflicted on the Palestinian people, which has been the root cause of instability across the Middle East. The poisons of the balance of power can only be remedied by returning to the principles of international legitimacy. Only these principles can guarantee a just peace. That is what makes the two-state solution, a cause that Saudi Arabia has played an active and influential role in pursuing, so important. The most recent fruit of this diplomatic momentum was the French president's announcement that his country would recognize the state of Palestine. Brutality, domination and erasure can only leave the Middle East sleeping over barrels of gunpowder. Its nations need a moment to catch their breath, fight poverty, allow the displaced to return, pursue development and join the modern world. The solution is not to surrender to the dictates of the balance of power. The solution is to do everything possible to empower international legitimacy. • Ghassan Charbel is editor-in-chief of Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper. X: @GhasanCharbel This article first appeared in Asharq Al-Awsat.
Ammon
3 days ago
- Politics
- Ammon
Suez Canal seized
Ammon News - On this day in 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser seized control of the Suez Canal and nationalized it, sparking a crisis that later resulted in French, British, and Israeli forces briefly occupying parts of Egypt. Britannica
The Hindu
6 days ago
- Entertainment
- The Hindu
On events happened on July 23
Daily Quiz | On events happened on July 23 Copy link Email Facebook Twitter Telegram LinkedIn WhatsApp Reddit YOUR SCORE 0 /6 RETAKE THE QUIZ 1 / 6 | On this day in 1952, the Free Officers, a nationalistic military group led by _____, engineered a coup that overthrew King Farouk I of Egypt, ending the monarchy and bringing the leader to power. Fill in the blank. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser SHOW ANSWER 2 / 6 | This former emperor of Ethiopia was born on this day in 1892. Widely considered to be a defining figure in modern Ethiopian history, he is accorded divine importance in Rastafari, an Abrahamic religion that emerged in the 1930s. Who was he? 3 / 6 | This English actor was born on this day in 1989. He is one of the most recognizable actors in the world for a role he played in a film series from 2001 to 2011. Based on a fantasy books series, this bespectaled role catapulted him to fame. Name the actor and the character. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Daniel Radcliffe, Harry Potter SHOW ANSWER 4 / 6 | This American activist, born on this day, became internationally known in the late 1990s after the U.S. President Bill Clinton admitted to having had an affair with her during her days as a White House intern between 1995 and 1997. Who was she? DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Monica Lewinsky SHOW ANSWER 5 / 6 | This company, on this day, sold its first automobile a Model A. Five years later, it introduced the hugely influential Model T. Name the company. DID YOU KNOW THE ANSWER? YES NO Answer : Ford Motor Company SHOW ANSWER
Rudaw Net
07-07-2025
- Politics
- Rudaw Net
Israel-Iran war, silent transformations in western Asia
The 12-day Israel-Iran war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab-Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions. Beyond the overt military dimensions, the war was also aimed at strategically distancing Tehran from its deepening ties with China and Russia, while simultaneously curbing the expansion of the pan-Shia movement led by Iran. In this sense, the conflict served a role analogous to that of the 1967 war, which effectively halted the rise of the pan-Arab movement spearheaded by Gamal Abdel Nasser and supported by Moscow. Regardless of whether it is referred to as "Operation Rising Lion," "True Promise," or "Midnight Hammer," it is evident that this war is quietly transforming the regional landscape. Syria appears to be entering a new phase, aimed at establishing the foundations of governance, while the regional influence of both Turkey and the Gulf states is expanding. In parallel, the issue of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) disarmament has progressed into a new stage, influenced by the broader consequences of the conflict. Moreover, the war has turned Iraq and the Kurdistan Region into arenas for two major regional rivalries. On one front, these areas have become a battleground for military competition between Iran and Israel, a dynamic that has pushed Iraq's internal situation to the edge of crisis - where "unknown drones" have emerged as key players in shaping the security environment. On another front, Iraq is increasingly becoming a site of strategic contention between Turkish and Iranian interests. Additionally, the war - and even the anticipation of it - has compelled Turkey to quietly engage in a discourse aimed at redefining its nation-state identity, particularly through the rhetoric of Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood. Simultaneously, within Iran, a growing debate between the ultra-conservative faction and other elements of the political elite reflects yet another dimension of the war's subtle but enduring influence - an influence that appears likely to persist. Iraq: between the hammer of war and the anvil of rivalry Iraq's current situation appears increasingly precarious as the country approaches elections under the shadow of both ongoing regional conflict and intensifying geopolitical rivalry - developments that may, as in previous instances, prove decisive for its future. In relation to the recent war, Iraq has formally protested the violation of its airspace sovereignty, but this issue is only one dimension of a broader and more complex set of challenges. On the day the conflict ended, two of Iraq's radar systems were destroyed, and in the days that followed, unidentified drones emerged as a growing security concern, appearing in areas ranging from Kirkuk to Sulaimani and Duhok. The Iraqi government is currently conducting investigations to determine the origins of these incursions. While some have speculated that the Islamic State (ISIS) may be responsible, this theory does not align with the group's current limited military and organizational capabilities. In reality, only three regional actors possess the capacity to conduct such drone operations across the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk: Turkey, Iran and affiliated 'resistance' groups, and Israel. At a time when the world is closely monitoring the PKK disarmament negotiations, it is unlikely that Turkey would risk undermining the process, especially since the nature and targets of the drone activity do not suggest Turkish involvement. Both Iran and Israel remain highly sensitive to the strategic positioning of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq more broadly. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the Kurdistan Region adopted a stance of silent neutrality during the recent conflict. However, this neutrality has failed to satisfy either Iran or Israel, each of which interprets the Region's posture through its own security and strategic lens. Whether war resumes or not, the Kurdistan Region's geographic and strategic location renders it critically important to the offensive and defensive calculations of both parties. At this stage, the identity of the actors behind the drone incidents remains unknown. Nonetheless, the prevailing interpretation is that these incidents constitute strategic signaling, intended more as a message than as direct acts of aggression or destruction. The ambiguity surrounding these developments underscores the fragile and volatile security environment in which Iraq now finds itself - caught between the hammer of regional warfare and the anvil of great-power rivalry. Another point is that the possibility of Iraq being caught up in war due to the balance of power in the region is always open, because Iraq is important to Iran to protect its last regional bastion, but it's also important to Israel to keep a gateway to reach Iran open and prevent a problem from forming through Iraq. It seems that in the future, beyond security and military matters, Iraq will increasingly become a field of economic competition and influence between Turkey and Iran, and this will translate into political tension.
Rudaw Net
04-07-2025
- Business
- Rudaw Net
The 12-day war and silent transformations of western Asia
Also in Opinions Kurds in the mirror: The psychology of oppressed people A decade into the Iraq-Kurdistan Region salary crisis: A deeper look behind the numbers The birth of mental health care in Mesopotamia Washington, London agreements: future prospects for Erbil-Baghdad oil, gas relations A+ A- The 12-day Israel–Iran war stands as one of the most consequential events of the first quarter of the 21st century, with the potential to reshape both the economic landscape and the political-security dynamics of western Asia. Much like the Six-Day Arab–Israeli War of 1967, which extended beyond mere territorial occupation, the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel was not solely about missile exchanges and nuclear ambitions. Beyond the overt military dimensions, the war was also aimed at strategically distancing Tehran from its deepening ties with China and Russia, while simultaneously curbing the expansion of the pan-Shia movement led by Iran. In this sense, the conflict served a role analogous to that of the 1967 war, which effectively halted the rise of the pan-Arab movement spearheaded by Gamal Abdel Nasser and supported by Moscow. Regardless of whether it is referred to as Operation Rising Lion, True Promise, or Midnight Hammer, it is evident that this war is quietly transforming the regional landscape. Syria appears to be entering a new phase aimed at establishing the foundations of governance, while the regional influence of both Turkey and the Gulf states is expanding. In parallel, the issue of Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) disarmament has progressed into a new stage, influenced by the broader consequences of the conflict. The war has turned Iraq and the Kurdistan Region into arenas for two major regional rivalries. On one front, these areas have become a battleground for military competition between Iran and Israel, a dynamic that has pushed Iraq's internal situation to the edge of crisis where unknown drones have emerged as key players in shaping the security environment. On another front, Iraq is increasingly becoming a site of strategic contention between Turkish and Iranian interests. Additionally, the war - and even the anticipation of it - has compelled Turkey to quietly engage in a discourse aimed at redefining its nation-state identity, particularly through the rhetoric of Turkish–Kurdish brotherhood. Simultaneously, within Iran, a growing debate between the ultra-conservative faction and other elements of the political elite reflects yet another dimension of the war's subtle but enduring influence - an influence that appears likely to persist. Iraq between the hammer of war and the anvil of rivalry Iraq's current situation appears increasingly precarious as the country approaches elections under the shadow of both ongoing regional conflict and intensifying geopolitical rivalry - developments that may, as in previous instances, prove decisive for its future. In relation to the recent war, Iraq has formally protested the violation of its airspace sovereignty. However, this issue is only one dimension of a broader and more complex set of challenges. On the day the conflict ended, two of Iraq's radar systems were destroyed, and in the days that followed, unidentified drones have emerged as a growing security concern, appearing in areas ranging from Kirkuk to Sulaimani and Duhok. The Iraqi government is currently conducting investigations to determine the origins of these incursions. While some have speculated that the Islamic State (ISIS) may be responsible, this theory does not align with the group's current limited military and organizational capabilities. In reality, only three regional actors possess the capacity to conduct such drone operations across the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk: Turkey, Iran and its affiliated 'resistance' groups, and Israel. At a time when the world is closely monitoring PKK disarmament negotiations, it is unlikely that Turkey would risk undermining the process, especially since the nature and targets of the drone activity do not suggest Turkish involvement. Both Iran and Israel remain highly sensitive to the strategic positioning of the Kurdistan Region and Iraq more broadly. Contrary to prevailing assumptions, the Kurdistan Region adopted a stance of silent neutrality during the recent conflict. However, this neutrality has failed to satisfy either Iran or Israel, each of which interprets the Region's posture through its own security and strategic lens. Whether war resumes or not, the Kurdistan Region's geographic and strategic location renders it critically important to the offensive and defensive calculations of both parties. At this stage, the identity of the actors behind the drone incidents remains unknown. Nonetheless, the prevailing interpretation is that these incidents constitute strategic signaling - intended more as a message than as direct acts of aggression or destruction. The ambiguity surrounding these developments underscores the fragile and volatile security environment in which Iraq now finds itself - caught between the hammer of regional warfare and the anvil of great-power rivalry. Another point is that the possibility of Iraq being caught up in war due to the balance of power in the region is always open, because Iraq is important to Iran to protect its last regional bastion, but it's also important to Israel to keep a gateway to reach Iran open and prevent a problem from forming through Iraq. It seems that in the future, beyond security and military matters, Iraq will increasingly become a field of economic competition and influence between Turkey and Iran, and this will translate into political tension. Iran has increasingly focused on developing its economic relations with Iraq and the Kurdistan Region. In 2020, Iran's trade volume with Iraq did not reach $6 billion, while Turkey positioned itself at around $17 billion. Since then, it has continuously tried to turn toward the Iraqi market, and in 2024 it reduced its gap with Turkey. Iran's economic losses after the fall of Bashar al-Assad are estimated at around $30-50 billion. It is estimated that the 12-day war also cost it between $24 and 35 billion. If international sanctions are to return by October 18, then it must grip the Iraqi market with teeth and claws, as it seems like the last resort for its economy. Mohsen Rezaee, former commander of the Revolutionary Guards, once said that we cannot fight wars for countries while their benefits go to other countries. A double-six for Turkey and the Gulf, and an opportunity for Syria The recent conflict has elevated the regional prominence of both Turkey and the Gulf states. For these actors, the simultaneous weakening of Iran and Israel constitutes a strategic gain - akin to a 'double six' in backgammon - provided that the hostilities remain confined within the borders of the two principal belligerents. At the same time, both Turkey and the Gulf countries are vying with Oman for the opportunity to host prospective negotiations between Iran and the United States, if such talks prove feasible. From Turkey's perspective, the Iran–Israel war represents the weakening of two of its major regional competitors. However, had the conflict intensified or triggered sudden political upheaval in Iran, it could have posed a direct threat to Turkish security. Despite this risk, the war appears to have drawn Turkey and the United States into closer alignment. The US ambassador in Ankara has publicly stated that Turkey might be readmitted into the F-35 fighter jet program. Additionally, Turkey was reportedly one of the few countries briefed by the United States shortly before Israel launched its attack. It appears that Turkey has played - and possibly continues to play - a role in the diplomatic efforts to end the conflict. This includes mediating between Iran and the United States, as well as between Hamas and the US. In the event that an agreement is reached between Syria's Ahmed al-Sharaa faction and Israel, it would signify a potential normalization of relations between Turkey and Israel. Such a reconciliation would not only alleviate long-standing political and security concerns, but also facilitate more stable and reliable access to the Syrian market - particularly significant given the recent partial lifting of US sanctions on Syria under the Trump administration. The aftermath of the war has also encouraged Sharaa to move closer to Israel, thereby strengthening his position and increasing his chances of consolidating political authority in Syria. This shift could signal broader transformations in the geopolitical dynamics of the region. The issue of PKK disarmament During the recent conflict, discourse emerged in both Turkey and among individuals affiliated with the PKK regarding the possibility of replicating the Syria–Rojava scenario in Iran. This comparison references the context in which the Assad regime handed over control of Kurdish-populated areas to Kurdish political parties and forces (the Democratic Union Party, PYD, and the People's Protection Units, YPG). However, this analogy is fundamentally flawed and arises from a misreading of Iran's internal situation and the nature of the Kurdish question within its borders. Assad's primary motivation for withdrawing from northeast Syria (Rojava) and reaching an accommodation with the PKK was tactical rather than ideological. He sought to place a human shield between his regime and Turkish-backed opposition groups. This maneuver enabled him to avoid direct conflict while anticipating that he could eventually reclaim those areas, given that the Kurdish forces lacked geographical depth and the region's topography was unsuitable for sustaining prolonged military resistance. In essence, Assad's strategy was to sacrifice Kurdish forces for short-term security gains, and even at the lowest point of his regime's power, he remained unwilling to formally recognize