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The Wire
3 days ago
- Politics
- The Wire
The Inscrutability of Partition
Books Sam Dalrymple does an exemplary job at putting a human face to the dissolution of the British India empire. Unfortunately, he misunderstands the governance structure and history of imperial dissolution. Sam Dalrymple does a fine job telling a complex history of the unravelling of the British Empire from the 1920s to 1971 in . Using a plethora of anecdotes, Dalrymple fleshes out the lives of the many characters who shaped and lived through the collapse of the British Indian empire – one that stretched from present day Yemen to Burma/Myanmar. The book tries to do three things: to make explicable the decision-making that affected, and continues to affect, the billions that live in the region (at that time, only hundreds of millions); to put a human face to the hopes, tragedies, and heroics of the people involved; and to broaden an idea of an 'India' that was, and could be, much larger. It succeeds to some degree in the first ambition, very well at the second, and fails horribly at the last. 'Shattered Lands : Five Partitions and the Making of Modern Asia', Sam Dalrymple, Fourth Estate India, 2025. Dalrymple is at his best when it comes to empathy, of digging out a factoid or anecdote from history, and with scrupulous care showing the human angle to a particular situation. There is a visceral description of Indian refugees fleeing Burma/Myanmar in the wake of the Japanese invasion in World War II, and the thoughtful choice of the Gujrati businessman Dhirubhai Ambani choosing to leave Aden as nationalism and Nasserite appeal rose in Yemen. The book is studded with these stories, told in a fine style, interspersed with key quotes. Unfortunately, the same style does a disservice to major historical characters. Both Gandhi and Jinnah come across as caricatures. To be fair, Jinnah's romance and heartbreak over his wife, Ruttie, is well told, but Jinnah's engagement with the Congress and disillusionment over its tactics as Gandhi became the pre-eminent leader is a mess. Taking just one quote, that Jinnah vowed to 'show Nehru' as a stand-in for Jinnah's motives is facile at best. Gandhi is portrayed as erratic and eccentric from 1930 onward, a strange categorisation for a man who was the principal steering power of the Congress. The Khilafat Movement – Gandhi's first major agitation which disgusted and alienated Jinnah as well as undercut him as a 'Muslim' leader – is not even mentioned in passing. Instead, the idea of a Hindu imagining of Bharat is highlighted as part of Gandhi's reason for not opposing the separation of Burma/Myanmar from India. Putting it like this, though, does not do justice to the book. Dalrymple is a fine writer, and has done an excellent job at archival research. His writing and knowledge make you feel as if you are in the midst of the action. I felt this in particular as he wrote about the Burma front during World War II, where my grandfather served from 1940-45. The problem is that trying to capture major historical actors in a few broad brushes, based on anecdotes and personal histories, rarely does justice to the complex, conflicted human beings that they were. Much of the problem is also the argument that undergirds Dalrymple's book – which is that there was a distinct political reality of the areas administered as 'India' by the British in 1928. This notion is undercut by the book itself in one of the best written chapters of collapsing the princely states into India and Pakistan (the Fourth 'Partition' of the book) when V.P. Menon is quoted as noting, 'For the first time India has become an integrated whole in the real sense of the term.' The British Indian empire of which Dalrymple writes was anything but an integrated whole. Yes, it was part of a cosmopolitan whole governed by the British, but then so were parts of Africa and the Caribbean, where Indians worked for generations. Simply because the areas that Dalrymple writes about were under the oversight of the India Office does not mean that present day Gulf Arab states shared any deep sense of belonging to an 'India,' or that Burma did. Bhutan is referred to as part of this 'India' but Dalrymple ignores the fact that British India explicitly excluded Bhutan from its domain because it did not want to have a border with China and thus its only form of governance there was in the shape of Political Agent whose principal duties was overseeing Sikkim and not interfering in Bhutan's affairs. He also refers multiple times to the tomb of Bahadur Shah Zafar in Rangoon, but never asks the obvious question that