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Arab News
2 days ago
- Politics
- Arab News
Libya: How to govern around fragmentation
Libya has since become a brutal case study in the consequences of institutional and governance collapse. The 2011 rebellion shattered Muammar Qaddafi's hyper-centralized state but failed to replace it with a functional alternative. Instead, the international community's fixation on centralized power-sharing deals with warlords and loose militia coalitions continues to neglect the crucial work of subnational institution-building. Thirteen years of political limbo have not yielded a single coherent local governance framework, enabling parallel power structures to metastasize. To date, Libya remains split between the Tripoli-based, UN-recognized Government of National Unity and a rogue eastern fiefdom dominated by the warlord Khalifa Haftar and his sons. These, in turn, also compete with more than 100 autonomous militias, including tribal-affiliated groups exploiting administrative vacuums. A conspicuous absence of well-defined, legally enforceable administrative boundaries is the principal accelerant. Law 59 of 2012 envisaged governorates as intermediaries between municipalities and the state, but zero have been operationalized. Proposed maps, like the Government of National Unity's 2022 blueprint for 19 provinces, remain theoretical amid venomous disputes over territorial jurisdiction. Meanwhile, tribal councils fill service-delivery voids in regions like Fezzan, where public structures have simply vanished. Elsewhere, municipalities consequently shoulder functions spanning healthcare, policing and infrastructure without budgets or coordination mechanisms, resulting in woeful outcomes such as crippled hospitals and extremely high dropout rates in schools. Such an operational vacuum is now fueling resource predation as local factions continue to seize parts of Libya's petroleum sector. Tribal and militia leaders have also become adept at exploiting institutional ambiguity, converting geographic influence into lucrative monopolies. Illicit economies and networks are now generating sums close to one-tenth of Libya's pre-2011 gross domestic product via ports and desert crossings administered by de facto warlords. At the same time, boundary disputes between Zintan and Gharyan municipalities have frozen $120 million in reconstruction funds for three years. Such paralysis is not incidental; it is structural. The persistent failure to establish legitimate subnational governance structures, particularly resolving the question of administrative boundaries, entrenches division and dims prospects for a unified, sovereign state. Delaying the resolution of this cartographic standoff means that Libya's fragmentation risks becoming irreversible at the cost of more than 2 million Libyans who require humanitarian aid in a country that once boasted high life expectancy, literacy rates and per capita income. There is some precedence to the depth of the challenge Libya faces now. The country's territorial administration has always been unstable, from the Ottoman sanjaks designed for tax extraction, to Italy's colonial divisions, to King Idris' short-lived federal experiment (1951-1963) balancing Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and Fezzan. Qaddafi's 1969 coup replaced provinces with 'people's districts,' eviscerating local capacity. Post-Qaddafi, the 2012 Local Administration Law envisioned governorates, municipalities and sub-municipal tiers, yet the critical governorate level remains non-existent. This absence cripples coordination on regional transport, resource management and security, overburdening a weak central authority and leaving municipalities isolated. Current proposals for administrative boundaries reveal crippling tensions. Advocates of three regions (Cyrenaica, Tripolitania, Fezzan) invoke historical legitimacy but ignore perilous realities. Similar 'federalizations' around the world with minimal regional units, e.g. Bosnia (two entities), Comoros (three) and Pakistan (1973: four) all exhibit chronic instability. In addition, Nigeria's post-independence shift from three to 36 states deliberately diluted ethnic domination. Libya's three-region model risks entrenching the very divisions that fueled past civil strife: Fears of secessionism, resource-hoarding by dominant cities like Benghazi or Misrata, and the marginalization of smaller tribes within macro-regions. Alternative frameworks, for instance, 12 provinces or 13 units based on electoral districts, aim for balance but face legitimacy deficits. Electoral districts, drawn for technical convenience, often ignore deep-seated