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EVN Report
17 hours ago
- Politics
- EVN Report
U.S.-Brokered TRIPP in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Deal: Opportunities and Risks
On August 8, 2025 , Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration facilitated by President Donald Trump. The deal aims to formally end 37 years of conflict, establish diplomatic relations and foster regional cooperation. Its centerpiece is the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP)—a strategic transit route through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave—over which the U.S. will hold exclusive development rights for 99 years. In addition to it, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a joint appeal to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to dissolve the Minsk Group. They also initiated the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement , the text of which had been agreed in March 2025. The deal has generated polarized reactions both within Armenia and internationally, with clear divisions between supporters and opponents. This article examines the origins and the legal and operational framework of TRIPP, its geopolitical implications, and domestic and international debates around it. Origins of the Road vs. Corridor Dispute Azerbaijan has repeatedly challenged Armenia's territorial integrity since 2021 through military incursions, coercive threats, maximalist demands and revisionist narratives. Among its claims, Azerbaijan has persistently demanded a 'Zangezur corridor'—a route through Armenia's Syunik region to Nakhichevan without Armenian customs or security control. Armenia has viewed this as compromising its sovereignty. Beyond legal and security concerns, such an arrangement could facilitate the annexation of Syunik, which Azerbaijan refers to as 'Zangezur'. Baku has openly threatened to establish this corridor by force if Armenia refuses. Combined with Azerbaijan's continued military buildup, this rhetoric suggests the corridor issue is driven by broader strategic ambitions rather than simple transit needs. Both Russia and Türkiye support Azerbaijan's project. Russia has backed such a corridor under the control of its Federal Security Service (FSB), seeing it as a way to bypass Western sanctions. There is a belief in Armenia that Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin corridor—with Russian peacekeepers' complicity—was designed to pressure Armenia into accepting an extraterritorial 'Zangezur corridor.' Türkiye has framed the corridor as a key component in its broader pan-Turanist ambitions, aiming to connect the Turkic world. Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Iran have launched an infrastructure project known as the 'Araz corridor ' to connect mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through Iranian territory. This provides an alternative to Azerbaijan's demands for an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia. Despite their differing systems of governance and values, Iran has served as Armenia's gateway to the Middle East and South Asia. Iran has also been perceived to act as a deterrent against Azerbaijan's threats to forcibly establish a corridor through Armenian territory, given Iran's opposition to border changes in the region. At the same time, the Araz corridor could further sideline Armenia's potential role in regional transit and connectivity initiatives, reinforcing Azerbaijan's influence over transport routes. Armenia has promoted its 'Crossroad of Peace' initiative, grounded in mutual respect for sovereignty, and reciprocal access to regional transportation and communication routes. The concept also envisions Armenian access through Azerbaijan and Türkiye, with customs procedures applied equally by all countries involved. Armenia has expressed readiness to 'implement simplifications of transit procedures and to introduce automated mechanisms' based on the principle of reciprocity, initially for cargo only. During his recent visit to Istanbul, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discussed Armenia's vision with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seeking to convince him that the 'Crossroads of Peace' also serves Ankara's regional economic interests. The EU is deepening its connectivity vision through the Trans-Caspian 'Middle Corridor' , which links Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan and Georgia. In April 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that Armenia could become part of the Middle Corridor. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev immediately rejected the idea of including Armenia in the project. Later, on July 14, von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa met with Pashinyan in Brussels and reaffirmed their support for Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative, highlighting its potential role to strengthen regional connectivity and Armenia's integration efforts. Various Interpretations and Concerns Supporters of the TRIPP in Armenia, including the authorities and their allies, present it as a historic breakthrough toward peace that creates new opportunities for regional connectivity and economic development. Some also view it as indirectly providing U.S. security guarantees to Armenia. More neutral interpretations in Armenia acknowledge it as a pragmatic compromise, given the power imbalance with Azerbaijan and the impossibility of securing better arrangements for Armenia's security and communication channels under current