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The National
4 days ago
- Business
- The National
This is what the Muslim world needs to do to boost its birth rate
We are often led to believe that women can have babies or careers – but not both. Every fresh dip in birth rates revives that refrain, and an emerging social media industry of 'back to tradition' influencers holds it up as proof that women's work is inherently at odds with family life. Policymakers – inside and outside the Muslim world – often buy the story and respond with cash or tax reductions for childbirth to incentivise fertility upwards. I start from a different place: the trade-off is mismeasured. This is important to understand because fertility and female labour participation are both critical to our economies. Each drives growth, stability and intergenerational prosperity, and neither can be sacrificed without long-term economic costs. The assumption that societies must choose between them is a false dichotomy, and that mistake is proving very costly. Crucially, international evidence shows that more jobs for women does not automatically mean a lower birth rate. In France and Sweden, well over half of adult women work – 52 per cent and 60 per cent, respectively – and fertility rates remain higher than in most Muslim-majority countries with far lower female labour force participation. Some may point out that in addition to both of these countries having strong maternity leave and childcare support policies, a majority of births now occur outside of marriage (62 per cent in France, and 55 per cent in Sweden). This credits a flexible, non-traditional view of family structures with promoting fertility, and that is indeed true. Does that mean the Muslim world, where most – if not all – societies heavily favour traditional family structures centred on marriage, is doomed to choose between female employment or higher birth rates? The answer is no, and the key examples here are Bangladesh and Indonesia. Both countries preserve traditional norms, with marriage remaining the primary route to childbearing, evidenced by the fact that only 3 per cent of births occurring out of wedlock. But they also sustain both high female employment and fertility rates near (in the case of Bangladesh) or above (in Indonesia) the replacement rate of 2.1. The assumption that societies must choose between fertility and female labour participation is a false dichotomy, proving very costly Equally interesting, however, is Turkey, which also demonstrates that there can be a positive – not inverse – relationship between female employment and birth rates. But the difference is that in Turkey, both are low. Like Bangladesh and Indonesia, only 3 per cent of children are born out of wedlock but female labour force participation lags at 36 per cent and the fertility has dropped to 1.48. So, it's clear in these cases that there need not be a trade-off. But it's also clear that something is going right in Bangladesh and Indonesia, and wrong in Turkey. What explains the divergence? This is an important question to answer for the Islamic world, where, unlike France and Sweden, marriage is likely to remain the dominant path to having children. And marriage is a very relevant part of the answer, because the difference in the cost of entry to married life is, in fact, a major determinant of fertility. When marriage is high-cost and there is no alternative, childbearing becomes locked behind a prohibitively expensive institution. In Turkey, which has branded 2025 the 'Year of the Family' clearly out of concern for the declining birth rate, the first step into partnered adulthood has drifted out of reach. Youth unemployment stands at 18 per cent, and even those with jobs often rely on near-minimum wages. More than half of all employees earn at or near the minimum wage – a figure higher among young workers, who are the main pool of prospective couples. Given these numbers, for couples planning to marry simply securing a modest apartment consumes nearly an entire full-time income – before accounting for deposits, furnishings or wedding expenses. In 31 of the country's 81 provinces, the average rent consumes three quarters of the net minimum wage. In Istanbul, the largest city, the average rent far surpasses it. Ankara's new Family and Youth Fund, established to promote stable families, offers an interest-free, four-year loan of 150,000 liras ($3,683) to couples starting a family. But in big cities, that amount barely covers three months of rent, household appliances and basic furnishings. And because youth unemployment remains high and this is, after all, just a loan, the programme merely postpones financial pressure rather than removing it. The contrasting success in Bangladesh and Indonesia is thanks to the fact that both countries, through policy and social practice, have tightly regulated the cost of marriage. Bangladesh's Dowry Prohibition Act of 1980 formally limits dowry demands, and widespread campaigns promote low-cost marriage ceremonies. In Indonesia, modest dowry practices and targeted, subsidised mortgage programmes help support more affordable pathways into