tribal animosities or socioeconomic ties. Proposals for 'economic regions' coordinating multiple governorates require robust planning institutions and fiscal autonomy that Libya lacks. Crucially, all models stumble on the core political schism: Federalists demanding regional autonomy vs. centralists fearing state fracture. This deadlock paralyzes reforms while illicit economies flourish; fuel-smuggling alone generates at least half a billion annually for militias, entrenching rule-by-gun-barrel. However, there is still some hope yet. South Africa's post-apartheid boundary delimitation offers curious parallels. Facing similar risks of ethnic polarization, it established a technocratic Commission on Demarcation and Delimitation guided by clear criteria: Historical boundaries, economic viability, infrastructure and cultural realities. Crucially, it embedded this within a Multi-Party Negotiating Forum, separating technical work from political bargaining. Four months of consultations yielded 780 written submissions and 157 oral testimonies, with hearings translated into 11 languages. The result: Nine provinces replacing apartheid's racial Bantustans, validated through inclusive participation. Libya's path demands a similarly structured process, not just a map. A boundary commission must integrate multidisciplinary expertise, such as demographers to quantify population distributions, economists to model resource allocation and geographers to assess topographical constraints, as seen with South Africa's commission, which included 16 specialists across seven fields. Crucially, such a body must derive its mandate from an inclusive political forum representing Libya's fragmented power centers, ensuring decisions reflect negotiated consensus rather than unilateral imposition. Historical continuities must be weighed alongside contemporary realities: Tribal land claims governing 65 percent of southern territories, hydrocarbon reserves concentrated in three basins and population disparities where Tripoli hosts 2 million residents while southern municipalities average 30,000. Resource distribution formulas must be codified to prevent rent-seeking, particularly given Libya's lucrative oil revenues. Public consultations require robust methodologies, not tokenism. Besides, imposing boundaries without tribal and community buy-in guarantees rebellion. Yet Libya's context demands added safeguards: Independent dispute-resolution mechanisms and explicit rejection of referendums, which magnify polarization in fractured societies. Lastly, dispute resolution necessitates permanent architecture. Nigeria's National Boundary Commission, operational since 1987, offers a template: A neutral technical body empowered to adjudicate inter-provincial conflicts and manage cross-boundary resources. However, in Libya, where 40 percent of proposed boundaries overlap with militia territories, such a commission will require authority to deploy verification teams and impose binding arbitration, backed by international guarantors to prevent politicization. A tall order, given the current context, but the cost of inaction escalates daily. Libya's chief export — oil, remains hostage to blockades by armed groups, even as 1.5 million people lack healthcare access, while municipalities, starved of funds and authority, cannot provide basic services. Each year of fragmentation deepens kleptocratic networks, radicalizes marginalized populations and erodes faith in public institutions. Strangely, the 2011 rebellion demanded dignity and equitable development. Redrawing administrative boundaries should therefore not be a mere cartography exercise but the very foundation for dismantling militias, redistributing resources and rebuilding social contracts. Without this, Libya's sovereignty will remain a fiction sustained only by foreign patrons and kleptocrats. • Hafed Al-Ghwell is a senior fellow and program director at the Stimson Center and senior fellow at the Center for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies. X: @HafedAlGhwell
The National
5 days ago
- Politics
- The National
Fifty years since Qaddafi's Green Book, Libya has yet to turn the page
