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Libya Review
8 hours ago
- Politics
- Libya Review
UK Report Warns of Renewed Tripoli Clashes
A new British analysis by Middle East Monitor has warned of a potential escalation in armed clashes in Libya's capital, Tripoli, as the government of Abdel-Hamid Dbaiba continues to hold power despite intensifying public protests and worsening living conditions. The report states that Dbaiba's government is under immense pressure following rare, unified demonstrations calling for his removal. The protests erupted amid mounting grievances over mismanagement, public sector failures, and growing corruption. This unrest has already prompted the resignation of three ministers. Dbaiba's televised address on May 18 was met with widespread rejection and reportedly exacerbated public anger. The report highlighted how the prime minister's appointment of militia leader Abdel-Ghani al-Kikli — known as 'Ghneiwa' — as head of the Stability Support Apparatus, and the allocation of $132 million to him in 2022 alone, has further fueled resentment. Efforts by the Libyan House of Representatives to replace Dbaiba have reportedly stalled due to fears of losing international recognition. Meanwhile, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has proposed four potential political frameworks, all calling for the formation of a new government to oversee elections during a 24-month transitional period. The report expects UN envoy Hanna Serwaa Tetteh to present these proposals to the UN Security Council on June 24. However, none of the plans are binding, leaving room for a flexible political roadmap based on the UN's discretion. The analysis described the Dbaiba administration as one of the most corrupt and dysfunctional since 2011. It attributed Libya's prolonged instability to NATO's intervention and subsequent failed international alliances that failed to secure peace. Despite the current pause in protests, now limited to Friday night demonstrations, the report attributes the temporary lull to the Eid holiday and the availability of cash liquidity — suggesting the calm may be short-lived. The article concluded that Dbaiba is unlikely to step down voluntarily, as he remains backed by powerful Misrata-based militias. This makes another round of violent conflict increasingly likely, with the government continuing to rely on propaganda, financial incentives, and armed groups to maintain its grip on power amid ongoing public fund mismanagement. Quoting a Western diplomat, the report stated: 'Frankly, nobody wants to appear as supporting a failed state — but no one is willing to fix it either.' Tags: Abdel-Hamid DbaibaArmed Clasheslibyatripoli
Yahoo
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Libya Takes Another Step Towards All-Out Civil War Amid Oil ‘Boom'
What was marketed as a fragile return to order in Libya has, once again, been exposed as a mirage. On May 12, Tripoli plunged into chaos following the reported killing of Abdul Ghani al-Kikli (aka 'Gheniwa'), the commander who runs the powerful SSA (Stability Support Apparatus), one of Libya's many militias whose patronage is necessary for either of the two clans that control the country's east and west in a bitter rivalry. The gunfire and shelling that started to tear through Tripoli on Monday wasn't simply on the level of an isolated skirmish; this is a major tremor along a fast-widening geopolitical fault line that won't just expose Libyan oil to more hijacking. For readers of exclusive weekly newsletter, all will already be clear: The fragile system of mutually beneficial corruption that's kept the two clans from launching the next civil war is cracking. For oil investors, it may be time for a rethink, and a recalculation of how much money they are willing to risk on the longer game here. While global energy majors have expressed a great deal of excitement about Libya's potential oil production rebound, the resurgence of clashes in Tripoli make clear what seasoned analysts have warned all along: Libya is still one political misfire away from collapsing into violent fragmentation. For oil investors, the timing of these clashes couldn't be worse. This is not a market opportunity—it's a geopolitical storm in the images out of Abu Salim—a Tripoli district that has long served as Gheniwa's stronghold—were grim. Clashes between the SSA and the Misrata-based 444 Brigade intensified within hours of news of his death. Multiple reports, including from Libya Observer and Al Jazeera, indicate that armored vehicles and heavy weaponry were deployed deep into residential areas. By nightfall, civilian life in Tripoli had ground to a halt, with the UN issuing an urgent call for calm, warning of 'significant risks to civilians.' Gheniwa's SSA is one of many militias co-opted into state structures by the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. His death leaves a power vacuum that