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Business Recorder
14-07-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
KP asks centre to retain its two HPPs on IGCEP 2025-35
PESHAWAR: The KP government has asked the federal government to retain its two public sector energy projects i.e. Madyan Hydropower Project and Gabral Kalam HPP on Indicative Generation Capacity Expansion Plan (IGCEP 2025-35) prepared by the ISMO (System Operator). For this purpose, the Special Assistant to KP Government on Energy and Power Department, Tariq Saddozai has written a formal letter to the Federal Minister for Energy and Power, Sardar Owais Ahmad Leghari. The content of the letter said that the provincial government has expressed surprise over the unilateral altering of the criteria for 'committed projects' in IGCEP 2025-35 that has resulted in the exclusion of the KP government's projects. It said that as per the National Energy (NE) Plan, all projects declared committed under approved IGCEP 2021 shall be included as committed projects in subsequent iterations of the IGCEP. Therefore, the exclusion of the said projects is clearly in contravention of the NE Plan approved by the federal government pursuant to the NEPRA Act, 1997. It said that the revised criteria introduced by System Operator is contrary to the earlier prescribed approved criteria. The system operator cannot revise the criteria for committed projects during the currency of the current NE Plan. Furthermore, the retrospective application of such revised criteria is also contrary to the law as it amounts to changing the goal post during the game. Once a project is recognized and declared as committed project, it cannot be revaluated afresh through subsequent iterations and the revised criteria shall be applicable to the new projects that were not earlier present, not iterated projects or where the committed projects have been abandoned. Even the delays in the committed projects do not justify their exclusion rather the timelines for the commercial operations date are to be adjusted. It has further stated that the KP government projects have already demonstrated considerable physical and financial progress after attaining the status of 'Committed Projects' pursuant to the earlier IGCEPs. In consequence thereof, the KP government had also secured Generation Licenses from NEPRA, creating a vested right. Moreover, the provincial government also understand that once the project are declared committed, the criteria of least-cost, cannot be applied retrospectively to their further processing in their development cycle. Notwithstanding, the KP projects despite achievement of the status of 'Committed Projects' have been subjected to least-costs evaluation under the draft IGCEP 2025-35, which is contrary to the constitutional, statutory and regulatory framework. It has also highlighted that public sector projects of the federal government, previously declared as committed, namely Mohmand Dam, Dasu, Tarbela Extension-5 etc, continue to remain as committed in the draft IGCEP 2025-35. In stark contrast, the government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's 'Committed Projects' namely Madyan and Gabral-Kalam HPPs, have been excluded, which demonstrates discriminatory approach of the system operator which should accord equal treatment to the federal and provincial power projects developed through the public funds. On one hand the KP government projects have been approved by the federal government through the ECNEC of the Planning Commission and on the other hand, the system operator which is owned and controlled by the federal government is not recognizing the approval granted by the federal government. It further stated that the provincial government has secured concessional financing from the multilateral lender, that is, the World Bank through the Economic Affairs Division of the federal government, through multilateral lending framework, which is signed and guaranteed by the federal government in respect of loans extended by the World Bank to the province. The exclusion of KP projects would undermine this window of multilateral lending and would expose the government of Pakistan to the cancellation of loan/ lending and recovery of the financing charges, winding up costs, breakage costs, commitment fees etc. The exclusion will further prevent future lending to development projects in general and power projects in particular in KP beside giving highly negative signal to the current and potential investors in the province. Thus, the system operator being an entity of the federal government is failing to recognize the financing arrangement, for the development of the power projects, which financing has been incepted, financing and closed with the approval of the federal government. In light of the mentioned facts, grounds and circumstances, the KP government has requested the federal government to retain the projects of Madyan HPP and Gabral Kalam HPP as 'Committed Projects' in the IGCEP 2025-35; not allowing the System Operator to alter, modify, deviate or revise the criteria for inclusion of projects in the IGCEP in contravention of NE Plan, those approved unanimously by the Council of Common Interests vide its decision No. 2(8)/2021 CCI (48) dated September 13, 2021. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
Express Tribune
23-04-2025
- Business
- Express Tribune
Pak-Afghan ties — thaw and thistle
