Latest news with #IslamicRevolutionof1979
India.com
06-08-2025
- Business
- India.com
Can A Country Survive Without America? These Nations Already Already Do Without U.S. Ties
New Delhi: The global order has long revolved around the United States. Its economic weight, military power and diplomatic reach have shaped how countries operate. But a handful of nations have taken a different path. They have either walked away from Washington or never entered the room. And despite years of pressure, sanctions and isolation, they continue to function. Among them, Iran stands out. For decades, Tehran has maintained one of the most antagonistic relationships with Washington. The rift deepened after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which led to sweeping sanctions that strangled its economy. But Iran did not collapse. Instead, it shifted its focus inward, developed its oil and gas sector and invested in domestic industries. It strengthened ties with countries like Russia, China and Turkey to keep its economy running. In 2024, U.S. President Donald Trump intensified tariff threats against several countries. India found itself on Washington's radar. He accused New Delhi of buying large quantities of crude oil from Russia and selling it in global markets at a profit. He announced a 25% tariff on Indian trade and lashed out on Truth Social, claiming New Delhi had no concern for the war in Ukraine. India issued a strong rebuttal. Responding to the threat, the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) made it clear that India would act in its national interest. MEA spokesperson Randhir Jaiswal explained that India had to turn to Russian oil because European suppliers had redirected their energy exports in the aftermath of the Ukraine conflict. At that time, Washington had supported India's decision. 'This is not a matter of choice. It was a response to the global market's limitations,' he said and pointed out the irony that countries that continue to criticise India are themselves engaged in trade with Russia, even when they face no strategic compulsion to do so. This debate has brought up a question: can a nation survive without engaging with the United States? Are there countries that have built an economic and political existence independent of American support? There are. Iran, Cuba, North Korea and Venezuela have managed to chart out such paths. Their experiences are far from smooth. Each of them has faced significant hardships. Still, they have not collapsed under pressure. Instead, they have sought out new alliances, developed local industries and found ways to adapt. After decades of sanctions, Iran signed a 25-year strategic agreement with China. The deal covers Chinese investments in Iran and steady oil purchases. Tehran also expanded military and economic ties with Moscow. Its domestic defence and technology sectors have grown despite external isolation. Its missile and drone programmes are homegrown. The country's education and healthcare systems, while strained, continue to function. Cuba has followed its own model. Since the 1960s, it has faced stringent U.S. sanctions. After embracing communism under Fidel Castro, the country was cut off from American trade. But it built a healthcare system that earned global praise. Cuban doctors and vaccines have been exported to countries across Latin America and Africa. Its tourism and biotechnology have brought in revenue. Partnerships with Russia, Venezuela and other regional allies have helped it remain afloat. North Korea offers a different case. There are no direct economic ties between Pyongyang and Washington. The two countries remain adversaries. Under Kim Jong Un, North Korea has prioritised its nuclear weapons programme and missile development. It has relied heavily on China for energy, food and essential supplies. Russia has also provided limited support. Despite economic difficulties, North Korea has continued to function under its rigid political system. Venezuela, too, has faced American sanctions, especially targetting its oil exports. But Caracas responded by strengthening its ties with Iran, China and Russia. It used its vast oil reserves as leverage, exchanging energy for investment and support. Each of these countries has followed a different model. Some turned to authoritarianism, while others leaned on regional alliances. But all have demonstrated that an economic existence without the United States, while difficult, is not impossible. These examples do not suggest that global engagement with Washington lacks value. The United States remains the world's largest economy and a central force in international diplomacy. But these nations show that with the right strategies, strong internal planning and alternative partnerships, survival outside the American orbit is not only possible, but it is already happening.