bilateral, regional and global realities. Critics, however, caution that transferring certain functions to an American consortium under the proposed oversight and management arrangements undermine Armenia's sovereignty over the southern Syunik region and could potentially serve as a 'Trojan horse' for Azerbaijani, American, or Israeli geopolitical ambitions. Pro-Russian and nationalist groups assert that it would indirectly transfer control of that route to Azerbaijan and Türkiye. Additional concerns center on the broader geopolitical implications of the initiative. These include the potential growth of Turkish influence, Russia's complete removal from the South Caucasus, Iran's isolation, the advancement of Israeli strategic interests, diminished French and EU roles in the region, and counterbalancing Chinese influence. While some—primarily in Armenia—view TRIPP as having resolved Azerbaijan's 'Zangezur corridor' demand, Azerbaijani propaganda and its supporters continue to present it as securing this corridor. In American and broader international discourse, the term 'corridor' often carries a positive or neutral meaning. However, in Armenian discourse, it has negative connotations because of its association with extraterritoriality and loss of sovereign control—especially given Azerbaijan's demands. Both Azerbaijani outlets and Armenia's illiberal opposition have spread disinformation, claiming that TRIPP would cut off Armenia's border with Iran or entail an American military presence. Legal and Operational Framework of TRIPP TRIPP differs from the so-called 'Zangezur corridor' not only in name, but also in its legal and operational framework. In 2021-2022, Russia interpreted Article 9 of the November 2020 trilateral Statement ending the war to favor its own and Azerbaijan's interests, reportedly planning to install a wall along the Meghri road and place it under FSB control. This arrangement would have stripped Armenia of its sovereignty—and possibly even access—over that road, granting Azerbaijan and Russia joint use. Azerbaijan could then transport not only commercial cargo but also military personnel and weaponry, potentially leading to the annexation of part or all of Armenia's Syunik region. Russia's oversight of the Lachin corridor from late 2020 to early 2023 already demonstrated its security services could not be trusted to prevent such outcomes. This scenario would have also severed Armenia's border with Iran. The Washington Declaration on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) affirms that all infrastructure developed under the project will function under Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction, and commits the parties to opening transport links at domestic, bilateral, and international levels in full respect of these principles. This includes unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan via Armenian territory, with reciprocal benefits for Armenia's international and intra-state connectivity. Armenia will work with the United States and mutually determined third parties to establish a framework for the TRIPP connectivity project in its territory. The declaration references the 1991 Almaty Declaration, which set the borders of newly independent states along the former administrative boundaries of Soviet republics. It affirms that good neighborly relations rest on the inviolability of international borders and rejects the use of force to acquire territory, stressing that this principle must never be subject to revision. While this provision prohibits Azerbaijan from pursuing further territorial gains through force, it also effectively normalizes Baku's conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh during 2020–2023. Furthermore, although Pashinyan has stated that Armenia aims to achieve the de-occupation of Armenian territories seized by Azerbaijan in 2021–2022 through delimitation rather than military force, it remains unclear whether Baku will exploit this position to entrench its occupation of Armenia's sovereign territories. TRIPP will put in place procedures ensuring transit remains strictly commercial—preventing Azerbaijan from transferring military personnel or weapons. Since Azerbaijan has refused direct interaction with Armenian customs or border security services, this role will be performed by a U.S. company as a compromise. It can be assumed that this company, possibly a private U.S. security firm, will inspect Azerbaijani cargo and passengers while operating in compliance with Armenian legislation and sharing all data with relevant Armenian security services. This arrangement avoids direct contact between Azerbaijani personnel and Armenian authorities, reducing the risk of provocations or escalation during this period of low confidence between the parties. Importantly, it also prevents the erosion of sovereignty that would have occurred under the Russian-backed proposal, as no U.S. military presence is involved. As outlined by Nerses Kopalyan, the arrangement will follow a front-office/back-office inspection model. A third-party operator, contracted by the U.S.