Kurdish identity. Replicating this strategy in Iran is not feasible. Any armed group that establishes a presence in the Zagros Mountain chain would be extraordinarily difficult to dislodge due to the region's formidable terrain and strategic depth. Furthermore, these mountainous zones - along with the Alborz Mountains, Iran's eastern deserts, and its southern maritime borders - form a critical geopolitical triangle. Compromising any of these strategic regions would unravel the country's military equilibrium and expose Tehran and the Iranian heartland to substantial vulnerability. As such, no rational political regime would willingly accept such a risk. Nonetheless, the war appears to have yielded a significant strategic gain for Turkey, particularly in the context of the PKK disarmament issue. It is increasingly likely that the PKK's expectation of garnering enhanced regional support has diminished. It has long been an open secret that PKK disarmament has not aligned with Iran's strategic interests, primarily due to security considerations. Since 1992, the PKK's presence along the borders has served, intentionally or otherwise, as a stabilizing force in terms of border security. Simultaneously, Turkey has historically feared that Iran might attempt to impose a Syrian-style situation on its own territory. However, in the aftermath of the 12-day conflict, Ankara appears to be approaching this matter with increased confidence and a sense of strategic ease. In a notable recent development, the president of Turkey authorized the release of a Kurdish prisoner previously incarcerated for PKK membership. This act may signify an initial step toward advancing the broader process of PKK disarmament. The international community now awaits a symbolic gesture from the PKK, which, if forthcoming, could encourage the Turkish state to implement additional legal reforms anticipated by the end of the autumn. While this process is likely to face fluctuations and setbacks, recent remarks by Devlet Bahceli - leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) - acknowledging the concept of Kurdish–Turkish brotherhood represents a rare political recognition of Kurdish identity from a figure associated with Turkish nationalism. Historically, Turkish presidents such as Turgut Ozal and Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made similar overtures. The current leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Turkey's largest political party, has also echoed this sentiment. Collectively, these developments suggest a gradual shift that may contribute to redefining the Turkish nation-state identity. On the other side, the PKK, under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan, has likewise moved away from territorial demands, signaling a significant transformation in its approach to the Kurdish issue. Iran: From geopolitical confrontation to domestic political discourse The rise to power of the Islamic Republic in Iran represented not merely a domestic political shift but a profound geopolitical transformation. It disrupted a key pillar of the regional order previously led by the United States and its Western allies. That order, anchored by strategic alliances with NATO-member Turkey, Israel, the Gulf states, and the Shah of Iran, began to fracture with the establishment of the Islamic Republic. Iran ceased to be a US ally, and between 1980 and the early 1990s, at least five significant armed groups emerged, three of which posed direct security challenges to both Turkey and Israel. Despite these developments, the West and the United States were not overly concerned at the time. On one hand, they retained the capability to manage and contain the threats posed by these groups. On the other hand, Iran's external relations with adversaries of the West had not yet matured into strategic partnerships that could undermine US interests. However, this began to change after the 2000s and particularly in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Iran's regional influence expanded significantly. While Iranian officials framed this shift as part of an 'Islamic Awakening,' its adversaries labeled it the 'Shia Crescent.' In parallel, Iran advanced its military capabilities - especially in the domain of missile and drone technology - and, more critically, began to quietly abandon its long-held foreign policy doctrine of 'Neither East nor West.' This strategic reorientation was underscored by Iran's 25-year cooperation agreement signed with China in 2021 and its 20-year agreement with Russia adopted in 2025. Iran's provision of drones to Russia, coupled with ongoing discussions about supplying ballistic missiles to Moscow, further signaled Tehran's deepening alignment with Eastern powers. These developments, combined with the events of October 7, marked a significant turning point from the perspective of the United States and Europe. In their view, Iran had effectively become an 'Eastern' power - an alignment that may well have been one of the underlying motivations for the 12-day war. In the aftermath of the conflict, the discourse among Iranian diplomats has shifted toward efforts aimed at preventing a renewed outbreak of war. However, skepticism remains high among military officials regarding the sustainability of the fragile ceasefire currently in place. The future trajectory of regional stability will likely hinge on the positions adopted by China and Russia. Should Tehran, buoyed by support from these allies, resume uranium enrichment or distance itself from negotiations and compromise with Europe and the United States, the prospect of renewed conflict could resurface. The wars have a bilateral impact on the nature of states' policies - they either lead to some kind of opening or make them more closed. In the shadow of discussions about the possibility of war and non-war, there is now a heated debate between the ultra-conservative wing and other groups in power over domestic and foreign policy that seems likely to continue for a while. Ziryan Rojhelati is director of the Rudaw Research Center. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position of Rudaw.
