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The Hill
6 days ago
- Politics
- The Hill
America is prepared for a strike on our nuclear weapons
In a recent op-ed for The Hill, ' America Isn't Prepared for a Strike Against our Nuclear Weapons,' freelance journalist Ben Ollerenshaw argued that the U.S. is woefully unprepared for the nuclear threats facing the nation because it relies on a 'single point of failure: the nuclear command, control and communications systems.' He explains that the nation is dependent on highly vulnerable E-6B Mercury command-and-control aircraft that, because they are now on 'ground alert' rather than flying 24/7, make easy targets for a surprise nuclear, drone or missile attack. Should such an attack occur, Ollerenshaw argues that the president could no longer employ the nation's nuclear weapons. Fortunately, this is simply untrue. The nuclear command, control and communications system has far more ways to transmit presidential orders. The system connects sensors and shooters with decision-makers using a detect, decide, and direct framework. Detection harnesses sensors that identify and correlate adversary launches to facilitate warning. Once detection is established and the assessment is made, senior leaders confer, review plans and determine appropriate courses of action during the decision process. Finally, presidential decisions are transmitted through the system to the nuclear forces charged with weapons employment, under any circumstance or environment, guaranteed. To accomplish this audacious mission, the system must be survivable, prompt and flexible. Keep in mind that the nation's nuclear command, control and communications system is essentially a system of systems resembling a spider web. If one strand is broken, there are other strands a president can use to ensure a message is transmitted to forces in the field. Historically, it was thought of as having a 'thick line' during times of peace, and a survivable 'thin line' during times of war, should a Soviet nuclear attack devastate the U.S. In peacetime, the National Military Command Center at the Pentagon and the Global Operations Center at US Strategic Command serve as the primary command and control centers for the nation's nuclear forces. These facilities are not designed to survive direct nuclear strikes, but for the last seven decades, they and their predecessors performed the job in times of peace and crisis. During the Cold War (1961-1990), the country also maintained EC-135 command-and-control aircraft in continuous airborne operations, flying around the clock, seven days a week. The airborne command post mirrored the capabilities of the Global Operations Center, so that if the latter was destroyed in a nuclear attack, the Airborne Emergency Action Officer could take over and perform the duties of commander for the Strategic Air Command. The Looking Glass aircraft were an insurance policy against a surprise Soviet nuclear strike. They enhanced second-strike capability, strengthened strategic stability, and provided a psychological and political signal. The continuous presence of Looking Glass sent a clear signal of American resolve, vigilance and readiness to respond, reinforcing the overall framework of strategic deterrence. This did not, however, mean that the National Military Command Center, Global Operations Center and Looking Glass aircraft were the only ways for the president to command and control nuclear forces. It was, in fact, expected that both the National Military Command Center and Global Operations Center would be destroyed early in a Soviet nuclear strike, and that the command post aircraft would quickly take over. There was, however, always a concern that the aircraft would either be destroyed by Soviet aircraft or missiles or simply run out of fuel for lack of remaining and available aerial refueling capability. So it should come as no surprise that the Air Force devised 'backups to our backups' and spent considerable time working through all plausible scenarios where not only were the National Military Command Center and the Global Operations Center destroyed in an attack, but so were the KC-135s and now E-6B fleet. In our own careers, we have participated in wargames, exercises and working groups where just such events occurred. It is also important to understand that U.S. Strategic Command, the joint staff, and other elements of the national command authority regularly conduct exercises under conditions that mimic catastrophic events. This means the uniformed and civilian personnel who operate the nuclear command, control and communications system regularly train to operate in degraded conditions. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, released under the Biden administration, reiterated a longstanding policy that 'while the United States maintains the capability to launch nuclear forces under conditions of an ongoing nuclear attack, it does not rely on a launch-under-attack policy to ensure a credible response. Rather, U.S. nuclear forces are postured to withstand an initial attack.' For decades, the U.S. opted for redundancy to meet its resilience requirement. Redundant systems, redundant command nodes, and redundant communication pathways require consistent resourcing and persistent exercise if America is to retain its noble intent to 'ride out' a first strike. There is no deterrence without a credible threat of existential retaliation. That means America's nuclear command, control and communications systems must always work after a first strike on the homeland. From nuclear arsenal resourcing to force posture and launch policy, America's deterrent cannot depend on hope to survive; it must depend on action. That is exactly how the system is designed. Adam Lowther, Ph.D., is the vice president of research at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He spent two decades as a civil servant in the Department of Defense nuclear enterprise. Col. (Ret.) Curtis McGiffin is the vice president of education at the National Institute for Deterrence Studies. He flew nuclear command-and-control aircraft during his career.
New York Times
29-03-2025
- Politics
- New York Times
8 Pieces of Free Advice for Trump's National Security Team
This may be presumptuous, but it strikes me that the new administration's national security team could use some advice. I have worked with senior leaders through many administrations from both parties. I've seen firsthand how highly capable and skilled professionals have conducted themselves in these positions. So, Vice President JD Vance; Secretary of State Marco Rubio; Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth; Tulsi Gabbard, the director of the Office of National Intelligence; and Michael Waltz, the national security adviser: In the wake of Signalgate, here are some recommendations. 1. Trust Your People. The military and civilian professionals assigned to you are very competent and possess deep knowledge about your organizations and national security. They want to help you succeed. My staff would have kept me from violating the rules you appear to have ignored or blundered through. If your staff knew you were sharing details of pending military operations on Signal, a commercially available app, and didn't stop you, that's a big problem. I'm assuming they weren't involved. Mr. Waltz, senior officials don't build their own chat groups. That should be done by support staff — if at all. I've worked with many of our senior military leaders. Many had extensive combat experience, including in missions not unlike those on March 15 targeting the Houthis. If they had known Signal was being used, or the nature of the communications being shared there, I cannot imagine that they would not have intervened. This is what happens when you disregard expertise. 2. Maintain the dignity and professionalism of your office. All of you are under constant scrutiny. You are being judged by the American people, by those who report to you and by the world at large. Anything you do may be reported on by the media and recorded for posterity. This isn't about you — it's about the office you hold. You do a disservice to yourselves and to the nation when you conduct yourselves unprofessionally. Emojis are not professional. Using Signal for sensitive matters is not professional. Using childish insults to characterize a reporter is not professional. Airstrikes that kill people are serious business and should be treated as such. The authority to deploy the armed forces of the United States is an awesome and humbling responsibility. Demonstrate by your conduct and by how you communicate that you fully appreciate that fact. 3. Trust and use the systems. All members of the national security team have extensive, sophisticated and secure communications systems standing by to support them 24/7, wherever they may be. In the case of the secretary of defense, there is both the National Military Command Center and the organization in the Pentagon known as 'cables,' where professionals stand by to set up one-on-one or group calls globally. Those systems can support any contingency up to and including a nuclear conflict. There is no good reason to ignore them. 4. Own obvious mistakes. Denying that you did anything wrong just won't fly. You may deceive some of the public or your supporters into thinking you did nothing wrong, or that this was no big deal, but I can assure you that the people you lead all know better. Everyone in uniform, every member of the intelligence community and everyone in our diplomatic services — the people you lead — know that what you did was seriously wrong. They also know that if any of them had committed a similar offense they would have been fired or severely disciplined. When Airman Jack Teixeira revealed highly sensitive classified information to his online buddies, he was trying to impress them. He wasn't a spy, just stupid and immature. He is facing years in prison for civil offenses plus a military court-martial. A phrase I heard occasionally in the Air Force was, 'We're not a one-mistake Air Force.' That meant we can make mistakes and then, instead of getting fired, be given the opportunity to learn and move on. My response to that was, 'It depends on the mistake.' In this case, by sheer good fortune (and the journalist's discretion), there was no apparent direct consequence to U.S. troops from your security breach. It was perhaps a rookie mistake made only two months into your various jobs, with no experience at these senior levels. That would make it more understandable. But if you want any chance of leading effectively, you need to own that you screwed up royally and won't repeat the mistake. 5. Don't exclude senior military personnel. All the National Security Council meetings I've attended or known about at this level also included relevant senior military leaders, such as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the vice chairman and the relevant combatant commanders. I know that Gen. Charles Q. Brown Jr., who was fired as chairman by President Trump, would have ensured that any such conversation was done through approved channels and at the right level of security. And I'm sure that Adm. Christopher Grady, the acting chairman, would have done the same. Why were they excluded? 6. Understand you are always a target for spies. The group of people on this Signal chat are probably, except for the president, the most targeted group of people for espionage on the planet. Our adversaries will use every means available to spy on you, including and especially trying to penetrate any commercial devices or applications you may be using. Never forget that for a second. 7. Don't embarrass the president or the country again. If there is one deadly sin for political appointees, it is to embarrass the president. In every case I can remember, political appointees who break that rule have not stayed in office long. The current president may be less sensitive about this than those I have served under, but I expect some of you are pretty close to even his limit. I suggest that you take a more cautious approach. 8. Look at yourselves in the mirror. You all hold positions of vast and awesome responsibility. Are your experiences and capabilities up to the jobs you hold? If not, you have a duty to the American people and to the president to acknowledge this and step aside. You might give that option some serious thought.
