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First Post
4 days ago
- Politics
- First Post
How Pakistani military has metastasised like cancer inside society
The public plays along as the military intensifies its anti-India narrative and false propaganda and the Generals prosper at the expense of the economy read more 'Of all the countries I've dealt with, I consider Pakistan to be the most dangerous because of the radicalisation of its society and the availability of nuclear weapons.' —Jim Mattis, former US defence secretary and four-star Marine Corps General, Call Sign Chaos: Learning to Lead, 2019 General Mattis, who commanded forces in the Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan War and Iraq War, realised three things: First, the Pakistani society is 'radicalised'. Second, Pakistan's political culture has 'an active self-destructive streak'. Third, US military interactions with Pakistan 'could only be transactional' as its military can't be trusted. The three factors are interwoven and describe the current state of Pakistan's mess. A nation born out of hatred and animosity, ruled directly or indirectly by its military, which sponsors terrorism and has radicalised its society, will keep on sinking into the abyss of self-destruction. Decades of hatred and enmity towards India—especially the dream of occupying J&K—systematically nurtured and propagated by the Pakistani military, have turned into a metastatic cancer which has spread deep inside its society. External affairs minister S Jaishankar rightly compared Pakistan to a cancer that has started affecting its society. 'Pakistan is an exception in our neighbourhood in view of its support for cross-border terrorism. That cancer is now consuming its body politic,' he said at the 19th Nani A Palkhivala Memorial Lecture in Mumbai in January. Military supremacy and hatred for India Hatred for India and the Pakistani military's creation of the mirage of a Hindu nation being an existential threat unite its society. Despite orchestrating four coups, ruling directly and indirectly, meddling in politics, robbing the nation of development, wasting funds and foreign loans on weapons and suppressing dissent and protests, the Pakistani military is respected by the population. The military has cemented its image as the saviour of Pakistan's borders and its people, 'threatened by a Hindu India' since its independence. In his book Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Husain Haqqani, a Pakistani journalist and former ambassador to the US, writes: 'Very soon after independence, 'Islamic Pakistan' was defining itself through the prism of resistance to 'Hindu India'.' The belief that India 'represented an existential threat to Pakistan led to maintaining a large military, which in turn helped the military assert its dominance in the life of the country'. Within weeks of independence, Haqqani writes, 'Editorials in the Muslim League newspaper, Dawn, called for 'guns rather than butter', urging a bigger and better-equipped army to defend 'the sacred soil' of Pakistan.' The national security apparatus was accorded a special status as protecting nationhood by military means 'took priority over all else'. 'It also meant that political ideas and actions that could be interpreted as diluting Pakistani nationhood were subversive. Demanding ethnic rights or provincial autonomy, seeking friendly ties with India, and advocating a secular Constitution fell under that category of subversion.' Haqqani explains how the military gained prominence. 'The Kashmir dispute as well as the ideological project fuelled rivalry with India, which in turn increased the new country's need for a strong military. The military and the bureaucracy, therefore, became even more crucial players in Pakistan's life than they would have been had the circumstances of the country's birth been different.' Historian Ayesha Jalal, in her book The State of Martial Rule, explains how internal threats to the government were conflated with a defence against India. Thus, the difference between internal and external threats was blurred to the military's advantage. 'So in Pakistan's case, defence against India was in part a defence against internal threats to central authority. This is why a preoccupation with affording the defence establishment—not unusual for a newly created state— assumed obsessive dimensions in the first few years of Pakistan's existence,' she writes. The Pakistani leadership found it 'convenient to perceive all internal political opposition as a threat to the security of the state'. Gradually, the Pakistani society also started perceiving India as a threat and the military as the protector from this imaginary danger. A February Gallup & Gilani Pakistan opinion poll found that only 41 per cent of Pakistanis think that Pakistan should maintain any relationship with India at any level before the Kashmir issue is resolved—35 per cent are