–Armenia joint venture, will manage the front office to process incoming Azerbaijani cargo, while Armenian border control authorities will exercise oversight from the back office. However, these specifics are not reflected in the Declaration, which remains generic with broad principles and undefined aspects. This ambiguity leaves room for different interpretations, underscoring that the Declaration marks the beginning of a process, not a conclusion. A key concern is the question of reciprocity for Armenia's access to Azerbaijan's transport network for both international trade and domestic connectivity. First, Azerbaijani cargo and potentially, also passengers will clearly enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Armenian authorities have stated that TRIPP would initially be implemented via railway before adding a road link, potentially improving Armenia's connectivity through Azerbaijan—and with Türkiye, if Turkish–Armenian relations normalize. However, without an arrangement in Azerbaijan comparable to TRIPP, neither access nor security for Armenian transit can be guaranteed, reflecting the persistent distrust between parties after more than three decades of conflict and blockade. The fate of the once-vital Meghri railway underscores the fragility of regional connectivity. Abandoned since the 1992 dismantling of the Yerevan–Baku link, the Meghri station symbolizes the region's transport potential. Its deterioration serves as a reminder that restoring infrastructure requires both reinvestment and durable political trust. According to the Declaration, Armenia will work with the U.S. and mutually determined third parties to establish a framework for the TRIPP connectivity project in its territory. Critics claim that 'third parties' means the U.S. might transfer de facto oversight of the corridor to Azerbaijan or Türkiye. In reality, this term likely refers to companies from other countries that could join the TRIPP implementation consortium. Armenia must agree on participating companies, which empowers it to exclude unsuitable entities or those with conflicts of interest, while creating opportunities for European companies and those from other partner countries mutually acceptable for both Armenia and the U.S. to participate. Domestic routes through Azerbaijan offer limited practical value, though they may shorten certain internal journeys. Pashinyan has emphasized that TRIPP will also facilitate Armenia's internal connectivity by enabling rail links between Syunik in the south and central Armenia via Azerbaijani territory and Nakhchivan. Internationally, access via Azerbaijan could connect Armenia to Russia and Central Asia, and if the Armenia–Türkiye border reopened, restore the Gyumri–Kars rail link. Eventually, this could connect Armenia to inter-regional projects, like the Trans-Caspian/Middle Corridor linking Central Asia and Europe through Azerbaijan. For Armenia to achieve meaningful regional integration, TRIPP must complement—rather than replace—its 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative, which seeks multiple open and reliable connections in all directions. Armenia and the U.S. have reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding to develop Armenia into a prospective regional transport hub. Through this agreement, Washington has committed to invest in and promote Armenia's infrastructure and border security, enhance customs and border management capacities, and stimulate private sector participation. However, the details of this agreement remain undisclosed. The project opens doors for American private investment in Armenia's transport and logistics sectors, potentially spurring local economic growth and job creation. This investment could enhance Armenia's integration into regional and global trade networks while serving as a long-term anchor for sustained U.S. engagement. Additionally, significant American economic interests in resource-rich Syunik could function as an informal security assurance, making Washington more attentive to Armenia's stability and sovereignty. A detailed implementation roadmap is essential to define the TRIPP's parameters and prevent misinterpretation or misuse. Geopolitical Implications TRIPP's introduction is widely viewed as a turning point in the balance of external influence in the South Caucasus, with implications that extend far beyond Armenia–Azerbaijan relations. For Washington, TRIPP offers both strategic and transactional benefits. By anchoring a U.S.-brokered route under Armenian sovereignty, the U.S. is consolidates its political presence in the South Caucasus and reinforces its role as a key external guarantor of Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization. Strategically, the initiative reduces Moscow's traditional leverage over regional transit and border arrangements, signaling a gradual reconfiguration of influence in the South Caucasus. While presented as a peace and connectivity initiative, TRIPP also reflects the transactional nature of current U.S. foreign policy. The 99-year exclusive development rights granted to a U.S. consortium create opportunities for substantial economic profit from infrastructure construction, operation, and commercial services. U.S. investment in these sectors would not only generate profit opportunities but also serve as a tangible assurance of sustained American engagement—embedding commercial stakes that underpin Washington's long-term security and political commitments in the region. Parallels can be observed with the U.S. role in the Panama Canal . In both cases, Washington positioned itself as a guarantor of stability, efficiency, and international access to a strategically important route. However, whereas Panama's sovereignty was effectively curtailed under U.S. administration of the Canal Zone, TRIPP differs in explicitly affirming Armenia's sovereignty and jurisdiction. Still, the granting of 99-year exclusive development rights to a U.S. consortium introduces a degree of ambiguity: while sovereignty is formally preserved, the scale and duration of external involvement may invite perceptions of limitation. Both arrangements extend enduring American influence over geopolitically sensitive routes—Latin America in the early 20th century and the South Caucasus today—while embedding a transactional dimension. U.S. involvement is framed as mutually beneficial, promising development, prosperity and peace, yet it simultaneously secures long-term American commercial and political stakes within the host state. Most regional analysts view TRIPP as the most significant blow to Russian interests in the South Caucasus since the 2020 war. It replaces the Russia-backed 'Zangezur corridor' under FSB control with a U.S.-managed route under Armenian sovereignty. This effectively sidelines Moscow from the region and neutralizes its claims based on the November 2020 trilateral statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. In response, Moscow has intensified its hybrid campaign in Armenia, portraying the deal as disastrous for Armenia's sovereignty and security in an attempt to undermine it. Questions remain about this arrangement's compatibility with the presence of the Russian border service on the Armenia–Iran border and Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The border issue is more straightforward: As of late 2024, Armenia began gradually assuming control of its borders from Russian personnel, marking a significant step in asserting sovereignty over critical frontier points. At the Agarak crossing on the Iran–Armenia border, Armenian border guards replaced Russian personnel on December 30, 2024. On February 28, Armenia's border service assumed control of the Margara crossing point on the Armenia–Turkey border. Pashinyan announced that starting March 1, 2025, all entry and exit points of Armenia—including those on closed borders—would be managed exclusively by Armenian border troops. [While Russian border guards no longer control the checkpoints themselves, they do still patrol certain stretches of Armenia's frontiers with Turkey and Iran]. This transition not only reduces Armenia's reliance on Moscow for border management but also strengthens its capacity to engage in regional connectivity initiatives with greater independence. However, economists note that Armenia remains unprepared to exit the EAEU due to its structural economic dependence on Russia. If communication routes open through TRIPP and the 'Crossroads of Peace,' Armenia could accelerate its economic diversification and reduce dependence on Russia and the EAEU. Yet implementing these changes without adequate institutional preparation and political consensus could trigger economic disruptions and geopolitical vulnerabilities. Besides, Armenia's railways are under Russian control. Pashinyan has noted that 'Russia may be interested in investing to restore the Ijevan-Hrazdan railway and the Ijevan-Kazakh railway; however, Azerbaijan's consent would also be necessary here.' Iran's reaction to TRIPP presents a significant challenge for Armenia. Initially, Iranian religious leaders strongly opposed any 'corridor' through Armenia and even threatened to block it, viewing it as a threat to regional stability. However, Tehran's official position has since evolved toward a more pragmatic stance. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that the joint Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration addresses Iran's core concerns: preserving Armenia's sovereignty, opposing border changes, and safeguarding Iran's overland access to Europe via Armenian territory. Pashinyan has emphasized that the project would also provide Armenia with a railway connection to Iran, with construction of the Meghri railway set to begin in the near future. It will be carried out alongside the ongoing development of the North–South highway by an Iranian company. Iran continues to oppose any foreign military presence in the South Caucasus, which has been ruled out under the arrangement, and has voiced concern about the involvement of an American company in the project's implementation. On August 14, Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister visited Iran to reassure that 'Tehran–Yerevan ties will never be subject to geopolitical bargain.' A strategic partnership agreement between Iran and Armenia is expected to be on the agenda during President Masoud Pezeshkian's upcoming visit to Yerevan on August 18. The potential benefits of TRIPP will remain constrained as long as Türkiye keeps its border with Armenia closed. For three decades, Ankara has conditioned normalization on the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, effectively subordinating its policy toward Armenia to Baku's demands. Now that Yerevan and Baku have committed to peace, this rationale is increasingly difficult to sustain. While Türkiye had long promoted the extraterritorial 'Zangezur corridor', recent signals suggest Ankara may find Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' vision more acceptable, as it would also generate tangible economic gains for Türkiye. Crucially, any move toward reopening will test Ankara's balancing act between deference to Azerbaijan's preferences and its own interest in diversifying East–West trade and re-engaging Armenia's market. Opening the border could provide Türkiye with direct access to Armenia's emerging transit routes, strengthening its connectivity with the South Caucasus while enabling Armenia to break free from isolation. For both countries, the shift could reframe their frontier from a symbol of confrontation