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Scroll.in
5 hours ago
- Politics
- Scroll.in
Quads, triads and India's South Asia paranoia
Let us not be coy. The limited war between Pakistan and India this past May, not long after the end-April terror attack near Pahalgam in Kashmir, has unlimited consequences for South Asia. As we know, avionics, strike and defensive systems got a massive workout. Vulnerabilities and strengths were duly exploited. And, duly noted – including artfully minimised losses in aircraft, equipment, facilities, and personnel – by both countries, their defense suppliers and strategic partners, and the world at large. Drone warfare truly joined the destructive drone of warfare by 'social' media, manned by keyboard warriors of South Asia. Ceasefire has now lapsed into uneasy détente. Leaders of India and Pakistan have moved on from claiming victory for their domestic audiences – while the leader of the United States as typically claimed the victory as his. We in South Asia are urged to take a deep breath and carry on. That is where the consequences enter, now brought to sharp relief by this on-again off-again conflict seemingly without end. If we were to telescope to India's security perspective – the perspective of a country that, significantly, shares borders with both China and all South Asian countries except Sri Lanka and the Maldives – the steady-state tandem enmity of Pakistan and China is joined by Bangladesh. This is being disseminated as an unholy triad, if you will, that carries both potential and demonstrable ill-will towards India. Indeed, India's newly voluble Chief of Defense Staff General Anil Chauhan indicated as much on July 8 at an event at a major establishment-oriented New Delhi think-tank. 'There is a possible convergence of interest we can talk about between China, Pakistan and Bangladesh,' said Gen Chauhan during an address at Observer Research Foundation, 'that may have implications for India's stability and security dynamics'. There are reasons for this and all of them, to India's mind, are collectively a clear and present – and future – danger. A dominant narrative in India is predicated on the South Asian ring of fire that its neighbours would be naïve to discount. Equally, India needs to accept that, while its regional strategic flex remains, its presumptuous South Asian zamindari, driven by sheer size and the geographic reality that no other South Asian country shares a land border with any other South Asian country but India, is over. Let us pan this out. Repeated calls for 'destroying' Pakistan – mainly by India's establishment-fed media and ruling party bots – is akin to Fool's Gold. This goes beyond the silliness of Indian government officials claiming that turning off the tap of the Indus will bring Pakistan to its knees. A fractured Pakistan will be a nightmare for India even though there are those among establishment hawks who see in such an eventuality the reclamation of all Kashmir. Add nuclear capability to that fracture and the future becomes a full-blown catastrophe that India's ultra-Right ecosystem nurtured with disinformation, delusion, and social media strategy masquerading as security imperatives can scarcely comprehend. Visualise generals as warlords. Visualise any number of fractious ethnic and religious groups in Pakistan which would sooner see any attack against India as a mark of faith and fulfilment. Visualise a future post-Pakistan's poverty-stricken millions sloshing about in a fractured land; and consider if any border security in the world is robust enough to withstand a flight of such dismantled people. The upshot: India will have to get its governance and hearts-and-minds act together in Kashmir, the same as Pakistan in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, if either is to withstand the other's rhetorical and actual onslaughts. (Besides, Pakistan needs to get its act together in its massively restive and deliberately under-developed Balochistan province, among other regions.) Over at the eastern arc, India's goodwill had already begun to take a hit in Bangladesh, as public opinion saw India as standing with an increasingly corrupt, electorally wayward, and essentially dictatorial Awami League government led by former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, especially during the past decade. India massively depleted its goodwill in a post-Hasina Bangladesh by standing with a belligerent Sheikh Hasina throughout the political upheaval over July and August 2024. And then, by presenting to outraged Bangladeshi citizenry the diplomatic horror of having India's national security advisor welcome an ejected Hasina at Hindon air force base near Delhi on August 5 – on live television. It was an optics disaster of epic proportion in both the mind's eye of Bangladeshi citizenry and to the emotionally charged and mission-oriented housecleaners of Bangladesh's interim government. It's a disaster from which India is yet to fully recover. It has made India's strategic and economic interests in Bangladesh, transhipment to its entire northeastern region, and India's strategic Siliguri Corridor deeply vulnerable to Bangladeshi policy squeeze. The risk of a squeeze by proxy makes matters worse for India: that slim corridor, the so-called Chicken's Neck, is a short hop for a China nestled in the hotly contested Doklam region just to the north. And