against it. Military cons, coerces Pakistanis at the same time Operation Sindoor exposed Pakistani society's fickle-mindedness, the military's hero-worshipping and how the Generals con and coerce the public at the same time. The Pakistani military changed the Black Day in May 2023 to the Day of Righteous Battle in the same month this year in merely four days. The tactics were the same. Pakistani and local terrorists attack J&K, Indian retaliation portrayed as an attack on Pakistan's sovereignty and the military retaliates as the nation's saviour. The scene in Pakistan changed from the massive protests against Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) chief Imran Khan's arrest, which engulfed major cities, public and private properties and military installations, to celebration and triumph around two years later. In May 2023, the public challenged the military's dominance and power. In May 2025, the public celebrated the military's fake propaganda of supremacy and winning against India as the Generals took advantage of Operation Sindoor and the decades-old Kashmir issue to boost their decreasing popularity. A May 7 Gallup Pakistan survey found 77 per cent of Pakistanis rejecting India's allegation that Pakistan was behind the Pahalgam attack with 55 per cent believing that India's intelligence or government may have orchestrated it. Despite India's no-first-use nuclear policy, 45 per cent of Pakistanis fear that India might launch a first nuclear strike. For Pakistanis, the country's foreign policy with India takes precedence over deep-rooted corruption, serious economic problems and the incapability of successive governments with 64 per cent of the public satisfied with the political leadership's unified stance on tensions with India. Sixty-five per cent express overall satisfaction with the Shehbaz Sharif government's India foreign policy. Another Gallup Pakistan survey, conducted on May 21, found how the military's lies, disinformation and fake propaganda had boosted its image with 96 per cent of the public believing that India was defeated and 97 per cent rating the performance of its armed forces as good or very good. An overwhelming 87 per cent held India responsible for initiating the conflict. Public opinion of the Army improved to 93 per cent compared to 73 per cent of the civilian government. Sharif's party, PML-N, received the highest positive performance rating (65 per cent), followed by PTI (60 per cent) and Pakistan Peoples Party (58 per cent). Around 30 per cent opposed normalisation of ties with India. Not even 50 per cent supported normalising relations with India with trade cooperation receiving the highest support (49 per cent), followed closely by sports (48 per cent), education (44 per cent) and cultural exchanges (40 per cent). Two incidents show how the military cons Pakistanis, who are willing to be conned, in the name of the non-existent Indian threat and increases its iron grip at the same time. First, the government revoked the ban on X, imposed in February 2024, a few hours after India targeted terrorist bases in Pakistan and PoK on May 7. The social media platform was banned on February 17, 2024, without notification on the pretext of threats to national security and Elon Musk's company's refusal to accede to requests and comply with the Removal and Blocking of Unlawful Online Content (Procedure, Oversight and Safeguards) Rules 2021. The actual reason for the ban was the accounts of candidates and parties, especially PTI and the National Democratic Movement, posting about election irregularities. The government admitted after one month that X was banned. Internet and cybersecurity watchdog NetBlocks said that X was banned after 'it was used to draw attention to instances of alleged election fraud'. According to Access Now, a nonprofit that focuses on digital civil rights and reports on global Internet censorship, Pakistan imposed 21 shutdowns in 2024. Once the ban on X was revoked, a deluge of disinformation, like Pakistan shooting down a Su-30MKI and a MiG-29, from Pakistani handles flooded the platform. Pakistanis were part of the disinformation campaign without realising that the ban was removed to whip up anti-India feelings and restore the military's image. The military managed to reunite the nation with hatred against India and false claims of victory as Pakistanis forgot how their economic woes increased, ethnic and political dissent was crushed, dissenters went missing and all these years. Even Khan, who had held Army chief General Syed Asim Munir responsible for his arrest, tweeted: 'The recent escalation between Pakistan and India has once again proven that Pakistanis are a brave, proud, and dignified nation.' Second, as Pakistanis celebrated the military's lies, the spineless Supreme Court, in a 5-2 verdict by the Constitutional Bench, allowed 105 civilians accused in the May 9, 2023, protests to be tried in military courts. The