Latest news with #Khomeini
Wall Street Journal
18-07-2025
- Politics
- Wall Street Journal
Iran Is Out to Assassinate Trump
Tehran can't stop. Not a day goes by in which Iranian religious or political officials don't threaten the life of President Trump. As long as the regime lives, so will the threat. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini made clear 40 years ago that when Iranian mobs chant 'Death to America,' it means they want to kill the U.S. president. His successor, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, restated the point: ' 'Death to America' means death to Trump.' Mr. Trump constitutes a unique threat to the mullahs because he has actually used American military might to punish the regime for its behavior.
Yahoo
07-07-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
The hit that wasn't: When Saddam Hussein offered to kill Khomeini and the Shah said no
This decision, made quietly, cautiously, and with the best of intentions, reshaped the fate of a nation and the entire region. Saddam Hussein could have changed everything. In an ironic twist, the Iraqi dictator responsible for countless deaths across the Middle East once had the chance to eliminate the leader of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, and potentially save the region from 46 years of the Islamic Republic, the Iran hostage crisis, and even the Iran-Iraq War. In the complex world of Middle Eastern power politics, there are moments that fade into silence, left unrecorded except in the memories of spies, ministers, and monarchs. One such moment came in the 1970s when Saddam Hussein, then Iraq's vice president but already the regime's dominant power, is believed to have made an extraordinary offer to the shah of Iran: to assassinate Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the exiled cleric agitating against the Pahlavi regime from a dusty corner of Najaf. The shah declined. According to Iranian exiles, intelligence veterans, and biographers of the period, the offer was made discreetly, possibly even during a backchannel encounter at the United Nations. The message was clear: Saddam, already suspicious of Khomeini's influence among Iraq's Shia population, was willing to 'solve' Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's Khomeini problem permanently. The shah, however, refused to engage in political assassination, reportedly saying: 'We are not in the business of killing clerics.' It is a moment lost to official archives but remembered in the margins of memoirs and whispered by those who lived through the dying days of Iran's monarchy. Conflicting timelines make it impossible to construct a direct timeline. However, there is sufficient evidence to suggest that the fundamental points are accurate. It is also a story with enduring consequences, one of those rare 'what if' moments where history is balanced on the edge. KHOMEINI HAD been exiled from Iran since 1964 after delivering a searing denunciation of the shah's 'White Revolution,' which he accused of betraying Islam and serving Western imperialists. After a brief refuge in Turkey, he was granted asylum in Iraq, where he settled in the Shia holy city of Najaf, a center of clerical learning. While the shah likely hoped Khomeini would fade into obscurity, the opposite happened. From a modest home near the shrine of Imam Ali, the Ayatollah recorded sermons on cassette tapes that were smuggled across the border into Iran. These tapes, often distributed in bazaars and mosques, became political dynamite. As his reach grew, so too did Saddam Hussein's concerns. The Ba'ath regime in Iraq was secular, Arab nationalist, and increasingly authoritarian. Khomeini's pan-Shia rhetoric posed a direct threat to Iraqi control over its Shia majority. It was only a matter of time before Saddam concluded that harboring Khomeini wasn't worth the trouble. One version says that the offer was conveyed by an Iraqi diplomat to an Iranian envoy at the United Nations in the context of warming relations after the Algiers Agreement, which resolved a territorial dispute between the two regimes. The shah's last ambassador to the United States, Ardeshir Zahedi, remembered, 'I was at the UN. Iraq's foreign minister brought us a message from Saddam. Saddam offered us a choice. He would expel Khomeini or eliminate him.' In his book, The Spirit of Allah, Amir Taheri, former editor of the daily newspaper Kayhan, describes a dramatic moment in September 1978: An unscheduled Iraqi Airways Boeing landed in Tehran with a single passenger, Barzan al-Tikriti, Saddam Hussein's half-brother and head of Iraqi intelligence. He was driven directly to the Shah's Niavaran Palace, then dimly lit amid rolling blackouts ordered by Khomeini's followers. Barzan delivered a message from Saddam: 'His Majesty must stand firm. Iraq is prepared to help in every way.' He strongly hinted that Iraq could arrange the 'physical liquidation' of the troublesome mullah. 'The shah, expressing his gratitude for President Hussein's concern and offer of help, ruled out any suggestion of organizing an unfortunate accident for Khomeini,' Taheri wrote. 'Instead, however, he asked the Iraqis to force the ayatollah to leave their country. Barzan instantly agreed.' THE SHAH, though deeply threatened by Khomeini's growing influence, rejected the offer. His reasoning has been the subject of debate. Some believe it was moral restraint, a belief that political murder, especially of a revered cleric, was unthinkable. Others argue it was a matter of optics and legacy: the shah wanted to be seen as a modernizing monarch, not a mafioso. The shah's widow, Queen Farah, who has spent 46 years living in exile, told the BBC in an interview, 'In those days, we thought if someone would get rid of Khomeini, he would become a martyr or someone greater.' Taheri concurred, writing, 'The reason why the shah refused to have Khomeini murdered was plain enough: such a move would have inflamed passions in Iran beyond all possible control.' Whatever his motivation, the decision proved fateful. While the archives of SAVAK, the shah's feared intelligence service, were largely destroyed after the revolution, former officers have confirmed that they monitored Khomeini's every move. Parviz Sabeti, a top SAVAK official, has admitted in interviews that the agency was aware of Iraq's frustrations with Khomeini and that Saddam 'might have been willing to go further.' But, he said, the shah was firm: Iran did not engage in assassinations abroad. There were certainly other ways the shah pressured Iraq. Diplomatic cables suggest that Tehran pressured Baghdad to restrict Khomeini's access to the press and his students. The Ba'ath regime, always transactional, obliged for a time. However, the shah never followed through on a permanent solution. In October 1978, under growing internal unrest and renewed Iranian pressure, Saddam expelled Khomeini from Iraq, hoping it would end the problem. Instead, it amplified his reach beyond anything seen before. Khomeini fled to Neauphle-le-Château, just outside the French capital of Paris, where he had unfettered access to the press, telephone, and international media. There, his daily statements were faxed and broadcast into Iran, and he gave between five and six interviews a day to foreign media. Young Iranians spread across the diaspora poured into Neauphle-le-Château to join Khomeini and became a part of history. Najaf's whispers became a roar in Tehran. Within four months, the shah was gone. WHY WAS Khomeini, then an elderly cleric, with his spartan way of life, such a threat? On paper, he was just a religious scholar in exile, with no army, no political party, and no territory. But in reality, he had something far more powerful that appealed to those disaffected with the shah's regime: an ideology, based on Islamic purity, and a message that resonated across all classes and regions of Iran. He fused Shia martyrdom theology with anti-imperial revolution, offering a worldview that cast the shah as both a heretic and a puppet. He didn't need to be charismatic, as his austerity and refusal to compromise became his strengths. Saddam recognized this threat earlier than most. So did SAVAK. But the shah, whether from pride or principle, failed to act decisively. When Saddam invaded Iran in 1980 to begin the Iran-Iraq War, he believed the new Islamic Republic was weak and divided and would fall within weeks. He was wrong. The war dragged on for eight brutal years, killing over a million people and involving the use of child soldiers and chemical weapons. Saddam would eventually execute scores of Shia clerics inside Iraq, trying to stamp out the ideological fire Khomeini had helped ignite. As for the shah, he died in exile of cancer in 1980, never returning to the country he ruled for nearly four decades. Had he accepted Saddam's offer, would things have been different? Would Iran have taken a different path? Perhaps one toward democracy, a constitutional monarchy, or at least a less theocratic state? It's impossible to know. However, what is certain is this: One decision, made quietly, cautiously, and with the best of intentions, reshaped the fate of a nation and the entire region.
National Post
07-07-2025
- Business
- National Post
Opinion: The retrenchment of Russian power and influence in the Middle East
Article content Stalin occupied Northern Iran during and after the Second World War. Then, shortly after the Islamic Revolution in 1979, the Soviet Leadership attempted to extend an olive branch to the new anti-U.S. regime, only to be swiftly rebuffed by Ayatollah Khomeini who took a dim view of the U.S.S.R.'s invasion of Afghanistan and Soviet atheism. Article content Putin's Russia, horrified by its inability to counter U.S. actions in Iraq after the 2003 invasion realigned away from the West after 2007 and sought new partners in the region. Following the 'Arab Spring' of 2011, Russia and Iran gradually moved closer, first in supporting their mutual Syrian proxy, and increasingly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Article content Iran sensed both a useful foe-turned-ally against the common threat of the U.S., and a commercial opportunity in supplying thousands of Shahed drones. More recent technology transfer has seen the creation of a factory in the Alabuga special economic zone in Tatarstan to build 6,000 drones by summer 2025. Iran has secured treasure — literally in the form of gold bars — amid much speculation about what else Russia is helping with, including its nuclear program. Article content But Russia's retrenchment in the region since 2024 has shown it can only service one priority — its campaign in Ukraine. Article content Despite the photo opportunities and grand words, the reality of Iranian, Russian, and now Chinese relations is purely transactional. China buys around 90 per cent of Iran's oil exports. Russia likely hopes to usurp this to offset the bargain basement prices China has paid for Russian oil since 2022, and Russia has sensed an opportunity to try to restart negotiations on the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline to China. Article content President Trump has dismissed Russian diplomatic efforts in the Middle East telling Putin, 'mediate your own (conflict)' in a tacit reference to Trump's frustration over a lack of peace in Ukraine. Article content Given Arab unease with the U.S.' actions in Iran, China may seek to pursue its commercial and strategic interests in the region as with its brokering of the 2023 rapprochement between Iran and Saudi. Article content China still plays catch up, given the scale of U.S. military assets and diplomatic heft, but many ' Asia First ' defence hawks like Elbridge Colby doubt a long-term presence in the Middle East now the U.S. is largely energy independent. Article content Article content
Libyan Express
29-06-2025
- Politics
- Libyan Express
Power, dominance and the fractured Middle East
Ahmed Mayouf, Libyan analyst, warns of the region's slide from influence to existential threat In the years following the incomplete revolutions of the Arab Spring, a fundamental reality has come into sharper focus: nearly every state, whether powerful or peripheral, seeks to assert hegemony—be it political, economic, cultural or military. This pursuit of influence is not confined to global superpowers. It is a defining feature of international relations today, shaped by a fluid global order where national interests increasingly override shared principles. While some states have resisted such efforts—either through internal cohesion between the people and their rulers, or through the endurance of institutional structures—external attempts at domination have continued. The erosion of the post-war international system and the decline of multilateral norms have only emboldened expansionist actors. In this shifting landscape, two powers—Iran and Israel—stand out as key architects of new regional dynamics. Each pursues a distinct project of influence, shaped by history, ideology, and hard power. Yet, the implications of their ambitions differ in scope and consequence. Iran: Ideology and strategic depth Since the 1979 revolution, Iran has pursued a long-term vision to shape the Middle East through a combination of ideological influence, strategic alliances, and calculated geopolitical manoeuvres. Ayatollah Khomeini's call for 'exporting the revolution' and 'awakening the Islamic world' signalled Tehran's intent to become the vanguard of a transnational Islamic resurgence. While this rhetoric was not explicitly aimed at dismantling nation-states, it did promote political independence from Western powers and a reimagined regional order grounded in Islamic unity. Over the decades, Iran has operationalised this vision by forging alliances with non-state actors and governments that share its opposition to Western dominance. From Hezbollah in Lebanon, to the Houthis in Yemen, to the Popular Mobilisation Forces in Iraq, and its enduring alliance with the Assad regime in Syria, Iran has developed a regional network of influence that has proven highly resilient. Iran's perception of threat has been equally influential in shaping its strategy. The presence of American military bases across the Gulf, alongside Israel's regional footprint, is viewed in Tehran as a direct challenge to its sovereignty and national security. In response, Iran has pursued 'strategic depth' by projecting power beyond its borders, establishing influence over neighbouring states, and controlling chokepoints such as the Strait of Hormuz—a vital artery through which 20% of the world's oil and gas flows. This geographical leverage has enhanced its bargaining power not only with regional actors but with global powers reliant on energy security. Yet Iran's ambitions are not pursued through outright occupation. Instead, it relies on ideological appeal, asymmetrical warfare, and proxy networks. Through this approach, it has carved a sphere of influence that extends from the Persian Gulf to the eastern Mediterranean—a formation often referred to as the 'Shia Crescent.' Despite some setbacks, particularly in Syria following shifts in the Assad regime's fortunes, Iran has succeeded in embedding itself within the region's political and security landscape. Israel: From survival to supremacy If Iran's project is ideological and defensive in origin, Israel's project is fundamentally existential and expansionist in trajectory. Since its creation in 1948, Israel has operated within a regional environment that questions its legitimacy. In response, it has adopted a posture grounded in security imperatives and strategic superiority. Over time, however, this has evolved into a more assertive quest for political normalisation, territorial consolidation, and demographic engineering. Israel's security doctrine, once centred on deterrence and survival, has expanded to include a range of political and ideological objectives. At the heart of these lies the ambition to be recognised not merely as a state, but as the nation-state of the Jewish people—a status formalised in the 2018 Jewish Nation-State Law. This law, passed by the Knesset, declared Israel as the exclusive national home of the Jewish people and downgraded the status of Arabic from an official language to one of 'special standing.' Though symbolic, it carries profound implications, entrenching legal inequalities and signalling a vision of the state that excludes its Arab citizens and Palestinians under occupation. This internal legislative shift is mirrored by an external diplomatic campaign. Over recent decades, Israel has succeeded in breaking Arab consensus on Palestine by normalising ties with key Arab states. From the Camp David Accords with Egypt, to the Wadi Araba Treaty with Jordan, and more recently the Abraham Accords with the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan, Israel has progressively dismantled the historical Arab front against normalisation. The strategic result is twofold: the marginalisation of the Palestinian cause and the legitimisation of Israeli regional leadership. Were it not for the Hamas-led attacks of 7 October 2023, more Arab states might have joined this path. Instead, the war on Gaza has crystallised a new phase in Israel's trajectory—one that moves beyond occupation to what many observers now describe as systematic ethnic cleansing, enabled by overwhelming Western support and in open defiance of international humanitarian law. A regional reckoning The current reality in Gaza, marked by mass displacement, destruction of infrastructure, and the collapse of humanitarian systems, represents more than a military campaign. It signals an Israeli strategy to permanently alter the demographics of Palestine, thereby resolving its so-called 'demographic dilemma' through force rather than negotiation. In this sense, Israel's hegemonic ambitions are not merely political—they are existential in their impact on others. The goal is not just influence, but erasure. In comparison, Iran's project—however destabilising—is rooted in strategic depth and deterrence. It seeks influence without necessarily dismantling states. Israel, on the other hand, is now engaged in reshaping borders, narratives, and entire populations. Its expansionist logic, some fear, aligns with earlier Zionist visions of a Greater Israel stretching 'from the Nile to the Euphrates.' This comparison is not meant to justify Iranian interference or downplay its impact. Iran's role in fuelling regional polarisation is real. But it does underscore the disparity in scope and intent. Where Iran seeks regional leverage, Israel appears to seek regional supremacy. Conclusion: The anatomy of hegemony Hegemony is not a static concept. It evolves with power, narrative, and opportunity. Many states, including Libya under Gaddafi, have sought regional influence, often projecting ideology or capital to assert leadership. Saudi Arabia exported Wahhabism; Qatar used the Muslim Brotherhood as a tool of soft power; the UAE has leveraged its economic might to counter revolutionary movements and reshape post-Arab Spring transitions. Yet none of these actors pose the same existential threat to the region as Israel currently does. Israel's project, bolstered by diplomatic cover, military superiority, and ideological conviction, aims not just at dominance—but at the displacement and elimination of a people. The forced demographic restructuring of Palestine, should it continue unchecked, could serve as a blueprint for similar campaigns elsewhere. If today Iran is the primary target of containment, tomorrow others may face the expansionist appetite of a state emboldened by impunity. The lessons of the Arab world's silence and complicity in the face of unfolding tragedy will not be forgotten. In the end, the region must ask: is it hegemony we fear—or annihilation we are failing to prevent?
Malay Mail
28-06-2025
- Politics
- Malay Mail
Iran's Khamenei resurfaces to claim ‘victory' over Israel, but doubts grow over his authority and role in war decisions
PARIS, June 28 — Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has re-emerged after the war with Israel but faces a struggle to maintain the authority he has wielded over the Islamic republic in over three-and-a-half decades of rule, analysts say. After days of silence, Khamenei appeared on Thursday in a video address to proclaim 'victory' and prove he is still alive following the 12-day conflict with Israel which ended with a truce earlier this week. But Khamenei, appointed Iran's number one and spiritual leader for life in 1989, spoke softly and hoarsely in the address, without the charismatic oratory for which he is known. Whereas his regular interventions before the war usually took place in public in front of an audience, this message was filmed against a plain backdrop of curtains and a picture of revolutionary founder Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This may indicate he could still be in hiding after Israel refused to rule out seeking to assassinate him. On Thursday, Israel's Defence Minister Israel Katz told media that the military would have killed Khamenei during the war if the opportunity had presented itself. 'If he had been in our sights, we would have taken him out,' Katz told Israel's public radio station Kan, adding that the military had 'searched a lot'. But in the end, the conflict did not trigger the removal of the system that has ruled Iran since the 1979 revolution. Still, it enabled Israel to demonstrate military superiority and deep intelligence penetration of Iran by killing key members of Khamenei's inner circle in targeted strikes. The war was also the latest in a series of setbacks over the last year for Khamenei. These include the downgrading of pro-Tehran militant groups Hamas and Hezbollah in conflicts with Israel and the fall of Iran's ally in Syria Bashar al-Assad, against the background of economic crisis and energy shortages at home. 'At this time, the regime does not seem to be on the verge of falling but it is certainly more vulnerable than it has been since the early years after the revolution,' said Thomas Juneau, professor at the University of Ottawa. 'Diminished figure' 'The authority of the supreme leader has therefore certainly been undermined,' Juneau told AFP. 'Even though his position remains secure, in that there is unlikely to be a direct challenge to his rule for now, he has lost credibility and bears direct responsibility for the Islamic republic's major losses.' Khamenei is 86 and suffers the effects of a 1981 assassination attempt in Tehran which paralysed his right arm, a disability he has never made any attempt to hide. But discussion of succession has remained taboo in Iran, even if Western analysts have long eyed his son Mojtaba as a possible – but far from inevitable – contender. Arash Azizi, visiting fellow at Boston University, said Khamenei looked 'frail and weak' in his televised message in 'a far cry from the grand orator we know'. 'It's clear that he is a diminished figure, no longer authoritative and a shadow of his former self,' he said. 'Power in Tehran is already passing to different institutions and factions and the battle for his succession will only intensify in the coming period.' Khamenei has come through crises before, using the state's levers of repression, most recently during the 2022-2023 protests sparked by the death in custody of Mahsa Amini, an Iranian Kurd detained for allegedly breaching Iran's strict dress code for women. Rights activists say hundreds of people have been arrested in a new crackdown in the wake of the conflict. 'Sidelined' The New York Times and Iran International, a Persian-language television channel based outside Iran that is critical of the authorities, have said Khamenei spent the war in a bunker avoiding use of digital communication for fear of being tracked and assassinated. Iran International reported that Khamenei was not even involved in the discussions that led to the truce which were handled by the national security council and President Masoud Pezeshkian. There has been no confirmation of this claim. Jason Brodsky, policy director at the US-based United Against Nuclear Iran, said Khamenei appeared 'frail and hoarse' and also 'detached from reality' in insisting that Iran's nuclear programme did not suffer significant damage. 'Nevertheless, I remain sceptical of the theories that Khamenei has been sidelined,' he told AFP. 'I have no doubt the war will prompt a debate within the Islamic Republic's political elite as to how best to rebuild the system's capabilities, but in the end, the buck has always stopped with Khamenei,' he said. — AFP
