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Korea Herald
06-08-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
Pentagon policy chief calls S. Korea 'role model' for N. Korea deterrence, defense spending
A senior Pentagon official has described South Korea as a "role model" in its willingness to take "more of the lead" in defending against North Korea and in its defense spending, as Washington prioritizes deterring Chinese threats while calling on allies to take on greater security burdens. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby made the remarks in a social media post on Thursday as he commented on a recent phone conversation between South Korean Defense Minister Ahn Gyu-back and US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. "South Korea continues to be a role model in its willingness to take more of the lead in a strong defense against the DPRK and in its spending on defense," Colby wrote on X, formerly Twitter. DPRK is short for North Korea's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. "We and the ROK are closely aligned on the need to modernize the Alliance in response to the regional security environment. We will work closely with Seoul to ensure a strategically sustainable Alliance that is ready to defend against shared threats," he added. ROK stands for South Korea's official name, the Republic of Korea. His remarks apparently underscored US President Donald Trump's expectations that allies will make greater efforts for their own defense, backed by their increased spending on defense, as the United States focuses on countering the "pacing threat" from an increasingly assertive China. The remarks came amid expectations that South Korean President Lee Jae Myung and Trump might discuss Seoul's defense spending and the future direction of the alliance in the name of alliance "modernization" when they meet in a White House summit that Trump said will take place in the coming weeks. The Pentagon has said that South Korea and other Asian allies are also subject to the "global standard" of spending 5 percent of their gross domestic product, a goal that North Atlantic Treaty Organization members have agreed to achieve by 2035 following Trump's demand. Colby has been tasked with crafting the Pentagon's new National Defense Strategy to prioritize increasing allies' "burden-sharing" and deterring Chinese threats in the Indo-Pacific. Hegseth directed that a final NDS draft be provided to him no later than Aug. 31.
Korea Herald
01-08-2025
- Politics
- Korea Herald
Senior Seoul official notes possibility of USFK role change due to 'various factors'
Senior Seoul official notes possibility of USFK role change due to 'various factors' WASHINGTON (Yonhap) -- A senior South Korean official made a rare mention Thursday of a possible change in the role of the US Forces Korea (USFK), amid speculation that US President Donald Trump's administration may seek to shift the focus of its mission to deterring China rather than countering North Korean threats. The official made the remarks in a meeting with South Korean correspondents in Washington as the Trump administration is seeking to "modernize" the South Korea-US alliance to make it "strategically sustainable" in the midst of an intensifying Sino-US rivalry. "I think there can be a change in the role and character of the USFK due to various factors," he said. The official pointed to the evolving international security environment, technological shifts and a "growing strategic role" of China, as he enumerated the factors that could drive a possible shift in the role of the 28,500-strong USFK. However, he cautioned against misconstruing his remarks, saying his talk of a possible change in the USFK role does not mean he concurs on the US view in support of the change. "Allies cannot see eye to eye perfectly with each other on everything," he said. As the Pentagon is working on crafting its National Defense Strategy to prioritize deterring China, speculation has persisted that the Trump administration might pursue greater "strategic flexibility" of the USFK to use it for a wider range of security operations beyond the Korean Peninsula. Opponents of a shift in the USFK role argue that it could lead to a weakening of efforts by Seoul and Washington to deter North Korea's advancing nuclear and missile threats, and that the potential use of the USFK for a mission against China would needlessly put Seoul in a geopolitically challenging position. US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby has advocated for a shift in the USFK mission, saying American troops in South Korea should not be "held hostage to dealing with the North Korean problem." The future direction of USFK operations is likely to be a key agenda item as South Korea and the US are expected to have earnest discussions on a shared understanding of where their longstanding alliance should be headed for. The official's remarks came after Foreign Minister Cho Hyun held his first talks with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio since the launch of President Lee Jae Myung's administration.