civilians had been convicted under the Pakistan Army Act (PAA), 1952, and the Official Secrets Act, 1923, for espionage, 'interfering with officers of the police or members of the armed forces' and unauthorised use of uniforms. The apex court overturned an earlier ruling against military trials of civilians. Section 2 of PAA permits trials of civilians before military courts when they are accused of 'seducing or attempting to seduce any person subject to this Act from his duty or allegiance to government' or having committed 'in relation to any work of defence…in relation to the military of Pakistan'. Section 59(4) provides for the trial of such civilians under the PAA. In a May report by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), 'Military Justice in Pakistan: A Glaring Surrender of Human Rights', found that trials of the 105 civilians violated Pakistan's legal obligations under international human rights. 'The ICJ recalls that the use of military courts to try civilians usurps the functions of the ordinary courts and is inconsistent with the principle of independence of the judiciary.' According to Principle 5 of the UN Human Rights Sub-Commission, 'military courts should, in principle, have no jurisdiction to try civilians… The jurisdiction of military courts should be limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed by military personnel. Military courts may try persons treated as military personnel for infractions strictly related to their military status'. Pakistani military's grip on economy The state of Pakistan's economy is as open as the military and the political leadership's sponsorship of terrorism. Since joining the IMF in 1950, Pakistan has been bailed out more than 20 times by the Fund to address fiscal deficits, balance of payments crises and structural reforms. One of the arrangements under which the IMF has bailed out Pakistan is the Extended Fund Facility (EFF), a longer-term arrangement involving reforms to address the economy's structural weaknesses. On May 9, a day before the ceasefire, the IMF granted $1 billion to Pakistan as part of its $7-billion EFF and another $1.3 billion under the Resilience and Sustainability Facility. The amount was a carrot dangled by the US-led IMF before Pakistan to end hostilities, and was vociferously opposed by India. Pakistan's economy was in negative territory twice in the last five years—2020, -0.9 per cent; 2021, 5.8 per cent; 2022, 6.2 per cent; 2023, -0.2 per cent; and 2024, 2.5 per cent In April, the IMF revised Pakistan's GDP growth in 2025 downward to 2.6 per cent from 3 per cent in January and 3.6 per cent in 2026 from 4 per cent citing the 29 per cent tariffs imposed by the Donald Trump administration. Inflation has been a constant problem with higher prices of fruits, vegetables, flour, rice, meat and chicken. According to IMF data, inflation has been in double digits in the last five years except once—2020 (10.7 per cent), 2021 (8.2 per cent), 2022 (12.2 per cent), 2023 (29.2 per cent) and 2024 (23.4 per cent). Per IMF projections, inflation in 2025 will be 5.1 per cent and 7.7 per cent in 2026. The unemployment rate in the last five years was 6.6 per cent in 2020, 6.3 per cent in 2021, 6.2 per cent in 2022, 8.5 per cent in 2023 and 8.3 per cent in 20204. According to the IMF, the unemployment rate in 2025 is projected at 8 per cent and in 2026 at 7.5 per cent. Pakistan's forex reserves are abysmally low compared to India's. In December 2020, it was $20.5 million; December 2021, $23.9 million; December 2022, $10.8 million; December 2023, $12.7 million; and December 2024, $15.9 million. Forex reserves in May were $16.6 million, according to data released by the State Bank of Pakistan. The Pakistani currency has been severely hit by economic mismanagement, ineffective fiscal policies, a massive trade deficit, the lack of structural reforms and investment, low growth rates, high inflation, rising unemployment and political instability. The PKR tanked to an all-time low of 307.10 against the dollar in the first week of September 2023. The currency has been trading above 280. According to a Fitch Ratings projection in April, Pakistan will gradually devalue its currency to avoid likely pressure on the current account. Bloomberg, quoting Krisjanis Krustins, director, Asia Pacific Sovereign Ratings, Fitch, reported, 'The ratings company sees the rupee falling to 285 against the dollar by the end of June and weakening further to 295 by the end of the next fiscal year in 2026.' Pakistan's poverty rate is estimated at 42.4 per cent in the 2025 fiscal year, higher than 40.5 per cent in 2024, according to the World Bank. With a two per cent annual population growth, 1.9 million more people will fall into poverty this year. Even in 2026 and 2027, the rate will be around 40 per cent and 40.8 per cent, respectively. Amid the economic disaster and financial ruin with a national debt of $130 billion, $7.64 billion was allocated for defence in the 2024-25 defence budget. The Generals have been thriving for decades at the expense of Pakistanis by controlling industry, agriculture and the private sector. Under the Defence Housing Authority, the Army owns 12 per cent of the country's land at nominal rates, including urban and agricultural. The military has a massive stake in the government's industrial and commercial policies due to its immense influence on industry, commerce and business. In her book Military Inc. – Inside Pakistan's Military Economy, Pakistani political scientist Ayesha Siddiqa terms the military's 'internal economy' Milbus, military capital used for the personal benefit of its personnel, especially officers. 