other groups will waste no time attempting to fill, on behalf of General Khalifa Haftar, who rules the east and largely controls oil production and exports, if not oil revenues. While the Tripoli clashes played out in real time, another headline flew mostly under the radar: the public prosecution ordered the detention of top executives at Al-Madar, Libya's largest mobile company. Ostensibly, the arrests target corruption. But in Libya's hyper-politicized environment, few believe this is mere legal housekeeping. The move reflects an ongoing pattern, which is part of Dbeibah's broader campaign to neutralize institutions that could serve rival power centers (in other words, the Haftar clan). According to Libya Herald, the timing of the Al-Madar arrests aligns with increased internal competition between the GNU (Dbeiba's Government of National Unity) and rival institutions in the east, most notably the Libyan National Army (LNA) under Haftar. Control over communications, just like control over oil terminals and military infrastructure, is a lever of power. As The Washington Institute poignantly noted earlier this week (and oil investors should pay attention), Libya is not governed by institutions. It is governed by men with militias, who wear the uniforms of state authority when convenient, and discard them when it suits political gain. The competition between Dbeibah and Haftar is not merely political; it is tribal, economic, and ultimately existential. Each side seeks not power-sharing, but monopoly, which means that the 'benefit-sharing' deal that has been in place for the past five years was simply a period of regrouping, with the aid of corruption on both sides. Once those arsenals are full, the deal is off. has recently highlighted the troubling trend of international oil companies showing renewed interest in Libya, buoyed by the country's ambitious production targets. Libya's National Oil Corporation (NOC) is eyeing a boost in daily output to 1.3 million barrels per day by 2026, which depends on stability. The political framework supporting Libya's oil sector is built on quicksand. Smuggling syndicates, militia-run fuel rackets, and foreign mercenary networks (including recently rebranded Russian mercenaries in the east) continue to undermine any efforts at national coherence. Even technical staff at key export terminals operate under de facto militia rule. The fatal flaw in investor optimism is that oil, unlike minerals or digital assets, requires physical infrastructure and physical security. Libya has neither. Every pipeline, refinery, and offshore platform sits within a zone of contested control. And with the central government unable (or unwilling) to disarm its own proxies, the industry is one factional dispute away from collapse. The assassination of a key Dbeibah militia commander is just that. Complicating the picture further is the growing role of Russia, particularly in Haftar-controlled territories. Russian-linked interests have not only entrenched themselves in eastern oil facilities but are also creating an alternative power architecture in coordination with Haftar's camp. Moscow's goal is not just energy influence; it's seeking access to the southern Mediterranean. For Western investors and governments, that should be a red flag. The same energy fields that are supposed to fuel European stability may, under current conditions, empower a Russia-aligned parallel state. Where does that leave Libya, then? And who will come out on top? That depends not simply on which militias each clan has won over with patronage schemes … It depends on which external powers will step into the fray more visibly than they are now. Washington is busy with tariff warfare, Ukraine and Gaza. It's largely stepped aside as Syria's new post-Assad regime scrambles to secure power and external forces (Turkey, Israel, UAE, among others) stake their claims and attempt to secure the fallout. It's also been absent in Libya for the most part, while Russia homes in on key Libyan outposts in the east. America isn't playing geopolitics anymore. It's only business. The only deal Trump has attempted to cut with Libya recently is to absorb illegal immigrants being deported from the U.S., where they will end up (should it materialize) fighting a civil war in which the U.S. has zero stake, but which will play an influential role in the future balance of power. By Tom Kool for More Top Reads From this article on
Libya Herald
13-05-2025
- Politics
- Libya Herald
Calm returns after overnight Tripoli clashes as major militia leader reportedly killed