household formation. The result is a low-cost, culturally sanctioned pathway into family-building allows both female employment and replacement-level fertility to co-exist. The math is simple: one rising line – the cost of setting up a household – pushes two curves – marriage and fertility – down. That's the real trade-off. To be clear, household inflation is not the only brake. Stagnant wages, crowded cities, extended schooling and evolving ideals all weigh on fertility decisions. Yet, the upfront cost of forming a family is the one variable governments can re-price fastest. It is also the one too many of them have largely ignored, focusing instead on paying couples who are already married for having children. It is simply unsustainable to invest heavily in post-birth incentives while ignoring the rising cost of forming a household in the first place, because the longer that process is delayed, the less likely births are to happen. Governments in the Gulf, where family start-up costs are a known factor in a multi-year decline in birth rates, are taking notice of this. In Qatar, the steep costs associated with weddings—and difficulties obtaining housing—are making marriage increasingly out of reach for many young couples. In the UAE, fertility has slipped to roughly 1.2 children per woman for Emirati citizens. A 2017 study by Zayed University put the average combined wedding and dowry cost at over $180,000 – a factor that for years pushed many marriages into the couple's early 30s. The UAE government has discouraged lavish weddings in recent years, explicitly linking the policy to efforts to promote family-building after studies showed that prohibitive cost is one of the main reasons Emiratis either choose not to marry or do so later in life. Last month, the UAE's Minister of Family, Sana bint Mohammed Suhail, announced plans for a national fertility strategy, saying the intention is to take a 'multidimensional approach' of 'not just revisiting child allowances or housing policies – although these matter – but rethinking how we empower young Emiratis to build families with confidence'. A similar mindset shift is required elsewhere in the region to introduce more policies that have an impact well before a married couple start considering having a child. In the Islamic world, many governments claim to champion family values and yet often treat single adults as afterthoughts – or worse, liabilities. But singles are not outsiders to family policy; they are its foundation. Once that shift is made, a more effective strategy becomes possible – one that recognises that fertility depends on two stages: singles' entry into family life by forming a stable union, and sustaining that union post-entry. If the entry point is blocked, no amount of post-entry incentives like baby bonuses will move the needle. What does this mean for policymakers? Multilateral lenders and intergovernmental organisations – such as the Islamic Development Bank, OIC agencies, UN Population Fund and the World Bank – already finance maternal health and early-childhood programmes across the Islamic world. With the right adjustments, they and individual governments could make these portfolios marriage-smart. One way to do that is to create clear metrics to track marriage affordability. International organisations, in particular, could develop a standardised marriage-affordability index and incorporate it into their country reports. While certain indicators – like wedding costs, starter-home affordability and age at first marriage – are routinely collected in some contexts, there remains no consolidated index that offers a clear picture of entry barriers to family formation. A useful parallel is the World Bank's Ease of Doing Business index, which transformed policy by systematically measuring the time, procedural steps and costs required to start a business. A comparable approach for marriage and household formation could similarly drive reforms. Without this visibility, governments and lenders risk designing policies that address symptoms rather than causes. Moreover, what gets measured gets budget lines. Second, more lenders and ministries should expand funding for scalable, marriage-enabling programmes that lower the cost of forming a household. This means bankrolling gate-openers – both new initiatives and existing best practices, like wedding loans, rent-to-own housing schemes and dowry insurance pools. Finally, economic policy should channel industrial loans toward sectors that create stable, formal employment opportunities for women. Ensuring that two paycheques can sustain a household helps keep the gate to marriage open. In Bangladesh, for example, targeted support for the garment sector created a culturally accepted form of work for women, enabling millions to contribute to household income. The cost of inaction is clear: shrinking workforces, a resurgent but mistaken narrative blaming women's economic participation, chronically underperforming economies and a generation unable to afford family formation. In the end, labour and love are not opposing forces. But when marriage becomes a luxury good, both the economy and family life falter.