The sharp smell of fuel and gunpowder hung over Tripoli's old centre. It was September 2011, three weeks after the Libyan capital fell to rebel forces, and three weeks before its leader Muammar Qaddafi was killed. Down a narrow alley near an international hotel, foreign journalists in protective gear filmed as a group of men tossed copies of Qaddafi's infamous The Green Book into a fire. It wasn't the first time the book, an economic and social manifesto-turned-collector's item, had been burned since the uprising began that March. But this was the biggest purge yet, and those present claimed they were watching the last of them go up in flames. Half a century after its 1975 debut, The Green Book may have vanished from homes and libraries, but its imprint on Libya's political economy and society endures. The energy-rich country of seven million has spent the past 15 years trying to turn the page. It still hasn't. The book's ideals – collective wealth, direct democracy and local governance – turned toxic long ago. Yet they linger in Libya's fractured present: a patchwork of armed groups, an oil-fuelled spoils system and populist rhetoric propped up by fragile institutions. When he introduced The Green Book, Qaddafi declared parliament inherently undemocratic: 'The mere existence of a parliament means the absence of the people.' His vision of true democracy meant rule by Popular Committees and the General People's Congress. Libya, he claimed, was the only real democracy on Earth. 'There is no state with a democracy except Libya on the whole planet,' he said. To spread this doctrine, the establishment formed the People's Establishment for Publication, Distribution and Advertising. The book was printed, translated and plastered everywhere, from schools to taxis, offices and billboards. It became an ideological infrastructure. State media broadcast its teachings. Students memorised passages. Ministry shelves overflowed with green covers. Qaddafi said his proudest achievement was helping Libyans 'govern themselves by themselves' through this book. His product, a rambling mix of political theory, economic advice and lessons on everything from menstruation to home ownership, aimed to be a new universal truth. Rejecting both capitalism and communism, he proposed a 'Third Universal Theory' built on grassroots rule. But, as bizarre as the colonel himself, the book often blurred the line between intellect and irony. In 2008, during a visit to Kyiv dressed in a white safari suit emblazoned with a map of Africa, Qaddafi claimed that Barack Obama's election in the US had been foretold in his book. ' The Green Book says society's time will come. The Green Book says power will belong to society and its minorities,' he said, speaking from a tent pitched outside the Ukrainian presidential residence. Despite ruling with an iron fist for more than four decades, Qaddafi fell to a sweeping uprising led in part by exiled Libyans and backed by western powers. Ironically, the rebels embodied perhaps the only principle in The Green Book that ever truly took hold: carrying guns. 'If the people are truly sovereign, then they must also be armed. Otherwise, power remains with those who hold the weapons,' Qaddafi argued. His regime collapsed in 2011. There were hopes that post-Qaddafi Libya, a strategically located country between Africa and Europe and rich in oil and gas, could open up to investment, travel and stability. Instead, militias rushed into the void. Many now function as de facto local authorities, filling the same roles once imagined for Qaddafi's People's Committees, only by force, not consent. These groups mirror his model of decentralised rule, but without legitimacy or oversight. Oil wealth, once promoted as 'owned by the people', now bankrolls warlords. Calls for people-driven governance persist, but the institutions to realise them never emerged. Even Qaddafi saw the irony: 'Theoretically, this is genuine democracy. But realistically, the strong always rule.' He wasn't wrong. Dictatorship cloaked as direct democracy gave way to chaos draped in similar slogans. Ask most Libyans what The Green Book meant to them, and they will probably struggle to provide an answer. Centres were once set up across the country to decode the book's contents, but some say not even Qaddafi understood what he was trying to say. Today, Libya's challenges are the same as they were 15 years ago: build durable institutions, distribute wealth fairly and govern by law, not ideology. The Green Book may belong to the past, but its ghost still haunts the present. In a house in Tripoli's upscale Andalus neighbourhood, copies of the book remain. Inside a wooden cabinet, tucked in a cardboard box, lie a few faded green covers. The homeowner told me she saved them when the new government ordered their destruction. Because they were part of history, even if they were meaningless. Because she liked the colour green. Because one day, a collector might pay a fortune to buy them. She gave me one. It now sits on my shelf among other collectors' items. Fifteen years on, I've only managed to read two pages. But I keep it. A strange little proof that sometimes, madness passes for power.