Calm seems to have returned to Tripoli this morning after overnight clashes between various state-recognised militias and army forces from within Tripoli – with support from Misrata based forces. After 9 pm Tripoli time, the public were advised by the Tripoli government to stay at home. Shops closed and the city was near deserted as shots were heard in the distance. Schools and universities announced they were closed and Mitiga airport flights were halted by airliners. The varying narratives The most widely circulated narrative says that Abdelghani Ghnewa Al-Kikly, leader of the powerful Tripoli state-recognised militia, the Support and Stability Apparatus (SSA), based in the Abusleem district, attended a meeting in the Tikbali barracks in Salah Al-Deen, south of Tripoli. Tikbali is controlled by the 444 Brigade, a brigade that is not considered a militia as it is headed Mahmoud Hamza, who, unlike most other top militias, is not a warlord who had made his name fighting in the 2011 revolution. He is government appointed. It is considered the closest thing to a state army. The narratives differ as to why Ghnewa, and six members of his militia, variously referred to as his entourage or bodyguards, were at Tikbali. The most accepted theory is that they were there for negotiations with Hamza and Abdelsalam Al-Zubi, Aldabaiba's Deputy Defence Minister, and leaders of the Misrata-based 111 Brigade to de-escalate the tensions in Tripoli, and elsewhere, over the last few days and weeks. Cutting Ghnewa down to size? What this de-escalation entailed and what was requested of Ghnewa, is still vague. Ghnewa has been overreaching himself territorially over the years by extending his operations to beyond the Western / Nefusa Mountains and Khoms. There have been recent clashes with him in Khoms and the Gharian. He and his followers, headed mostly by extended family members from his relatively small Western Mountain homeland town of Kikla, have also been overreaching themselves in the state. They have been increasingly forcing their personnel into many state agencies, development and investment funds, telecoms agencies and diplomatic missions. This disproportionate influence by SSA members has been resented by the Aldabaiba government and other cities and militias. The Tikbali negotiations went wrong? The theory goes that the Tikbali negotiations were unsuccessful and Ghnewa either refused to de-escalate, or threatened to use force, or that negotiations turned into a fraught argument which ascended into a macho flexing of muscles and finally into an unintended shootout. Unconfirmed deaths? It is during this assumed shootout that Ghnewa and his six personnel were supposedly killed. Social media images have shown a photo purporting to be the corpse of a dead Ghnewa. However, the Tripoli authorities have failed to confirm or deny this. Unconfirmed social media photos of Ghnewa's corpse At the time of publishing, it is still unconfirmed that Ghnewa has been killed. The social media photos of his corpse are unconfirmed by the Tripoli government or its official health agencies. In Islam, the usual custom is to bury the dead as soon as possible. But there has been no sign of Ghnewa or his delegation – nor of their corpses. If they are dead, the government could be delaying the release of their corpses to allow for it to gain full control of the situation and pre-empt and mitigate any possible counterreaction by Ghnewa's supporters, family and tribe. It could be buying time to control the narrative by enforcing a cooling-off period. Confirmed deaths The only confirmed deaths by the Recovery Unit of the Corpses Department of the Emergency and Support Medicine Centre (ESMC) were 6 bodies from clash points in the vicinity of Abusleem area. These showed bodies being recovered out of military vehicles around Ghnewa's Abusleem headquarters. Was it a setup? An alternative theory is that Ghnewa was set up and walked into a carefully prepared trap. He was presented with options during this meeting that he was bound to reject, spiralling the situation into a shootout. Other viewpoints suggest an attempt was made to arrest Ghnewa at the end of the meeting, which his bodyguards predictably resisted. At least one relative of Ghnewa has posted that the meeting was a trap and that Ghnewa was set up. Militia leaders and government officials have met with each other tens of times since the 2011 revolution, and it is taken for granted that meetings for negotiations come with guaranteed safe passage. The Aldabaiba government attempting to own the ''victory''? The announcement this morning by the Tripoli based and Abd Alhamid Aldabaiba-led Ministry of Defence that the military operation has been successfully completed seems to lend itself to the narrative that there was much preplanning by Aldabaiba and his aligned forces. There have been numerous video clips over the last few days showing a military buildup into Tripoli. So, a clash of some sort was expected, planned for or even intended all along. Owning the success On the other hand, the Aldabaiba regime could be attempting to own events that fortuitously went their way. Either way, Aldabaiba is putting a positive spin on events – with the government and its aligned forces coming out of last night's