into a corridor for commerce, energy and political dialogue—anchoring a more sustainable regional order. From Tbilisi's perspective , TRIPP introduces both opportunity and uncertainty. Traditionally, Georgia has served as the South Caucasus' primary transit corridor—linking Armenia and Azerbaijan to Europe and Central Asia via the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. While TRIPP has a potential to reconfigure regional connectivity in ways that could diminish Georgia's monopoly as a transit hub, it may also be an opportunity to weaken Russian dominance and reinforce U.S. strategic involvement—an outcome that aligns with the aspirations of Georgia's pro-Western groups. Pro-European circles in Armenia worry that TRIPP could diminish the EU's and France's recently expanding role in Syunik and across Armenia, particularly in light of the growing policy differences and conflicting interests between Brussels and Washington at the global level. While in April 2024, the EU and the U.S. launched a Joint Cooperation Platform for Armenia, its viability has remained ambiguous since Trump came to power, and Armenia is now dealing with them separately. This reflects the wider erosion of unity within the collective West. Nevertheless, TRIPP also creates space for complementarity and synergies with EU and French initiatives planned or already underway in Syunik, enabling their infrastructure, resilience, and development efforts to align with the broader objectives of regional connectivity. France demonstrated its commitment to the region by opening a consulate in Syunik in July 2025, signaling long-term interest in the region's security and development, and by signaling the intention to formalize its Strategic Partnership with Armenia. French companies are expected to implement projects of strategic importance in Syunik, underscoring France's long-term interest in the region's security and development. As regional connectivity begins to realign around TRIPP, French involvement in infrastructure projects offers an opportunity to maintain and potentially deepen its engagement, complementing broader strategic partnership efforts with Armenia. Meanwhile, the EU has been funding projects to strengthen Syunik's resilience, improve local infrastructure, and support socio-economic stability, while the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA) continues its patrols along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. A shift in the external involvement could weaken these European efforts. At the same time, the provision in the Armenia–Azerbaijan Joint Declaration concerning cooperation with third parties may enable continued engagement of the EU and its member states in the implementation of TRIPP. The EU has an opportunity to align TRIPP with its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to strengthen sustainable and secure infrastructure links worldwide. Armenia has been identified as a priority partner, with its 'Crossroads of Peace' concept viewed as compatible with both Global Gateway and the Middle Corridor. The EU is already financing major projects, such as the Sisian–Kajaran section of the North–South highway in Syunik. Embedding TRIPP within these broader connectivity strategies would allow the EU to reinforce Armenia's sovereignty and deepen its regional integration. Pashinyan has emphasized that TRIPP would also connect Armenia to Central Asia through a ferry link, while providing China with a new railway route to Europe that does not currently exist. This prospect aligns with the broader logic of the Middle Corridor, the trans-Caspian route that Beijing has increasingly factored into its Belt and Road planning as an alternative to northern routes passing through Russia. For China, the addition of an Armenian segment under TRIPP could diversify its access to Western markets, while for Armenia, it would strengthen the country's role as a transit hub and embed it more firmly in Eurasian connectivity frameworks. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told Fox News Digital that he does not anticipate pushback from Russia or Iran regarding the U.S.-facilitated transit route in the region, describing the arrangement as a 'win for all sides.' He noted that if the deal is materialized, Iran would have access through a railway from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea. And Russia and Iran will have an opportunity to have a railway connection between the two countries. In another interview, Pashinyan expressed hope that 'this project could become a good opportunity for economic cooperation to begin between Iran and the U.S., and between Russia and the United States.' To conclude, TRIPP ultimately represents both a departure from the threatening 'Zangezur corridor' concept and a bold experiment in balancing sovereignty, connectivity and geopolitical rivalries. Its success hinges on Armenia's ability to secure tangible economic and security benefits while preventing the route from becoming a channel for external leverage or regional destabilization. Equally important is sustained U.S. commitment and engagement in its implementation. By presenting TRIPP as beneficial to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the region's major powers, Yerevan aims to position itself as a bridge between competing geopolitical interests—an ambitious balancing act offering both opportunities and the risk of overextending Armenia's multivector diplomacy. As attention shifts from TRIPP to the broader peace agreement, the unresolved issues and ambiguities in the accord highlight that securing physical connectivity is only one aspect of the much more complex process of achieving lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