News.com.au
4 days ago
- Politics
- News.com.au
Afghanistan under the Taliban: Four years on
COMMENT As the Taliban celebrate their fourth-year reign of terror in Afghanistan, the country suffers from an unprecedented episode of political, social, cultural and economic crises in its modern history. The terrorist group has set back Afghanistan by decades in the name of a self-centred brand of Islam that does not exist anywhere else in the Muslim world. The country today is at the bottom of all human development and living conditions indices. The Afghanistan tragedy is man-made and largely an outcome of betrayal by its own leaders and foreign powers As an ethno-tribal and fragile Muslim country, situated in a zone of regional and major power rivalries, the country has historically been vulnerable to internal conflicts and outside interventions. But it had never experienced what struck it during the first round of the Taliban rule from 1996 to the 9/11 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, orchestrated from Afghanistan. The United States' retaliatory intervention and toppling of the Taliban regime, with a promise not to allow Afghanistan to become a terrorism hub again, brought a sigh of relief. However, as detailed in my book How to Lose a War, the US, backed by its allies including Australia, failed miserably, just as the Soviet Union had in its occupation of the country in the 1980s. The US lacked an appropriate strategy grounded in a clear understanding of Afghanistan's complexities and those of its region, which also thwarted its efforts to secure effective and reliable Afghan governments. After two decades of a very costly intervention, the US bowed out. Its protégé government in Kabul disintegrated, with President Ashraf Ghani fleeing to the United Arab Emirates, and the Taliban re-assumed power in mid-August 2021. Taliban 2.0 was expected to be softer and gentler than that of the group's previous exercise of power. But to the contrary, it has proved to be more brutal, tribal, exclusionary, and misogynistic. Women and girls have been stripped of all their rights and virtually caged. The degree of political and social freedoms as well as social and economic development that occurred under the US aegis have now totally been reversed. According to various United Nations agencies' reports, hunger, starvation, malnutrition, child mortality, death from curable diseases, girls' and women's suicide, and summary execution of many who worked for the previous government as well as the US and allies, have become rampant across the country. More than half of the population live off foreign handouts from a few international humanitarian organisations under the strict watch of the Taliban who ensure a cut for themselves. The Taliban is led by a self-styled supremo, Hibatulla Akhunzada, who presides in the southern city of Kandahar – the birthplace of the group – and is not publicly seen. He is under an arrest warrant by the International Criminal Court for crimes against humanity. Akhunzada and his cohort do not believe in any form of political pluralism or participatory government or any international legal and humanitarian laws. They have instituted a system of sharia (Islamic law) based on their version, which is not approved by the respected centres of Islamic studies and organisations in the Muslim domain. They have turned educational institutions into all-male jihadi madrassas to serve their ideological and political standing. Many school age children are trained as soldiers and recruited for suicide bombings. The Taliban have remained totally impervious to international criticism and demands for change. The Taliban are well armed, courtesy of the $7.8 billion worth of weapons left behind by the US and allied forces. They are the first terror group in history also to possess an air force. As reported by the UN, Afghanistan has once again become a sanctuary and breeding ground for various violent extremist groups, most importantly al-Qaeda, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K), which have been, with the Taliban's support, responsible for many terrorist acts in the region and beyond. Yet, despite lacking national and international legitimacy, with only Russia according their government formal recognition, the Taliban keep consolidating their rule. This is so for several reasons. Chief amongst them are the regional and global geopolitical rivalries that are played out in Afghanistan. The country's neighbours have increasingly found it expedient to deal with the Taliban in pursuit of conflicting interests or to prevent the group from spreading its jihadi version of Islam into their countries. They include more prominently Pakistan, Iran and Uzbekistan. Even the Qatar-UAE competition has made a footprint in Afghanistan with both seeking to influence the Taliban, though at different levels. A similar dictum has motivated major powers in the context of US-China and US-Russia rivalry. These actors also want to benefit from trade with Afghanistan and the country's mineral deposits, including coal, iron, copper, and lithium. China has moved in a big way and made lucrative deals with the Taliban to exploit such resources as oil and copper. Russia has been very accommodating of the Taliban, and the US has closely interacted with the group. Washington has held regular meetings with the Taliban in Doha and allowed, though indirectly, $40 million from its humanitarian aid to end up in the Taliban treasury on a weekly basis. Although the financial spin off is being reviewed by Donald Trump's administration, it nonetheless indicates Washington's concerns about China's and for that matter Russia's growing involvement in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan political and armed opposition groups operating from exile have been very divided, a historical curse of Afghanistan. They have been of little or no help to a couple of brave female resistance groups inside the country. As the situation stands, the future of Afghanistan appears as bleak as its prevailing darkness. With the plight of the Palestinians and the Ukraine war dominating the world's focus, the tragedy of Afghanistan has been pushed onto the backburner. Yet, this is not to claim that the Taliban are infallible. Afghanistan has seen five distinctly different political and ideological groups rule the country one after another in the last four decades. Taliban 2.0 may well go down in the same way as a result of either internal conflict or change in the internal and external circumstances of Afghanistan, as has been the case during most of its modern history, but not soon enough for the suffering people of Afghanistan.