'Pakistan's military runs a huge commercial empire with an estimated value of billions of dollars.' This capital is 'neither recorded nor a part of the defence budget. Its most significant component is entrepreneurial activities that are not subject to state accountability procedures'. The military is the sole driver of Milbus— and is 'an example of the type of Milbus that intensifies military interest in remaining in power or direct/indirect control of governance'. According to her, Milbus involves: the varied business ventures of four welfare foundations (small businesses such as farms, schools and private security firms and corporate enterprises such as commercial banks and insurance companies, radio and television channels and manufacturing plants) direct institutional military involvement in enterprises such as toll collecting, shopping centres and petrol stations and benefits given to retired personnel, such as state land or business openings. Siddiqa explains how Milbus hurts Pakistan economically, politically and socially. The system 'nurtures' the military's political ambitions by creating deep-rooted vested interests in military dominance. 'The military has nourished the religious right to consolidate military control over the State and society.' Socially, it 'increases inter-ethnic tensions (due to skewed military recruitment policies), reduces the acceptability of the military as an arbiter among political interests and increases the alienation of the underprivileged'. Moreover, building and sustaining the military's influence in power politics come at a cost. 'Evidence shows that military businesses are not run more efficiently than others. Some of the military's larger businesses and subsidiaries have required financial bailout from the government.' Meanwhile, the Army continues with its anti-India narrative despite losing four wars to India—and the public plays along. Anti-India rhetoric, sponsorship of terrorism in J&K and the portrayal of India as an existential threat to Pakistan sustain the military while development has come to a standstill. According to Noam Chomsky, professor emeritus at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the father of modern linguistics, 'Pakistan just cannot survive' if it continues the confrontation with India. In an interview with the Dawn in May 2013, he said, 'Pakistan will never be able to match the Indian militarily and the effort to do so is taking an immense toll on society.' The writer is a freelance journalist with more than two decades of experience and comments primarily on foreign affairs. He tweets as @FightTheBigots. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the writer. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost's views.
NDTV
4 days ago
- Politics
- NDTV
Eid-ul-Zuha 2025: Schools, Colleges In Kerala To Remain Closed On June 7
The Kerala government has declared a holiday for all educational institutions in the state on Friday and Saturday (June 7) in view of Eid-ul-Zuha (Bakrid). However, government offices will remain open on Friday, as the official public holiday has been rescheduled to Saturday, June 7, in accordance with the revised festival date. The holiday was earlier set for June 6 but had to be postponed after the moon was not sighted in time, causing the observance of the festival by a day. Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) state general secretary PMA Salam said the decision to grant a holiday to educational institutions on Friday came after strong public opposition. "The government gave in to public pressure. Instead of announcing a general holiday for all government institutions, it restricted the leave to educational institutions. Government offices should have been included," he said. In a Facebook post, he added, "The cancellation of the previously declared Eid holiday led to protests. The Muslim League demanded that Friday be declared a holiday for all government offices, not just educational institutions." Central Govt Offices In Kerala To Remain Closed On Saturday Central government offices in Kerala will also remain shut on Saturday, June 7, following the state government's revised directive. However, they remain open on Friday.
