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Business Recorder
31-07-2025
- Politics
- Business Recorder
Power versus people
There is a standoff between power and people, each holding on to its domain. In a democratic dispensation, power flourishes from the support of the people. Misuse of power creates ill-will that is usually difficult to bridge. Without the effective support of people, power tends to adopt extortion methods to fulfil its needs, which then leads to a clash. The mantra of 'Sub Theek Hay' (all is well) does not hold ground when people are made to suffer by the misuse of power. For the country to flourish the two must work with understanding; otherwise, the decline cannot be reversed. Irreversible declines invariably lead to a collapse. Major course correction is needed before it is too late. I remember the fall of the all-powerful Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan. After completing ten years in power, he decided to celebrate his decade of progress. Little did he know it would prove to be the decay of his rule. While it was the best of times for few, it was the worst of times for many. When people took to the streets he was baffled. All was not well as he was made to believe by the sycophants that surrounded him. By March 1969, he was powered out by the powerful as he had lost public trust and support. It was indeed a sad ending for an individual who had supported his master's will against the will of the people he was required to serve. His 'Friends not Masters, a Political Autobiography' failed to restore the people's trust in him. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (ZAB) emerged from the ashes of the Ayub regime. I remember the day in November 1967 at the YMCA hall on the Mall where he announced the formation of his party. It was the first real political party of the country based on people's power. His anti-establishment stance was well taken by the masses. When he came into power he called his regime 'Awami Hakumat' (people's government) which indeed it was. In the words of his own Comrade Hanif Ramay, ZAB then drifted towards power and was ultimately eliminated. The 'Mazboot Kursi' (strong seat of power) could not save him. Yayha Khan, the second usurper, had to surrender to the will of the people in East Pakistan. The third usurper who considered himself to be above the constitution met a tragic end. Pervez Musharraf had to live in exile after his trial and conviction under Article 6. His supra-constitutional acts could not save him. It is widely believed that power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. People provide the umbilical cord to power, which cannot be disrupted. Power itself is always a burden which is carried by the people; in other words, it is a cost on their head which must be borne by the people willingly in the best national interests. Unwilling extortion leads to turmoil. The US war of independence started on the principle of 'No Taxation without Representation'. In other words, people decide the distribution and utilization of their tax money collected by the powerful, not the other way around as has been the case in the land of the pure. Despite widespread suffering of the people, the party is unending for the individuals enjoying power. To determine the will of the people, votes are counted. Credible elections are the only means of determining the people's mandate. The Islamic Republic of Pakistan has a track record of manipulated electoral exercises, only the contests in 1970 and 2024 count as credible, but both failed to strike the much-needed balance between power and people. It is widely believed that the US Constitution enacted in 1787 is the best written document ever. It starts with the words, 'We the people allow the government'. In other words, the power always remains subservient to the people as regulated by the agreement between the rulers and the ruled. No one has ever dared to cross the constitutional boundaries in over two centuries of its enactment. The balance between power and people is remarkable. The law enforcement agencies are allowed to use guns, so are the people under the right to bear arms. There are no exit-control lists; no one can be stopped from leaving the country under the right to travel. Exit stamps are not required. The US Constitution is hailed as the 'Miracle of Philadelphia' but unfortunately the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan remains under constant threat of the powerful while the people helplessly watch. Both Zia and Musharraf introduced amendments at will, while under the so-called 'Hybrid System' they are being forced through the parliament. The 26th amendment and now the 27th is being worked upon by the powers under the unwilling gaze of the people. Such gross imbalances lead to instability. Absolute power can never lead to stability. Investors, both local and foreign, shy away from conflicts. Even the best intentions fail in an environment of tussle. I remember during my days at the Pakistan Science Foundation (PSF) we were involved in building a model farm near Ormara in Baluchistan. Wind pumps were to be used to extract groundwater, combined with drip irrigation technology. As we were driving down the picturesque coastal highway, the road suddenly ended. While going through the detour, I asked our local contact about the washing away of the road. With remorse, he said, the plans are made in Islamabad to be implemented by NHA (National Highway Authority); no one ever consults the locals who know the ground realities. The first major rainfall and the portion of the highway was swept away by the gushing water. No power could come in the way. Man-made power has serious limitations which must be understood. There is a concept of 'Awaz-e-Khalq' (voice of the people), which must be heard; otherwise, power is toppled like the washing away of the coastal highway of Baluchistan by the gushing waters. No nation can sustain such continuous losses by not reaching out to the very people the power is meant to serve. Yes, power is needed to run the affairs of the state but not without the support of the people; it is the lesson of history, which cannot and should not be ignored. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