Atlantic
05-08-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
The Iranian Revolution Was an Accident of History
The Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of anguish for its own people, its neighbors, and the broader world. The government likely executes more people than any state except China. It imposes bizarre restrictions on its citizens, especially women (who are barred from singing solo, cycling, or smoking hookah in public). Its transnational revolutionary Islamist identity is extremely rare for a modern state. Similarly ideological states of the communist variation were mostly either abolished long ago or preserved only in name. Yet the Tehran regime is still here. How was it that, of all countries, Iran became this Islamic Republic? It boggles the mind, especially if you get to hang out with Iranians. On average, we are less religious than many peoples of the Muslim world, and patriotic to the point of narcissism. How did we become the building block of globally messianic Islamism? In other words, how did the Islamic Revolution of 1979 come to be, and why did its leaders endure? The revolution was preceded by years of organized opposition to the shah, waged not just by Islamists but by Marxists, nationalists, and liberals. Each group had entered the movement with its own aspirations. Very few advocated for the kind of theocracy that eventually emerged and went on to repress all non-Islamists. The losers of the revolution have spent the years since trying to figure out what went wrong. The field of Iranian studies sometimes resembles a whodunit, fixated on finding a grand, overarching reason for the revolution. Was it the Marxist left and secular nationalists, fatally allying themselves with devout Muslims in 1979? Was it the shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, reforming too rapidly in the 1970s? Was it the U.S., which in 1953 helped overthrow Iran's democratic government? Or does blame go much further back, to the way Iranians began adopting Islam in the 600s? Or to an authoritarian culture forged in the Persian kingdoms of antiquity? The obsessive nature of such inquiries reveals more about their authors than the question at hand. Academics often scoff at histories written by journalists, as some surely will at Scott Anderson's new book, King of Kings: The Iranian Revolution: A Story of Hubris, Delusion, and Catastrophic Miscalculation. But Anderson succeeds precisely because he eschews structural, quasi-philosophical queries for an energetic account that concerns itself with, as he puts it, 'a few core questions': Why was the shah unable to stop the revolution? Why was the U.S. so oblivious to the dangers facing one of its most crucial allies? And how could Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, a mysterious septuagenarian Muslim cleric then little known to most of the world, 'establish a theocratic dictatorship with himself as supreme leader?' As a result of this inquiry, Anderson finds an answer at once simpler, more instructive, and truer than those of many scholars. The book is based mostly on oral-history interviews with Americans involved in making Iran policy during and before 1979, as well as a few Iranians, such as Queen Farah Pahlavi, the widow of the last shah. But to his credit, Anderson has also consulted the best scholarship on the revolution, including historians such as Ervand Abrahamian, Abbas Milani, Darioush Bayandor, and Ray Takeyh. Anderson thus offers a readable page-turner that's also attuned to those core questions. The book answers the why and the how of the revolution with a clear conclusion that might frustrate the grand theorists: It was a contingent event, not some historical inevitability but, in many ways, an accident. The key to understanding it, therefore, lies not in queries into the soul of the Iranian nation or the nature of Islam but in studying who did what in the crucial months leading to February 11, 1979. Much of Anderson's reporting focuses on the U.S. and the shah; he is weaker in examining the diverse factions of Iranians who opposed the shah and understanding what made them tick. Anderson could have done more to dig into the bizarre kaleidoscope of Iranian revolutionaries in the 1960s and '70s, showing us why the best and brightest of a rapidly advancing society would line up behind an obscurantist like Khomeini. But the focus on the U.S. is also helpful for several reasons. First, the American government was central to the course of revolution, although in indirect ways. Anderson's account shows just how ill-informed and unfocused its approach was to the events of 1978–79. Its inaction was as earthshaking as action can be, especially because both the shah and his opponents were governed by their perceptions of what the U.S. did or did not want. Second, the book helps dispel conspiracy theories, now distressingly common among Iranians, that propose that the shah's overthrow was secretly planned and carefully orchestrated by President Jimmy Carter. Anderson's account of the shah in the 1970s is a familiar story of an Icarus-like figure felled by his own hubris. Buoyed by his rising currency at the Nixon White House and the modernizing Iranian economy, the shah missed the country's growing inequality, which encouraged snowballing dissent. Anderson explains