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Al Jazeera
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
‘No one is safe': Civilians, foreigners caught in escalating Mali violence
Sikasso, Mali – The Kayes region, which borders Senegal and is vital to Mali's economy, had remained largely untouched by the violence from armed groups that has rocked the country for several decades. But that changed when armed men waged a string of coordinated attacks on military installations in several Malian towns last week, after which the country's armed forces launched a counterattack that it said killed 80 fighters. The uptick in violent clashes between armed fighters and the Malian army – who are being assisted by Russian paramilitaries known as the Africa Corps – comes as the country's political future looks murky, experts say, with the military-led government seemingly determined to permanently extend its rule. For more than a decade, Mali has faced rebellions from separatist movements and armed fighters, including the two most active groups – ISIL affiliate, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and al-Qaeda-linked Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). JNIM claimed responsibility for last Tuesday's attacks, which Malian officials said targeted seven major towns in the west and centre: Kayes, Nioro du Sahel, Niono, Molodo, Sandare, Gogui and Diboli. The group did not list any human or material casualties, but its leader Iyad Ag Ghali said JNIM had taken total control of three enemy barracks and dozens of military positions. At the same time, during the attack on Kayes town, three Indian nationals working at a cement factory were forcibly taken by gunmen as 'hostages', the Indian foreign ministry said on Wednesday, in an incident that could risk escalating the crisis beyond Africa's Sahel. This month's attacks are also just the tip of the iceberg, as communities across Mali continue to be caught in the crossfire – at times to violent and even deadly ends. Less than a fortnight earlier, on the night of June 18, areas in the centre of the country, including Diallassago and Dianweli, were the scene of attacks in which at least 130 people were killed. Before that, on May 23, an armed group attack on the Dioura military camp in the Mopti region killed 41 members of the Malian army. Foreigners 'potential targets' Security experts say the army is understaffed, despite the waves of recruitment drives over the last five years. This has left Mali vulnerable as it compromises efforts to rebuild military capabilities. 'The armed forces have shown a certain level of vigilance in the face of attacks,' said Moussa Dienta, who works for the Coordination of Associations for Peace and Development in Mali (CAPEDEM), a body that supports the country's military transition. He said that to support the army, communities in Mali should 'make their contribution' by helping gather local 'intelligence' that enhances their ability to do their work. 'This will enable the army to remain the pillar of the nation.' While some support the military's efforts, others argue that they are not enough to contain the threat of the armed groups. 'No one is safe from the new terrorist threat posed by al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Mali,' said Jean Marie Konate, a community development expert with the Red Cross in the Kayes region, pointing to the hostage-taking of the Indian nationals last week. 'The assailants are determined to bite where it hurts, and foreigners will remain potential targets.' India has urged the 'safe and expeditious' release of the hostages, with its foreign ministry saying it 'unequivocally condemns this deplorable act of violence'. It said its embassy in Bamako was also in close communication with the relevant authorities of Mali and urged all its citizens in the country to 'exercise utmost caution' while there. But some analysts feel more effort is needed. Defence and security expert Aly Tounkara, who lectures at the University of Bamako, believes embassies should take immediate additional security measures to reinforce the protection of their nationals. 'States seem overwhelmed and they are genuinely unprepared to prevent coordinated attacks. The threat stalks all states in the Sahel and beyond, and will certainly have economic and social repercussions in surrounding countries,' he warned. Finding viable security solutions The coups that brought the military to power under Assimi Goita followed mass antigovernment protests in Bamako, over the previous leadership's failure to deal with advancing swarms of armed groups from the north. While the military made security one of its top priorities when it took power, July's attacks, like previous ones, calls into question the viability of the strategy the current government has in place, analysts say. Experts are also divided on the best approach to rebuilding the national security sector, as Russian military intervention and joint patrols with the army in certain parts of the country seem to be showing their limits. 'It is clear that the military approach offers no lasting alternative or definitive solution to the crisis,' said Alkaya Toure, an expert and former technical adviser to the Malian Ministry of Defence under previous governments. 'What needs to be done is, to effectively combat the attacks, Mali should redouble its vigilance and strengthen its security watch … to be set for the long term.' Security expert Tounkara is, however, not convinced this will be enough. 'I'm not saying this to frighten anyone. We are in a dangerous and vicious circle, and the attacks will continue in the long term. Those who are not aware of this should be convinced,' he said. He feels Bamako's current strategy to tackle armed groups focuses more on theory and political manoeuvrings than on localised dynamics and solutions. 'Pockets of insecurity can only be tackled through local approaches. This will inevitably require greater involvement of what I call the invisible players. Leaders cannot claim to be fighting terrorism effectively by excluding or marginalising the invisible players who are so key to stability.' In its current strategy, 'Mali is making the same mistakes as in previous agreements, offering the same diagnosis and the same therapy', Tounkara said. 'We need to move towards contextualising security solutions.' Uncertain political prospects The system to rebuild security in Mali is taking on water, observers say. With an operational strength of nearly 25,000 soldiers, the Malian army is struggling to occupy the 1,241,000 square kilometres (480,000 square miles) of national territory. And the recent attacks are a further slap in the face, especially as they targeted a region the government may have thought was safe. A military source close to the defence cabinet, who requested anonymity, expressed his dismay: 'The recent attacks are not just a problem of inattention or a lack of vigilance, they are above all linked to the poor deployment of security throughout the country,' he told Al Jazeera. 'Since the coordinated attacks on Bamako on 17 September, 2024, efforts have remained focused on the central and northern regions. In the western region, the general staff have sufficiently reduced the military presence, overlooking the fact that the threat is omnipresent.' As the violence between the army and armed groups escalates, the political situation in Mali is also growing increasingly tense. In May, the military government announced the dissolution of political parties and organisations by presidential decree. Then, last week, the transitional authorities adopted a bill granting a five-year presidential term of office to Goita, renewable 'as many times as necessary' without holding elections. Critics have decried these moves as restrictions on freedom to consolidate the military leadership's hold on power in the country. At the same time, Russian intervention in Mali – which observers say took place under conditions that are still unclear – has failed to stem the threat of the armed groups they are meant to help fight. After the 2021 coup, Goita's government distanced itself from France, its former colonial power, with French forces exiting Mali in 2022. To fill the security vacuum, Bamako turned to Russian fighters from the Wagner mercenary group. Last month, Wagner announced its exit from the country, saying Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps paramilitaries would remain in their place. But the Kremlin seems more concerned with the economic stakes of its partnership with Mali. In June, a trip to Russia by Goita culminated in a series of economic agreements and conventions with Moscow. Energy and mining issues have taken precedence over security, observers say. Meanwhile, for Malian civilians increasingly caught between the escalating violence, fear and uncertainty remain. After the attack in Kayes town last week, a hospital source speaking to the AFP news agency said more than 10 seriously injured people were admitted to the medical facility there, and one civilian died. For security experts, until a definitive peaceful solution is found, civilians will continue to suffer the consequences of the fighting, and no region of the country will be spared.
Daily News Egypt
02-07-2025
- Politics
- Daily News Egypt
Mali says Islamic State militant linked to 9/11 killed in northeastern operation
Mali's armed forces said on Saturday they had killed a senior figure in the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), identifying him as a convicted al Qaeda affiliate who had previously served prison time in Spain for his links to the September 11, 2001 attacks. In a statement, the military said the operation took place in the northeastern region of the country, where troops engaged the militant and his bodyguard during a targeted mission based on intelligence reports. The two were killed in a brief clash while reportedly pressuring local populations as part of a forced recruitment campaign. The militant was identified as Imad Eddin Barakat, also known as Abou Dahdah, a Spanish national born in Syria. He had previously been convicted by a Spanish court for his association with the 9/11 plot and his links to al Qaeda. Barakat was sentenced to 27 years in prison, though the term was later reduced to 12 years Mali says Islamic State militant linked to 9/11 killed in northeastern operation According to Malian and regional security sources, Barakat later joined ISGS, a group that has claimed responsibility for a series of deadly attacks across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. In his role, he acted as both an ideologue and a technical expert in suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and was reportedly connected to the Banibango attack in Niger earlier this year. Security officials said Barakat's presence in Mali was part of a broader effort by ISGS to radicalize and mobilize communities in remote areas of the Sahel in order to expand its operational base. 'This figure was not just symbolic; he was central to the group's strategy of indoctrination and recruitment,' a spokesperson for a local pro-government militia told Reuters. ISGS, which emerged as an offshoot of the Islamic State's global network, remains active across parts of Mali where government forces have limited reach. The Malian army, which has been engaged in a years-long fight against Islamist insurgents, has stepped up operations in the country's volatile northern and central regions. The killing of Barakat marks a high-profile success for the Malian military, though security analysts warn that ISGS remains resilient, with deep local networks and access to arms and funding across porous borders
Al-Ahram Weekly
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Egypt condemns deadly terrorist attack on mosque in Niger - Foreign Affairs
Egypt has condemned a "treacherous terrorist attack" targeting innocent worshippers outside a mosque in Niger's southwestern village of Manda, which resulted in dozens of deaths and injuries, According to a statement issued by the foreign ministry on Tuesday, Egypt reaffirmed its full support for the government and people of Niger in their fight against terrorism and extremism. Egypt also offered its condolences to the victims' families and the government and people of Niger, wishing the injured a quick recovery. The attack occurred on Friday, when suspected Islamic State-affiliated militants ambushed worshippers on their way to Friday prayers, in Niger's Tillaberi region, killing at least 71 people, according to AFP. Egypt urged the international community to intensify efforts to support the Sahel countries in their war against terrorist organizations, and called for coordinated action to eliminate extremist strongholds and combat terrorism in all its forms. The attack is the latest in a series of violent incidents across Niger in recent week. In May, a deadly attack by suspected Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) militants on a military outpost in Eknewan killed 41 Nigerien soldiers. Moreover, in March, a terrorist attack targeted a mosque in the village of Fambita in southwestern Niger during Friday prayers, killing at least 44 people and injuring 13. Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Daily Maverick
17-06-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Why a jihadist takeover of a Sahelian capital is unlikely
Despite a recent surge in terrorist attacks, the region is more at risk of fragmentation than centralised jihadist rule. Insecurity has risen sharply in the Sahel in recent months. Between late May and early June, major attacks claimed by Jama'at Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) targeted various locations in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. This resurgence underscores the two groups' adaptive capabilities and questions the efficacy of counterterrorism strategies implemented by the Alliance of Sahel States' (AES) military-led governments. Consequently, some analysts are concerned about the potential for a Sahelian capital to fall under jihadist control – drawing parallels to the December 2024 capture of Damascus by terror group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). However, there are critical contextual distinctions between the two scenarios. Unlike HTS, which has consistently pursued regime change to position itself as a political-religious alternative, JNIM and ISGS show no intent to seize power in the capital cities of Bamako, Niamey or Ouagadougou. Rather, their strategies emphasise the gradual erosion of state authority in rural peripheries where they mediate local conflicts, enforce norms and collect taxes. This underscores their comparatively limited operational capacity. JNIM and ISGS primarily operate in remote rural areas, using light weapons such as rifles, machine guns, rocket launchers and mortars. They also use motorcycles, improvised explosive devices and weaponised civilian drones. Although they have taken and temporarily controlled towns in the interior, such as Djibo and Diapaga, they lack the firepower and logistical capabilities to sustain a prolonged siege and occupation of a major city. Their strength lies in mobility and local knowledge rather than the capacity to occupy and govern territory for long periods. HTS, by contrast, developed a structured military force with centralised command and tactical units capable of coordinated assaults supported by drones and heavy artillery. The group had sustained access to sophisticated weaponry through well-organised transnational supply lines. The fall of Damascus represented the culmination of a broader regime-change dynamic set in motion by the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings and bolstered, to varying degrees, by some Western and Gulf countries. For a while, HTS capitalised on key cross-border corridors – particularly with Turkey – that enabled the steady influx of foreign fighters, medical aid, munitions and advanced weapons systems. No comparable geopolitical architecture exists in the Sahel. While weapons trafficking from Libya has strengthened some armed groups, there is no declared international effort aimed at toppling the governments of Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Although AES leaders frequently accuse foreign actors – notably France – of supporting terrorism or destabilising the region, open-source data offers little evidence of this. Even Algeria, whose role in northern Mali has occasionally been ambivalent, has never sought to overthrow the government in Bamako. Another point of distinction is the internal dynamics of state militaries. The fall of Aleppo, Hama, Homs and ultimately Damascus, occurred within just two weeks. This was primarily due to the limited resistance by the Syrian Army – weakened by a decade of conflicts, widespread defections and deteriorating living standards. In contrast, the capabilities of armies in Sahelian countries are increasing. These militaries are ideologically and institutionally resistant to jihadists, perceiving them as existential threats to their respective governments. Furthermore, having assumed political power, AES military leaders have entrenched their authority within the state apparatus, bolstering their responsibility and accountability. Also, the rise of HTS was enabled by the exhaustion of a war-weary Syrian population and economic collapse, further aggravated by international sanctions. Disillusioned by Bashar al-Assad's authoritarian regime, many Syrians viewed HTS as either a lesser evil or, in some cases, a more favourable alternative. The Sahel situation is starkly different. Although hardline Islamist ideologies have found some traction in urban centres, public sentiment in the capital cities remains hostile towards jihadists who are perceived as instigators of violence, instability and national suffering. For now, these factors together render the capture and sustained control of a Sahelian capital by jihadist forces improbable. JNIM and ISGS are likely to restrict themselves to guerrilla and destabilisation tactics. As history shows, however, this does not make these cities immune to political instability linked to rising insecurity. The 2012 Mali coup was triggered by military setbacks in the north. Similarly, Burkina Faso's January 2022 coup occurred following a mutiny prompted by escalating casualties among security forces. Considering the AES countries' protracted military transitions and constrained political environments, further upheavals leading to institutional breakdowns and a disorganisation of security forces cannot be ruled out. This could have unpredictable consequences for the Sahel and west Africa at large. To avoid this, AES governments must acknowledge the strategic limitations of their militarised approach to terrorism. While increasing troop numbers and acquiring advanced weaponry have yielded some tactical successes, these measures haven't incapacitated the violent extremists. In 2024, the Sahel remained the world's epicentre for terrorism for the second consecutive year, accounting for half of all global casualties. The youthful appearance of the assailants in the foiled 2 June Timbuktu attack should be a wake-up call to AES strategists. It reflects a generation of children deprived of schooling due to chronic insecurity, and whose families lack access to income, justice and essential social services. These factors are potent drivers of recruitment into armed groups – and cannot be solved through military means alone. AES governments need a coherent, region-wide counterterrorism strategy that goes beyond military interventions. Valuable insights can be gleaned from the Lake Chad Basin's disengagement and reintegration programmes, Mauritania's religious dialogue initiatives, and Algeria's non-kinetic approach. Equally important is the need to engage with communities stigmatised by counterterrorism operations, fostering trust and reducing the risk of recruitment. Enhanced relations with Algeria and the Economic Community of West African States could bolster regional cooperation and intelligence sharing, strengthening the collective capacity to reduce the threat posed by armed groups. Without a meaningful recalibration of strategy, the Sahel could descend into prolonged fragmentation, with profound consequences for west Africa's stability. DM
Business Recorder
22-05-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
Gratuity, in addition to CPF: AGP questions power of ISGS board for irregular payment to employees
ISLAMABAD: Auditor General of Pakistan (AGP) has questioned the power of the board of Inter State Gas Systems (Pvt) Limited (ISGS) for irregular payment gratuity in addition to contributory provident fund (CPF) to its employees annually. According to the website of the company, ISGS is a private limited Company incorporated under the Companies Ordinance, 1984 (Now Companies Act, 2017) and a wholly owned subsidiary of Government Holding (Pvt) Ltd. The company has a Board of Directors comprising nine members. The authorised share capital of the company is Rs20 billion. In a Public Accounts Committee (PAC)'s sub-committee held on Tuesday discussed the authority of the board in light of observations of audit report 2012-13. Audit report of ISGS observed that facility of gratuity in addition to CPF was allowed to employees appointed after October 16, 1984. Thus payment of gratuity in addition to CPF of Rs5.25 million made was held irregular. Federal government service rules provide for the various other benefits such as the pension, medical, accommodation, tuition, vacation, social security etc which are currently not applicable on the employees of the ISGS. These are competitive with the current prevailing market practices. The CPF scheme was being run by the government for its employees and not the private funds created. In case of ISGS the separate funds were being maintained for the gratuity and provident fund and no payment for gratuity was made out of the CPF scheme and therefore, there was no violation of the part of the ISGS of the instructions of the Finance Division. This would have been applicable if the ISGS provident fund had been part of the government provident fund scheme. Furthermore, finance consultation with Finance Division was not warranted when payment of remuneration/ bonus did not involve budgetary impact for government. In another audit report year 2022-23 pointed out that Petroleum Division collected GIDC amounting to Rs354 billion up to June 30, 2023. These funds meant to be utilised on TAPI, IP and Pakistan Stream Gas Pipeline Project but progress on these mega gas infrastructure development projects were slow and no significant headway could be made resulting in non-utilisation of GIDC funds. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