The writer is a retired major general and has an interest in International Relations and Political Sociology. He can be reached at tayyarinam@ and tweets @20_Inam Listen to article Pakistan did reach out to Kabul in an ostensible reset of its fracturing ties with its erstwhile proteges, the Afghan Taliban. Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar visited Afghanistan on Saturday April 19, 2025, in a first high-level exchange with the Emirate since assuming office. He met Acting Afghan PM Mullah Muhammad Hassan Akhund, Deputy PM Mullah Abdul Salam Hanafi, FM Amir Khan Muttaqi, etc. The focus of the delegation level talks was continuation of diplomacy to iron out differences, trade and economic relations, regional economic integration, repatriation of the Afghan Refugees (ARs), cross-border security and TTP-engendered terrorism etc. First, diplomacy and trade. Wows were exchanged to enhance bilateral ties, P2P and B2B contacts, and ensure continued engagement at all levels. Wide-ranging discussions covered CASA-1000 MW electricity project, TAPI and TAP, and trans-regional connectivity projects like Central Asia-Pakistan railway connectivity via Kohat and Parachinar, besides trade facilitation and tariff reduction. Dar successfully pursued diplomacy, especially economic diplomacy, greatly melting the ice. In offering concessions, Pakistan agreed to eliminate tariffs on Afghan transit goods for around 16 additional categories. It removed 10% taxes on 867 types of products and transit goods. The 2% Container Cross Stuffing (CSS) tax imposed by KP Government on Afghan containers is slashed to 1%. 'Bank guarantees' from Afghan traders are to be replaced with 'insurance guarantees' to ease financial burden and enhance trade. Demurrage on Afghan goods at the Karachi port is to be limited; concessions would be given to Afghans on loading and handling, besides container exchange privileges; and they would be exempted from extra duties, to incentivise bilateral trade. Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA) would be finalised and implemented effective June 30. And the two committees formed earlier for political and trade discussions shall meet periodically. Second, the ARs. Pakistan stuck to its position of repatriating illegal migrants, including ARs, with respect and dignity, without resorting to forced deportations, as per its phased timeline, despite Kabul's requests to hold or slow down the process. Dar reaffirmed protecting the property and capital of ARs in Pakistan, pledging to prevent any 'arbitrary action'. Third TTP. Both sides agreed to tackle this thorny issue through an ambiguously stated 'mutual understanding and joint mechanisms'. However, potential optimism about resolution in the short-term remains misplaced, as none of the Khostwal Haqqanis, the host and benefactors of the TTP, attended the parleys. TTP and the rising terror incidents along the Pak-Afghan border, and in the settled districts, were discussed in detail, especially the involvement of Afghan nationals in such acts. Pakistan also raised the issue of cross-border movement of terrorists and smuggling. On Afghanistan's observation about miscreants entering Afghanistan disguised as ARs, Pakistan reassured Kabul of never allowing its soil to be used against Afghanistan. At the conclusion of the visit, a joint press conference by Dar and Muttaqi was held. Pakistan and Afghanistan already have a Joint Coordination Committee (JCC), reporting monthly on the TTP violence and other security related issues. Pak-Afghan bilateralism is defined by constants like common religion, history, geography linguistics, ethnicity and culture etc all positive; and variables like TTP, Durand Line, Border Fence and ARs sadly all negative. During the cited talks, there has been no tangible commitment by the Afghan side on the most disruptive variable of TTP. It had been argued in this space that TTP remains a divisive issue within the IEA; and that TTP is a force-in-being for its Khostwal hosts, the Haqqanis; and at the same time, TTP is an intractable dilemma for Haqqani, given their pro-Pakistan imperatives. And that without Haqqani intercession, peace would remain elusive in KP and Balochistan. Details were covered in my piece 'Greater Qandahar, Loya Paktia and the US' published in these columns on April 3, 2025. It goes without saying that minus lasting resolution of the TTP conundrum, all other cooperation between both countries would always stand on shaky grounds. Although due to persistent efforts by Pakistan, IEA in particular Qandahar now admits that TTP is a problem, yet it remains unable, and/or unwilling or both to go for a resolution in the absence of TTP hosts, the Haqqanis. IEA discreetly seeks time from Pakistan to address Pakistan's concerns, whereas Islamabad, while showing flexibility, expects the IEA to take 'some' steps in order to prevent the TTP attacks against Pakistan. Realising the IEA dilemma, Pakistan has asked IEA to take measures, short of resorting to use of force against TTP. Some 'critical' intelligence cooperation is discerned as briefings in the JCC suggest. While continuing to conduct 'religious diplomacy' with Qandahar and applying calibrated force cis or trans-frontier when needed, Pakistan is suggested to help its one-time Haqqani assets to either cough out or gobble up the TTP bone, stuck in their neck. Serious-minded Afghanologists realise this Afghan/Haqqani dilemma. For Haqqanis and the IEA, restraining TTP attack remains the most essential confidence building measure. It is a sad reality that lack of progress on the TTP issue by Kabul and IEA's continued recalcitrance make ordinary Afghans, living peacefully for decades in Pakistan, pay the price. With no TTP hosting by the Emirate, the empathy and support for ARs within Pakistani state and society would have remained intact, bringing in the neighbourly integration between the two countries on more solid grounds. Pakistani state and society feel ARs' pain and have responded to their plight in unprecedented ways. In the changed and charged realities of real politick, the notions of treating Afghanistan as a sovereign state, and the bogey that Afghans never yield to force are, at best, historic romanticisms, without any geostrategic footing. The full potential and benefits from the 'reset' of Pak-Afghan bilateralism as optimistically expected now, would be evident by June this year, when the APTTA and the concessions offered during recent visit are put to implementation. And if and when, the TTP meanwhile could be restrained by its Afghan hosts from recommencing its terrorist violence against Pakistan. PM Akhund assured Deputy PM Dar about not allowing the use of Afghan soil against neighbours, including Pakistan. It would be interesting to see the Afghan side walking the talk. We are keeping the fingers crossed!