JAMnews
6 days ago
- Politics
- JAMnews
Peace treaty text sparks mixed reactions in Baku
Azerbaijan-Armenia peace treaty The peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia has drawn a mixed public reaction. The 17-point document sets out opportunities for cooperation in diplomacy, the economy, culture and humanitarian affairs, while committing both sides to refrain from hostile actions. Once signed, it will require both countries to withdraw all legal claims, complaints and disputes, and to refrain from pursuing them in the future. 'Azerbaijan has made a major concession' Ilgar Mammadov | photo: Ilgar Mammadov, a politician and former chair of the Republican Alternative party, believes the draft agreement does not clearly explain why it exists or what its purpose is. He argues that while Armenia has formally renounced territorial claims, there is no guarantee other states will not support such claims in the future. Mammadov says the agreement should have made it explicit that Armenia's territorial claims led to war and deportations – otherwise, Azerbaijan is making a major concession. 'Yerevan has only formally stepped back. In the past, we could at least respond to Armenian claims with our own claim to Western Zangezur. After the agreement, if they find another patron and act on it, what argument of justice will we have in response? I'm not talking about 'rights' – those don't seem to exist – I'm talking about justice. The draft should have at least acknowledged in some way that Armenia's territorial claims opened the door to war and deportations. Otherwise, Armenia is now, as if nothing happened, negotiating with us about the future. By agreeing to this, Azerbaijan has made a huge concession. Will anyone recognise it? They should.' He also says the document is too general and puts too much faith in the good faith of future actions. 'Looking at the text, I'm not convinced peace will last – but let them sign it, and we will all try to make sure there is no more war. An agreement alone cannot guarantee that.' 'We also had to make some concessions' Elkhan Shahinoglu | photo: Political analyst Elkhan Shahinoglu takes a more pragmatic view of the document. He says that including several of Azerbaijan's demands in the Washington agreement is an important achievement. These include abolishing the Minsk Group, opening the Zangezur corridor and suspending Amendment 907. Shahinoglu says that dropping the demand for compensation for Armenia's 30-year aggression has been met with mixed reactions, but mutual concessions were inevitable. 'Obviously, in exchange for what we achieved, we also had to make some concessions. If Armenia hesitates to implement the points set out in the peace agreement, we can return to our demand for compensation. In any case, there needs to be healthy debate around this issue.' 'Hard to say what the mood in the region will be in 15–20 days' Rauf Mirgadirov | photo: Meydan TV Political analyst Rauf Mirkadirov told Meydan TV that the process of bringing the peace treaty into legal force remains uncertain. 'For the signed agreement to be ratified in Armenia, a referendum must be held and constitutional changes made. In Armenia, the referendum is expected in 2027. It is very hard to predict what the political situation in Armenia will be in two years' time – or even what the mood in the region will be in three months or in 15–20 days. The 15 August meeting between Trump and Putin should also be taken into account.' Mirkadirov said that after the 44-day war in 2020, the statement signed by Azerbaijan and Armenia with the participation of Russian president Vladimir Putin included a provision on the 'Zangezur corridor,' which was meant to be under Russian control. 'Today, that document is nothing more than a useless scrap of paper that no one recalls,' he said. 'Now, with Trump's participation, they have signed a declaration. They called it the 'Trump Path'. You see how quickly things can change.' Still, he believes the declaration signed in the US can be seen as the basis for a peace agreement. 'This transport corridor is of great importance not only for Azerbaijan, but also for the wider region – for Turkiye, Central Asia, China and the European Union.' While the published text of the peace agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia sets out an important legal framework for lasting peace, discussion has shown it has drawn mixed reactions among the public and experts alike. Although the deal is seen as a key step towards preventing another war, its durability will ultimately depend on future political will and mutual trust. Azerbaijan-Armenia peace treaty
Wall Street Journal
6 days ago
- Politics
- Wall Street Journal
Expand the Abraham Accords to Azerbaijan and Beyond
When President Trump hosted the signing ceremony of the peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia last week, celebrations weren't limited to Washington, Baku and Yerevan. In Jerusalem, Israeli officials welcomed the initiative led by one of their closest allies, Azerbaijan, in partnership with the U.S. The trilateral cooperation had been a shared strategic goal. Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev, recognizing the ineffectiveness of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's Minsk Group as peace arbiters, opted instead for direct negotiations with Washington, supported by Jerusalem.
Morocco World
11-08-2025
- Business
- Morocco World
Historic Joint Declaration Signals a New Era for Azerbaijan-Armenia Relations
On Friday, President Trump facilitated at the White House a historic meeting that concluded with the signing of the Joint Declaration, a historic agreement that is set to bring peace, stability, and prosperity to the region after more than three decades. The landmark document signaled that the Azerbaijan-Armenia Peace Agreement is near completion, and announced the creation of a new regional corridor – the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP).' The parties initialed the text of the peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia, confirming that they had agreed upon it. Although initialing is not the same as signing, it is nonetheless a significant step toward peace. It means that Azerbaijan and Armenia are now very close to achieving a final, sustainable peace. This Trump-brokered agreement holds significant potential to move beyond symbolism and become a genuine foundation for sustainable peace. Its strength lies in its ability to address the underlying political, economic, and connectivity issues that have fueled tensions for decades. Why this time is different Past efforts often focused narrowly on halting hostilities without addressing underlying political issues. This time, there is a stronger support by President Donald Trump on integrating peace with development and regional infrastructure, which makes it more comprehensive. The Joint Declaration signed by the leaders of Azerbaijan and Armenia confirms that the two countries will jointly appeal to the OSCE Secretary General for the dissolution of the Minsk Group which was established in 90s to solve the conflict but played no role in both ending occupation and getting peace. At the same time, it recognizes the necessity of 'taking further steps to achieve the signing and ratification of the agreement' once the remaining term is done. In other words, Friday's meeting confirmed one of the main prerequisites for signing the final peace agreement – the necessity of amending the Armenian constitution. Azerbaijan–U.S. relations have generally developed in a positive and constructive manner, grounded in mutual respect and trust. Officially established on February 28, 1992, these ties – especially through the invaluable efforts of National Leader Heydar Aliyev – were built on shared interests, with energy cooperation serving as a cornerstone. More than 80 state-level agreements have been signed over the years, clearly reflecting the current high level of partnership between the two countries. The re-election of Donald Trump as U.S. President in 2024 gave a fresh impetus to bilateral relations. The two leaders exchanged phone calls and letters, with President Ilham Aliyev speaking favorably of Donald Trump in several speeches – particularly noting that no new wars began under his presidency and commending his commitment to family and traditional values. President Aliyev's significant diplomatic success Against this backdrop, President Ilham Aliyev's working visit to Washington, at President Trump's invitation, marked a turning point. The trip signaled not only a new phase in bilateral relations but also progress toward lasting peace in the South Caucasus and the creation of new investment opportunities for multiple countries. During the visit, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to establish a Strategic Working Group for further development of the 'Charter on Strategic Partnership between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the United States of America.' This agreement is pivotal for advancing cooperation in regional connectivity (energy, trade, transit), economic investment (including artificial intelligence and digital infrastructure), defense, arms sales, and counterterrorism. It also paves the way for increased U.S. technological and financial involvement in Azerbaijan. Additionally, the Trump administration signed a document suspending the application of Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act – a congressional amendment from 1992 that unjustly restricted direct U.S. aid to Azerbaijan until it was repealed during Trump's presidency. And so, President Ilham Aliyev's Washington visit has been a significant diplomatic success. It has elevated Azerbaijan–U.S. relations to a strategic partnership while advancing the cause of peace, security, and stability in the region. Under President Aliyev's leadership, Azerbaijan continues to strengthen its international standing while ensuring sustainable national development. Tags: ArmeniaazerbaijanUnited States president Donald Trump
Hindustan Times
11-08-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Donald Trump brokers a peace plan in the Caucasus
