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AllAfrica
15 hours ago
- Business
- AllAfrica
Japan's plan to break China's rare-earth stranglehold
In the evolving landscape of critical mineral geopolitics, Japan is working to recalibrate its rare-earth strategy amid intensifying competition between the United States and China. While Tokyo has aligned itself with partners such as the US, Australia and India to reduce reliance on Chinese rare earths, analysts caution that Beijing continues to dominate the supply chain, particularly in refining of rare-earth elements (REEs), where it holds over 90% of global capacity. Japan's vulnerability was underscored following the 2010 export embargo by China, which catalyzed efforts to diversify sourcing. Recent trade data shows that Japan has significantly increased rare-earth imports from India and Southeast Asia, yet concerns persist about long-term supply security, as India aims to conserve its current rare-earth reserves. At the same time, geopolitical developments, such as new US interest in Myanmar's rare-earth reserves and Quad-backed supply chain initiatives, highlight the growing strategic salience of these materials. As the global push toward clean energy and advanced manufacturing accelerates, Japan's ability to secure a resilient and independent rare-earth supply chain remains a critical test of its industrial policy and diplomatic leverage. The 2010 rare earth embargo on Japan remains a pivotal turning point in China's deployment of resource nationalism, exposing the strategic utility and limits of using REEs as a tool of economic statecraft. While Beijing denied any formal restrictions, the abrupt halt in exports following the Senkaku boat collision sent shockwaves through Japan's manufacturing sector, which depended on China for over half of its REE imports at the time. According to an extensive paper published this year by Dr Florence W. Yang of National Chengchi University, this incident catalyzed a dual-track shift: Japan scrambled to diversify its rare-earth sources and innovate around REE alternatives, while China doubled down on asserting control over its domestic REE industry through production caps, export taxes and strict investment regulations. The episode not only demonstrated the geopolitical risks of supply concentration but also revealed China's own internal challenges, most notably widespread smuggling and regulatory gaps that undermined its pricing power. In response, Beijing has since moved to restructure its rare-earth sector, forming state-backed conglomerates and launching a long-term strategy to dominate both upstream extraction and downstream magnet manufacturing. For Japan, the 2010 crisis served as a cautionary tale, reinforcing the urgency of building a self-reliant and geopolitically resilient rare-earth supply chain in the decade that followed. This strategic vulnerability is compounded by the increasingly concentrated nature of global supply chains for rare-earth permanent magnets (REPMs), which underpin the very technologies central to Japan's clean energy ambitions. According to a recent publication co-authored by economist Dr Thomas Porcher, neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) magnets, used in electric vehicles, offshore wind turbines and industrial motors, account for the vast majority of global REPM demand, with wind and EV applications alone making up over 20%. Yet Japan remains deeply dependent on upstream inputs sourced from China, which maintains overwhelming control over every stage of the NdFeB supply chain: mining, separation, refining and magnet production. In this study, using monthly Chinese export data from 2017 to 2024, the authors find that geopolitical tensions, particularly with the United States and Australia, have not curbed China's exports of REPMs but instead correlate with increased volumes. The authors interpret this as a form of calibrated statecraft: rather than impose abrupt restrictions, Beijing appears to adjust export flows to maintain market dominance while diffusing diplomatic pressure. For Japan, this behavior adds complexity to supply chain diversification efforts, revealing that even 'reliable' flows from China may be strategically managed and subject to political calculus. In response to the strategic opacity of China's rare-earth supply ecosystem, Tokyo has recently doubled down on innovative pathways to reduce its dependency. One such avenue is a novel partnership being explored with the European Union. Under a newly proposed Japan‑EU 'economic two‑plus‑two' dialogue, the sides plan to launch joint public–private procurement of rare earth elements, effectively creating a collaborative sourcing channel designed to bypass Beijing's dominant market position. At the same time, Tokyo has kicked off a domestic, frontier-oriented initiative. Starting in early 2026, Japan will begin test-mining rare-earth-rich mud from the seabed near Minamitori Island. The pilot, scheduled to transition to daily recovery of up to 350 metric tons by January 2027, represents the world's first attempt at harvesting deep-sea REE resources and underscores Japan's strategic push to develop homegrown sources, especially of neodymium and dysprosium, which are vital for EV magnets. In light of its recurring exposure to rare earth coercion, Tokyo has become increasingly vocal in its diplomatic strategy. In July 2025, Japan's foreign minister publicly pressed Beijing to expedite export licensing and ensure reliable access to REEs and magnets, underscoring Tokyo's concerns over unpredictability in Chinese export decision-making. This appeal follows a pattern of restraint observed in past diplomatic crises, such as China's 2010 export curbs, highlighting Japan's limited room to maneuver despite its dependency. At the same time, Tokyo has been fortifying its regional alliances: recent reporting confirms that Japan is seeking to align its rare-earth sourcing policies with the United States, exploring joint procurement mechanisms as part of broader trade talks on critical minerals. In June 2025, Japan formally proposed strengthening cooperation with the United States on rare-earth supply, integrating this into broader trade talks over tariffs and offering technical support on processing and refining in allied or third-country facilities. These moves signal that Japan is shifting from reactive mitigation toward a proactive approach, leveraging multilateral frameworks to institutionalize resilience and offset Beijing's strategic leverage. Despite these diplomatic and industrial advances, Japan's rare earth strategy is not without friction. While analysts praise Japan as being 'more prepared than most' for future supply shocks, thanks to long-term stockpiling efforts, investment in overseas mining projects and a well-developed domestic magnet manufacturing industry, critical gaps remain, particularly in upstream extraction and refining. Tokyo's ambitious plan to harvest rare earths from ultra-deep seabed mud at Minamitorishima illustrates both its resourcefulness and the dilemmas it faces. Environmental groups have raised strong objections to the project, warning that the ecological risks of deep-sea mining remain poorly understood and potentially irreversible. Duncan Currie, an environmental lawyer for the High Seas Alliance of like-minded nations and green groups, stated that this type of rare-earth extraction will be a fatal risk to life on and near the sea floor. According to a July 2025 report by Japan's Agency for Natural Resources and Energy, the upcoming test-mining operation will target sediment layers at depths of over 5,500 meters, taking roughly three weeks to complete. The tension between ecological risk and geopolitical necessity underscores a deeper challenge facing Japan: how to secure critical minerals without compromising its environmental commitments or strategic autonomy. Japan's rare-earth realignment encapsulates the broader dilemmas faced by middle powers navigating an era of intensifying geoeconomic competition. While Tokyo has made notable progress in diversifying its rare-earth supply chains, forging international partnerships and pioneering frontier technologies like seabed mining, the road ahead is still fraught with uncertainty. China's continued dominance, backed by vertically integrated production, strategic export behavior and aggressive resource nationalism, presents both a structural constraint and a moving target. Meanwhile, Japan's efforts to reduce dependence must balance geopolitical urgency with environmental ethics, industrial feasibility and alliance coordination. As the global race for critical minerals accelerates in tandem with the clean energy transition, Japan's evolving rare-earth strategy offers a microcosm of the 21st-century resource struggle – one in which economic security, environmental stewardship and geopolitical agency are no longer separate concerns but deeply intertwined imperatives. Sayaka Ohshima holds an MBA and a B.S. in Accounting, and works as a U.S.-based accountant specializing in financial reporting and compliance. Her research explores the intersection of economic policy, trade strategy and global capital flows.
The Diplomat
04-08-2025
- Politics
- The Diplomat
Taiwan's Civil Society Is Not Ready for War
As the war in Ukraine grinds on and tensions rise in the Taiwan Strait, comparisons between the two flashpoints have become common. But for all the talk of parallels, one glaring lesson remains unheeded in Taipei: civil society must be battle-ready before any conflict begins. The slogan 'Defending Ukraine is defending Taiwan' has gained traction among international policy elites. With the return of U.S. President Donald Trump's 'America First' doctrine, the parallel between Taiwan and Ukraine has become even more pronounced, as concerns over Ukraine's potential abandonment by the U.S. have reignited and intensified the conversation. For many in Taipei and Washington alike, Ukraine's endurance in the face of Russian aggression is seen as a metaphor for Taiwan's future resilience. However, this comparison, while compelling, overlooks the most pressing disparity: Ukraine's civil society was well-prepared. Taiwan's is not. Taiwan recently conducted its largest-ever Han Kuang exercises, which stretched twice as long as usual and mobilized over 20,000 reservists in live-fire scenarios staged in everyday settings, from train stations to schoolyards. Children watched as smoke clouds and blank rounds filled the air. This year's drills included unprecedented civilian-facing components, such as emergency response simulations and cyberattack countermeasures. The message to Beijing and Washington was clear: 'We are defending ourselves.' But is that enough? Despite these expanded exercises, Taiwanese civil defense remains, to some extent, performative rather than structural – or the structural component stays outside of the media cameras. Programs like Kuma Academy have begun to raise awareness and offer civil defense training, but their reach remains limited. Han Kuang exercises only began systematically integrating civilians in 2025, three decades after they were first launched. And while reservist training has expanded, ordinary citizens remain largely spectators rather than participants. This reflects a deeper issue. Many Taiwanese still treat war as unthinkable. Years of peace and prosperity have dulled the sense of urgency. Unlike Ukrainians, who by late 2021 had begun to accept invasion as an inevitable risk, many in Taiwan maintain psychological distance. A 2025 poll by National Chengchi University showed that while more than 60 percent of respondents identify as Taiwanese rather than Chinese, most prefer to maintain the status quo over seeking formal independence. In Taiwan, identity is shaped more by culture and lifestyle than existential political commitment. Ukraine was different. After the 2014 Revolution of Dignity and Russia's annexation of Crimea, Ukrainian society mobilized from the bottom up. Grandmothers knitted socks for strangers at the front. Villages sent food. Volunteers formed territorial defense units and supply chains. By the time of Russia's full-scale invasion in 2022, that resilience had matured into a hardened national defense network. Civilian readiness was an integral part of daily life. Ukrainian identity came to mean democracy, sovereignty, and resistance to imperial domination. In Taiwan, by contrast, civil-military integration remains weak. Public interest in geopolitical threats is very often comparatively low. Many young people are disengaged from debates on national security. Defense policy is frequently left to the state and military establishment. Taiwanese authorities have begun addressing this gap. But the scale is still insufficient. Taiwan's 'baby steps' toward resilience remain tentative and lack clear direction. Even recent conscription reforms – extending mandatory service from four months to one year – appear to be reactive rather than transformative. Civilian participation in the Han Kuang drills is only now being introduced, and the delay speaks volumes. Meanwhile, China has been preparing its society for decades. Through patriotic education, ideological discipline, and social control mechanisms, Beijing has cultivated a population conditioned to support the state in conflict. Taiwan's strategy has been the opposite: depoliticize, demilitarize, and hope for deterrence through foreign alignment. The discrepancy could be catastrophic. Security guarantees are not security strategies. Ukraine learned this with the failure of the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. When the invasion came, international support was crucial – but insufficient without internal resilience. Taiwan risks a similar fate. Its defense posture relies heavily on U.S. backing under the Taiwan Relations Act, yet in a crisis, external help could be delayed or constrained by legal ambiguity, political division, or fear of escalation with China. Moreover, to receive American aid, Taiwan must demonstrate its readiness to resist, as the U.S. will not come to save those who don't want to fight for themselves. Even in the event of a robust U.S. response, it would take time – something Taipei might not have. China's likely strategy for taking Taiwan would be a swift and overwhelming assault, aimed at preventing foreign intervention and minimizing civilian resistance. It may not be framed as a war, but rather as a 'quarantine,' 'peacekeeping operation,' or a 'domestic stabilization campaign.' Taipei may have only hours to respond. Without a mobilized population, no volume of imported hardware will be enough. Even Taiwan's recent drills, despite their expanded scope, underscore the problem. Civilian-facing exercises may look impressive, but they remain isolated and symbolic. Watching blank rounds fired in a train station doesn't prepare civilians to act. Unless these gestures evolve into a national civic mobilization strategy, the island remains vulnerable. Despite dramatic headlines and regular military provocations, Taiwan must fully absorb the lessons of Ukraine. The comparison may be imperfect, but the warning is unmistakable: war may not come tomorrow – or ever – but in Xi Jinping's era, national rejuvenation and 'reunification' remain core objectives of the Chinese Communist Party.
Time of India
06-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Can Taiwan's energy grid withstand a Chinese attack?
China's increasingly frequent military drills around Taiwan have raised concerns on the island over its energy security. The self-governing democracy, which lies just 100 miles (160 kilometers) off the coast of mainland China, relies heavily on liquefied natural gas (LNG) and energy imports — making it particularly vulnerable to a marine blockade. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now "Energy would be Beijing's first target [in case of a blockade or invasion]," James Yifan Chen, a scholar of international relations, told DW. In the latest exercises in early April, China's military simulated blockade operations around vital shipping lanes near the island. The drills also simulated live-fire strikes on ports and energy facilities. "LNG ships would find it hard to arrive in Taiwan," Chen explained. "People would run out of power and water, as the water supply is powered by electricity. Communication is based on electricity and the military would not be able to function," he added. In that case, the expert believed that Taiwan would be left with little to no outside help with its energy supply due to its geographic and diplomatic isolation. "Taiwan is more vulnerable than Ukraine," Chen said, as Kyiv can at least turn to its European neighbors and allies for support. Taiwan's location, on the other hand — and the fact that it only has formal diplomatic ties with 12 small nations — means the island would be quickly overwhelmed by a Chinese blockade. How long would Taiwan's energy last if China attacks? Beijing views Taiwan as a breakaway territory, and has not ruled out using force to take control of it. A majority of Taiwanese are opposed to unification with the mainland, according to Taiwan's National Chengchi University. In 2023, the then-minister of national defense, Chiu Kuo-cheng, said that if left unainded, the island could withstand a Chinese attack for two weeks if sufficient preparations were made during peacetime. Tired of too many ads? go ad free now But Chia-wei Chao, of the Taiwan Climate Action Network (TCAN) and an assistant professor at National Taiwan University, believes two weeks "isn't a reasonable guideline." "Energy consumption would go down, or even halve, in the case of a blockade, so the reserves could last longer," Chao told DW. Based on current estimates, "gas reserves should be able to last for 30 days after 2030, and 28 days currently with lowered energy consumption demand," Chao added. Tsaiying Lu of Taiwan's Research Institute for Democracy, Society, and Emerging Technology (DSET), is even more optimistic. She predicts that the territory's LNG stores would last at least 40 days under a blockade. That estimate is based on patterns of the island's energy supply during typically low-consumption periods, such as the second day of Lunar New Year, which offers the closest approximation to wartime conditions. "According to our assessment, demand [in case of a blockade] would be supported by coal-fired generators, and then gas turbines will be used for support when solar power starts to lower during the night," Lu said. Energy reserves could also be further extended by rationing electricity for certain industrial sectors, she added. 'Renewables can ensure energy security' Although Chao pointed out Taiwan did not include energy supply in its defense budget, he highlighted that "green energy development is associated with national security." "Solar energy and storage should be the most reliable in case of war, since the panels can be moved around," said Chao. "Renewables pushing energy transition can truly ensure energy security." The island plans to generate 20% of its power from renewables by the end of 2025, as part of its climate goal of being net-zero emissions by 2050, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, last year only about 12% of Taiwan's domestic energy came from wind, solar, hydro, methane and burning waste, the state-owned Taiwan Power Company said. Why simply being Taiwanese could lead to war Is nuclear power the solution? To bridge the gap, calls for restarting the island's controversial nuclear program have been gaining momentum. In May, Taiwan is set to retire its last operating nuclear reactor as part of a "nuclear-free homeland" policy promoted by the administration of President Lai Ching-te. Nuclear power accounts for less than 3% of Taiwan's energy generation, according to Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs. But Chen (former professor at Tamkang University) believes nuclear power could be key to the island being able to survive a Chinese blockade. "Taiwan only needs one to two years to restart its nuclear plants, and the US can help us with that," he said. Earlier this year, Taiwan's main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), claimed that 73% of respondents of a poll conducted by a KMT think-tank are in favor of extending the lifespan of nuclear power plants. But even if the plants are revived, they remain vulnerable in times of war, Lu said, highlighting that Ukraine's nuclear plants "became one of the biggest targets" of Russia's invasion.
Washington Post
21-03-2025
- Politics
- Washington Post
Taiwan warns of growing Chinese threat, partly to secure Trump's support
TAIPEI, Taiwan — For decades, Taiwanese leaders have performed a delicate dance of defending Taiwan's sovereignty while not provoking Beijing. Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te is changing that. Lai last week labeled China a 'foreign hostile force,' something no other recent Taiwanese president has done. Under his watch, a Chinese influencer living in Taiwan has been ordered to leave after supporting Beijing's view that Taiwan is part of China. He has called for reviving martial law-era military courts to better punish spies leaking national security secrets to China. And he has pledged to increase Taiwan's defense spending to 3 percent of its gross domestic product, a level not seen in more than a decade. All of this risks angry retaliation from Beijing, which has been ramping up threats to seize Taiwan by force if it does not come willingly — and it comes at a time when it's not clear whether the United States, Taiwan's main military backer, would step in to help. 'We are moving toward conflict escalation with China, that's for sure,' said Chong-Han Wu, a professor in the department of diplomacy at National Chengchi University. 'And China? They will respond for sure to all of Lai Ching-te's strategies and comments.' In a fiery speech, Lai said Chinese infiltration — from recruiting members of the military as spies to ordering Taiwanese celebrities to echo Beijing's view — had reached new levels. 'By its actions, China already satisfies the definition of a 'foreign hostile force,'' he said last week. 'We have no choice but to take even more proactive measures.' It was the first time a Taiwanese president had addressed the issue of Chinese interference so publicly and boldly, analysts said. Lai's 17-point plan to address the national security threat appeared partly aimed at Taiwanese voters as his party encourages them to recall opposition lawmakers who dominate the legislature. But there is another important audience: China hawks in President Donald Trump's administration. 'The announcement of the plan was likely also an attempt to secure more support from the Trump administration and to rally support for Lai and the DPP,' said Amanda Hsiao, China director for the Eurasia Group, referring to Lai's ruling Democratic Progressive Party. 'Taiwan wants to highlight for the U.S. the dangers it continues to face from China, and the proactive steps it is taking to defend itself,' she said. The U.S., while not a formal diplomatic ally, is Taiwan's most important partner, offering political and military support in the form of weapons, training and intelligence sharing. The long-standing U.S. policy of 'strategic ambiguity,' which leaves unclear whether the U.S. would militarily intervene to stop a Chinese takeover, is seen as crucial for deterring Beijing. Under Trump — who recently suspended U.S. military support for Ukraine to force Kyiv into a ceasefire deal with Russia — that ambiguity is now even more pronounced. Trump has said that Taiwan — which, like Ukraine, lives in the shadow of a much bigger neighbor with territorial ambitions — should 'pay us for defense.' When asked last month whether Trump would adhere to the long-standing U.S. policy that China should not take Taiwan by force, Trump refused to comment. The president's nominee for under secretary of defense for policy, Elbridge Colby, said earlier this month that Taiwan should be spending 'more like 10 percent' of its GDP on defense. Taiwan purchased $26 billion in weapons from the U.S. over the past eight years, Taiwan's de facto ambassador in Washington, Alexander Tah-ray Yui, told the Wall Street Journal last month. The U.S. president's transactional approach has unnerved many in Taiwan, home to 23 million people who are subject to near-daily incursions of Chinese fighter jets, drones and military vessels crossing or nearing the median line, an unofficial sea border in the 110-mile-wide strait. Some fear Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping, whom Trump has repeatedly called a 'good friend,' might use Taiwan as a bargaining chip in a trade deal — just as he is trying to do with Ukraine in his dealings with Russian leader Vladimir Putin. Xi, China's strongest leader in decades, has said 'reunification' with Taiwan is 'inevitable,' even though Taiwan has never been ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Jason Hsu, a former legislator in Taiwan and senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, said Lai's remarks may have been timed to preempt talks between Xi and Trump, who has claimed a meeting will happen in the 'not too distant future.' (Beijing has not said anything publicly about a meeting.) 'It's to show that Taiwan is taking self-defense seriously and that Taiwan is also committed on intelligence affairs,' Hsu said. Taiwan's Defense Ministry on Tuesday released a security plan for the next four years that called the U.S. a 'crucial strategic partner,' especially in reconnaissance, long-range precision strike capability and military hardware. The ministry pledged to cooperate more with the U.S. in intelligence sharing and improving the 'interoperability' of the two countries' armed forces. The military on Monday launched five days of 'rapid-fire' exercises to practice mobilizing in the event one of China's drills turns into an attack. In his speech, Lai also pledged to crack down on espionage in the military by bringing back military courts, which, according to analysts, can more swiftly and severely dole out punishment. 'He's definitely tougher, but he's trying to find a new narrative to deal with China without risking escalation,' Hsu said. Preventing escalation will be difficult. Beijing has refused to engage with Lai, having branded him a 'dangerous separatist.' And over the past two years, China has ramped up its pressure campaign, sending fighter jets and naval vessels, as well as merchant ships and drones, close to Taiwan's various islands. This is viewed as a tactic to strain Taiwan's military and psychologically exhaust the Taiwanese people. Although Lai has said that he is committed to maintaining the status quo, following a strategy of 'neither yield, nor provoke,' he has subtly but significantly pushed boundaries. During his inauguration last year, Lai repeatedly referred to 'China,' underlining the idea of Taiwan being separate from China. His predecessors more often referred to 'mainland China' or 'Beijing authorities' to avoid directly challenging Beijing. 'He went even further in his own inauguration speech, and now he's calling China a foreign hostile force. The question is: Is that in Taiwan's interest?' said Bonnie Glaser, an analyst at the German Marshall Fund in Washington, who said she agreed with Lai's measures but was concerned Beijing's reaction could cause a spiral of retaliation, escalating tensions. 'I think Lai is right to call attention to the way that China has ramped up efforts to sow discord in Taiwan society and sow a sense of psychological despair. It poses a threat to Taiwan in ways that very few people talk about,' she said. The Lai administration says the speech was not meant to be a departure from the status quo, but simply a plan for dealing with national security threats from China. Last year, authorities prosecuted 64 people for spying for China, more than half of whom were active or retired military members. One recent case involved a retired lieutenant general who is accused of forming a paramilitary cell to help Chinese forces in the event of a takeover. 'In response to China's persistent infiltration ... defending ourselves is not an act of provocation,' said a spokesperson for Taiwan's presidential office, Wen Lii. 'China is taking advantage of Taiwan's open society to sow division and engage in subversion,' he said. Some say Lai still could have gone further. 'Our legal framework has major loopholes — whether in national security or trade secrets, it remains too weak,' said Kuo Yu-jen, a professor at National Sun Yat-sen University and an adviser to Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, which handles cross-strait relations. 'I actually think defining China as a hostile foreign force is not strong enough.' Kuo and other analysts said they expect more retaliation from China, but that uncertainty over how the Trump administration will react will act as a restraint. After Lai's speech, Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, called Lai a 'crisis maker' and 'destroyer of cross-straits peace,' adding that he was pushing Taiwan toward the 'perilous brink of war.' China on Monday sent 59 fighter jets and nine naval ships on sorties in the Taiwan Strait, in what Chen said was 'resolute punishment' for Lai's remarks. Still, analysts said Beijing's response was relatively muted. 'Beijing's response probably had Washington in mind,' said Hsiao of the Eurasia Group. 'China likely does not want to close the door to a potential Xi-Trump summit and a deal that could help it weather the Trump years.' Pei-Lin Wu contributed to this report.
