U.S.-Brokered TRIPP in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Deal: Opportunities and Risks

EVN Report

a day ago

On August 8, 2025 , Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev signed a Joint Declaration facilitated by President Donald Trump. The deal aims to formally end 37 years of conflict, establish diplomatic relations and foster regional cooperation. Its centerpiece is the 'Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity' (TRIPP)—a strategic transit route through Armenia connecting Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan exclave—over which the U.S. will hold exclusive development rights for 99 years. In addition to it, Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a joint appeal to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to dissolve the Minsk Group. They also initiated the Armenia–Azerbaijan peace agreement , the text of which had been agreed in March 2025.
The deal has generated polarized reactions both within Armenia and internationally, with clear divisions between supporters and opponents. This article examines the origins and the legal and operational framework of TRIPP, its geopolitical implications, and domestic and international debates around it.
Origins of the Road vs. Corridor Dispute
Azerbaijan has repeatedly challenged Armenia's territorial integrity since 2021 through military incursions, coercive threats, maximalist demands and revisionist narratives. Among its claims, Azerbaijan has persistently demanded a 'Zangezur corridor'—a route through Armenia's Syunik region to Nakhichevan without Armenian customs or security control. Armenia has viewed this as compromising its sovereignty. Beyond legal and security concerns, such an arrangement could facilitate the annexation of Syunik, which Azerbaijan refers to as 'Zangezur'. Baku has openly threatened to establish this corridor by force if Armenia refuses. Combined with Azerbaijan's continued military buildup, this rhetoric suggests the corridor issue is driven by broader strategic ambitions rather than simple transit needs.
Both Russia and Türkiye support Azerbaijan's project. Russia has backed such a corridor under the control of its Federal Security Service (FSB), seeing it as a way to bypass Western sanctions. There is a belief in Armenia that Azerbaijan's blockade of the Lachin corridor—with Russian peacekeepers' complicity—was designed to pressure Armenia into accepting an extraterritorial 'Zangezur corridor.' Türkiye has framed the corridor as a key component in its broader pan-Turanist ambitions, aiming to connect the Turkic world.
Meanwhile, Azerbaijan and Iran have launched an infrastructure project known as the 'Araz corridor ' to connect mainland Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through Iranian territory. This provides an alternative to Azerbaijan's demands for an extraterritorial corridor through Armenia. Despite their differing systems of governance and values, Iran has served as Armenia's gateway to the Middle East and South Asia. Iran has also been perceived to act as a deterrent against Azerbaijan's threats to forcibly establish a corridor through Armenian territory, given Iran's opposition to border changes in the region. At the same time, the Araz corridor could further sideline Armenia's potential role in regional transit and connectivity initiatives, reinforcing Azerbaijan's influence over transport routes.
Armenia has promoted its 'Crossroad of Peace' initiative, grounded in mutual respect for sovereignty, and reciprocal access to regional transportation and communication routes.
The concept also envisions Armenian access through Azerbaijan and Türkiye, with customs procedures applied equally by all countries involved. Armenia has expressed readiness to 'implement simplifications of transit procedures and to introduce automated mechanisms' based on the principle of reciprocity, initially for cargo only. During his recent visit to Istanbul, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan discussed Armenia's vision with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, seeking to convince him that the 'Crossroads of Peace' also serves Ankara's regional economic interests.
The EU is deepening its connectivity vision through the Trans-Caspian 'Middle Corridor' , which links Central Asia to Europe via Azerbaijan and Georgia. In April 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen suggested that Armenia could become part of the Middle Corridor. Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev immediately rejected the idea of including Armenia in the project. Later, on July 14, von der Leyen and European Council President António Costa met with Pashinyan in Brussels and reaffirmed their support for Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative, highlighting its potential role to strengthen regional connectivity and Armenia's integration efforts.