how the shah's deft oil-price manipulations and President Richard Nixon's carte blanche military support helped fuel 'massive inflation and social dislocation.' The rich-poor gap grew, and Tehran became surrounded by slums full of unemployed young men. The tinder for a revolutionary movement was there, requiring only the right spark. American negligence was another undeniable factor, as Anderson shows. Responding to the shah's paranoia about Americans wanting to undermine him, the U.S. simply stopped tracking systematic opposition to his rule. A National Security Council officer in the '60s said that the CIA, largely focused on the Soviets, had relied mostly on the shah's secret police for intelligence about domestic dissent. In 1978, as the mammoth anti-shah protests grew, the U.S. was unable to respond effectively; different branches of the government worked against one another and didn't even share relevant information. The shah's paranoia made things worse. Secretly suffering from cancer, he was meandering and ineffective. Meanwhile, the Carter administration was distracted by other global events: the Panama Canal crisis, the SALT II negotiations with Moscow, the Israeli-Egyptian peace talks. Surely, they thought, the shah wouldn't simply fall. As the year progressed and protests didn't cease, sharply divergent positions developed in the U.S. Some officials, such as National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, pushed for a hard line, clinging to the hope that American-trained Iranian forces could save the day with a coup. Others thought the U.S. had little to worry about with Khomeini because of his non-communism. The Western-educated men surrounding the ayatollah worked hard to strengthen this impression. Having failed to do their homework, few American officials knew about the extremist core of Khomeini's ideas. This ignorance persisted to the end: Shockingly, not a single Persian-speaking staffer from the American embassy attended the ayatollah's comeback speech in Tehran on February 1, 1979, one of the most important events in the history of the 20th century. Simply put, the revolutionary camp won because it was able to outsmart the shah and his powerful American backers. This chaotic U.S. response is evident all the way up to February 11, 1979, the day of the revolution. Fittingly, the top-level Situation Room meeting about Iran that day didn't include Carter or Secretary of State Cyrus Vance—both were away in Camp David—and it took place at 8:30 a.m. D.C. time, already 5 p.m. in Iran, 'too late for the Americans to in any way affect the outcome there,' as Anderson puts it. The team in the capital wanted to contact the U.S. Ambassador to Iran William Sullivan to get the latest from the ground, but he was busy with more pressing matters. Twenty-six American servicemen were in a bunker surrounded by revolutionaries, and he was trying to get them to the U.S. embassy three miles away. Shadi Hamid: The reason Iran turned out to be so repressive Yet the calls from the White House persisted, especially an inquiry by Brzezinski, who kept insisting on his fanciful notion of a last-minute anti-Khomeini coup, a 'pie-in-the-sky' idea, per Anderson. Sick of having to hear it even at this eleventh hour, Sullivan shouted on the phone: 'Tell Brzezinski to go fuck himself!' It didn't matter. Khomeini won and the shah was done for good. Iran's centuries-long monarchical tradition gave way to its first-ever republic. But Anderson doesn't pin the blame on the U.S.—he hasn't found a single culprit, and he hasn't written a whodunit. Different U.S. actions might not have changed much. Sometimes some people just get lucky. A few months later, even when Carter did see the 'approaching cataclysm' of the seizure of the U.S. embassy and the ensuing hostage crisis, he was prevented from stopping it by what Anderson describes as 'a nearly freakish convergence of circumstances.' Whenever I teach a class on the Iranian Revolution, I start with a conversation about historical contingency. If there is one event that shows that a freakish convergence of circumstances can make history, this is it. Anderson's book, one of the best on 1979, won't be the last word on the subject, but I wish we could move away from a search for neat causal explanations and swallow the harsh truth that Khomeini got a lucky break, and Iran got the rough end of it. The Islamic Republic has survived only by shape-shifting endlessly while retaining some of the worst impulses of 1979. This is mostly thanks to one 1960s revolutionary, Ali Khamenei, who replaced Khomeini as supreme leader in 1989 and has continued to rule to this day. Now 86 and ailing, Khamenei has lived long enough to see the total failure of his predecessor's revolution. The old man had promised to offer an alternative to both communism and capitalism that would make Iran into a spiritual heaven. Instead, the Islamic Republic survives as a massively unpopular dictatorship, economically ruined, internationally isolated, and battered by both the U.S. and Israel. As Iranian elites compete to form the post-Khamenei Iran, they are likely to jettison Khomeinism wholesale, even if some hold on to the better ideals of 1979. It has taken almost half a century, but the page is closing on the revolution. Perhaps Iran's luck will turn again.
Indian Express
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
As Israel strikes Yemen, it will need to look back at its security architecture after conflict with Iran
Israel's ongoing air strikes targeting the Houthis in Yemen, the ports of Hodeidah, Ras Isa and Salif, and the Ras Khatib power station, could be construed as its commitment to consistently degrade the operational capabilities of any adversaries it perceives as major security threats. While most Iranian-supported proxies lie low for the moment, the Houthi militias appear intent on enhancing their reputation as a threat which Israel cannot afford to ignore. For decades, the rivalry between Israel and Iran has been characterised by proxy conflicts and rhetorical antagonism, yet direct military confrontation remained largely theoretical. The recent escalation in hostilities between these two regional powers has fundamentally altered this dynamic. The ideological and political divergences between Israel and Iran crystallised following the Islamic Revolution of 1979, which established a theocratic governance structure under clerical authority headed by the Supreme Leader. Iran's nuclear programme, particularly its uranium enrichment activities, has emerged as a central flashpoint in this arch rivalry, which intensified following the mid-2002 revelation of Tehran's nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz. The policy trajectory has remained consistent across successive US administrations, culminating in direct military strikes against three important nuclear facilities inside Iran on June 22, 2025. These actions, however, followed Israel's pre-emptive strikes against Iran on June 13 and subsequent Iranian retaliation. While the military exchanges between Israel and Iran in 2024 resulted in limited material damage to both parties, it appeared that the former's leadership had grown complacent due to the measured Iranian responses during these earlier strikes. Tel Aviv was operating under the assumption that future threats could be effectively mitigated through existing air defence systems, a miscalculation that proved costly. Critical infrastructure in Israel, including a Haifa oil refinery, a Beersheba hospital, and residential complexes in populated areas suffered substantial harm. On the other hand, the conflict's aftermath presents significant challenges for Iran's domestic stability. The current regime confronts the imperative of securing substantial public support for its continued legitimacy while simultaneously implementing more stringent governance measures to prevent the fragmentation of public opinion. This represents a particularly delicate balancing act, given recent episodes of civil unrest (for instance, Mahsa Amini) stemming from Iran's human rights records, restrictions on female political participation, and persistent socio-economic grievances. In the post-conflict environment, the theocratic regime is likely to respond to any manifestation of dissent with increased authoritarian measures. This 'wounded' regime — even the IRGC has suffered severe operational degradation following the elimination of several senior military commanders — is likely going to be a dangerous one. The conflict has also fundamentally challenged Iran's regional ambitions, especially its project of establishing a Shiite crescent across the Levant. The assassination of former Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in an Israeli airstrike in Beirut in September 2024, to an extent, undermined operation effectiveness of the Axis of Resistance, calling into question the viability of Iran's regional proxy network. The fall of former Syrian President, Bashar al-Assad to rebel forces in December 2024 constituted a major setback for Iranian leadership, representing the loss of a crucial ally who had been instrumental in sustaining and advancing the so-called resistance framework. And beyond the Houthis' initial missile attack against Israel, other Iranian proxies had shown limited engagement during the conflict. This was mostly evident among Iranian-aligned groups operating out of Lebanon and Iraq which could be construed as potential weaknesses in Iran's proxy coordination and commitment mechanisms. However, it remains premature to anticipate the complete cessation of proxy activities; these groups will likely adopt a more cautious operational posture to avoid retaliatory measures for a while. While Iran's setbacks during the June conflict were discernible, Israel also confronted significant security challenges. Despite deploying advanced anti-missile defence systems, including variants of Arrow, David's Sling, Iron Dome, and US-manufactured Patriot systems, which intercepted numerous long-range ballistic missiles, the defensive network proved insufficient against the sustained missile assault carried out by Iran. For a geographically constrained state like Israel, prolonged exposure to such intensive attacks from regional adversaries presents unsustainable strategic risks, given its limited defensive resources and the escalating financial cost of continuous retaliation. Questions also remain regarding the sustainability of Israel's dependence on American security assurances, particularly given the Trump administration's disinterest to engage in protracted Middle Eastern military entanglements. This dilemma between immediate security guarantees and long-term strategic autonomy presents a critical consideration for Israeli defence planning moving forward. The damage inflicted upon Iran's nuclear infrastructure will likely require several years of reconstruction efforts, though whether Tehran will resume uranium enrichment activities remains an open question. Simultaneously, there are growing concerns that Iran may retreat into unprecedented levels of operational secrecy, potentially complicating international monitoring efforts and obscuring the regime's actual capabilities and intentions from the global community. Given Israel's consistent capacity for strategic adaptation following military engagements throughout its history, it will likely conduct a comprehensive assessment of the operational deficiencies and strategic vulnerabilities exposed during the recent confrontation. The 12-day confrontation, nevertheless, marks a watershed moment, testing Israel and Iran's deterrence frameworks and strategic resilience, fundamentally altering the parameters of their longstanding rivalry and establishing new precedents for regional security dynamics. The writer is Deputy Director & Assistant Professor, Symbiosis School of International Studies, Pune
Scroll.in
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
What Iranians in India think about the war and Tehran
For several nights this month, Nader Mohandesi stayed up till 2 am in his Bengaluru home watching television news about the war between Israel and his country, Iran. The 60-year-old surgeon was worried about his mother, who lives in the Iranian city of Shiraz. Throughout the war, Mohandesi used to send a WhatsApp message on his family group chat every morning and wait for it to get delivered. 'We could not talk everyday because the internet connection in Iran was very weak,' he said. 'It was really stressful.' Things were worse in Tehran, Iran's capital. An Iranian artist who lives in Delhi told Scroll that his parents and younger sister had to flee the city on the fifth day of the fighting. 'They locked up our house and went to my grandparents' home in the North-West of Iran,' said the artist who requested anonymity citing privacy concerns. Anxious and unable to sleep, the 38-year-old even considered flying to Turkey or Armenia and making his way to them by land. But his family dissuaded him. 'You go through more stress if you live outside,' he explained. The Israel-Iran ceasefire, announced on Tuesday by United States President Donald Trump, brought relief to Mohandesi and the artist. But the two differed vastly on what had led their country to the brink. Their differences shed light on the schism in Iranian society. 'Is this karma?' asked Mohandesi as he walked to his clinic in Bengaluru on Monday. He was referring to the air strikes carried out by the US on three of Iran's nuclear sites the previous day. Though the US has justified its attack by alleging that Iran was on the verge of producing nuclear weapons, the International Atomic Energy Agency has found nothing to support this claim. The surgeon, however, was clear that Iran's nuclear programme and the ideology supposedly underpinning it was to blame for its current predicament. 'For 45 years, they have been saying down with this country or that,' he added. 'What else did they expect?' Soon after the Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran locked horns with the US, which had allowed Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, the deposed Shah, to visit America for medical treatment. While the monarch did not live for very long, the feud between the two countries has lasted ever since. Mohandesi argued that the bitterness between Iran and the US had done no good to his homeland. He came to India in 1985 to study medicine and stayed on after falling in love with a college junior – a woman from Guwahati. The couple decided to build their lives together in Bengaluru. Living in the Silicon Valley of India gave Mohandesi a ringside view of India's unfolding growth story even as Western sanctions were impeding the economic trajectory of his own country. Now, he wanted Tehran to hold a referendum on continuing its nuclear programme. 'Our Constitution says that in difficult situations you must go to the people,' he reasoned. The artist, on the other hand, dismissed all talk about nuclear weapons as eyewash. The US, in his view, was making a 'power play' in West Asia by attacking Iran. 'The world is an unfair place,' he said. He first came to India over two decades ago with his parents, who had found work here. While they returned to Iran a few years later, he chose to stay because he was in the middle of college. Over time, he found himself drawn to the world of Indian arts, which he likened to the environment he grew up in back home in Iran. 'If Iran is my father, India is my mother,' he joked. He made it clear, though, that the nostalgia had not made him a regime apologist. He was critical of its economic policies, particularly the state of the Iranian Rial, its currency. Still, he appreciated the advances that his country had made in areas such as 'defence and medicine' since the revolution. 'Things don't happen overnight,' he contended. 'Sometimes, it takes one or two generations.' In recent years, Iran has been rocked by women-led protests, most notably against compulsory veiling. In December, the country was considering the promulgation of a law which proposed death penalty for women refusing to veil themselves. But the artist held the protests as proof of democracy deepening in the country. The one thing that the artist as well as the surgeon agreed on was the need for political reform in Iran. Both hoped that the recently concluded war would be a 'wake-up call' for the regime. 'I hope the regime sees that most people backed the country,' the artist said. Mohandesi was less optimistic. He remembered having voted for the reformists in the elections of 1997 and 2001 only to be eventually disappointed by them. 'I thought something would happen,' he recalled. 'But the system is very rigid. It just does not give in.' Here is a summary of the week's other top stories. India's stance at the SCO. India did not sign a joint statement at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Defence Ministers' meeting as the document did not reflect New Delhi's position against terror. The Ministry of External Affairs said that New Delhi 'wanted concerns and terrorism reflected in the document, which was not acceptable to one particular country'. The statement reportedly did not contain references to the Pahalgam terror attack on April 22 that killed 26 persons. At the organisation's meeting in China, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh said that New Delhi had launched Operation Sindoor in response to the Pahalgam attack. India exercised its right to defend against terrorism and pre-empt as well as deter further cross-border attacks, said the minister. Free and fair polls. Alleging that 'vote theft' took place during the Maharashtra Assembly elections in November, Congress leader Rahul Gandhi demanded the immediate release of machine-readable digital voter rolls and security camera footage. The leader of Opposition in Lok Sabha made the statements after Newslaundry reported that Maharashtra Chief Minister Devendra Fadnavis' constituency saw an 8% increase in voters between the Lok Sabha elections, held in May and June 2024, and the Assembly polls in November. Gandhi has frequently demanded access to voter lists, polling data and election footage, alleging irregularities. His statements on Tuesday came days after the Election Commission wrote to him saying all polls are held strictly as per laws passed by Parliament. Former CM booked. The police in Andhra Pradesh's Guntur district filed a first information report against former Chief Minister YS Jagan Mohan Reddy and several of his aides over the death of a 65-year-old man during a YSR Congress Party rally on June 18. Guntur District Superintendent of Police S Satish Kumar said the man Cheeli Singaiah died after being run over by a vehicle in which Jagan Mohan Reddy was travelling during the rally. Besides Jagan Mohan Reddy, the FIR names his driver Ramana Reddy, personal assistant Nageswar Reddy, MP YV Subba Reddy and former ministers Perni Nani and Vidadala Rajini. All of them were reportedly in the vehicle that ran over Singaiah. interim protection from arrest till July 1. Also on Scroll this week Follow the Scroll channel on WhatsApp for a curated selection of the news that matters throughout the day, and a round-up of major developments in India and around the world every evening. What you won't get: spam.
The Irish Sun
27-06-2025
- Politics
- The Irish Sun
I endured 5 sobering days in Iran's capital & saw what locals have put up with for 46 yrs – reign of tyranny must end
4 THERE are no boozers in Iran. In the capital, Tehran there are plenty of shops selling spare parts for trucks and heavy machinery though. There are also a plethora of stores flogging long-sleeved shirts, hijabs and chadors (full body cloaks). Advertisement In the Islamic Republic, advertising is virtually non-existent. Western brands are forbidden. They drive 4 The forbidding eyes of the Ayatollahs stare down at the public in Tehran Credit: Alamy The only advertisements you'll see, apart from those praising local products, are massive murals celebrating the The 'martyrs' of the eight-year Iran-Iraq war adorn the sides of apartment blocks. The street outside the old British Embassy is still named after the Advertisement Four-lane motorways accommodate eight lanes of traffic, at least. A city of 10 million souls live in a theocratic prison. The Islamic Revolution of 1979 promised freedom, instead it delivered repression, isolation, inequality, death and despair. Men in black never deliver. Those are some of my memories of Tehran. I was there for the guts of a week in November 2001, sent by my editor to cover the World Cup play-off match between Ireland and Iran. The winner would go to Ireland had won the first leg in Advertisement I was part of a media pack of about 20. A further 100 or so die-hard fans joined us. We travelled on the same plane as the team, jetting out on a Sunday. We all stayed in the same hotel, the five-star Laleh International, guarded 24/7 by plain-clothes Iranian regime spies and car loads of Basij, the morality Whenever we ventured out, we were followed at an indiscreet distance. We knew they were there and they wanted us to know they were there. After all, it had been just two months since terrorists had flown two planes into the Twin Towers in DICKY STOMACH After two days without a drop of There's only so much soft drink one can imbibe, without the body rebelling. Then, on Wednesday afternoon, the day before the big game, rumours swirled at the hotel that someone had sourced booze, but at a secret location in the city. All very hush, hush it had to be. A go-between by the name of 20 Major had set up the pre-match party, but it'd be £50 a head (punts). Advertisement