India Today
6 days ago
- General
- India Today
Celebrate Eid, pay Rs 5 lakh PKR as fine: Pakistan to Ahmadiyya Muslims
The Ahmadiyya Muslims, who under Hazrat Khalifatul Masih I had extended unequivocal support to Muhammad Ali Jinnah and his Muslim League for the creation of Pakistan on religious grounds, are now bearing the brunt of repression in the very Islamic Republic they helped form. With Eid al-Adha less than a week away, Pakistan's marginalised Ahmadiyya community is facing growing pressure to forgo qurbani (sacrifice) and other rituals, even in the confines of their homes, with Punjab provincial authorities now demanding affidavits warning of a Rs 5 lakh (PKR) fine for police in several districts of Punjab and Sindh provinces have been detaining members of the Ahmadiyya community, and threatening and harassing them into signing undertakings that they not perform Eid al-Adha 2025 is on June 7. Come Eid, the Pakistani establishment-run state reminds the Ahmadiyya community that they don't belong to the republic that their forefathers helped Ahmadiyya community, numbering around 2 million, faces severe persecution in Pakistan, including violent attacks and legal discrimination. They are not recognised as Muslims under a 1974 constitutional amendment. Barred from reading the Quran or performing namaaz openly, Ahmadis have also been targeted by terrorist groups such as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Tehreek-e-Labbaik June 2024, at least 36 cases of arbitrary arrests and detentions of Ahmadiyyas were reported in Pakistan's Punjab, aimed at preventing them from performing animal sacrifice for Eid, noted Amnesty March this year, around 100 graves belonging to the Ahmadiyya community were desecrated by members of Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP) in Punjab's Khushab some cases, authorities have demanded affidavits from Ahmadiyya without any legal basis. Pakistani law does not specifically prohibit people from the Ahmadiyya community from performing qurbani in MUSLIMS MADE TO SIGN AFFIDAVITS IN PAKISTANMembers of the Ahmadiyya community in Punjab have been instructed to submit affidavits and indemnity bonds, pledging not to observe Eid al-Adha or perform its associated religious rituals, reported the Karachi-based of the affidavit forms issued by the Punjab government, shared by US-based Pakistani-origin journalist Sabookh Syed, includes a clause requiring signatories to pay a fine of Rs 5 lakh (PKR) for a full range of repressions against the Ahmadiyya community, officials of Punjab province have offered conflicting explanations for the a 2023 notification has been used to bar Ahmadiyyas from identifying as Muslims or practising Islamic rituals. However, legal experts argue that forcing individuals to sign such declarations is unconstitutional and exceeds the authority of local officials, according to a report by the Lahore-based newspaper, The Friday BAR ASSOCIATION WRITES AGAINST AHMADIYYASIn Punjab's capital, the Lahore High Court Bar Association (LHCBA) added fuel to the fire by writing to the Punjab Inspector General of Police, urging him to take action against the Ahmadiyya community for "violating" the law by organising gatherings resembling Islamic letter, signed by LHCBA President Malik Asif Nissoana and other office bearers, insisted that only Muslims have the right to perform qurbani, and that Ahmadiyya participation "hurts the sentiments of the Muslim majority and risks public disorder", reported is a Sunni-majority country and a big chunk of the population does not consider the Ahmadiyya community to be Muslims because the community believes in Mirza Ghulam Ahmad as a prophet, a view seen as heretical to the mainstream Islamic belief that Prophet Muhammad was the final Ahmadiyya community in Pakistan has faced systematic disenfranchisement since the Second Constitutional Amendment in 1974, which declared them non-Muslims, stripping them of religious and legal recognition as Muslims. In 1984, Ordinance XX under General Zia-ul-Haq further restricted their rights, criminalising their practise of Islamic rituals, with penalties of up to three years in prison. As Pakistan took a turn towards radical Islam under Zia, and continued on that path after him, the Ahmadiyya community faced widespread discrimination, including voter exclusion through separate electoral lists, effectively barring them from political InTrending Reel
The Wire
30-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
Pakistan's Chimerical Quest for Parity with India Has Hit a Dead End