South China Morning Post
03-08-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Israeli far-right minister prays at flashpoint Jerusalem holy site, sparking condemnation
A far-right Israeli minister visited and prayed at Jerusalem's most sensitive holy site on Sunday, triggering regional condemnation and fears that the provocative move could further escalate tensions. The visit came as hospitals in Gaza said 27 more Palestinians seeking food aid were killed by Israeli fire. With Israel facing global criticism over famine-like conditions in the besieged strip, the visit by Itamar Ben-Gvir to the hillside compound threatened to further set back efforts by international mediators to halt Israel's nearly two-year military offensive in Gaza. The area, which Jews call the Temple Mount, is the holiest site in Judaism and was home to the ancient biblical temples. Muslims call the site the Noble Sanctuary. Today it is home to the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the third-holiest site in Islam. Visits by Israeli officials are considered a provocation across the Muslim world and openly praying violates a long-standing status quo at the site.


South China Morning Post
10-07-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Malaysia's Mahathir turns 100, proving age is no barrier to political influence
Malaysia's former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad turned 100 on Thursday, marking a rare milestone for any world leader while defying age with his sharp mind and relentless work ethic. Mahathir's social media platforms have been inundated with well-wishes over the last few days from Malaysians as well as admirers abroad, particularly in the Muslim world, where he is seen as an icon of moderate Muslim leadership who dares to speak up against the West. The two-time prime minister, whose 24 years in power left an indelible mark on Malaysia, spent his last day as a nonagenarian as he often does – in his Putrajaya office, meeting people, as well as reading and writing about the country he helped shape, one where his legacy is still up for debate. Former youth minister Syed Saddiq Syed Abdul Rahman said Mahathir's work ethic at 100 'puts many of us to shame'. Malaysia's former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad working at his office in Putrajaya on May 5. Photo: AFP 'He still reads, writes, exercises, and speaks with clarity – proof that age is just a number when the mind and body are kept sharp,' Syed Saddiq told This Week in Asia.


South China Morning Post
25-06-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
China's partnership with Muslim world is redrawing global landscape
As Gaza endures unrelenting Israeli bombardment , the humanitarian toll is staggering: more than 55,000 Palestinians killed and millions displaced. This catastrophe not only evokes moral outrage but also highlights the collapse of the Western-led international order. Advertisement The June 13 Israeli strikes on Iran's nuclear and military sites under 'Operation Rising Lion' and Iran's swift missile retaliation pushed the region to the edge of a broader war. That risk escalated further on Sunday when the United States launched coordinated strikes on several key Iranian nuclear facilities, including Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan. What this spiralling confrontation underscores is a sobering reality: the West is no longer capable of imposing stability on its terms. Amid this geopolitical fragmentation, a consequential shift is under way – an alignment between China and the Muslim world. Once seen as unlikely partners, this axis is now grounded in respect, sovereignty and a shared aspiration for a post-Western world order. Egypt , China's engagement with the Muslim world is not impulsive but strategic. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, it has invested heavily in infrastructure and logistics in countries such as Pakistan Iran and Saudi Arabia. Unlike the traditional aid programmes of Western powers, Chinese aid offers an alternative that is appealing to nations scarred by colonial legacies and structural adjustment programmes. A pivotal moment came in 2023 when China helped bring Iran and Saudi Arabia to the table and re-establish diplomatic ties . Where decades of Western diplomacy failed, China's quiet negotiations prevailed. It marked China's rise not only as an economic juggernaut but as a credible stabiliser, particularly in regions where US policy has often deepened instability. Advertisement