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Business Standard
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Business Standard
As Munir meets Trump, a look at the past legacy of Pak's military chiefs
Since achieving independence in 1947, Pakistan's military leadership has seen a very close engagement with the political, economic, and foreign relations of the country. Army chiefs have not only led coups and managed wars, but they have also shaped and controlled the frameworks within which states operate. The evolution of power has transitioned through two key titles, Commander-in-Chief (1947-1972) and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) from 1972 onwards. This long arc of military dominance reached a new milestone on Wednesday (June 18), when General Asim Munir, Pakistan's current army chief, held a direct meeting with US President Donald Trump at the White House. This was the first time a sitting Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, who was not a politician or ruling under martial law, was formally received at such a high diplomatic level, which indicates the global weight of the military organisation. Over the years, each army chief stamps a different mark as the organisation transformed with coups, wars, diplomacy to commercialising itself. Here is an overview of how subsequent military leaders have shaped the civil-military relationship in Pakistan and extended the army's role in statecraft. Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan (1951–1958) This legacy began with Field Marshal Muhammad Ayub Khan when he served as the Commander-in-Chief from 1951 to 1958 as the United States increased its military aid to Pakistan. A series of events led Ayub Khan to seize power in a military coup in 1958, cloaked as a necessary response to civilian mismanagement. He set up an operational "developmental dictatorship," consolidating economic and administrative power and dividing profits with military elites through the Fauji Foundation and massive parcels of land. His rule ended with a negotiated settlement that reestablished its international martial image when the 1965 war with India came to an end. His rule established a future pattern: seize power, entrench economically, and command diplomacy. General Muhammad Musa Khan (1958-1966) Following him, General Muhammad Musa Khan (1958-1966), a symbolic figure installed by Ayub, extended the same centralised authority and military privileges without initiating a new coup. He remained involved during the 1965 war and supported the Ayub-era political-economic framework. General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1966-1971) General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1966-1971) assumed power after Ayub's resignation, imposing martial law to address a growing crisis in East Pakistan. He disbanded the parliament and cracked down on dissent, centralising authority in West Pakistan. His tenure ended in catastrophe during the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, as Pakistan faced military defeat and diplomatic isolation, ultimately leading to the creation of Pakistan. This marked a big rupture in the myth of Pakistan's military invincibility and exposed the limitations of authoritarian rule. Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan (Dec 1971-Mar 1972) Lt. Gen. Gul Hassan Khan briefly served from December 1971 to March 1972 during a transitional phase. His role was largely ceremonial, presiding over a caretaker military command during national disintegration. General Tikka Khan (1972-1976) In the post-1971 period, General Tikka Khan (1972-1976) was appointed COAS under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. He initiated military restructuring and oversaw violent campaigns in Balochistan. While supporting Bhutto's nationalisation efforts, he ensured the military retained its institutional privileges. Diplomatically, he repositioned the military after the 1971 setback, marking the army's re-entry as a core power broker in civilian governance. General Zia??'ul??'Haq (1976-1988) General Zia??'ul??'Haq (1976-1988) executed a coup in 1977, Operation Fair Play, after fuelling political unrest. He imposed martial law, institutionalised Islamisation, and expanded military economic interests through the Defence Housing Authority, Fauji Foundation, and other welfare corporations. His foreign policy pivoted around alignment with the United States during the Soviet-Afghan War. While remaining neutral during the Iran-Iraq conflict, Zia actively supported Afghan Mujahideen. His rule left a legacy of ideological, political, and commercial militarisation. Weak generals in turbulent times After Zia's death in 1988, General Mirza Aslam Beg (1988-1991) facilitated a return to electoral democracy but ensured the National Security Council (NSC) retained supervisory authority. He maintained behind-the-scenes influence over fragile civilian administrations. General Asif Nawaz Janjua (1991-1993), selected on the basis of seniority, died unexpectedly in office. His brief tenure did not register any significant political or economic shift. General Abdul Waheed Kakar (1993-1996) took charge amid political unrest. He influenced the dismissal and restructuring of governments and continued to utilise the NSC as a policy advisory instrument. General Jehangir Karamat (1996-1998) assumed command under constitutional norms but was forced to resign after advocating parliamentary oversight of the NSC, an action that exposed military discomfort with civilian checks. General Pervez Musharraf (1998-2007) In 1998, General Pervez Musharraf seized power after the Kargil War in a coup against the Nawaz Sharif government, citing administrative failures. His regime restructured the Constitution, liberalised the economy, and significantly expanded military-led business