events on top. Why did the SSA collapse so quickly? There has been some surprise at how easily and quickly the SSA collapsed. The perception is that it was one of the strongest militias in Tripoli and hence in Libya. It was expected to put up a strong, deadly and destructive fight – at least in its homeland of Abusleem. Large numbers of injured and deaths would be expected. However, sources in Abusleem and those who visited the area this morning have said that most SSA members had fled or melted into the background. There was no sign of burnt-out vehicles, buildings and spent cartridges – the usual signs of strong clashes. The top echelons have been reported to have either headed to Kikla, their tribal land, or headed to the Tunisian border crossings attempting to escape. Does this mean they saw the end, the writing on the wall? Another view is that the SSA is now comprised of ''kids'' who were simply jumping on the kudos bandwagon of being in the SSA. They are not battle-hardy and were just born at the 2011 revolution. They view is that the best SSA fighters had died in the Hafter war on Tripoli. A further view is that they were caught completely by surprise. Their vanity did not allow them to think the Tripoli government would have the audacity to attack them at the heart of their power centre: Abusleem. Will SSA forces make a comeback? It is for this reason that sources believe that the SSA will not make a comeback under the leadership of the Ghnewa-Kikly clan. Once the warlord figurehead of Abdelghani Ghnewa has gone, the attraction of the powerful leader is no longer there as a pull factor. The news of his possible death seems to have dissolved the SSA – which was overwhelmingly built around Ghnewa's leadership kudos. Mitiga airport flights to resume Airlines have announced this morning their intention to return their aircrafts to Mitiga airport and resume flights from there. It must be pointed out that the Tripoli government did not halt flights or shut down Tripoli's Mitiga airport, but it was the individual airlines who decided to move their aircraft and flights for safety to Misrata airport. Interior ministry: Situation in the Tripoli is safe and stable This morning, the Tripoli Ministry of Interior announced that the situation in the Tripoli is safe and stable, and the security services are performing their duty efficiently in maintaining security and public order. It called on all citizens, especially employees in state institutions, to join their work and contribute to the return of life to normal. It called on all employees of the Ministry to return to their workplaces and adhere to official working hours, in order to ensure the continuity of services and enhance stability. PM Aldabaiba Meanwhile, Tripoli Prime Minister Aldabaiba posted: ''I commend the Ministries of Interior and Defence, and all members of the army and police, for their significant accomplishments in establishing security and imposing state authority in the capital. What has been achieved today confirms that the regular institutions are capable of protecting the nation and preserving the dignity of citizens. It constitutes a decisive step toward eliminating irregular groups (militias) and establishing the principle that there is no place in Libya except for state institutions, and no authority except for the law''. What happens next? The Tripoli government's Defence Ministry announced this morning that it is in full control of Ghnewa's Abusleem district. After the dust settles, the question will be: what happens next? Will the Aldabaiba government leave a vacuum that could be exploited by other parties? Or will it fill the ga?. What will happen to the SSA? Will it be disbanded or will it be rebranded with a new name? Will it be merged into the Interior Ministry or into the 444 Brigade? It must act fast to build on the supposed disassembling of a supposed strong Tripoli militia in favour of accountable state security forces such as the Interior Ministry or the 444 brigade – if it is to strengthen the Libyan state. More power to Trabelsi and 444? If indeed this is the end of the SSA, it will clearly strengthen the Interior Ministry and the 444 brigade. The less unaccountable, warlord-led militias exist in Tripoli and Libya, the stronger the Libyan state. Aldabaiba is stronger? The results of last night's clashes would also make Aldabaiba stronger. They have consolidated his position before other Tripoli militias and viz-a-viz the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Ageela Saleh, and Khalifa Hafter. Is Kara next? The ending of the SSA will now direct all focus on the other powerful Tripoli Milita: Abdelraouf Kara's Mitiga based Rada / Special Deterrence Force (SDF). Only with the removal of Kara as its head can a Tripoli government have total control of the capital and move to merge other city's militias into a state security force accountable to the government of the day.