THE SOUTH CAUCASUS is a mosaic of warring rivals and closed borders. Lookout posts and bunkers dot its frontiers. On August 8th Donald Trump met Armenia's prime minister, Nikol Pashinyan, and Azerbaijan's president, Ilham Aliyev, in an effort to end the conflict between their two countries. At the White House the trio signed a peace declaration and agreements on trade and security. Crucially, Armenia agreed to open an American-operated transport route across its territory, linking Azerbaijan to its exclave, Nakhchivan (see map). The corridor will be called the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP). 'A great honour for me,' said America's president. Mr Aliyev and Mr Pashinyan vowed to nominate him for a Nobel peace prize. The deal will diminish Russia, which has long meddled in the conflict, as well as Iran. It is not a formal peace treaty. But it paves the way to a bigger prize: an end to one of the world's most intractable conflicts and a regional detente, including the normalisation of Armenia's relations with Turkey, Azerbaijan's ally. Whether that happens will be a test of American diplomacy and of Armenia and Azerbaijan themselves. Russia could still sow trouble. Map Armenia and Azerbaijan have been fighting for more than 35 years. In the late 1980s, as the Soviet Union disintegrated, Armenian-backed separatists seized Nagorno-Karabakh, a region within Azerbaijan, and later built a buffer zone. For years the conflict was frozen. Azerbaijan, whose oil-and-gas industry boomed, built a formidable army equipped with Turkish and Israeli drones and missiles. In 2020 it recaptured the area around Nagorno-Karabakh. In 2023 it took back the territory itself; some 100,000 Armenians fled. Russia, which had supported Armenia during the 1990s, stood back. It did so partly to punish Mr Pashinyan, a democrat, who rose to power in 2018 in a peaceful revolution that swept Armenia's Kremlin-backed rulers from office. Since early 2024 the two sides have been inching towards a peace treaty. In previous negotiations they have relied on intermediaries such as Russia, Turkey or the Minsk Group, a multilateral forum set up in the 1990s to deal with the conflict. But recently they have been speaking directly. In March they agreed on a draft treaty. Two obstacles remained. The first was Azerbaijan's insistence that Armenia remove references to Nagorno-Karabakh from its constitution, which will require a referendum. The second was Azerbaijan's demand for a transport corridor to Nakhchivan. In 2020, as part of a ceasefire deal, Mr Aliyev and Mr Pashinyan agreed to open a route supervised by Russian officials. Both men later resiled from the idea that Russia should be involved, but could not agree on an alternative. Mr Trump provided a partial solution. For months, American negotiators have been shuttling back and forth to the region to thrash it out. Armenia will lease the land for 99 years to America, which will hire contractors to run the route. The TRIPP gives America a long-term stake in the region's security. Russia is furious. America has offered Armenia and Azerbaijan sweeteners, too. The boss of SOCAR, Azerbaijan's state energy firm, visited Washington with Mr Aliyev to sign a deal with ExxonMobil, an American oil giant. Armenia, which lacks Azerbaijan's natural resources, has less to offer America's mercantile president, but will get some support on artificial intelligence and semiconductors. Mr Trump also waived sanctions, introduced in 1992, that have prohibited military co-operation with Azerbaijan. He announced a 'strategic partnership' with Azerbaijan, which is a staunch ally of Israel. The peace deal could also pave the way for Turkey and Armenia to bury the hatchet. The standoff with Armenia has been 'Turkey's Achilles heel, in terms of its regional influence', says Nigar Goksel of the International Crisis Group, a global think-tank. Rapprochement between the two began in 2008, but stalled. To accommodate Mr Aliyev, Turkey had made normalisation with Armenia conditional on a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That obstacle now appears to be gone. Turkey may decide to open its border with Armenia, which it shut in solidarity with Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in 1993. 'Things will start moving fast,' Ms Goksel predicts. Yet amid the Trumpian pomp, the deal leaves much to be done. In Washington Messrs Aliyev and Pashinyan put their initials on a formal peace treaty, but did not sign it. Azerbaijan's demand for Armenia to change its constitution is unmet. The TRIPP's benefits will be concentrated in Nakhchivan and Syunik, the sparsely populated Armenian region it will cross. But the hope is that it could unlock more dealmaking. Azerbaijan and Armenia could start talking about opening other parts of their fortified border. There are reasons to be cautious. Mr Pashinyan is unpopular: just 13% of Armenians say they trust him. Nationalist hardliners, including Robert Kocharyan, a former president, accuse him of compromising Armenian sovereignty. (Mr Kocharyan, for his part, sold Armenian assets to Russia in exchange for debt relief during the 2000s.) Holding the referendum that Azerbaijan demands will be divisive, and an election next year will give Russia a chance to interfere. In June Armenia's government said it had foiled a coup planned for September. Azerbaijan could also disrupt the peace process. Mr Aliyev, an autocrat who succeeded his father in 2003, had previously threatened to seize a transport corridor by force. He has indulged in irredentist fantasies such as calling Armenia 'West Azerbaijan'. Laurence Broers of Chatham House, a British think-tank, says such talk will be 'kryptonite' for peace if it continues. Azerbaijan's military dominance only makes it harder for Armenia to trust it. Another risk is that America loses interest. Historically, peace in the south Caucasus has often been brought by outside powers. 'It was Russia and Turkey in 2020, it was the Minsk Group in the 1990s, it was the Bolsheviks in the 1920s,' says Mr Broers. Mr Trump has positioned America as the latest peace broker in a tough neighbourhood. Whether it lasts will not be in his control.