ventures. Under Musharraf, Pakistan allied with the United States during the post-9/11 global war on terror and maintained strong ties with China and Gulf states. His controversial Kargil campaign attracted international condemnation and resulted in retreat under US pressure. Musharraf's leadership institutionalised the military's supremacy in politics and global diplomacy. The post-Musharraf era General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani (2007-2013), a Musharraf appointee, led during the post-coup normalisation period. Though he projected a reduced public military footprint, his tenure ensured continued control of the NSC and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Appointed in 2013 by Kayani, General Raheel Sharif (2013-2016) prioritised counter-terror operations, particularly Operation Zarb??'e??'Azb, and expanded the army's role in infrastructure under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). He largely avoided political entanglement while engaging internationally to secure infrastructure investment. General Qamar Javed Bajwa (2016-2022) assumed command over senior contenders and received two extensions from Parliament. His tenure deepened military involvement in electoral processes, most notably engineering the rise of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and orchestrating the 2022 regime change. Under him, the military strengthened its economic stakes in CPEC and intensified diplomatic alignment while tightening domestic political control. Field Marshal General Asim Munir (2022-present) General Asim Munir, the current Chief of Army Staff (COAS), assumed office in November 2022 amid political upheaval. In May 2025, he was elevated to the rank of Field Marshal, only the second in Pakistan's history after Ayub Khan. Munir's tenure has seen the reintroduction of military courts to prosecute civilian dissenters and a major expansion of 'milbus' (military-business) interests across mining, agriculture, and infrastructure. His leadership was tested during the April-May 2025 conflict with India, triggered by the Pahalgam terror attack. India responded with Operation Sindoor, targeting Pakistani military installations. Pakistan retaliated with Operation Bunyan??'um??'Marsoos. A ceasefire was reached on May 10. Munir emerged as a national hero, with a dramatic increase in public approval. On June 18, he attended a high-profile White House lunch hosted by U.S. President Donald Trump, where discussions focused on regional stability, Iran, and Indo-Pak relations. Munir has since broadened military diplomacy, finalising jet deals with China, strengthening ties with Gulf nations, and elevating Pakistan's engagement in the United Nations Security Council and the International Monetary Fund. So far, his legacy is marked by unprecedented consolidation of military power in both state and commercial spheres. However, critics warn of an authoritarian drift and an increasingly militarised political landscape. Over the course of seven decades, Pakistan's army chiefs have followed a familiar blueprint: seize control through coups or exploit crises, institutionalise their authority via the NSC and influence over the judiciary and bureaucracy, monetise power through sprawling military business empires and justify their hold through war and diplomacy.
India.com
10-05-2025
- Politics
- India.com
India Pakistan ceasefire: History of ceasefires between two countries and what the current one means
New Delhi: Ceasefire means temporarily or permanently halting war or conflict. It is implemented when two or more parties (such as countries, armies, or groups) agree to stop firing, attacking, and military actions. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has confirmed the ceasefire with Pakistan. India has agreed to the ceasefire on its terms. In simple words, when there is a war-like situation between two countries and they decide that there will be no further attacks, this agreement is called a ceasefire. Main objectives of ceasefire: To protect human life (both military and civilian). To provide an opportunity for dialogue and peace process. To reduce tension and move towards a permanent solution. To respond to international pressure. A ceasefire occurred after the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War which primarily revolved around the disputed Himalayan region of Kashmir, with both countries vying for control. The war began after Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which aimed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to instigate an insurgency against Indian rule. The Tashkent Declaration, also known as the Tashkent Agreement, was a peace treaty signed on January 10, 1966, in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, by the Prime Minister of India, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and the President of Pakistan, Muhammad Ayub Khan. It aimed to end the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965. Then, after the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the Shimla agreement was signed between India and Pakistan on 2 July 1972 in Shimla, the capital of Himachal Pradesh. Its official purpose was stated to serve as a way for both countries to 'put an end to the conflict and confrontation that have hitherto marred their relations' and to conceive the steps to be taken for further normalization of India–Pakistan relations while also laying down the principles that should govern their future interactions. A ceasefire does not mean peace – a ceasefire is only a 'battle halted by agreement' – the war is not over yet. Peace is considered to be when both countries reach a permanent agreement or treaty. After several days of continuous shelling, drone attacks, and retaliatory military actions, India and Pakistan have agreed to a ceasefire along the borders. The armies of both countries have decided to halt all military activities at the border. The situation in Jammu and Kashmir is currently normal, and firing from the Pakistani side along the LOC has stopped.