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Top Stories Pakistan's Chimerical Quest for Parity with India Has Hit a Dead End Manoj Joshi 6 minutes ago Seventy-seven years after Partition, Pakistan's four-pronged strategy to achieve 'effective parity' with India – through alliances, military spending, nuclear weapons, and terrorism – has left it weaker, not stronger. It's time for both nations to embrace reality over fantasy. Illustration: The Wire. Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now Few will deny that the roots of India's problems with Pakistan lie in the partition of the country in 1947. But just what a tangled growth those roots have yielded is difficult to grasp at times. When negotiations were taking place with the British, Muhammad Ali Jinnah sought to somehow ensure that Muslims, constituting a quarter of the Indian population, would be given political parity with the majority Hindus. Jinnah's views were based on the two-nation theory – that the Hindus and Muslims in India were separate 'nations'. Over the years, his demands varied, but it was always aimed at somehow squaring the circle – assuring 'Muslim' political and cultural equality in an unequal demographic situation. During the negotiations for the Interim Government in 1946 he demanded a 50-50 representation in the government between the Muslim League and the Congress. He initially engaged with the Cabinet Mission Plan of 1946 for a federal India with Muslim and Hindu provinces, and sought equal representation of such provinces in the federal legislature and the executive. Four planks for effective parity Since real parity was not possible, what Pakistan did after Jinnah was to pursue 'effective parity' whose central strategy was to somehow diminish India geographically, politically and economically, so that Pakistan could be, and be seen, as its equal. This policy has been based on four planks 1. External alliances to balance a larger India. 2. High military spending to build a force that can deter India 3. Fabricating nuclear weapons 4. Using terrorism as an instrument to promote separatism and civil war to breakup and destabilise India. As M.S. Venkataramani has shown, Pakistan approached the US in 1947 and requested an alliance and went to the extent of even asking the Americans to pay the salaries of their military. The US was not initially interested in South Asia and turned down the requests. But by 1953, the US had identified Pakistan as its partner in South Asia. In 1954, the US and Pakistan signed a mutual defence assistance agreement followed by Pakistan joining SEATO and CENTO. Its mutual defence pact has yet to be revoked. Pakistan sensed opportunity when India was humiliated by China in the war of 1962 and it began back-door talks with China which culminated in a border agreement. This was the beginning of the Pakistan-China relationship which has today reached the status of a quasi alliance. There have never been doubts that this alliance is based on the mutual interests of both sides to check India. In the 1965, Pakistan sought to wrest Kashmir from India through a war in which China played a bit role in aiding Karachi. In the 1960s, through its eastern wing, Pakistan helped a slew of north-eastern separatist groups in India. All this was with the view of breaking up India into manageable bits. However, karma struck back when Pakistan itself came apart following the rebellion in East Pakistan and Indian military intervention in 1971. Going nuclear Pakistan's leaders, military and civilians, now decided to get the ultimate deterrent, the nuclear bomb. In a project begun following a meeting in Multan in January 1972, President Bhutto authorised a programme to go full steam ahead. He had been an advocate of nuclearisation since the 1965 war. This is one area where Pakistan has been at par with India, if not slightly ahead. Though India conducted a nuclear test in 1974, Pakistan received assistance from China in terms of nuclear materials and weapons design in 1982. Further, in 1990, the Chinese tested a Pakistani device based on their designs at Lop Nor. Pakistan thus had a verified design which enabled its prompt response to the Indian tests in May 1998. Militancy Pakistan started 'facilitating' the Khalistani militancy at its very outset in the early 1980s by enabling militants to acquire arms and go through the border to carry out their terror campaign in Indian Punjab. In the late 1980s, things started bubbling up in Jammu and Kashmir, and Pakistan 'facilitated' the growth of the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and its uprising against India at the end of 1989 and early 1990. Thousands of Kashmiris crossed the border and returned with some training and arms provided by Pakistan. When this militancy was defeated, Pakistan, having learnt a great deal from the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union, took up the Kashmir 'cause'. It sent in Pakistani terrorists who took on the security forces and conducted occasional massacres of civilians on the Indian side of the Line of Control. In the 1990-2000 period, Pakistan had also sought to link the Khalistan and Kashmir movements but it did not work out. The Khalistani militancy was quickly rolled up by military and police action by 1993, the year in which Pakistan facilitated the multiple bombing attack in Bombay aimed at unsettling India's economic growth. Pakistan also stepped up its support for the Kashmiri militancy by sending in ever-larger number of Pakistani fighters into the fray. Following a near war after the attack on the Indian Parliament in 2001, Pakistan, under President Pervez Musharraf, took a step back. By now it was clear that Kashmir was not about to break away from India. But the terror campaign did not ease off. Terror Following the destruction of the Babri Masjid, Pakistan had sought to capitalise on the angst of Indian Muslims by recruiting them for a terror campaign in an arc from Gujarat to Uttar Pradesh. Operating from Nepal and Bangladesh, ISI operatives sent a stream of terrorists and Indian recruits to destabilise India. But this campaign, peaked in 2008 when the so-called Indian Mujahideen carried out a trail of bombings and were eventually wiped out. Their leaders have always operated from sanctuaries in Pakistan, as have some Khalistani terrorists. The Mumbai attack of 2008 was the last major attempt to use terrorism to destabilise India. Whether in the messaging or in their get up, an effort was made to pass off the terrorists as Indians. But the capture of Ajmal Kasab and the interception of their communications in the 60 hour rampage made it clear that the planners of the attack were in Pakistan. The Mumbai attack in a sense also marks the point at which the terror monster began to bite back in Pakistan. Led at various times by Baitullah Mehsud, Hakimullah Mehsud, Hafiz Gul Bahadur and others, they turned their militancy against the Pakistani state. This was described by the Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid in his book Descent into Chaos in 2008. This period also marked the growing infirmity of the Pakistani state. Benazir Bhutto's assassination and the downfall of the Musharraf Presidency began a process that was marked by political instability, polarisation and a delicate balance between the military and the civilian government, even as militancy rose across the country. Opposition The rise and fall of Imran Khan's PTI only underscored the decline. The 2024 elections revealed that Imran was the most popular force in the country and his arrest sparked widespread rioting and an anti-military upsurge. The 2024 elections were rigged against him and since then instability has grown with a rising toll of terrorist attacks. The dominance of the military cannot even provide a band aid to stem the bleeding. We must see the Pahalgam attack in this context. The exaggerated Pakistani claims of its 'accomplishments' in the fighting that followed Operation Sindoor and its elevation of Gen Asif Munir to the rank of Field Marshal are a desperate attempt to stabilise the situation. But the military, as the experience of Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf shows, can hardly provide solutions. Economy Over time, Pakistan's claims to effective parity with India have worn thinner and thinner. Now, on the economic front, there is nothing to claim. On the military front, too, nuclear weapons have not proved to be the magic wand under which terrorism could flourish. India had earlier shown it can deal with all the terrorist attacks Pakistan can throw at it. And now it inclined to hit back as well. China remains as Pakistan's 'iron brother' but there are clear limits as to what the alliance can do. Pakistan's insecurities at the time of independence are understandable; it was a nation conjured out of the thin air by Mohammed Ali Jinnah. But today, though flailing, it is an established state whose security against its huge eastern neighbour is guaranteed by nuclear weapons and not by its over-weening Army. Now it needs to get beyond its national insecurities and learn to live as a normal nation with its neighbours. Both Pakistan and India need to realise that they are destined to be neighbours forever. A failing or failed Pakistan is not in India's interest, neither is a belligerent one. A country that is hoping to emerge as a major world power cannot be sharing a major portion of its border with a hostile power. As for Pakistan, it is geography and demography that make its effort at parity with India a chimerical quest. But there is nothing that says that it must not live in terms of sovereign equality. There is the matter of Kashmir, which has woven itself into the make-believe world of Pakistan. There was nothing in the Partition arrangements that said that the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was to become part of Pakistan. Jinnah's acceptance of the (failed) accession of the overwhelmingly Hindu Junagadh indicated that he did not assume that the princely states were to be divided on religious grounds. Pakistan made a grab for Kashmir, but failed to capture the prized valley and has since woven the myth of it being the jugular of the Pakistani state. Peace Over the years, there have been tantalising glimpses of the possibility of a South Asia where India and Pakistan live in peace. The first was in 1953 when Prime Ministers Nehru and Mohammad Ali Bogra agreed to a plebiscite in Kashmir, but the issue foundered when the US appeared as a military ally of Pakistan. In 1972, India's hopes that its lenient handling of post-Bangladesh War Pakistan could lead to peace came to a nought as the Pakistan Army embarked on a long quest for revenge. In 2007-2008, through the so-called Four Point formula, the two countries worked out a way of handling Kashmir without changing borders, but the process collapsed along with the Musharraf presidency. Indeed, in 2004, at the SAARC summit, they had agreed on creating a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) by 2014, but all of it has come to nought. Good relations can only be built on realistic terms not on political fantasy. There are things India can do, and has tried to do, to aid this process – Gujral's composite dialogue of 1997, Vajpayee's Lahore trip in 1999, the Agra summit of 2001, Manmohan Singh's dialogue with Musharraf and forbearance (combined with using evidence to build a global case for Pakistan to act) after the Mumbai attack of 2008, and even Modi's outreach of 2014-15 – have been recent instances of the effort. Indeed, recall that the Modi government actually invited Pakistani officials to investigate the Pathankot airbase attack of 2016. Since we are neighbours who, as Vajpayee famously said you don't have the option to change, we seem destined to ride a relationship roller-coaster that is becoming steeper by the year. In recent years there has been little interest on either side to change the situation for the better. Like an open wound, the India-Pakistan situation is like a wound that can only fester. Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi Make a contribution to Independent Journalism Related News A Nation Is Known By the Enemy It Keeps 'Trade Offer Averted India-Pakistan War': Trump Administration Tells US Court Full Text | India-Turkey Relationship Before and After the Recent Conflict With Pakistan Five Questions That Indian MPs May Have to Face Abroad India May Push FATF to Revert Pakistan to 'Grey List' on Terror Funding Charges India, Pakistan and The Day After Pakistan's Slick US Strategy: It's Deja Vu All Over Again India's Outreach to Kabul Amid Simmering 'Pashtunistan' Demand Could Give It Leverage Over Pakistan Violent Pakistan Storms Trigger Floods, Landslides Killing At Least 10 View in Desktop Mode About Us Contact Us Support Us © Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
News18
20-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Asim Munir Gets Field Marshal Title: Last Time It Happened, Pakistan Slid Into Dictatorship
Last Updated: In 1959, Field Marshal Ayub Khan exiled Pakistan's top civilian leaders and seized total control. With Munir now wearing the same rank, is history about to echo? In 1959, then-Pakistan President Iskander Mirza became disillusioned with democracy and invited then-Pakistan Army Chief Ayub Khan to impose martial law, wrongly assuming he could keep him in check. Pakistan was facing absolute political chaos after its creation due to the Partition of India in 1947. Constant no-confidence motions, collapsing coalitions and a crumbling parliamentary system crippled Pakistan and the government was losing grip on Islamabad as well as on eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh). After its creation, Pakistan witnessed a rapid churn in leadership. Seven prime ministers came and went between 1947 and 1958, none completing a full term. Civilian institutions remained weak, with the parliament unstable, the bureaucracy dominant and the military growing in influence. The Muslim League, once the face of the freedom struggle, had splintered and lost ground. Following the deaths of MA Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan, unelected officials and bureaucrats held sway. A new constitution in 1956 turned Pakistan into a republic but failed to bring political stability. Due to this Mirza abolished the 1956 Constitution, declared martial law and appointed General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator on October 7, 1958. Mirza thought Ayub would remain a loyal subordinate while he continued to pull the strings from the presidency. Instead, Ayub moved fast. He assumed the presidency himself, becoming Pakistan's first military ruler. What is noteworthy is the fact that when Ayub took power in 1959, he first promoted himself to Field Marshal to cement his hold on power. The move was both symbolic and political as he positioned himself above the military and civilian leadership. He ruled until 1969 under a military-backed setup that brought press censorship and a tightly controlled presidential system. His regime laid the groundwork for decades of military dominance in Pakistan. Fast forward to 2025, Pakistan has a new Field Marshal — General Asim Munir. He is the first army chief to get this title since Ayub Khan. The decision was approved by Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's cabinet on May 20, just days after the Pakistan Army took heavy losses in the latest conflict with India. The violence began after a terror attack in Pahalgam killed Indian tourists. In response, India launched Operation Sindoor, hitting terror camps in Pakistan and PoK. When the Pakistan Army tried to protect these camps, Indian forces also struck their air bases and military posts, causing major damage. Munir's promotion comes in the middle of rising tensions. He has backed groups involved in cross-border attacks and has used sharp language about India, even invoking the two-nation theory that led to the Partition in 1947. While the Field Marshal title is mostly symbolic now, in a country where the military runs the show and elected governments are often sidelined, the move brings back memories of Ayub Khan, and how Pakistan slipped into dictatorship soon after. Watch India Pakistan Breaking News on CNN-News18. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from geopolitics to diplomacy and global trends. Stay informed with the latest world news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! First Published: May 20, 2025, 21:45 IST