Arab News
18-07-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
A Libyan accused of war crimes has been arrested in Germany, ICC says
THE HAGUE: A Libyan accused by the International Criminal Court of crimes against humanity and war crimes has been arrested in Germany on a sealed arrest warrant, the court announced Mohamed Ali El Hishri was allegedly one of the most senior officials at Miriga Prison in Tripoli where thousands of people were detained. He was arrested Wednesday based on a warrant issued by the court on July 10.'He is suspected of having committed directly himself, ordered or overseen crimes against humanity and war crimes, including murder, torture, rape and sexual violence, allegedly committed in Libya from February 2015 to early 2020,' the ICC said in a Hishri will remain in custody in Germany until legal proceedings to have him transported to The Hague are court relies on other countries to execute its arrest warrants. It paid tribute to German authorities for detaining El Hishri.'I thank the national authorities for their strong and consistent cooperation with the Court, including leading to this recent arrest,' ICC Registrar Osvaldo Zavala Giler said in a United Nations Security Council called on the ICC to open an investigation in Libya in 2011 amid violence that led to the toppling of Muammar Qaddafi and morphed into a crippling civil war. The court issued a warrant for the longtime Libyan strongman, but he was killed by rebels before he could be court has arrest warrants out for eight other Libyan suspects, including one of Qaddafi's sons. Earlier this year, authorities in Libya accepted the court's jurisdiction over the country from 2011 through to the end of 2027.
Arab News
14-07-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
More than 100 migrants freed in Libya after being held captive by gang, officials say
BENGHAZI: More than 100 migrants, including five women, have been freed from captivity after being held for ransom by a gang in eastern Libya, the country's attorney general said on Monday. 'A criminal group involved in organizing the smuggling of migrants, depriving them of their freedom, trafficking them, and torturing them to force their families to pay ransoms for their release,' a statement from the attorney general said. Libya has become a transit route for migrants fleeing conflict and poverty to Europe via the dangerous route across the desert and over the Mediterranean following the toppling of Muammar Qaddafi in a NATO-backed uprising in 2011. Many migrants desperate to make the crossing have fallen into the hands of traffickers. The freed migrants had been held in Ajdabiya, some 160 km (100 miles) from Libya's second city Benghazi. Five suspected traffickers from Libya, Sudan and Egypt, have been arrested, officials said. The attorney general and Ajdabiya security directorate posted pictures of the migrants on their Facebook pages which they said had been retrieved from the suspects' mobile phones. They showed migrants with hands and legs cuffed with signs that they had been beaten. In February, at least 28 bodies were recovered from a mass grave in the desert north of Kufra city. Officials said a gang had subjected the migrants to torture and inhumane treatment. That followed another 19 bodies being found in a mass grave in the Jikharra area, also in southeastern Libya, a security directorate said, blaming a known smuggling network. As of December 2024, around 825,000 migrants from 47 countries were recorded in Libya, according to UN data released in May. Last week, the EU migration commissioner and ministers from Italy, Malta and Greece met with the internationally recognized prime minister of the national unity government, Abdulhamid Dbeibah, and discussed the migration crisis.
Arab News
09-07-2025
- Politics
- Arab News
UN mission in Libya urges immediate de-escalation in Tripoli
TRIPOLI: The UN Mission in Libya urged on Wednesday all Libyan parties to avoid actions or political rhetoric that could trigger escalation or renewed clashes in Tripoli, following reports of continued military buildup in and around the city. Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Al-Dbeibah ordered in May the dismantling of what he called irregular armed groups, which was followed by Tripoli's fiercest clashes in years between two armed groups that killed at least eight civilians. 'The Mission continues its efforts to help de-escalate the situation and calls on all parties to engage in good faith toward this end ... Forces recently deployed in Tripoli must withdraw without delay,' the UN Mission said on social media. A Tripoli-based Government of National Unity under Al-Dbeibah was installed through a UN-backed process in 2021 but the Benghazi-based House of Representatives no longer recognizes its legitimacy. Libya has had little stability since a 2011 NATO-backed uprising ousted longtime autocrat Muammar Qaddafi. The country split in 2014 between rival eastern and western factions, though an outbreak of major warfare paused with a truce in 2020. While eastern Libya has been dominated for a decade by commander Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army, control in Tripoli and western Libya has been splintered among numerous armed factions.