Atlantic
28-07-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
The Pentagon's Policy Guy Is All In On China
Elbridge Colby believes that China is the only country on the planet that has the ambition, resources, and military might to knock the United States off its pedestal as the world's leading superpower. Most in President Donald Trump's administration agree. But even by the standards of MAGA world, Colby is a divisive figure. And the Pentagon policy master's prescription for how to counter China's rise explains why. The only way to stop Beijing's bid for global dominance, he has argued, is for the U.S. to pour everything it can into securing the western Pacific, even if doing so comes at the expense of combating Russia or maintaining U.S. influence in the Middle East. That is, to remain superpowerful, the U.S. may need to temporarily stop superpowering. Colby didn't always think this way. During Trump's first term, he wrote a strategy document that advocated continuing to try to do it all, as superpowers do. But his attitude has evolved, and along the way, he has amped up the ire among his enemies—including fellow Republicans and U.S. allies abroad. Colby's worldview was at the root of U.S. indecision this summer over whether to provide Ukraine with badly needed weapons. When the U.S. military canceled an expected shipment late last month, catching even the White House off guard, the blame—and the credit—went to Colby. It was an unlikely moment in the spotlight for a policy wonk whose stances had, until recently, been little-noticed beyond the world of Beltway think tanks. Some on the right, including hawkish GOP senators, seized upon the decision as evidence that Colby should be ousted, and began pushing the White House to act. Others in the MAGA movement cheered the suspension—Tucker Carlson is a longtime Colby fan —and described the move as evidence of a truly 'America First' national-security strategy. Both wings of the movement were ultimately disappointed: Within days of the pause, Trump not only reversed it, he went a step further in providing new support to Kyiv. And far from being fired, Colby appears secure in his position at the Pentagon, his influence undiminished. In some ways, Colby personifies an ongoing shift within the Republican Party. Trump has moved away from positioning the U.S. as defender of the post–Cold War order and toward preserving its resources for threats that directly affect the U.S. homeland—with China at the top of the list. During Trump's first term, Colby led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. The document concluded that the U.S. must be prepared to confront a wide range of threats beyond China, including from Russia, and also must be able to 'counter rogue regimes such as North Korea and Iran, defeat terrorist threats to the United States, and consolidate our gains in Iraq and Afghanistan while moving to a more resource-sustainable approach.' More recently, Colby has come to the view that to meet the supreme challenge of China, other priorities will have to be sacrificed. 'We see with Colby's recent comments a shift towards a military almost entirely focused on one region and one opponent,' Bryan Clark, a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute, told us. 'And the question is: What drove that change? The only thing that seems to have changed is the political zeitgeist within the Republican Party.' During an October speech at Dartmouth, Colby argued that the threat from Beijing was paramount—and that the U.S. was ill-equipped to deal with it. The U.S., he told the audience, faces 'the possibility of a World War III in the coming years. We're not prepared.' America needs 'to prioritize the potential for a conflict with China precisely in order to avoid it.' The 45-year-old Yale and Harvard graduate—who goes by 'Bridge,' speaks animatedly, and is known for his thick head of blond hair—comes to the role of Pentagon undersecretary with a pedigree as a consummate Washington institutionalist and foreign-policy intellectual. The grandson of former CIA Director William Colby, he spent part of his childhood in Japan and much of his adulthood cycling between government and think tanks, at times working across bipartisan lines on issues including nuclear-weapons policy and the Middle East. He wasn't always a Trump supporter—but was never a Never Trumper. Now he has gone all in for Trump and the president's norm-breaking approach to world affairs. Over the past decade, China has developed a bigger navy, launched more sophisticated cyber warfare and missile systems, and expanded its global footprint, all while the U.S. has been divided over how to stop its advances. Under Colby's strategy, the U.S. can both focus on China and deploy troops to protect the homeland. But it likely can't do those missions and also sustain air-defense systems and naval ships in the Middle East, not to mention tens of thousands of troops in Europe. Those regions need to do more for themselves, Colby has said. Since taking over the Pentagon's No. 3 position in April, he has argued that support for allies such as Israel and Ukraine risks coming at the expense of U.S. interests in Asia. He has proposed moving Pentagon funding away from the Army toward the services that would spearhead the fight against Beijing—the Navy and the Air Force. That suggestion has forced the Army to scramble to prove its continued relevance. Colby advocates withdrawing forces from Europe and redistributing them around the Asia-Pacific region. The nation's main geopolitical goal, he believes, should be deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan—and defending the island if deterrence fails. His critics have been unnevered by some of his early moves. After taking the post, Colby told his British counterparts that the Royal Navy should focus on threats from Russia and leave the U.S. Navy to lead in the western Pacific, defense officials told us. Colby also helped trigger a review of former President Joe Biden's multibillion-dollar U.S.-U.K.-Australia submarine pact, out of concern that the Australians might not deploy U.S.-provided submarines during a U.S.-led campaign on Chinese forces in the event of an assault on Taiwan. (Lawmakers from both parties have urged the Pentagon to go ahead with the deal.) Detractors charge that Colby wants to jettison an international-security approach that has held for the past 80 years and replace it with an overly simplistic alternative. 'His belief is that we can only accomplish one thing at a time and that we can't maintain troops or defensive positions worldwide,' one Senate aide, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, told us. 'That is counter to what most national-security experts believe and what the U.S. has done since World War II.' Threats from China and Russia are too intertwined to have a strategy for one nation but not the other, European officials told us. Russia's war in Ukraine and China's push in the South China Sea reflect their shared territorial ambitions. Allied diplomats bristle at the idea that they should leave such a massive part of the world to the Americans when Europe has its own economic and security interests in Asia that must be defended. 'We agree on the basic principle that we in Europe should lead our security. We also feel we have a role in the Asia-Pacific,' one European official told us. Although Colby has not spoken extensively in public since taking up his new post, he has outlined parts of his approach on social media. Earlier this month, after the president's announcement that aid to Ukraine would go ahead, Colby wrote: 'Central to President Trump's common sense, America First message is that our alliances have to be fair and equitable for them to be sustainable. This is eminently reasonable but was treated for many years as heresy.' Colby narrowly secured the undersecretary job on a largely party-line confirmation vote. Opposition from within the GOP, such as it was, came from those who questioned whether he would be tough on other adversaries aside from China. Colby was at pains to insist he could be. He had previously said that if Iran obtained nuclear arms, the U.S. could contain it, but in his hearings he insisted that Washington must avoid that possibility at all costs. In response to questioning from Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas, he said using American tankers and bombers to go after Iran's nuclear facilities were options that 'I would raise for the consideration of the secretary and ultimately the president.' Colby may not be well known among the general public, but he is considered highly influential within the Pentagon. As Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth focuses on his TV appearances and rooting out symptoms of a 'woke' military, Colby has been working quietly in the background. Colby has earned fans in the MAGA movement for his efforts to push U.S. allies to spend more on their own defense. His emphasis on China has won praise from within the administration and from key outside advisers including Steve Bannon. Supporters tout him as a future secretary of defense or state. But he's also made enemies among more traditionally hawkish Republicans, who fear that focusing on China will let Russian President Vladimir Putin off the hook. Those concerns were magnified when, at his confirmation hearings, he repeatedly refused to say Putin had attacked Ukraine. The suspension of military aid to Kyiv came at a particularly inopportune moment: just as a growing number of senators from both parties had signed onto a bill calling for more sanctions on Russia, reflecting their frustration with Moscow's continued attacks on Ukraine. Colby had in previous months led the development of a memorandum evaluating Ukrainian weapons requests and how they lined up (or didn't) with America's own needs. Officials said the framework, which was presented to Hegseth and other senior officials, was 'outcome agnostic' and contained no recommendation to pause weapons shipments to Ukraine. But Colby's critics blamed his memo for influencing the decision to suspend aid, noting that though it didn't explicitly state a position, it made clear that providing Ukraine more weapons could put a strain on missions elsewhere, a position Hegseth ultimately adopted. Senator Mitch McConnell, the former majority leader, who opposed Colby's confirmation, complained to the White House about the pause. Other Republicans, including Cotton, have also expressed unhappiness, an administration official and another White House aide told us. 'The strategic incoherence of underfunding our military and restricting lethal assistance to partners like Ukraine is measured in the avoidable erosion of American credibility with allies and the mounting deaths of innocents,' McConnell said in a statement at the time of the pause. Since reversing the move, Trump has adopted a tougher approach to Russia—for now. No evidence suggests that Trump held Colby responsible for temporarily suspending the aid, and Colby's allies in the administration were quick to absolve him of blame. Although Colby declined to speak to us for this story, multiple administration allies and GOP senators sent us unsolicited quotes of support once we reached out to the White House for comment. 'President Trump has an extremely knowledgeable and fiercely loyal advisor in Elbridge Colby,' Vice President J. D. Vance, who introduced Colby at his confirmation hearing, told us in a statement. 'The commitment Bridge has demonstrated to President Trump's foreign policy goals is unmatched throughout this administration, and we are incredibly grateful to have him as a part of our national security team.' Christopher Landau, Marco Rubio's deputy at the State Department, called Colby 'a creative thinker in fields that haven't seen a lot of creative thinking in decades.' A White House official suggested that the flap over the Ukraine memo was shrugged off internally and was instead simply evidence of Colby—'a consummate policy guy,' the official told us—presenting a series of options in line with Trump's views. Trump-administration officials working on Asia are sometimes divided into three categories: 'primacists,' who believe that the U.S. must lead the global response to threats around the world, a onetime Colby position; 'restrainers,' who want a foreign policy based primarily on U.S. economic interests; and 'prioritizers,' which Colby is frequently described as personifying. Prioritizers want Washington to focus above all on threats from China, and move away from concerns over Russia and Iran. Those who have worked with Colby—who bears the name of his great-grandfather, an Army officer who served in China—describe his views as an amalgamation of the three approaches. He is not an isolationist, they say, but rather a proponent of a precise use of American assets with the goal of defending its economic and military interests across Asia. He believes that the U.S., more than any other nation, should lead the world effort to combat threats from China, which he sees as singular. Colby's defenders say that Trump likewise encapsulates all three tendencies, advocating the use of force in discreet ways and leveraging U.S. influence to get allies to take up more of the shared defense burden. Colby's advocacy of moving away from legacy American missions in the Middle East and Europe has an impact on U.S. policy in the Asia-Pacific region, opponents argue. They note that if the U.S. doesn't support Ukraine and allows Russia to prevail, it will diminish American credibility with allies like Japan and South Korea, which are key to combating threats from China. Richard Fontaine, CEO of the Center for a New American Security, where Colby worked between Trump terms, told us there is broad agreement across the administration that the United States must devote greater resources to Asia and do more to prioritize the threat posed by China's military rise. But some—whom he put in the 'Asia only' camp—would be more willing to accept risk or trade-offs in other areas, such as the Middle East and Europe. Those people, Fontaine told us, 'seem to dismiss Europe as a distraction from the real game, which is in the Indo-Pacific.' Of course, there may be another way to contain China while maintaining American commitments elsewhere. Colby's approach, the Hudson Institute's Clark explained, presumes that the U.S. can halt Beijing's advances only through a large-scale deployment to the western Pacific. But less military power, he told us, could be equally effective: 'The U.S. just has to be smarter about how it deploys and orchestrates its power.'
Business Wire
23-07-2025
- Health
- Business Wire
A New Standard of Living: Vitacorps Begins Installation of Advanced Wellness Technology in U.S. Army Housing
WARWICK, R.I.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Vitacorps, a leader in integrated wellness solutions for military environments, today announced the first installations of its innovative mission readiness solution are underway in homes at Fort Bragg, N.C., and Fort Meade, Md. This marks the beginning of a large-scale initiative to enhance the indoor environments of more than 4,500 homes across three major U.S. Army installations, including a future rollout at Fort Riley, Kan. The Vitacorps program is driven by a comprehensive process designed to help support the health, well-being, and readiness of service members and their families. This involves rigorous infield assessment of indoor conditions and resulting prescriptions of 3 rd -party tested interventions engineered to achieve certifiable indoor health outcomes across air and water quality, lighting and excess humidity. By holistically improving the indoor environment, Vitacorps aims to enhance soldier readiness, improve performance, strengthen family resilience, and contribute to the retention of military personnel. 'We are proud to begin the installation of our comprehensive wellness solution, bringing a new standard of healthy living to our nation's military families,' said Rob Bellmar, president of Vitacorps. 'Our seven-step program creates healthier living environments without major infrastructure investments or the need for temporary resident relocation. We bring together indoor environment and building experts to deliver scalable, research-based solutions that are designed to enhance well-being and operational effectiveness.' The initiative follows successful pilots that validated significant post-implementation enhancements to air and water quality, humidity control, and lighting conditions. Key enhancements being deployed include: Air Purification: Providing purified air throughout the entire home. Water Filtration: Ensuring access to high-quality filtered water. Excess Humidity Control: Implementing solutions to manage and reduce indoor humidity. Circadian Lighting: Installing lighting systems that support natural sleep cycles and increase mental acuity. Residents at a community participating in the pilot of the Vitacorps program reported an 82% increase in satisfaction with on-post housing. The U.S. Army approved the rapid rollout of the program to communities covering more than 15,000 residents after initial data showed an overwhelmingly positive response and significant improvements across multiple thresholds, with prototype installations being validated and certified to the WELL Building Standard™, the world's leading benchmark for indoor health. This initiative advances the National Defense Strategy's goal of a strong, healthy, and ready force and aligns with the Army's Holistic Health and Fitness (H2F) program, which promotes health and well-being for peak performance. About Vitacorps Vitacorps transforms military living with an evidence-based, integrated wellness solution designed to help enhance service members' health, performance, and quality of life. Unlike fragmented, one-off solutions, our comprehensive seven-step process improves indoor environmental quality to help bolster service member performance. Designed for scalability and streamlined implementation, the Vitacorps Program elevates military infrastructure into strategic assets that help bolster national defense and operational readiness.
AllAfrica
02-07-2025
- Politics
- AllAfrica
S. Korea's role in a Taiwan crisis on which North might piggyback
This article was first published by Pacific Forum. It is republished here with permission. The new president of South Korea remains cautious in articulating a position on a potential Taiwan contingency. Still, public and policy discourse within Korea has been active, often gravitating toward a stance of deliberate restraint, arguing that the North Korean threat justifies non-involvement in a different crisis. Yet this position is riddled with strategic confusion. First, it conflates strategic goals with bargaining positions. Minimizing involvement may be a negotiation tactic, but it should not define a nation's strategy. Second, it lacks coherence in managing strategic signaling – when to conceal and when to reveal intentions and capabilities. Third, it ignores the risks of strategic miscommunication: warnings meant for adversaries can inadvertently unsettle allies, and domestic political messages can embolden external challengers. Passive posturing and abstract principles will not suffice. Instead, South Korea must carefully assess the realities it would face during a contingency and map out its strategic options accordingly. This paper explores how South Korea can move from being a silent observer to a strategic enabler in the event of a Taiwan conflict, and what choices and preparations this role would entail. US planners now treat a dual-front crisis – China over Taiwan, plus North Korea on the peninsula – as a central assumption, not a remote risk. Washington's 2022 National Defense Strategy elevated 'integrated deterrence,' pressing allies to link multiple theaters. For Seoul this means moving beyond a North-Korea-only lens and preparing forces, laws, and public opinion for wider regional contingencies. Yet, substance lags behind rhetoric. A recent Korea Economic Institute study finds the allies still lack agreed-upon roles, thresholds and command relationships for a Taiwan scenario. The problem is qualitative as much as temporal: Pyongyang leans toward vertical nuclear escalation, while Beijing wields cyber, space and precision-strike tools. Managing both simultaneously therefore requires new concepts, interoperable C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) capabilities and flexible logistics networks – not just more forces. The stakes are immediate. In the Guardian Tiger simulation, Chinese strikes on Taiwan coincided with North Korean provocations, forcing US Forces Korea to split attention across two theaters – untenable under current planning. Because Korean semiconductors, batteries and shipping lanes hinge on cross-Strait stability, neutrality offers no shelter: Bloomberg Economics ranks Korea the world's second-hardest-hit economy in a blockade scenario. If Seoul is serious about being a 'Global Pivotal State,' it must treat strategic simultaneity not as an added burden but as the price of safeguarding its own prosperity and alliance credibility in an interconnected Indo-Pacific. South Korea cannot afford the illusion of neutrality in a Taiwan contingency. Seoul should adopt a phased response that ranges from diplomatic backing and intel-sharing to calibrated base access and limited deployments. It must also practice strategic signaling, blending public restraint with quiet contingency planning; Guardian Tiger I showed that displaying autonomous strike options while keeping official rhetoric muted can deter Beijing and steady partners. Finally, Seoul can make a decisive contribution short of direct combat: KEI's analysis highlights how military bases in Korea would be indispensable for base access and support for coalition ISR, air and maritime protection and logistics even without ROK troops on the front line. Building on its phased-response plan, Seoul must also prepare for the requests Washington will make if a Taiwan crisis erupts. The United States will seek broad strategic alignment across military, diplomatic, economic and informational fronts – not just battlefield aid. South Korea can meet this need by setting flexible red lines: internal thresholds that dictate when and how it will step up support, keeping Beijing uncertain while showing domestic audiences that Seoul, not Washington, controls the pace. Category Likely Request Policy Considerations Diplomatic Support Public statements and joint declarations with the UN, G7, or others Calibrate language; use backchannel messaging to manage escalation risks Intelligence and Surveillance Cooperation Enhanced trilateral intelligence sharing (ROK-US-Japan); emergency intel exchanges during crisis Requires integrated platforms and information-sharing protocols Cyber and Space Operations Joint cyber defense and offensive coordination; satellite data sharing and space asset cooperation Institutionalize coordination between cyber commands; establish a joint cyber ops center Humanitarian and Non-Combat Support Disaster relief, Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO); provision of non-military supplies High public support and low legal constraints; caution needed to prevent mission creep Air and Maritime Protection Securing key air and sea lines; naval escort or air interdiction missions Emphasize a posture of protection and deterrence Base Access Forward deployment of USAF; support for carrier strike group deployment Establish conditional use principles MRO Support MRO for US military; civilian-military tech sharing pre-negotiated civilian cooperation Logistics Support Ammunition, fuel, transport, and maintenance support Develop a civilian-military logistics network; coordinate dispersed support with Japan/Philippines/Australia Redeployment of USFK Assets Redeploying ISR and missile defense assets; diversion of USAF squadrons; emergency redeployment of ground forces Assess trade-offs with North Korea deterrence posture and political constraints Forward Deployment of Strike Assets Hosting long-range strike platforms and surveillance radar Risk of Chinese retaliation; cost of infrastructure and domestic consensus in peacetime Participation in Multinational Operations Naval escort missions, mine clearing, joint fire support; limited participation in multinational operation Reduces political risk; requires legal authorization Deployment of Combat Forces Overseas deployment of Korean troops and weapon systems High political and public burden; UN resolutions or firm alliance agreements Washington's most plausible request will be access to South Korea's bases. Osan and Gunsan offer hardened runways and fuel; Busan and Jeju can move war stocks and aid at scale, signaling allied resolve and reinforcing integrated deterrence without ROK boots on the ground. Folding this demand into Seoul's phased-response playbook and flexible red lines lets Korea meet US needs while retaining political control. Hosting such operations, however, brings real risks – North Korean opportunism or Chinese retaliation – so Seoul should adopt a 'conditional access' principle, for example, barring strikes on the Chinese mainland. Clear boundaries would deter Beijing, reassure allies and keep escalation with Pyongyang in check, allowing South Korea to contribute decisively without strategic overextension. In the climactic scene of the movie 'Battleship,' the world comes together to confront an alien threat. It presents a neat narrative: one enemy, one front, one unified response. Reality, however, is far messier. Threats are multifaceted, solidarity is never automatic, and national responses are shaped by diverging interests and internal constraints. A Taiwan contingency will be the ultimate test of such complexity. South Korea cannot reduce the Taiwan crisis to a simple 'intervene or abstain' choice. The peninsula and the strait are tied not just by proximity but by interwoven political, economic, and strategic interests, so turbulence in one will inevitably reverberate in the other. Seoul should recall that its very survival in 1950 hinged on the costly intervention of the United Nations Command – proof that international solidarity can be decisive. What the ROK-US alliance now needs is detailed internal planning: As the United States, Japan, Taiwan, Australia, and the Philippines shape responses to their own interests, Seoul must shed a North Korea-only mindset. Even without combat troops, enabling allied operations through intelligence, logistics and base access can signal resolve as powerfully as direct intervention. In periods of strategic flux, commitment is measured less by force size than by reliability. Silent observation is no longer viable; strategic enabling is. Hanbyeol Sohn PhD ( serves as a professor in the Department of Strategic Studies at the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), also embracing a role as the director of the Center for Nuclear/WMD Affairs at the Research Institute for National Security Affairs (RINSA). His research areas include nuclear strategy, deterrence and the ROK-US alliance. Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Korea National Defense University, the Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Korea or any other affiliated institutions.