for all of Bangladesh's justified moral lament for the democratic dislocation of the Hasina years and the atrocities perpetrated against students and innocent citizens over July-August 2024 – which this columnist observed first-hand – its interim government isn't blameless in adding to the tension. For his part, the head of the interim government of Bangladesh, no slouch when it comes to a networking opportunity polished by a lifetime of limelight, put several words out of place during an official visit to China this past March. Among other things, he publicly marketed Bangladesh to Chinese officials and businesses as being China's entrepôt for a 'landlocked' northeastern India. That too was an optics disaster – an observation which several senior South Asian diplomats have shared with me. With India's ongoing border spat with China, and repeated announcements by various Bangladesh entities to offer Chinese interests a deal to develop the Teesta River basin in northern Bangladesh – close to the strategic hotspot of the Siliguri Corridor – it was akin to waving a red flag to a bull in a China shop. This came in addition to the visible thaw in Bangladesh-Pakistan relations in the post-Hasina era, another huge red flag for India, among several other factors, including the release from jail of several people India views as inimical to its security. Bangladesh's interim government walked back the China-in-Northeastern India talk, but the damage was done. I've heard career-officials gripe about how the interim government should realise its interim nature, scale back knee-jerk pronouncements and Goebbelsian spin, and permit regime-agnostic professionals to go about their business in Bangladesh's national interest. In a tit-for-tat response that one could term Pakistanesque – or Indiaesque, depending on the lens – India has begun to squeeze Bangladesh by withdrawing some trading and transhipment benefits. Citing quite legitimate security reasons India has also refrained from expanding visa issuance for Bangladeshi visitors to the peak-Hasina level of a staggering 1.6 million visas a year – the figure for 2023. There are other indications of this avoidable freeze. With its heightened threat perception and what it perceives as necessary maritime deterrence, enhanced Indian naval and security activity in both the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea has become the new constant. There is the west-to-east arc of Pakistan, China, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Myanmar – where China has displayed deft management to secure its energy, mineral, and territorial interests. From a regional-and-maritime perspective, Sri Lanka is of course another competitive geography for India and China and which, much like its southern co-location with neighbouring Maldives, completes the ring of encirclement for India. There are several instances of the China and India's push-and-shove in Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Myanmar, and, increasingly, Bangladesh, that this column has variously discussed over the past three years. But just how acute regional threat perception has become is indicated by a churlish incident from early this year – predating the India-Pakistan fracas in May. A Bangladeshi naval vessel was to visit Colombo port for a courtesy call, en route Karachi for a naval exercise – Bangladeshi navy ships had earlier participated in previous editions of the exercise. From available indications, India pressured Sri Lanka to deny the vessel entry. It was touch and go for a while, but the Bangladesh-Sri Lanka 'bilateral' prevailed. Or, from India's freshly jaundiced eye, the Pakistan-Bangladesh-Sri Lanka 'trilateral'. Or to be a bit more provocative, perhaps the China-Pakistan-Bangladesh-Sri Lanka 'quadrilateral' – that would, ironically, run counter to the Quad or Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between India, Japan, Australia, and the United States that is commonly perceived as a strategy to contain China in the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region. But for all that, there is monumental work to be done to mend the India-Bangladesh bilateral, a rent in which could – with or without China – ruin Eastern South Asia.
Mid East Info
7 days ago
- Business
- Mid East Info
Ministry of Economy and Planning signs MOU with India based Observer Research Foundation to enhance collaboration in economic research and studies
Ministry of Economy and Planning signs MOU with India basedObserver Research Foundation to enhance collaboration in economic research and studies The Ministry of Economy and Planning signed a Memorandum of Understanding with India based Observer Research Foundation (ORF), to enhance collaboration in economic research and studies, and to exchange knowledge and research expertise, contributing to the formulation of evidence-based policies. The memorandum aims to strengthen the research partnership between the two sides by launching a joint annual publication, the development of youth leadership programs, and the organization of events, conferences, seminars and research activities in coordination with the relevant authorities. The MOU is part of the Ministry of Economy and Planning efforts to enhance international cooperation in the field of research, and to support the creation of knowledge-based economic policies, to help achieve the objectives of Saudi Vision 2030.
Hindustan Times
13-07-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
How the young in India perceive global politics
The return of the Donald Trump administration to the White House at the beginning of this year earmarked the inception of a more uncertain and unstable world order. In addition to this, certain unceasing challenges, such as the war in Europe, the crisis in West Asia, the rising spectre of terrorism in South Asia and most importantly, the growing assertiveness of China, raise further concerns about the state of international affairs. As India's role grows in the world, the aspirations of Indians to shape the global order have also been rising. Now in its fourth year, the Observer Research Foundation's Foreign Policy Survey 2024: Young India and the China Challenge attempts to bridge the gap between foreign policy and how policy decisions and challenges are perceived by the country's youth. An annual initiative, the survey of young Indians (18-35 years) collected data from 5,050 respondents spread across 19 cities in India in 11 languages, between July 22 and September 26, 2024. The findings of the survey are restricted to this period and do not capture major developments after that, particularly the impact of Donald Trump on the global order, the deterioration in India-Pakistan ties after the Pahalgam terror attack in April, and the subsequent Operation Sindoor. But the survey sheds light on public opinion on India's approach towards major foreign policy concerns. The overall support for India's foreign policy has increased consistently over the last four years, with 88% of respondents showing a positive perception this year. The central theme of this year's survey was to gauge the perception of China amongst India's youth. A higher 89% percentage consider border conflict with China as the biggest challenge for India, followed by cross-border terrorism (86%) and border conflict with Pakistan (85%). Even as China and India have resumed the process to achieve a thaw in ties, the trust deficit mires any prospect of a big breakthrough. The respondents who have expressed dissatisfaction with the bilateral relationship have also increased since last year's survey. Five years after the Galwan clashes, there are still concerns about China's rise, with many youth viewing it as a military threat and regarding the occupation of Tibet as a major impediment in the relationship (81%). China's presence in the neighbourhood is viewed with concern (73%) and there is increasing support for countering its presence. The youth also prioritises national security over economic partnerships (84%) and have shown support for imposing non-tariff barriers on China and cutting down on imports from the country. They also deem India's decision to stay out of Beijing's Belt and Road Initiative as beneficial to the country (79%). The importance of the Indian Ocean region in terms of its strategic vitality has also increased, with 33% support followed by South Asia and the Indo-Pacific region. This also explains the concern shown about China's growing presence in the maritime domain. India's Neighbourhood First policy is viewed favourably, particularly its development and connectivity initiatives. While Nepal (72%) is considered as the most trusted neighbour, followed by Bhutan and Sri Lanka, for Bangladesh, the level of trust has decreased since 2022. The distrust for Pakistan and Afghanistan also outweighed the trust reposed in these countries (81% and 46% respectively). While the level of distrust for Afghanistan has decreased since last year, for Pakistan, the changed norms of engagement in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and a new low in ties can lead to more caution. There is also a growing appreciation for India's exercise of its strategic autonomy, vis-a-vis its ties with the Quad countries — the US, Australia and Japan and also its historical partner, Russia. The respondents expressed satisfaction with the US (86%) and also saw it as emerging as India's leading partner in the next 10 years. While this is a subset of the growing synergy in the bilateral relationship in the last few years, the impact of Trump 2.0 will reflect in the coming iterations of this annual survey. The respondents also urge India to side with the US in its rivalry with China (54%). The youth see a permanent status in the United Nations Security Council as an important goal for India while also endorsing a permanent invitee status for the country in the G7, to leverage the strong ties New Delhi has with the member countries. While the subsequent surveys will show how much the developments of the past few months have influenced people's perceptions, the China-Pakistan nexus and its impact on India's interests and the trajectory that the US-China ties take in the future have already been underlined as critical determinants of India's future foreign policy trajectory. Harsh V Pant is vice president, studies and foreign policy, and Shivam Shekhawat is junior fellow, Observer Research Foundation. The views expressed are personal
Hans India
10-07-2025
- Politics
- Hans India
CDS flags new threat to India
New Delhi: Chief of Defence Staff Gen Anil Chauhan has warned of a possible strategic convergence between China, Pakistan, and Bangladesh—a development, he said, could carry serious long-term implications for India's security and regional stability. Speaking at the launch of the Observer Research Foundation's Foreign Policy Survey, Gen Chauhan flagged the shifting geopolitical order and called for sharper assessments of evolving alignments across South Asia. He stressed that India's strategic autonomy must not be misread as isolationism. 'Frequent shifts in governments across South Asia, along with changing ideological perspectives and geopolitical priorities, are major challenges,' he said. The CDS singled out the increasing Chinese presence in India's neighbourhood, warning that a growing China-Pakistan-Bangladesh axis could test India's security architecture in new ways. He also expressed concern over what he called the United States' ambiguous position in the Indo-Pacific and West Asia. 'The world is in flux—caught in a transition between two orders. Amid this chaos, the U.S. position further complicates matters,' he said, without citing specifics. Gen Chauhan also highlighted the strategic fallout of debt diplomacy in the Indian Ocean Region, where China's lending has created vulnerabilities among smaller nations. He pointed to Sri Lanka's 2022 crisis and India's $3 billion bailout as an example of the growing risks. Addressing questions on Operation Sindoor, launched in response to a deadly terror attack in Pahalgam that killed 26 civilians, the CDS confirmed Indian strikes on multiple terror camps across the LoC. He said Pakistan escalated the conflict into conventional warfare, limiting its own strategic options.
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Business Standard
09-07-2025
- Business
- Business Standard
Indian youth 'concerned' about China's rise, think-tank survey shows
A majority of India's youth — through a representational sample — is either very concerned or concerned about China's ascension to global power, according to an Indian think-tank survey that was unveiled on Tuesday. The continued border dispute, including the 1962 Sino-Indian war, China's annexation of Tibet (1950-51) and its 'aggressive promotion' of a flagship project under the Belt and Road Initiative that passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, are among major issues that have affected India-China relations, the 2024 Foreign Policy Survey by New Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation (ORF), said it found. 'Indian youth are also wary of China's military coercion,' the ORF survey said, citing border incidents such as the Doklam standoff in 2017 and the Galwan River valley clash in 2020 as likely causes for 'the respondents to worry about China's rise'. The survey asked more than 5,000 Indians — between the ages 18 and 35, from different socio-economic backgrounds, across 19 cities in the country — about China, India's foreign policy and geopolitics in general. It was conducted from July to September last year. On China's ascent, the survey said it found that among the respondents, holders of post-graduate degrees expressed the highest apprehension at 91 per cent, with skilled workers next at 89 per cent and job seekers at 88 per cent. A majority of the respondents in India's eastern and northern cities (in geographical proximity to China, Pakistan and Bangladesh) highlighted their 'China concern' in the survey. The ORF said income was seen as influencing perceptions about India's economic engagements with China. A model used in the survey suggested young Indians who earn Rs 30,000-90,000 a month were more likely to support policies that address India's trade imbalance with China such as reducing imports. Most respondents, the survey said, saw China as a maritime threat and as 'weaponising' its vast supply chains and mineral reserves. While the Galwan clash froze the bilateral relationship over the past five years, a thaw has been noticed in the months since Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping met on the sidelines of a Brics summit in Russia in October. But China's diplomatic support to Pakistan after the Pahalgam attack in April, which India linked to Pakistan-based terrorists, and China's military support to Pakistan during Operation Sindoor have again complicated India-China relations. The ORF said the respondents in its survey — conducted before the 2024 Brics summit and the Pahalgam attack — saw 'border conflicts with China, cross-border terrorism and border conflicts with Pakistan' as the three biggest challenges for India. In the preface to the survey, Samir Saran, ORF president, asked if China's leaders and policymakers want their country to be viewed by Indians in a similar way as Indians view Pakistan, that is, as 'an irresponsible global actor'. On the other hand, the survey said the majority of the Indian youth polled showed favourable response to Quad, the grouping of the United States, Australia, Japan and India, as well as to India's relations with Russia, although many worried about the China-Russia relationship. Most respondents viewed the Quad countries and Russia as 'India's potential leading partners in the next decade.' About 54 per cent of the respondents said India should side with the US in its rivalry with China, 38 per cent said India should adopt a neutral position and 70-77 per cent spoke in support of India-US cooperation across domains, according to the ORF survey.