if the idea of India coincided with British rule in South Asia, why Zafar was exiled to Burma, well within British control, or why Zafar would write, ' Kitna hai badnaseeb Zafar dafn ke liye do gaz zamin bhi na mili kuu-e-yaar mein /How unfortunate is Zafar that he could not receive even two metres to be buried in the land of the Beloved'. The blunt truth is that, as Manan Ahmed Asif illustrates in his The Loss of Hindustan, a political reality existed before the British, and six centuries of the creation of a Hindustan, from the 13th to 19th century, preceded the British in South Asia. This area, largely analogous to, but not constrained within, the borders of the Sultanate and Mughal Empire had some sense of shared laws, history, and political imagination. Compared to this, the British Indian empire that Dalrymple maps from 1928, and which had its first partition in 1937, is a mere blip in history. There are other empires that have dissolved, with far longer histories and deeper integration. The dissolution of the British India empire of 1928 led to only 12 successor states, and although the violence has been immense, it pales in comparison to the violence from the dissolution of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after World War I, which saw far more partitions and led to World War II. Even the dissolution of the Soviet Union – which also existed far longer than the British India empire and was much more institutionally integrated – saw more partitions, creating some successor states that would be appalled at being reintegrated into an imagined post-Soviet space. One of them – Ukraine – is fighting a massive war not to be reintegrated. The romantic notion in much of South Asia that partitions are 'bad' is unsupported by evidence. Its force comes from the catastrophic mishandling of the partitions in the region, most notably between India and Pakistan, but as Dalrymple demonstrates, also India and Burma/Myanmar and others. Borders do not need to mean violence, as the European Union has demonstrated, but too frequently they do because nationalisms are enmeshed with the dehumanisation of 'others' based on race or creed. This, really, is the tragedy of our partitioned globe, and despite the problems of Dalrymple's book, it does a great job in showing how nasty and insane humans can be when they drink from that poison. Omair Ahmad is an author. His last novel, Jimmy the Terrorist, was shortlisted for the Man Asian Literary Prize, and won the Crossword Award. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
Business Recorder
7 days ago
- Politics
- Business Recorder
ZU hosts series of dialogues
KARACHI: Ziauddin University hosted the 24th interactive series of ZU Dialogues, titled "Jinnah's Vision of Pakistan: Interfaith Harmony: Faith, Freedom & the Nation.' The event served as a tribute to the inclusive ideals of Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah, bringing together scholars, community leaders, and students to reflect on his enduring principles of unity, religious freedom, and equal citizenship, values that lie at the very foundation of Pakistan. In his address to students, Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, Patron-in-Chief of the Pakistan Hindu Council, emphasized that young Pakistanis should move beyond religious labels. 'When you graduate and step into the world, don't see yourself or others as majority or minority, see yourselves as Pakistanis. That's the only way to honour Quaid's vision of a united nation built on mutual respect and shared values,' he said. "Quaid-e-Azam envisioned a Pakistan where every individual, regardless of faith or background, is treated with dignity and proudly calls themselves Pakistani. He believed that diversity is our strength, and mutual respect is the foundation of a united and progressive nation," he further stated. Speaking the audience, Amir Shahzad, Convener of ZU Dialogues, echoed Jinnah's iconic words: 'You are free to go to your temples. You are free to go to your mosques or to any other places of worship in this State of Pakistan.' He emphasized that these words are not just historical; they form the foundation of Pakistan's constitutional commitment to religious freedom, tolerance, and inclusivity. Emphasizing the need to understand Quaid-e-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's vision, pastor Ghazala Shafique shared that Quaid's presidential address to the Constituent Assembly in 1947 must be included in the curriculum at every level. "We want to be known as Pakistani Christians or Pakistani Hindus. Faith is personal, but it should not define our status in society. Christians significantly contributed to the creation of Pakistan, including casting the highest number of votes in Punjab in favour of it,' she remarked. Reflecting on the importance of interfaith harmony, inclusion, and unity, Sardar Amar Singh, Chairman of the Pakistan Khalsa Sikh Council, said that 'This is the Pakistan that Quaid-e-Azam envisioned, one where every community is respected. If we become honest and truthful, the vision behind our independence will truly be realized. Initiatives like the Kartarpur Corridor symbolize the peace and unity we must continue to strive for.' Dr. Syed Muzaffar Hussain, faculty member at Ziauddin University, underscored the importance of dialogue. 