Various Interpretations and Concerns
Supporters of the TRIPP in Armenia, including the authorities and their allies, present it as a historic breakthrough toward peace that creates new opportunities for regional connectivity and economic development. Some also view it as indirectly providing U.S. security guarantees to Armenia. More neutral interpretations in Armenia acknowledge it as a pragmatic compromise, given the power imbalance with Azerbaijan and the impossibility of securing better arrangements for Armenia's security and communication channels under current bilateral, regional and global realities. Critics, however, caution that transferring certain functions to an American consortium under the proposed oversight and management arrangements undermine Armenia's sovereignty over the southern Syunik region and could potentially serve as a 'Trojan horse' for Azerbaijani, American, or Israeli geopolitical ambitions. Pro-Russian and nationalist groups assert that it would indirectly transfer control of that route to Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
Additional concerns center on the broader geopolitical implications of the initiative. These include the potential growth of Turkish influence, Russia's complete removal from the South Caucasus, Iran's isolation, the advancement of Israeli strategic interests, diminished French and EU roles in the region, and counterbalancing Chinese influence. While some—primarily in Armenia—view TRIPP as having resolved Azerbaijan's 'Zangezur corridor' demand, Azerbaijani propaganda and its supporters continue to present it as securing this corridor. In American and broader international discourse, the term 'corridor' often carries a positive or neutral meaning. However, in Armenian discourse, it has negative connotations because of its association with extraterritoriality and loss of sovereign control—especially given Azerbaijan's demands. Both Azerbaijani outlets and Armenia's illiberal opposition have spread disinformation, claiming that TRIPP would cut off Armenia's border with Iran or entail an American military presence.
Legal and Operational Framework of TRIPP
TRIPP differs from the so-called 'Zangezur corridor' not only in name, but also in its legal and operational framework. In 2021-2022, Russia interpreted Article 9 of the November 2020 trilateral Statement ending the war to favor its own and Azerbaijan's interests, reportedly planning to install a wall along the Meghri road and place it under FSB control. This arrangement would have stripped Armenia of its sovereignty—and possibly even access—over that road, granting Azerbaijan and Russia joint use. Azerbaijan could then transport not only commercial cargo but also military personnel and weaponry, potentially leading to the annexation of part or all of Armenia's Syunik region. Russia's oversight of the Lachin corridor from late 2020 to early 2023 already demonstrated its security services could not be trusted to prevent such outcomes. This scenario would have also severed Armenia's border with Iran.
The Washington Declaration on the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP) affirms that all infrastructure developed under the project will function under Armenia's sovereignty, territorial integrity and jurisdiction, and commits the parties to opening transport links at domestic, bilateral, and international levels in full respect of these principles. This includes unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan via Armenian territory, with reciprocal benefits for Armenia's international and intra-state connectivity. Armenia will work with the United States and mutually determined third parties to establish a framework for the TRIPP connectivity project in its territory.
The declaration references the 1991 Almaty Declaration, which set the borders of newly independent states along the former administrative boundaries of Soviet republics. It affirms that good neighborly relations rest on the inviolability of international borders and rejects the use of force to acquire territory, stressing that this principle must never be subject to revision. While this provision prohibits Azerbaijan from pursuing further territorial gains through force, it also effectively normalizes Baku's conquest of Nagorno-Karabakh during 2020–2023. Furthermore, although Pashinyan has stated that Armenia aims to achieve the de-occupation of Armenian territories seized by Azerbaijan in 2021–2022 through delimitation rather than military force, it remains unclear whether Baku will exploit this position to entrench its occupation of Armenia's sovereign territories.
TRIPP will put in place procedures ensuring transit remains strictly commercial—preventing Azerbaijan from transferring military personnel or weapons. Since Azerbaijan has refused direct interaction with Armenian customs or border security services, this role will be performed by a U.S. company as a compromise. It can be assumed that this company, possibly a private U.S. security firm, will inspect Azerbaijani cargo and passengers while operating in compliance with Armenian legislation and sharing all data with relevant Armenian security services. This arrangement avoids direct contact between Azerbaijani personnel and Armenian authorities, reducing the risk of provocations or escalation during this period of low confidence between the parties. Importantly, it also prevents the erosion of sovereignty that would have occurred under the Russian-backed proposal, as no U.S. military presence is involved.
As outlined by Nerses Kopalyan, the arrangement will follow a front-office/back-office inspection model. A third-party operator, contracted by the U.S.–Armenia joint venture, will manage the front office to process incoming Azerbaijani cargo, while Armenian border control authorities will exercise oversight from the back office. However, these specifics are not reflected in the Declaration, which remains generic with broad principles and undefined aspects. This ambiguity leaves room for different interpretations, underscoring that the Declaration marks the beginning of a process, not a conclusion.
