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Al-Ahram Weekly
25-06-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Why Iraq remains a bystander in Iran's conflict?
The first thing many Middle East watchers thought when they heard the news of Israel's military strikes on Iran on 12 June was that it might finally be time for Tehran's Iraqi Shia allies to stand with their main backer. However, days later nothing of the sort had happened, and Iraq's Shia leaders have maintained their usual rhetoric of condemning the Israeli 'aggression' and blasting its violation of Iran's sovereignty. Noise made by the hardliner bosses of the Shia militias, part of the Iran-backed 'Axis of Resistance,' about retaliation went by without actually producing any action. With its western flank open to wave after wave of Israeli missile and drone strikes through Iraqi airspace, Iran has been left entirely alone to deter the Israeli aggression and threats from US President Donald Trump. The surprising lack of empathy prompted Iran's President Masoud Pezeshkian to urge Iraqi Prime Minister Mohamed Shia Al-Sudani to block Israel from using Iraqi airspace to launch attacks on the Islamic Republic. 'We urge the Iraqi government to exercise greater vigilance and protect its borders and airspace so that Iraqi territory is not misused against the Islamic Republic of Iran,' Pezeshkian told Al-Sudani during a telephone call. From the onset of the Israeli operations in Iran it was clear that this conflict will be a 'watershed moment' for Iranian-Iraqi relations, particularly in testing the strengths and weaknesses of the alliance between Iran and the Iraqi Shias. Since the fall of the regime of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein in the US-led invasion in 2003, many of the Shia leaders who came to power as a result were groomed by Iran and perceived as strategic assets for Tehran. When leaders of the ruling Shia alliance in Iraq met to respond to Pezeshkian, they issued a statement condemning Israel's 'violations of Iraqi airspace and its use to launch attacks on neighbouring countries.' But their message was loud and clear – they had no intention of being actively involved in the confrontation, posing a serious problem for Iran's defence efforts. Whether they are unable or unwilling to support Iran has been left an open question, as has the question of whether this was their best option to prioritise their own political survival and the needs of the Iraqi Shia population. Technically, supporting Iran would be a major challenge for the Iraqi Armed Forces. Iraq lacks the resources to defend its airspace and back Iran against the incursion of Israel's war- planes, drones, and missiles over its territory. Iraq's air defences have proven ineffective in countering threats of air and missile attacks, and the country is powerless when it comes to facing the ever-changing threats in the regional landscape. The bulk of Iraq's air defences consist of old Soviet systems and a number of European built surface-to-air missile systems, such as the French Roland, all from the Saddam era. Like any country that faces multiple threats, Iraq needs to bolster its military with advanced missiles and effective air defence systems. But the United States, which still maintains a military presence in Iraq, has reportedly torpedoed Baghdad's attempts to acquire such defensive weapons. Meanwhile, anxiety is rising in Iraq about the Israeli strikes in Iran and the possibility of being caught in the middle of a broader conflict that could involve pro-Iran militias and US troops in Iraq. As for Iran, the situation remains dire as the country is forced to rely primarily on its own less-effective military power to face more-advanced Israeli weapons coming in undeterred to kill its military leaders and scientists and destroy its infrastructure. Iraq has a 1,200 km border with Iran, and for most of their statehood period it has been ruled by unfriendly governments perceived by Tehran as a major security threat. Iran's security fears crystallised when Saddam ordered a wide-scale incursion into Iran in 1980, seeking to counter the revolutionary government of Ayatollah Khomeini that came to power in 1979. The eight-year war that followed was a defining period in the country's modern history. Iran learned many lessons from the war, including the need to be self-reliant in order to face up to prolonged diplomatic isolation. After the war, the Islamic Republic spared no efforts in building up its military power and putting in place a strategy to deter its foes. This included efforts to upgrade its nuclear infrastructure to make it capable of enriching uranium. The 1980-1988 war remains a huge story in Iran. Murals commemorating its martyrs still decorate street junctions in Tehran and other Iranian cities, along with pictures of Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic and Iran's wartime leader. Two years after the end of the war when the Iraqi Army invaded neighbouring Kuwait, Iranian fears were revived, and officials used the dangers to consolidate the Islamic Republic and mobilise the population in the face of Iraqi challenges. Iran's sense of foreboding escalated after the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which helped to crystallise Iran's regional views as well as define the country's security policy and make it more proactive. With the Saddam regime's belligerency in mind, one of Iran's main worries is the possibility of a hostile regime in Iraq that could be incorporated into an anti-Iranian regional alliance, upsetting the post-invasion balance of power that Iran saw as operating in its favour. Ostensibly, the US-led invasion of Iraq put Iran in a favourable position in the light of the destruction of the Iraqi military by the US Occupation Authority and the empowerment of Shia opposition groups in Iraq that had been prepared and equipped by Iran to fight Saddam. Gradually, Tehran managed to become hugely influential in Iraq, including by creating political, economic, and cultural assets as well as a vast pro-Iranian para-military