'Islam teaches mutual understanding and encourages interfaith dialogue. We must internalize the true spirit of Islam and the teachings of the Prophet (PBUH) to build a more tolerant society,' he said. While highlighting the constitutional and societal contradictions around minority rights, Dr. Huma Ghaffar, faculty at the School of Nursing and Midwifery at Aga Khan University, said, "The issue isn't just minority protection, it's about ensuring fundamental human rights for all. Education, awareness, and pluralism must play a central role in fighting extremism and promoting equality.' In her closing remarks, former Caretaker Minister of Education, Sindh, Rana Hussain, stated, 'Pluralism is neither a religion, nor an art, nor a science; it is a mindset. It means holding in our hearts the kind of feelings and thoughts we wish not only for ourselves; but also for others. The respect, dignity, and goodness we seek for ourselves should be equally extended to everyone around us.' She emphasized the urgent need for curriculum reforms that reflect Pakistan's diverse religious and cultural landscape, noting that Sindh is actively revising its curriculum to promote interfaith harmony. Earlier in the session, Dr. Pamela Marshall, Dean, Faculty of Nursing and Midwifery, of Ziauddin University, reminded the audience of Jinnah's clear stance on religious freedom. 'Every individual has the right to follow their faith freely, and no one should impose their beliefs on others,' she stated. The panel discussion was moderated by Dr. Sumaira Punjwani, Principal, Ziauddin College of Nursing and Midwifery. The session concluded with an interactive Q&A session, allowing students to actively participate and engage with the speakers, further encouraging a spirit of dialogue, critical thinking, and unity. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Express Tribune
20-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Jinnah foresaw a grim future for Pakistan
The writer is a chemical engineer with interest in Society, Politics & Economy. Contact him at: Listen to article Pakistan, born from majority-Hindu apathy, now suffers majority-Muslim ethnic apathy, a tragic comedy. Durkheim (1858), founder of modern sociology, noted mechanical solidarity creates superficial unity but deeper apathy, explaining our socio-political chaos and economic decline. Recent conflict with India showed tactical wins using Chinese tech, but it didn't end hostilities, and more conflicts to follow with pauses. It is, however, troubling to see apathy in Balochistan, Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, and parts of Sindh regarding military victory signifying anemic national cohesion. This demands a revisit to Jinnah's original goal for Pakistan: save some, not all, Muslims in India. He united willing Mohajirs and unwilling Bengal, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan under his vision of a modern democratic state. Sadly, his Pakistan was quickly captured and system was subverted for some while masses and smaller provinces suffered. Mohajirs reduced to "second class citizens" and their political leadership twisted into clown for everyone's amusement. Ironic for descendants of those who fought British Raj (1857) and made Pakistan possible (1947). Still! Redemption lies restoring integrity and moral values not going after material gains, Jinnah's hallmark. Jinnah knew existential threat posed by PakRaj (British-loyalist feudal-military-bureaucratic trio) to unity among different groups and his founding principle — a country for people. Despite poor health, he acted fast: To fight feudalism, Jinnah chose non-feudal leaders in all provinces. Just months before his death, he disbanded landlord system in Sindh (blocked by court) and pushed land reforms in Punjab (sabotaged by legislature). Jinnah's land reforms died with him. West Pakistan stayed feudal, but East Pakistan implemented land reforms by 1950. Ayub and Bhutto's half-measures failed and no one dare talk about land reform in Pakistan since 1977. Jinnah kept military under civilian rule, fired General Messervy for ignoring him on Kashmir and placed military policy under cabinet control. His death allowed military to regain influence with feudals and bureaucrats — something Jinnah had forbidden. His bureaucratic reforms replaced feudal-backed recruits with merit-based ones. An exam under his watch in February 1948 had only 12% feudal recruits. After his death, English test barriers and vague interviews increased feudal share to 65% by 1965. Jinnah expected a grim future for Pakistan without reforms, and he was right. PakRaj initiated country's capture via malafide actions of Ghulam Muhammad and Iskander Mirza - both ex-ICS officers who carried contempt for politicians and democratic process. Using government-dismissal powers, they destroyed democracy between 1948 and 1958. Later, same provision serves a hanging sword over successive governments until last used by Musharraf in 2007. Mirza's tyranny led to martial law as he remained in power, but immediately replaced by Ayub's military dictatorship under judicial cover provided by Justice Munir — mother of all tragedies which State of Pakistan has yet to see, as its last judicial pillar fell. With that ended checks and balances system letting PakRaj do as it pleases. Institutional failures followed: Ayub's failed idea of basic democracies, Bangladesh's creation in 1971, and cycles of dictatorship and managed democracy — Bhutto, Zia, Benazir, Musharraf, Sharifs, Imran, PDM versions. Each rule made institutional decay worse. Why? PakRaj response has been always in "National Interest" (framed as required); over time they became all powerful entity beyond imagination, meanwhile joined by opportunistic politicians, industrialists, businesses tycoons and enablers. So, they control state and operate unaccountably. Period. It would be unfair not to see their performance accumulated over time, which can be evaluated under Scripture's guidance "By their fruits ye shall know them" (Matthew 7:16). The harvest has been bitter. Governance has collapsed: Pakistan ranks poorly globally — all in worst tiers: Corruption 135, Rule of law 129, Political change 100, Governance 122, among others. Economy is equally damning: FY25 shows growth is just 2.68% (target 3.6%) creating more poverty, which is made worse by an increasing population growing at 2.7% annually. Public debt stands at Rs76.01 trillion (74.60% of GDP) with servicing at Rs9.775 trillion (51% of federal spending). Yet politicians approve their own pay rises while Cabinet expanded — a further arrogant act under misrule. Tax shortfall and mismanagement: Feudal escape taxes. SOE losses Rs851 billion, power sector losses Rs660 billion, elitist IPPs-related circular debt Rs2.5 trillion, UGF Rs190 billion, corruption costs 1.4% of GDP and an unknown amount of tax evasion. Pakistan borrows new money to service old debts — absolutely hostage to IMF and the US. Human cost is staggering: About 44.7% live below Rs2,324/day ($4.20/day) and 16.5% live in absolute poverty below Rs840/day ($3.0/day); actual figures will be higher given old database (2018-19). Even with military victory against India, Pakistan is losing war for human dignity which India is winning — only 23.89% of Indians live below $4.20/day, and just 5.3% live in absolute poverty below $3.0/day (CES 2022/23 data). Future? More of same suffering: development spending stays around 0.9% of GDP, health under 0.9%, education below 0.8% — warranting shameful "education emergency". Despite numerous national and international studies on countries' ailments and state commissions since 1949, PakRaj has set aside most recommendations and arrogantly ignored decades of real failures as country continues to decline. C'est la vie! Surely, PakRaj will not give up its power and privileges, nor can we expect them to; I along with them and masses await the coming reckoning, as John Elia said: Hashar main bataon ga tujhy Jo hashar tu nay kiya hay mera What lies before us is a simple binary decision. Do nothing — Accept PakRaj's fiascos disguised as "success" in governance, economy and battlefield wins at mercy of US/China. Or, Do what must be done — Finish Jinnah's structural reforms. Empower educated middle class, entrepreneurs and professionals. Adapt 21st-century realities — digital governance, global economic integration and climate challenges that didn't exist in 1947. History has proved Jinnah was right. He warned: without change we will remain exposed — fragile, divided and easily ruled. The reality always begs core question — whether Pakistan will heed it before it's too late.
Business Recorder
19-07-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Rethinking Partition in colonial and post-colonial Pakistan: a Gramscian perspective — II
This unravelling was accelerated by domestic and colonial unrest. The Royal Indian Navy mutiny of 1946—spanning 78 ships and involving 20,000 sailors—was not just a military insurrection but a class-conscious uprising that resonated with workers and students alike. It exposed the decaying authority of the Raj and signaled a potential revolutionary convergence between the military and the masses. For Prime Minister Clement Attlee's government, this was the final blow—a clear sign that Britain no longer had the capacity to dominate India by force. Faced with the specter of a full-scale, radicalized freedom movement, the British hastily sought to divide and exit. They forged an alliance with the native bourgeois nationalist parties, who were more interested in inheriting state power than dismantling the imperial economic structure. Partition, then, was not an act of liberation — it was a strategic surgical division, engineered from above, using religion as a scalpel. As Eric Hobsbawm noted, it was a form of 'prophylactic decolonization,' designed to pre-empt revolutionary transformation by substituting symbolic independence for substantive emancipation. Rethinking Partition in colonial and post-colonial Pakistan: a Gramscian perspective—I When Nehru and Jinnah pledged allegiance to King George VI as Prime Minister of India and Governor-General of Pakistan, respectively, they did so as heads of dominions—not republics. Their governments, born of imperial fiat, marked the transfer of political power but not economic sovereignty. The subcontinent was not baptized in the blood of revolution, but in the tears and trauma of two million displaced and slaughtered subalterns. The 'tryst with destiny' that Nehru invoked became, for ordinary citizens on both sides of the divide, a descent into nightmare. What emerged on August 15, 1947, were not liberated states but dominions—nominally sovereign but still enmeshed in the structures of imperial dependency. The term 'political independence' was, at that point, a debatable one; the states may have shed the Union Jack, but they retained colonial institutions, economic policies, and class hierarchies. Dominion status codified British domination in a new form: indirect, economic, and neo-colonial. III. Postcolonial Caes-arism and bureaucratic supremacy (1947–1958) The Muslim League, a hollow political entity, quickly collapsed into dependence on its charismatic leader, Jinnah. His decision to bypass the elected Prime Minister in favour of Cabinet Secretary Chaudhry Mohammad Ali marked the ascendancy of the bureaucracy. Thus emerged a new ruling bloc: postcolonial intermediaries—feudals, bureaucrats, and comprador capitalists—who constructed a system of domination from which they themselves could not escape. This era exemplifies what we may call Postcolonial Caesarism: a fragile equilibrium among competing civilian elites, with bureaucracy as the central force until the military emerged as the decisive 'third force.' Gramsci wrote, 'The bureaucracy is the most dangerously hidebound and conservative force… if it becomes a compact body independent of the masses, the party becomes anachronistic and, in times of crisis, is voided of its social content.' IV. Oscillations between Bonapartism and Cae-sarism Pakistan's state apparatus, in its relentless pursuit of capital accumulation, has utilized legal, military, and ideological tools to dispossess its marginalized populations, particularly in Bengal and Balochistan. The state has often presented itself as a unifier only to suppress political contestation and centralize power in a paternalistic elite. As Gramsci noted, 'The government operated as a 'party'. It set itself above the parties not to harmonize their interests, but to disintegrate them, to detach them from the masses and obtain a force of non-party men linked by paternalistic ties of a Bonapartist-Caesarist type.' Importantly, 'A Caesarist solution can exist even without a Caesar, without any great 'heroic' or representative personality... Every coalition government is a first stage of Caesarism.' Pakistan continues to oscillate between direct military Bonapartism and Caesarist coalitions. Today's hybrid regimes reflect Gramsci's insight that such systems are led by dangerously unaccountable bureaucracies, dominating without legitimacy. Recent regional conflicts have momentarily revived a sense of hegemonic unity in the dominant province, where capital accumulation has occurred. Yet across the country, the dominant strategy remains accumulation through dispossession. V. Neoliberal Caesarism in the 21st century The post-9/11 period ushered in a new era: Neoliberal Caesarism. The Pakistani state, a security-centric, externally-aligned apparatus that prioritizes, surveillance, capital accumulation for the centre, and elite consolidation over mass welfare, gave up even the false pretence of securing the public interest by becoming totalitarian. Temporary hegemonies, bolstered by foreign aid, military partnerships and hitting back the enemy in recent skirmishes, are now being eroded by inflation, discontent, and ideological decay. Gramsci reminds us that historical blocs are needed to offer paths toward liberation. But in contemporary Pakistan, the formation of such a bloc — a coalition capable of challenging peripheral capitalism and Caesarist rule — remains unlikely, though not impossible. Conclusion Rather than liberating the subcontinent, Partition entrenched colonial structures under new guises. Through Gramsci's lens, we understand Pakistan's journey not as a rupture from colonialism, but as its transformation. From Caesarism to Bonapartism, from passive revolutions to neoliberal authoritarianism, the structures of domination have remained intact—only the actors have changed. The crisis consists precisely in the fact that 'the old is dying and the new cannot be born.' The need, as ever, is not just to interpret the world, but to transform it.-- Concluded Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Express Tribune
17-07-2025
- Politics
- Express Tribune
Under One Flag, But Not One Fate
The writer is a Dean's honour list student at the Beaconhouse National Univesity in Lahore, pursuing Media Studies 'Pakistan not only means freedom and independence but the Muslim ideology which has to be preserved, which has come to us as a precious gift and treasure…' — Muhammad Ali Jinnah Every August, we rise to recite the anthem: 'Iss parcham ke saaye talay hum aik hain.' It is not a fact — it is an aspiration. And like most aspirations in Pakistan, it is repeated more often than it is realised. We assume the flag unites us. But symbols don't create solidarity. Systems do. Justice does. Shared fate does. And in today's Pakistan, fate is the most unequally distributed commodity of all. Pakistan was not created as a nation-state in the traditional sense. It was born as a state first, with the hope that the nation would follow. The assumption was that a shared religion could unify diverse ethnic, linguistic, and socio-economic identities under one ideological roof. But religion, while essential to Pakistan's formation, proved insufficient to bind a country made up of distinct historical trajectories — Baloch, Pashtun, Punjabi, Sindhi, Saraiki, Hazara, and more — into a cohesive national identity. In theory, we are one. In practice, we are a federation of alienations. Jinnah's early speeches emphasise a secular civil order, not a theocratic state — where citizenship, not faith or ethnicity, determined one's rights. But what replaced his vision was a hybrid elite bargain — a ruling clique of feudal landlords, politicians, and bureaucrats that used the idea of Pakistan but never built the reality of it. They didn't dismantle colonial hierarchies; they inherited and repurposed them. In Punjab, the feudal nexus consolidated land and loyalty. In Sindh, political dynasties and rural clientelism replaced participatory democracy. Balochistan was treated as a resource reservoir, not a province of people. And in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the state bartered long-term development for short-term strategic depth. The result is a unitary national narrative sitting atop a deeply plural society, with no mechanisms for meaningful inclusion. Yes, Pakistan rallies during crises. War, earthquakes, floods — they trigger a performative solidarity. But this kind of unity is emotional. It does not build institutions. It fades with the news cycle. True unity is constitutional. It is forged through fair representation, justice delivery, decentralisation, and economic equity. Is a Hazara from Quetta protected like a businessman in Gulberg? Does a Hindu sanitary worker in Umerkot feel as safe as a banker in Islamabad? Does a student in Kech have the same educational rights as one in DHA Karachi? We wave the flag over them all — but it shelters them differently. Pakistan's obsession with symbolism masks its failures in substance. We perform anthem-singing assemblies in schools that have no functional toilets. We celebrate minority heroes while silencing the cries of their communities. We invoke Iqbal's shaheen but reduce our youth to jobless, voiceless observers. We defend Islam vocally but abandon its ethics when it comes to justice, compassion, or economic morality. This is not hypocrisy. This is the result of a society that has learned to perform identity, not build it. It is easy to blame the state. But the deeper crisis is societal. We lack not just governance; we lack a moral architecture. Corruption is a service, not a crime. Bigotry is dinner-table humour. Merit is mocked. Silence is rewarded. Nationalism is now theatre, not sacrifice. Unity cannot grow where collective memory is shallow and collective responsibility is absent. If unity is to move beyond slogans, we must first redefine it beyond religion. Pakistan must embrace its ethnic and cultural pluralism not as a threat but as the very fabric of its identity. The flag should not homogenise — it must harmonise. Second, constitutional federalism must be restored. Article 140A guarantees local governments, yet most provinces function without them. Without genuine devolution and local representation, the elite-commoner divide will continue to widen. Third, we must move from charity to equity. Zakat funds and ration drives cannot replace structural redistribution. True unity demands economic dignity — a minimum threshold below which no Pakistani should fall. Fourth, we must de-weaponise identity. Religion, ethnicity, and language are manipulated in the service of power. Until identity becomes a protected right — not a political tool — we will remain in conflict with ourselves. Finally, we must build historical honesty. A society cannot unify when its histories are erased, its traumas redacted, and its voices excluded from national memory. 'Iss parcham ke saaye talay hum aik hain' should not be a slogan we shout once a year. It should be a question we answer daily — with policy, with empathy, with action. Until every citizen — regardless of language, faith, gender, or geography — can point to the flag and see not just a symbol of identity, but a guarantee of dignity, we are not one nation. We are a collection of managed illusions under a single piece of cloth. And no amount of ceremonial patriotism can heal a society that refuses to look into the mirror the flag demands we hold up. Pakistan Zindabad — when every citizen can mean it the same way.