A key concern is the question of reciprocity for Armenia's access to Azerbaijan's transport network for both international trade and domestic connectivity. First, Azerbaijani cargo and potentially, also passengers will clearly enjoy privileged transit through Armenia, but Armenian cargo and passengers have no equivalent guarantees through Azerbaijan. Armenian authorities have stated that TRIPP would initially be implemented via railway before adding a road link, potentially improving Armenia's connectivity through Azerbaijan—and with Türkiye, if Turkish–Armenian relations normalize. However, without an arrangement in Azerbaijan comparable to TRIPP, neither access nor security for Armenian transit can be guaranteed, reflecting the persistent distrust between parties after more than three decades of conflict and blockade.
The fate of the once-vital Meghri railway underscores the fragility of regional connectivity. Abandoned since the 1992 dismantling of the Yerevan–Baku link, the Meghri station symbolizes the region's transport potential. Its deterioration serves as a reminder that restoring infrastructure requires both reinvestment and durable political trust.
According to the Declaration, Armenia will work with the U.S. and mutually determined third parties to establish a framework for the TRIPP connectivity project in its territory. Critics claim that 'third parties' means the U.S. might transfer de facto oversight of the corridor to Azerbaijan or Türkiye. In reality, this term likely refers to companies from other countries that could join the TRIPP implementation consortium. Armenia must agree on participating companies, which empowers it to exclude unsuitable entities or those with conflicts of interest, while creating opportunities for European companies and those from other partner countries mutually acceptable for both Armenia and the U.S. to participate.
Domestic routes through Azerbaijan offer limited practical value, though they may shorten certain internal journeys. Pashinyan has emphasized that TRIPP will also facilitate Armenia's internal connectivity by enabling rail links between Syunik in the south and central Armenia via Azerbaijani territory and Nakhchivan. Internationally, access via Azerbaijan could connect Armenia to Russia and Central Asia, and if the Armenia–Türkiye border reopened, restore the Gyumri–Kars rail link. Eventually, this could connect Armenia to inter-regional projects, like the Trans-Caspian/Middle Corridor linking Central Asia and Europe through Azerbaijan.
For Armenia to achieve meaningful regional integration, TRIPP must complement—rather than replace—its 'Crossroads of Peace' initiative, which seeks multiple open and reliable connections in all directions. Armenia and the U.S. have reportedly signed a memorandum of understanding to develop Armenia into a prospective regional transport hub. Through this agreement, Washington has committed to invest in and promote Armenia's infrastructure and border security, enhance customs and border management capacities, and stimulate private sector participation. However, the details of this agreement remain undisclosed.
The project opens doors for American private investment in Armenia's transport and logistics sectors, potentially spurring local economic growth and job creation. This investment could enhance Armenia's integration into regional and global trade networks while serving as a long-term anchor for sustained U.S. engagement. Additionally, significant American economic interests in resource-rich Syunik could function as an informal security assurance, making Washington more attentive to Armenia's stability and sovereignty. A detailed implementation roadmap is essential to define the TRIPP's parameters and prevent misinterpretation or misuse.
Geopolitical Implications
TRIPP's introduction is widely viewed as a turning point in the balance of external influence in the South Caucasus, with implications that extend far beyond Armenia–Azerbaijan relations.
For Washington, TRIPP offers both strategic and transactional benefits. By anchoring a U.S.-brokered route under Armenian sovereignty, the U.S. is consolidates its political presence in the South Caucasus and reinforces its role as a key external guarantor of Armenia–Azerbaijan normalization. Strategically, the initiative reduces Moscow's traditional leverage over regional transit and border arrangements, signaling a gradual reconfiguration of influence in the South Caucasus. While presented as a peace and connectivity initiative, TRIPP also reflects the transactional nature of current U.S. foreign policy. The 99-year exclusive development rights granted to a U.S. consortium create opportunities for substantial economic profit from infrastructure construction, operation, and commercial services. U.S. investment in these sectors would not only generate profit opportunities but also serve as a tangible assurance of sustained American engagement—embedding commercial stakes that underpin Washington's long-term security and political commitments in the region.
Parallels can be observed with the U.S. role in the Panama Canal . In both cases, Washington positioned itself as a guarantor of stability, efficiency, and international access to a strategically important route. However, whereas Panama's sovereignty was effectively curtailed under U.S. administration of the Canal Zone, TRIPP differs in explicitly affirming Armenia's sovereignty and jurisdiction. Still, the granting of 99-year exclusive development rights to a U.S. consortium introduces a degree of ambiguity: while sovereignty is formally preserved, the scale and duration of external involvement may invite perceptions of limitation. Both arrangements extend enduring American influence over geopolitically sensitive routes—Latin America in the early 20th century and the South Caucasus today—while embedding a transactional dimension. U.S. involvement is framed as mutually beneficial, promising development, prosperity and peace, yet it simultaneously secures long-term American commercial and political stakes within the host state.