force, or militias, that it has used to maximise its influence. For the past 22 years, Iran has sought to cement its alliance with the Iraqi Shias, reasoning that a friendly regime in Baghdad would make for a stronger Islamic Republic and a regional power to reckon with. The list of actions that demonstrate Iran's political standing and security influence in post-Saddam Iraq is long and far-reaching. Iran has established itself as the key external powerbroker in Iraq using its longstanding ties with key Iraqi Shia politicians, parties, and armed groups to do so as well as its soft power in the religious and economic domains. Iran has also used its Shia proxies in Iraq to gain an alternative source of influence and the means to secure itself as a key regional power, giving it a geopolitical edge over its Arab neighbours. Iran is one of Iraq's main trading partners, and its annual exports to Iraq amount to about $10 billion or some 25 per cent of Iraq's imports. Through intricate networks within Iraq's financial system, Iran manages to siphon off billions of dollars to cover its shortages of hard currency caused by international sanctions. Clearly, Iran has succeeded in building client-type relationships with Iraq's Shia leaders that Tehran has hoped to use to build its regional power by expanding both its hard power (military and economic) and its soft power (diplomacy and cultural influence). Yet, when it comes to Iraq's standing during the current conflict, there have been strikingly few signs that its friends, allies, and proxies have come to its rescue in its time of need. On the surface, Iraq's caution about showing its support to Iran is linked to its Shia leadership treading carefully amid the escalating Iran-Israel confrontation and fears of a backlash. But a closer look at Iraq's decision to stay out of the military confrontation shows not only a complex policy issue that could be a potential security threat to Iraq, but also a feeling of national self-scrutiny that Iraq's Shia leaders should take into consideration. As the US joins the war against Iran, a deep national dilemma that has long been expected to surface over the Iraqi Shias' bonds with Iran has emerged, probing the limited options Iraq has to respond directly to the conflict. Viewed from this larger national perspective, the war between Iran and Israel is a significant test of Iraqi nationalism, revealing both the challenges of unifying Iraqis from multiple sectarian and ethnic backgrounds and the potentially divisive aspects of competing visions of national identity. While the conflict has fostered a sense of national accord between the Iraqi Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds in particular, it has also highlighted historical and ideological fault lines within Iraqi society, including relations with Iran. The conflict has been a crucial test of Iraq's Shia leadership, involving not only its fear of undermining their community's interests but also its judgement of the country's broader national interests, which require sparing Iraq from the scourge of another war. Some of the militias that have occasionally struck bases housing US troops in Iraq have continued to make threats, but they have not actually carried them out. It is believed that the militias' focus has shifted to self-protective tactics to avoid harm from Israel and the United States as long as they are not facing an existential threat. By all accounts, the Iran-Israel war has placed the Iraqi Shias at a crossroads and one that could be detrimental not only to their rule and influence but also to their future if Iran's regional power is severely degraded. Whatever happens, it is doubtful that Iran will come out unscathed from the war, and as far as its networks of regional allies and in particular Iraqi Shias are concerned, these will certainly face an uncertain future. The increased political influence of Shia Muslims in post-Saddam Iraq, or what has been called the 'Shia rise' championed by Iran, will be challenged, especially after the setbacks for Iran and its allies in Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria. Israel might have launched its war to destroy Iran's capacity to make nuclear weapons, targeting missile depots and military and political leaders and eliminating its regional influence, but by reversing the Shia revival, the Middle East will face another drastic geopolitical game-changer. This will be Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's new Middle East, a chaotic and divided region plunged into sectarian wars. The amended goals of the war endorsed by the Israeli Cabinet and published this week have shown that damaging the 'Shia Axis' is at the top of Israel's list. * A version of this article appears in print in the 26 June, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
Iraqi News
18-06-2025
- Politics
- Iraqi News
Muqtada al-Sadr calls for nationwide Friday protests against US and Israeli terrorism
Baghdad ( – Influential Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr on Wednesday (June 18, 2025) called for organized, peaceful demonstrations to be held across Iraq after prayers this coming Friday. In a public statement, Al-Sadr urged his followers to protest in the center of each governorate to condemn what he described as 'Zionist and American terrorism, its colonial expansion, and its hostility towards peoples and religions.' He specifically cited 'aggression against Arab and Islamic countries,' including neighboring Iran, Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. The call also serves as a condemnation of the 'violation of our internationally protected Iraqi airspace,' which he said would harm the nation. Invoking the legacy of his father, Al-Sadr reiterated the slogan 'No, no to Israel; no, no to America,' framing the US as the 'primary driver of all wars in the world.' He stressed the demonstrations must be peaceful and called on 'sincere ones' to participate while excluding 'the corrupt.' The call to protest comes amid heightened regional tensions following recent Israeli-Iranian military exchanges.
Iraqi News
18-06-2025
- Politics
- Iraqi News
Iraqi forces secure German Embassy in Baghdad ahead of planned pro-Iran protests
Baghdad ( – Iraqi security forces imposed a security cordon around the German Embassy in Baghdad on Wednesday (June 18, 2025) in response to calls for protests by supporters of Iraqi Shia factions. A security source confirmed that high-level directives were issued to reinforce units and secure the embassy's perimeter in the Al-Mansour district. This followed social media posts urging a large protest at the embassy. The calls for demonstration were to condemn recent Israeli military operations against Iran and to protest a statement issued by the Group of Seven (G7) on Monday. The G7 statement had expressed support for Israel in its conflict with Iran and stressed that Tehran cannot possess nuclear weapons. The security deployment is a precautionary measure by Iraqi authorities to maintain order and protect diplomatic missions amidst heightened regional tensions.
The Age
14-06-2025
- Politics
- The Age
Iran's four possible responses to Israeli attack
Israel's attack on Iran opens the next phase of the Great Middle Eastern War that began on October 7, 2023. Over the past 20 months, that war has played out on fronts across the region and has drawn in actors from around the globe. There is much we don't yet know about what has happened, let alone what will happen. But it is clear that Iran has suffered significant damage to its leadership, its military and industrial capabilities, and perhaps its nuclear program. The endgame of this conflict and the future of the region will be profoundly shaped by how a wounded Iran responds. There are four basic possibilities. Their consequences range from a bigger, bloodier Middle Eastern mess to a potentially surprising diplomatic denouement: a far stronger nuclear deal than United States President Donald Trump could have secured just a few days ago. First, Iran could go nasty but narrow, striking back against Israel but avoiding US bases or other regional targets. Drone, missile or terrorist attacks against Israel (some of which are already underway) would offer a measure of vengeance. But this strategy would seek to avoid triggering a larger, riskier conflict with Washington. The problem is that America is already involved in this conflict: Trump has pledged to help Israel defend itself. A narrow response could thus look pathetic if Tehran's remaining weapons can't penetrate Israel's multi-layered (and multi-nation) air and missile defence. And even if Iran draws blood, Israel will just keep coming, as these opening strikes were the beginning of a larger military campaign. If Iran needs to make a bigger statement, it could go big and broad. In addition to hitting Israel, it could strike US personnel, facilities and partners from Iraq to the Persian Gulf. It could also activate its proxies – the Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and what remains of Hezbollah – in a bid to set the region on fire. That strategy has appeal as a way of restoring deterrence against dangerous enemies. It would remind the world that even a weakened Iran can cause real pain. But it would also cross the red line Trump has drawn against attacks on US targets. So Iran could find itself fighting a bigger war against Israel and the US, fraught with existential dangers for an already battered regime. The third possibility – nuclear breakout – could be just as dangerous. Depending on how much nuclear infrastructure is left – particularly the buried, hardened uranium enrichment facility at Fordow – Tehran could withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty and make a desperate push for the bomb.
Sydney Morning Herald
14-06-2025
- Politics
- Sydney Morning Herald
Iran's four possible responses to Israeli attack
Israel's attack on Iran opens the next phase of the Great Middle Eastern War that began on October 7, 2023. Over the past 20 months, that war has played out on fronts across the region and has drawn in actors from around the globe. There is much we don't yet know about what has happened, let alone what will happen. But it is clear that Iran has suffered significant damage to its leadership, its military and industrial capabilities, and perhaps its nuclear program. The endgame of this conflict and the future of the region will be profoundly shaped by how a wounded Iran responds. There are four basic possibilities. Their consequences range from a bigger, bloodier Middle Eastern mess to a potentially surprising diplomatic denouement: a far stronger nuclear deal than United States President Donald Trump could have secured just a few days ago. First, Iran could go nasty but narrow, striking back against Israel but avoiding US bases or other regional targets. Drone, missile or terrorist attacks against Israel (some of which are already underway) would offer a measure of vengeance. But this strategy would seek to avoid triggering a larger, riskier conflict with Washington. The problem is that America is already involved in this conflict: Trump has pledged to help Israel defend itself. A narrow response could thus look pathetic if Tehran's remaining weapons can't penetrate Israel's multi-layered (and multi-nation) air and missile defence. And even if Iran draws blood, Israel will just keep coming, as these opening strikes were the beginning of a larger military campaign. If Iran needs to make a bigger statement, it could go big and broad. In addition to hitting Israel, it could strike US personnel, facilities and partners from Iraq to the Persian Gulf. It could also activate its proxies – the Houthis, Iraqi Shia militias, and what remains of Hezbollah – in a bid to set the region on fire. That strategy has appeal as a way of restoring deterrence against dangerous enemies. It would remind the world that even a weakened Iran can cause real pain. But it would also cross the red line Trump has drawn against attacks on US targets. So Iran could find itself fighting a bigger war against Israel and the US, fraught with existential dangers for an already battered regime. The third possibility – nuclear breakout – could be just as dangerous. Depending on how much nuclear infrastructure is left – particularly the buried, hardened uranium enrichment facility at Fordow – Tehran could withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty and make a desperate push for the bomb.