That evening, three or four mini-buses drove up to the back gate of the hotel to take 40 or so who'd stumped up the necessary. After an hour's ride through back streets the buses parked up outside a block of apartments. The fans were ushered inside and found themselves outside a flat in a dark hall. The door slowly opened and they were ushered in, the hosts holding their fingers up to their lips. Hands were rubbed, lips licked, feet tapped together in anticipation of a feed of drink. In they traipsed to the kitchen. A generous spread of grub was piled on one table, but all eyes were on the table at the back wall. MATCH DAY For there lay the holy grail; 200 cans of Tuborg that were TWO YEARS out of date. Undeterred by the prospect of a dicky stomach the following day (and they all had), the cans were devoured. Advertisement At 3am, they were smuggled back to the hotel, mercifully without incident. Match day. Thursday evening. The Azadi stadium. 99,900 Iranian men. A sea of beards. 100 Paddies. A cacophony of noise, colour and horns. The stadium was ringed with Islamic revolutionary slogans. Two giant portraits of old, dead Khomeini and the new man in black, Khamenei staring at us. A dour, nervous game. The first time women had been allowed into a football stadium in Iran (after a diplomatic wrangle). Ten or so of our girls. Wearing green chadors in defiance, in a metal cage. STADIUM SCENES Iran winning 1-0. Ireland hanging on for the win. Scenes. Rocks and bottles come at us from all angles. The revolutionary posters are torn down and set on fire. Seats are on fire too. We're kept in the stadium for three hours afterwards. Outside, Iranian fans and police engage in running battles. Advertisement Our buses arrive. Reporters, photographers, Irish fans and team clamber on board. Glass and debris litter the road on the 45km drive from the stadium to the airport. No one says a word. Fear makes you shut your trap. Airport staff can't get shot of us fast enough. Scowls. Moustaches. Dark eyes. We board the The relief to be away from that suffocating place. What must it be like for ordinary, decent Iranians? We endured five sobering days there. They've put up with it for the last 46 years. The soft and remarkable Iranian people long for regime change, the one thing both Israel and the For lasting peace in the Advertisement STUDENT RITE ENDS YOUNGSTERS heading to America on J1 student visas to work during the We've been doing it for generations. I went to 4 President Donald Trump ordered US embassies world-wide to vet the social media of everyone seeking a work visa Credit: Shutterstock Editorial They worked in bars and restaurants, at amusement arcades, as hotel valets and porters to name but a few. They had a ball. America gave them a taste of a culture that's been in the Irish DNA for over 150 years. Both profited hugely from the exchange. Advertisement Students will now think long and hard about heading to the States on a J1 after Kids will now have to make public every Who would want to go through that? The days of the J1 are over. Until Trump is ousted and sanity prevails in America, Irish students and anyone else in possession of a brain will go to work and live in SOLVE THE MYSTERY TO lose a child is unfathomable. To lose a child and for them never to be found is a heartbreak too far. Annie McCarrick, who The search of the house has ended. Annie's mother, Nancy, who lives in Long Island, New York, has endured a living hell. The latest developments would have given her renewed hope of a breakthrough as to what happened to Annie. The cold case cops are close, but not there yet. For Nancy's sake, hopefully they will crack the case soon. ALL TALK, NO ACTION IN DUBLIN THE hot air brigade were busy again this week huffing and puffing and bloviating about what they will do. Taoiseach Advertisement 4 Waste on the side of a road in Dublin Credit: Alamy Like the Boy Who Cried Wolf, we've stopped believing anything that emanates from either of their mouths. We've heard it all before. Now is not the time for more talk, it's way past the time for action. Dublin is blighted by dereliction, crime-ridden due to too few cops, chronically littered and its public spaces filthy. A firm hand would end that quickly. Instead of tough love, we were again served up the weak hand this week. Advertisement Martin, Martin said policing numbers would be increased over the next TEN YEARS. Christ almighty. They waxed lyrical about the revamp of the GPO, the Abbey and Ambassador theatres and the Fruit & Veg market. But these are already under way and not because of anything they did. The Dublin City Task Force made a series of recommendations last year. Those recommendations remain largely unfulfilled. 'DUBLIN IS A JEWEL SINCE that report, the government has failed to implement concrete plans and match any commitments with the necessary funding. Dublin is a jewel. It is a city we should be proud of. It deserves better than the plamas being lobbed in its direction every few months from politicians who, if they did care about sorting Dublin's problems, would just get on with it and do it. It's clear this government, with FF/FG in power, has failed Dublin and its citizens. They have repeatedly reneged on a recommendation from the Citizens' Assembly that Dublin have its own directly elected mayor with real power. Hot air won't transform Dublin, a mayor with teeth would. Until that happens, don't believe a word the government says about our capital city.