Most regional analysts view TRIPP as the most significant blow to Russian interests in the South Caucasus since the 2020 war. It replaces the Russia-backed 'Zangezur corridor' under FSB control with a U.S.-managed route under Armenian sovereignty. This effectively sidelines Moscow from the region and neutralizes its claims based on the November 2020 trilateral statement between Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Russia. In response, Moscow has intensified its hybrid campaign in Armenia, portraying the deal as disastrous for Armenia's sovereignty and security in an attempt to undermine it.
Questions remain about this arrangement's compatibility with the presence of the Russian border service on the Armenia–Iran border and Armenia's membership in the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The border issue is more straightforward: As of late 2024, Armenia began gradually assuming control of its borders from Russian personnel, marking a significant step in asserting sovereignty over critical frontier points. At the Agarak crossing on the Iran–Armenia border, Armenian border guards replaced Russian personnel on December 30, 2024. On February 28, Armenia's border service assumed control of the Margara crossing point on the Armenia–Turkey border. Pashinyan announced that starting March 1, 2025, all entry and exit points of Armenia—including those on closed borders—would be managed exclusively by Armenian border troops. [While Russian border guards no longer control the checkpoints themselves, they do still patrol certain stretches of Armenia's frontiers with Turkey and Iran]. This transition not only reduces Armenia's reliance on Moscow for border management but also strengthens its capacity to engage in regional connectivity initiatives with greater independence. However, economists note that Armenia remains unprepared to exit the EAEU due to its structural economic dependence on Russia. If communication routes open through TRIPP and the 'Crossroads of Peace,' Armenia could accelerate its economic diversification and reduce dependence on Russia and the EAEU. Yet implementing these changes without adequate institutional preparation and political consensus could trigger economic disruptions and geopolitical vulnerabilities. Besides, Armenia's railways are under Russian control. Pashinyan has noted that 'Russia may be interested in investing to restore the Ijevan-Hrazdan railway and the Ijevan-Kazakh railway; however, Azerbaijan's consent would also be necessary here.'
Iran's reaction to TRIPP presents a significant challenge for Armenia. Initially, Iranian religious leaders strongly opposed any 'corridor' through Armenia and even threatened to block it, viewing it as a threat to regional stability. However, Tehran's official position has since evolved toward a more pragmatic stance. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has stated that the joint Armenia–Azerbaijan declaration addresses Iran's core concerns: preserving Armenia's sovereignty, opposing border changes, and safeguarding Iran's overland access to Europe via Armenian territory. Pashinyan has emphasized that the project would also provide Armenia with a railway connection to Iran, with construction of the Meghri railway set to begin in the near future. It will be carried out alongside the ongoing development of the North–South highway by an Iranian company. Iran continues to oppose any foreign military presence in the South Caucasus, which has been ruled out under the arrangement, and has voiced concern about the involvement of an American company in the project's implementation. On August 14, Armenia's Deputy Foreign Minister visited Iran to reassure that 'Tehran–Yerevan ties will never be subject to geopolitical bargain.' A strategic partnership agreement between Iran and Armenia is expected to be on the agenda during President Masoud Pezeshkian's upcoming visit to Yerevan on August 18.
The potential benefits of TRIPP will remain constrained as long as Türkiye keeps its border with Armenia closed. For three decades, Ankara has conditioned normalization on the Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, effectively subordinating its policy toward Armenia to Baku's demands. Now that Yerevan and Baku have committed to peace, this rationale is increasingly difficult to sustain. While Türkiye had long promoted the extraterritorial 'Zangezur corridor', recent signals suggest Ankara may find Armenia's 'Crossroads of Peace' vision more acceptable, as it would also generate tangible economic gains for Türkiye. Crucially, any move toward reopening will test Ankara's balancing act between deference to Azerbaijan's preferences and its own interest in diversifying East–West trade and re-engaging Armenia's market. Opening the border could provide Türkiye with direct access to Armenia's emerging transit routes, strengthening its connectivity with the South Caucasus while enabling Armenia to break free from isolation. For both countries, the shift could reframe their frontier from a symbol of confrontation into a corridor for commerce, energy and political dialogue—anchoring a more sustainable regional order.
From Tbilisi's perspective , TRIPP introduces both opportunity and uncertainty. Traditionally, Georgia has served as the South Caucasus' primary transit corridor—linking Armenia and Azerbaijan to Europe and Central Asia via the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway. While TRIPP has a potential to reconfigure regional connectivity in ways that could diminish Georgia's monopoly as a transit hub, it may also be an opportunity to weaken Russian dominance and reinforce U.S. strategic involvement—an outcome that aligns with the aspirations of Georgia's pro-Western groups.
Pro-European circles in Armenia worry that TRIPP could diminish the EU's and France's recently expanding role in Syunik and across Armenia, particularly in light of the growing policy differences and conflicting interests between Brussels and Washington at the global level. While in April 2024, the EU and the U.S. launched a Joint Cooperation Platform for Armenia, its viability has remained ambiguous since Trump came to power, and Armenia is now dealing with them separately. This reflects the wider erosion of unity within the collective West. Nevertheless, TRIPP also creates space for complementarity and synergies with EU and French initiatives planned or already underway in Syunik, enabling their infrastructure, resilience, and development efforts to align with the broader objectives of regional connectivity.
France demonstrated its commitment to the region by opening a consulate in Syunik in July 2025, signaling long-term interest in the region's security and development, and by signaling the intention to formalize its Strategic Partnership with Armenia. French companies are expected to implement projects of strategic importance in Syunik, underscoring France's long-term interest in the region's security and development. As regional connectivity begins to realign around TRIPP, French involvement in infrastructure projects offers an opportunity to maintain and potentially deepen its engagement, complementing broader strategic partnership efforts with Armenia.
Meanwhile, the EU has been funding projects to strengthen Syunik's resilience, improve local infrastructure, and support socio-economic stability, while the EU Monitoring Mission in Armenia (EUMA) continues its patrols along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border. A shift in the external involvement could weaken these European efforts. At the same time, the provision in the Armenia–Azerbaijan Joint Declaration concerning cooperation with third parties may enable continued engagement of the EU and its member states in the implementation of TRIPP. The EU has an opportunity to align TRIPP with its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to strengthen sustainable and secure infrastructure links worldwide. Armenia has been identified as a priority partner, with its 'Crossroads of Peace' concept viewed as compatible with both Global Gateway and the Middle Corridor. The EU is already financing major projects, such as the Sisian–Kajaran section of the North–South highway in Syunik. Embedding TRIPP within these broader connectivity strategies would allow the EU to reinforce Armenia's sovereignty and deepen its regional integration.
Pashinyan has emphasized that TRIPP would also connect Armenia to Central Asia through a ferry link, while providing China with a new railway route to Europe that does not currently exist. This prospect aligns with the broader logic of the Middle Corridor, the trans-Caspian route that Beijing has increasingly factored into its Belt and Road planning as an alternative to northern routes passing through Russia. For China, the addition of an Armenian segment under TRIPP could diversify its access to Western markets, while for Armenia, it would strengthen the country's role as a transit hub and embed it more firmly in Eurasian connectivity frameworks.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan told Fox News Digital that he does not anticipate pushback from Russia or Iran regarding the U.S.-facilitated transit route in the region, describing the arrangement as a 'win for all sides.' He noted that if the deal is materialized, Iran would have access through a railway from the Persian Gulf to the Black Sea. And Russia and Iran will have an opportunity to have a railway connection between the two countries. In another interview, Pashinyan expressed hope that 'this project could become a good opportunity for economic cooperation to begin between Iran and the U.S., and between Russia and the United States.'
To conclude, TRIPP ultimately represents both a departure from the threatening 'Zangezur corridor' concept and a bold experiment in balancing sovereignty, connectivity and geopolitical rivalries. Its success hinges on Armenia's ability to secure tangible economic and security benefits while preventing the route from becoming a channel for external leverage or regional destabilization. Equally important is sustained U.S. commitment and engagement in its implementation. By presenting TRIPP as beneficial to Armenia, Azerbaijan, and the region's major powers, Yerevan aims to position itself as a bridge between competing geopolitical interests—an ambitious balancing act offering both opportunities and the risk of overextending Armenia's multivector diplomacy.
As attention shifts from TRIPP to the broader peace agreement, the unresolved issues and ambiguities in the accord highlight that securing physical connectivity is only one aspect of the much more complex process of achieving lasting peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan.