Latest news with #OperationBrasstacks
NDTV
27-07-2025
- General
- NDTV
MiG-21's Final Flight: Why Training, Not The Jet, Failed Air Force Pilots
The Indian Air Force (IAF) is preparing to retire its fleet of Russian-origin MiG-21 fighter jets in September. The aircraft, which played a key role in India's military campaigns, including the 1971 war against Pakistan, has been both celebrated as a formidable war machine and stigmatised as the "flying coffin" due to its high accident rate. With just two months until the final flight on September 19, historian and Indian Air Force expert Anchit Gupta joined NDTV to provide a detailed perspective on the MiG-21's legacy, dissecting its triumphs, challenges, and the reasons behind its controversial nickname. Introduced to the IAF in 1963, the MiG-21 was initially acquired for a specific role: as a high-altitude interceptor designed to counter aircraft like the American U-2 spy plane. Mr Gupta, whose father flew the MiG-21 during his service, recalled the aircraft's distinct roar as a morning alarm at airbases. "The MiG-21 is extremely close to my heart. And I saw my father fly it. We used to live at the bases. That was our alarm in the morning to wake up. I remember 1986 Operation Brasstacks. My father was in Bhuj, going into the trenches and counting the aircraft coming back to the base. So there is an emotion to MiG-21 for all of us," Mr Gupta told NDTV. MiG-21F-13, designated Type 74 from 1963 The IAF operated around 800 to 1,000 MiG-21s over six decades, a scale unmatched by most air forces. Of these, approximately 300 were lost in accidents. "That is a very sobering statistic. But there's no time lapse to that statistic, and therefore, people struggle to make sense of it. I think the answer very much lies in what we did with the aircraft. The aircraft was acquired for a very, very limited role, to be honest. It was a high-altitude interceptor. The original design of the MIG was to intercept the U-2," Mr Gupta said. The aircraft's role evolved far beyond its original design, encompassing ground attack, fighter reconnaissance, air defence, and, critically, jet training -- a role, Mr Gupta said, it was never intended to fulfil. "Flying Coffin" Label: A Misnomer? The MiG-21's reputation as a "flying coffin" stems from its high crash rate. Mr Gupta challenged this label, arguing that the aircraft's accident record is less about inherent flaws and more about systemic issues in pilot training and aircraft acquisition. "It's very much linked to our procurement. Our combat squadron strength went from eight squadrons in 1947 to nearly 40 squadrons in 1965. Now you have sanctioned it, how do you acquire? And so we were huffing and puffing to acquire more aircraft, and MiG-21 came out of nowhere with the USSR saying, 'Listen, I'll do technology transfer, you manufacture it locally.' It was something that really fell into our laps," Mr Gupta told NDTV. The MiG-21 When the MiG-21 entered service, only the IAF's most experienced pilots were assigned to it due to its demanding flight characteristics. The aircraft's small size, limited cockpit visibility, and high landing speed of over 300 km/h made it unforgiving, particularly for novices. The MiG-21U trainer variant was ill-suited for training. The IAF relied on subsonic trainers like the Kiran and Iskra, which were inadequate for preparing pilots for the MiG-21's supersonic performance. The gap between basic trainers and the MiG-21 widened as the fleet expanded from eight squadrons in 1963 to nearly half the IAF's strength by the 1980s. "The biggest difference is speed. The speed at which you are performing the manoeuvres, the actions that you are doing, dramatically changes. That is the biggest difference, whether it is mid-air manoeuvres, whether it is landing or whether it is taking off,' Mr Gupta said. The "Human Error" Factor The IAF's attribution of many MiG-21 crashes to "human error" has often been misunderstood, he added. Mr Gupta explained that human error, in aviation terms, does not necessarily blame the pilot. "Air Force doesn't mean 'human error' in the way people interpret it," Mr Gupta said. "In the simplest form it means that when you've done an accident investigation, you've realised that the accident happened because the pilot in control made a mistake. Now that mistake has a cause behind it. That cause could be training. You have not trained the pilot appropriately. That cause could be inexperience. "That cause could be psychological, that cause could be disorientation, tons of causes behind it." For young pilots transitioning from subsonic trainers to the MiG-21, the lack of adequate preparation was a significant contributor. The stigma of "human error" often compounds the pain for families, who perceive it as blaming the pilot rather than acknowledging systemic issues. "I haven't met a single MiG-21 pilot who said he didn't love the jet," Mr Gupta said. "It's a big regret. They love the aircraft, but they love their colleagues more. And every life lost is a story that remains etched on the psyche forever. I think the human element is actually made worse off by how we categorise the loss. To the family or to a civilian, it sounds like we're blaming the pilot, and then the emotion comes out. The guy had barely started flying. This is an unforgiving aircraft, the aircraft has problems, and now you have the audacity to blame the pilot and say 'human error,'" he added. The MiG-21's Combat Record Despite its challenges, the MiG-21's combat record is formidable. During the 1971 India-Pakistan war, the MiG-21FL (Type 77) earned the moniker "runway buster" for its ground attack role, with 240 units manufactured by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL). The aircraft was instrumental in India's victory. In 1999, during the Kargil conflict, MiG-21s performed admirably, though the war also saw the loss of Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja in a crash. Post-Kargil, Squadron Leader Prashant Kumar Bundela shot down a Pakistani Atlantique maritime patrol aircraft. In 2019, Wing Commander Abhinandan Varthaman, flying a MiG-21 Bison, engaged Pakistani aircraft during the Balakot operation, downing an F-16 despite facing advanced adversaries like AMRAAM-armed F-16s and JF-17s. The Bison variant, introduced in the early 2000s, remains contemporary, equipped with an Israeli jammer, Russian R-77 and R-73 missiles, a partial glass cockpit, and a helmet-mounted sight. Its short scramble time makes it ideal for forward bases like Srinagar, where it outperformed alternatives like the MiG-29. "There's a very interesting point around the 2019 incident. You know, there's a lens people wear which says, 'Why was the MiG-21 there? Why didn't we have the MiG-29? Why didn't we have the Su-30?' People don't know that there was no other aircraft capable of being at Srinagar at that time other than the MiG-21. It has the shortest scramble time to date," Mr Gupta said. The MiG-29 "We have replaced it with a MiG-29 in Srinagar. I hate to say this, but it is not ideal for Srinagar, even today. A MiG-21 today is more ideal than the units we have there because you don't have a gyro, you have a single engine, light it, off you go, and therefore even today in the last 8 to 10 years or longer, MIG-21 has been our Operational Readiness Platform (ORP) guardian. It is the jet that scrambles. You put small detachments across all our forward bases. Imagine with the MIG-21 going away, who's supposed to fill that shoe? Who is supposed to fill that shoe? It's supposed to be the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). It is supposed to be the LCA. I hope it does," he added.
The Print
29-05-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Exhuming the past: BJP targets decisions of previous govts to singe Congress in Op Sindoor slugfest
And leading from the front, especially on social media, is none other than its firebrand MP Nishikant Dubey, who has been posting a raft of posts against the Congress and the Gandhis. Joining forces with the Godda MP are the likes of Amit Malviya and Shehzad Poonawalla. After the Congress attacked foreign minister S. Jaishankar accusing him of 'informing' Pakistan about Operation Sindoor, the BJP has hit back, questioning and criticising the foreign policy initiatives of the past Congress-led governments. New Delhi: Diplomatic talks, agreements and foreign policy decisions of the past governments have come to the centre of the ongoing political slugfest between the BJP and the Congress over Operation Sindoor. Additionally, the BJP has been taking on Leader of the Opposition in Lok Sabha Rahul Gandhi for his question on how many fighter jets were lost during Operation Sindoor and for criticising the decisions of Jaishankar. Much of these charges against the Congress leaders of the past—be it Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira, Rajiv Gandhi, Narashimha Rao and Manmohan Singh—seemingly cannot be taken at face value given the political rhetoric involved in the slugfest with the Congress party. Of late, Dubey has been posting a clutch of declassified US documents to make various statements ranging from the 1972 Simla Agreement to Operation Brasstacks, a military exercise carried out by the Indian armed forces in 1986-87. For instance, the BJP MP has shared on 'X' a declassified 1963 telegram message of the US State Department to claim that Jawaharlal Nehru and Indira Gandhi were responsible for decisions that led to territorial concessions to Pakistan. Meetings were held between 1962 and 1964 between Swaran Singh and Pakistan's Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, he posted. Dubey further claimed that India had decided to give back to Pakistan the territory forcibly occupied in Poonch and Uri. 'The matter did not stop at this; the entire Neelam and Kishanganga valley in Gurez was made the international border along with the Line of Control (LoC),' he added. Similarly, BJP spokesperson Shehzad Poonawalla has slammed the Congress for its willingness to 'hand over a large part of J&K to Pakistan in the 1960s under foreign pressure.' In his memoir, 'Outside the Archives', a foreign secretary under Nehru, writes: 'Thus it was that on February 10, 1963, in Karachi, the 'Kashmir' map was on the table between Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's PM, and Sardar Swaran Singh. Our delegation asked Bhutto to show on the map what he actually wanted. Bhutto leaned over the table and pointed to the little town of Kathua on the Kashmir-Himachal border. He drew a circle somewhere there with his forefinger and said, 'You can have this part of Kashmir. We want the rest'.' Held in the aftermath of 1962 India-China War, six sessions were held but they ended in a stalemate as Pakistan insisted on its demands for a territorial settlement. Congress spokesperson Pawan Khera has slammed the BJP MP for quoting Pakistan's Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto to attack Congress. '…And this broker-turned-pseudo-historian should know that Sardar Swaran Singh and Mr. Bhutto had six rounds of talks in 1963 but all in India and Pakistan. Not in a 'neutral site' as was mentioned as part of the ceasefire on May 10th 2025 by Jaishankar's friend US Secretary of State Marco Rubio,' he posted on 'X'. In another post on 'X', Khera lampooned the Godda MP, saying that he was 'being fed with US archival material'. He suggested that Dubey read books by military historian Srinath Raghavan and former diplomat Chandrasekhar Dasgupta to understand the full history of 1971. Dubey, meanwhile, has gone on to make various claims. He has alleged that the Congress under Indira gave away 828 sq km of Gujarat's Rann of Kutch to Pakistan after winning the 1965 war. He has further claimed that PM Manmohan Singh had almost reached an agreement with Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf in 2007 to give up Siachen. Congress spokesperson Shama Mohamed has slammed the Modi government for its tactics to deploy its functionaries like Dubey for taking on the opposition party. 'On one hand, PM Modi is saying the opposition and government are on one page on national security issues and on the other hand, he is allowing others like Nishikant Dubey and Amit Malviya to attack the Congress,' she told ThePrint. 'Nishikant does not believe in the Constitution; he raised a question mark on the Supreme Court (on the Waqf law and for setting a timeline for the President to clear Bills). The attack is happening on behalf of Modi.' Also Read: Nadda draws the line, but unease over Supreme Court's moves continues to simmer within BJP No-holds barred attack These statements, however, have not stopped the BJP functionaries from taking swipes at the Congress on episodes like the Sharm el-Sheikh memorandum of 2009. Dubey has attacked former prime minister Manmohan Singh for certifying that Pakistan is a victim of terrorism. 'An extremely shameful incident occurred in Sharm el-Sheikh when the then Prime Minister of India, Manmohan Singh, embraced Pakistan's President Musharraf and issued a joint statement claiming that, like India, Pakistan too is grappling with terrorism. Giving such a big certificate to a terrorist nation? This is the dark chapter of Congress, this is the truth,' he tweeted last week. BJP IT cell chief Amit Malviya has trained his guns twice on Rajiv Gandhi—for putting out details of Operation Brasstacks and for 'compromising' India's nuclear doctrine. 'In 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi signed an agreement with Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto that compromised India's nuclear doctrine before it was even formally established,' he posted on 'X'. 'While it was framed as a confidence-building measure, in reality, it revealed India's nuclear infrastructure to an adversary that has repeatedly sponsored terrorism and conflict.' In her book, 'Reconciliation: Islam, Democracy, and the West,' Benazir has called the 1988 agreement a 'remarkable treaty'. 'In foreign policy, we made broad overtures even to those who had been our adversaries—and, of course, to those who had stood by us in the past. I am particularly proud of our work with Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, building on the progress in Pakistan-Indian relations that our parents had established in the Simla Accord,' she writes. 'Rajiv and I negotiated a remarkable treaty committing our nations not to attack each other's nuclear facilities. This was the first nuclear confidence-building treaty between Pakistan and India.' Former Indian diplomat Vivek Katju explained the nuances behind the signing of 'Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities between India and Pakistan' in 1988. 'Any agreement is done to boost bilateral relations. Since a nuclear plant has radioactive material, countries exchange information about their plants to avoid any mishappening or misadventure. If a leak happens, thousands of people can die. So such an agreement is executed to avoid such risks. It cannot be called a compromise of national security,' Katju, who served as secretary at the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) from 2009 to 2011, told ThePrint. As for Malviya, the BJP IT cell head has dragged Rajiv Gandhi in one of his long posts on how Operation Brasstacks 'was derailed not by strategy, but by political weakness.' 'The exercise was no secret. Pakistan was formally informed via military and diplomatic channels, including at the SAARC Summit in Bangalore where PM Rajiv Gandhi assured Pakistan's PM Junejo it was 'just an exercise',' Malviya claimed. 'Despite these reassurances, Pakistan escalated tensions by moving offensive troops across the Sutlej River, right up to Indian Punjab's border. On January 22, 1987, Pakistan crossed critical military thresholds while Khalistani extremists announced support for a separatist movement, raising fears of internal unrest. 'India, caught off guard, hesitated. On January 23, it finally deployed troops to the border—but just one day later, Rajiv Gandhi abruptly backtracked, announcing there would be no attack and opting for diplomacy instead,' he posted. Former ambassador to Pakistan, TCA Raghavan, in his book 'The People Next Door: The Curious History of India-Pakistan Relations', highlights the context of notifying each other in advance about military exercises. Pakistan diplomat Humayun Khan, he mentions, got a sense of the magnitude only when he was asked to meet minister of state for external affair Natwar Singh very early one morning. He was told that the Pakistan Army moved two divisions to Punjab border and that India regarded this as offensive move. Unless the troops went back to the peacetime locations within 24 hours, India wouldl be compelled to move its own forces. 'Humayun Khan was astounded at ultimatum and possibly doubly so because he had no reason to presume that such crisis was brewing over Operation Brasstacks. He conveyed to Islamabad that it would be tragedy if a conflict was to erupt nearly because of suspicion,' he writes. One of the results was a written agreement that both sides would in future notify each other in advance of military exercise being carried out, Raghavan adds. Dubey, meanwhile, accused the Congress of sharing information about military movement to Pakistan. 'The Congress, in 1991, supported the Chandrashekhar government that backed the pact. Later, the Congress-led Narasimha Rao government in 1994 implemented the pact requiring India to share army, navy and air force movement details with Pakistan. This is treason, and those responsible must face trial,' he said. Among other claims, the BJP MP has alleged that Indira Gandhi stopped the pension, vehicle, and facilities of General Sam Manekshaw despite the tradition of Field Marshals being entitled to these benefits for their entire lives. Appointed Army chief in June 1969, General Manekshaw had led the Indian Army to victory during the 1971 India-Pakistan War. He was promoted to the rank of field marshal in January 1973. Also Read: BJP-led NDA outlines game plan at key meet—Op Sindoor, caste census, Emergency & best practices 'They don't read…' A Congress veteran, who has also been a Union minister, deplored the tactics of digging out past episodes to score political brownie points. 'The problem with today's leaders is they don't read and respond accordingly. Several governments from Nehru to Manmohan Singh tried to resolve the Kashmir problem in their way and make peace with Pakistan. When all-party delegations are visiting across the world, the BJP allowed few leaders to score political points. During the Vajpayee rule, held back channel negotiations and the Chenab formula was discussed,' the Congress veteran told ThePrint. Mishra, a veteran journalist, was Vajpayee's point person for back-channel talks with Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif's emissary Niaz Naik in 1999. '(Former diplomat) Satinder Lambah has written quoting G. Parthasarathy, the High Commissioner of India in Pakistan during Kargil (war), that New Delhi would agree to adjustment in LoC eventually being moved to the Chenab river basin,' the above-mentioned Congress functionary told ThePrint. 'Vajpayee was open to LoC as an international border if Pakistan didn't claim more land and was ready to stop the proxy war in J&K. But, it did not materialise. It means Vajpayee was ready to leave the claim on PoK (Pakistan-occupied Kashmir). It was discussed in the CCS (Cabinet Committee on Security) and with the envoy, but we never raised this to score brownie points.' Similarly, former Army chief General (retired) recounted how he had met former prime ministers Atal Bijhari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh after the 1999 Kargil War and requested them to keep the Army out of politics. 'The Vajpayee government was an interim one and election was around the corner. I had gone to meet the prime minister and requested him that please leave us alone. 'We are apolitical.' I had even met Manmohan Singh and requested the same. Both leaders agreed with my viewpoint. Today, I see political leaders indulge in mud slinging to score political points. It's sad,' the former Army chief told ThePrint. (Edited by Tony Rai) Also Read: Nishikant leads charge against Rahul after his Op Sindoor comments, accuses Gandhi family of 'deshdroh'
News18
24-05-2025
- Politics
- News18
Op Sindoor And The Shadow Of Brasstacks: What 1987 Reveals About Today's Posture
Last Updated: What Op Brasstacks pulled back from, Op Sindoor pursued. One standoff ended with cricket. The other, with airstrikes. The rules have changed The political discourse around Operation Sindoor has revived comparisons with an earlier moment of high-stakes brinkmanship—Operation Brasstacks. In a pointed attack on Congress leader Rahul Gandhi, BJP's Amit Malviya invoked the 1986–87 crisis to contrast today's military assertiveness with what he framed as the strategic indecision of Rajiv Gandhi's leadership. According to Malviya, Brasstacks began as India's most ambitious military mobilisation, but ended in a diplomatic retreat following a call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—made at Pakistan's behest. The message, he argued, was clear: India blinked, and Pakistan took note. That moment of hesitation now serves as a reference point for how far India's strategic posture has evolved. Where Operation Brasstacks ended in retreat despite overwhelming military readiness, Operation Sindoor unfolded with decisive strikes and a clear assertion of intent. One pulled back at the brink; the other stepped forward with calibrated force. Together, they mark a shift in doctrine—from demonstrating strength to using it. A DRILL OR A PRECURSOR TO WAR? Operation Brasstacks was conceived by then Army Chief General Krishnaswami Sundarji as a bold experiment to test India's evolving mechanised warfare doctrine and rapid mobilisation capabilities. It involved the deployment of close to half a million troops in Rajasthan. The Indian Army formed a powerful strike force comprising nine infantry divisions, three mechanised divisions, three armoured divisions, and one air assault division, all operating under four corps headquarters. This force was supported by extensive artillery regiments, rocket systems, and elements from the Indian Air Force and Navy. Importantly, there was also a planned amphibious component involving an assault division off the Korangi coast near Karachi, as well as the integration of India's emerging tactical nuclear capabilities into routine manoeuvres. These elements combined to create a scenario that could easily be interpreted as more than a training exercise. The Indian government claimed the operation was a routine internal exercise. However, the scale, timing, and proximity to Pakistan's southern flank—especially Sindh—triggered alarms in Rawalpindi. The mobilisation was viewed as a strategic feint that could transform into a real offensive without further notice. The location of the drills, away from the traditional India-Pakistan flashpoint of Kashmir and instead focused on the Thar desert, further contributed to Pakistan's suspicion that the real objective might be a conventional thrust into Pakistani territory designed to split the country. INTELLIGENCE PANIC AND FEARS OF STRATEGIC DECEPTION Pakistani military intelligence, already attuned to Indian deployments due to the Cold War environment and domestic insurgency in India, interpreted Brasstacks as a strategic deception. Intercepted Indian plans reportedly suggested a corps-level attack that would cut through the Bahawalpur-Khairpur corridor. Some assessments feared the exercise was designed to gauge India's resilience in case of a tactical nuclear strike—something that was not entirely implausible given the simulated use of nuclear battlefield scenarios in Brasstacks. Despite India's formal notification to Pakistan in November 1986, and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's assurances to his counterpart Mohammad Khan Junejo during the SAARC Summit in Bangalore, Pakistani anxieties deepened. Junejo is believed to have interpreted these discussions as a commitment to review or limit the final phase of Brasstacks, but no such adjustment followed. Instead, the Indian Army proceeded with Phase IV—the largest and most provocative leg of the operation. THE FOURTH PHASE AND THE PROSPECT OF WAR Phase IV of Brasstacks involved a complex choreography of large-scale troop movements in Rajasthan, Punjab, and Jammu and Kashmir. Forward deployment of armoured divisions and stockpiling of logistics suggested India was preparing for sustained operations. The Indian Air Force adopted an offensive posture, and the Navy conducted mock amphibious landings. Pakistan countered by activating its satellite airbases, moving reserves to forward positions, mining bridges near Lahore, and evacuating civilians from vulnerable regions. By mid-January 1987, nearly 340,000 troops from both nations stood in full readiness along a 400-kilometre front. The risk of miscalculation became palpable. Indian generals such as Lieutenant General P.N. Hoon—then Commander-in-Chief of Western Command—later revealed that the Army was fully prepared for a limited war. Hoon alleged that the political leadership had been briefed and that operational plans existed which went well beyond an academic war game. The external mobilisation coincided with grave internal disturbances. In April 1986, months before Brasstacks, the Panthic Committee had issued a unilateral declaration of Khalistan from within the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar. This escalated the already fraught situation in Punjab, which had not recovered from the trauma of Operation Blue Star in 1984. In response to the Khalistan declaration, Operation Black Thunder I was launched. The security forces, under the direct supervision of Punjab's DGP J.F. Rebeiro and with covert backing from Delhi, raided the complex and arrested hundreds of militants. Though less bloody than Operation Blue Star, the operation deepened communal tensions. 27 MLAs resigned from the Akali Dal, the Barnala government lost legitimacy, and Delhi was accused of manipulating events through political puppetry. Khalistani militants began to align with Pakistani intelligence operatives. Delhi was caught in a bind—any escalation in military deployment along the Pakistan border risked inflaming Punjab, while any leniency risked a missed opportunity to counter Pakistan's growing strategic threat. Rajiv Gandhi, under immense pressure, was balancing external posturing with internal stability. NUCLEAR WARNING AND DIPLOMATIC REVERSAL It is also important to note that at the time of Brasstacks, there existed no formal agreement between India and Pakistan regarding the sharing of information on troop deployments or peacetime exercises. That protocol was only established later, with a bilateral pact signed in 1991 under a Congress-supported government and formally ratified in 1994, again during a Congress tenure. The situation reached a critical point in January 1987 when Pakistani nuclear scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan, in an interview to journalist Kuldip Nayar, claimed that Pakistan possessed nuclear weapons and would not hesitate to use them if threatened. Although he later backtracked, the statement had the desired effect. On January 22, India deployed fresh units to the forward theatre. But within 24 hours, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi ordered a halt to the escalation. Multiple sources suggest that this decision was prompted by a phone call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, made on behalf of Zia-ul-Haq during an Islamic Summit in Kuwait. Rajiv Gandhi, conscious of his global peace-oriented image, abruptly reversed India's mobilisation. No reciprocal gesture was made by Pakistan. Zia, in fact, seized the diplomatic upper hand. He flew to India, attended a cricket match, and turned what could have been a crisis for Pakistan into a diplomatic opportunity. A few months later, Rajiv Gandhi visited Pakistan and on December 31, 1988, signed the Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The agreement came into effect on January 1, 1991. It required both countries to exchange annual lists of nuclear installations and facilities, promoting transparency and aiming to prevent surprise attacks on nuclear assets. Critics argue that the agreement gave Pakistan strategic parity without similar transparency. STRATEGIC CONSEQUENCES: OPERATION TUPAC AND KASHMIR If Brasstacks was India's last grand assertion of conventional power, its diplomatic retreat emboldened Pakistan to pivot. In 1988, General Zia initiated Operation Tupac—a covert campaign to destabilise India through asymmetric warfare in Kashmir. Pakistani operatives trained and armed militants, infiltrated borders through Nepal and Bangladesh, and fuelled insurgency. The following year, the insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir exploded. Sparked in part by the rigged 1987 state elections, the movement was quickly hijacked by Pakistan-backed groups like Hizbul Mujahideen. According to estimates, more than 84,000 people have died in Kashmir since the 1990s. India has had to station upwards of 500,000 troops in the valley, an enduring legacy of the failure to deter Pakistan post-Brasstacks. POLITICAL FRAMING AND CONTEMPORARY PARALLELS BJP IT cell chief Amit Malviya reignited the historical debate around Operation Brasstacks in a pointed tweet targeting Rahul Gandhi's criticism of Operation Sindoor. Malviya asserted that the Gandhi family's handling of the 1986–87 crisis exposed a legacy of appeasement and strategic retreat. In his post, he claimed that Operation Brasstacks, though meticulously designed by General Sundarji, was derailed by political indecision when Rajiv Gandhi abruptly halted troop movement following a call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak—made at the behest of Pakistan's General Zia-ul-Haq. Malviya alleged that Rajiv Gandhi, in a bid to uphold his image as a global peacemaker, sacrificed military advantage without securing any reciprocal concessions from Pakistan. He further pointed to Rajiv's decision to invite Zia to a cricket match in India, and later, the Congress government's 1995 conferment of the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding to Mubarak, as indicative of a consistent pattern of diplomatic overreach. The tweet concluded with a sharp rebuke: before lecturing the nation on military operations, Rahul Gandhi should revisit his family's track record of compromising India's strategic interests. 🚨 Time for a Reality Check on the Gandhis and National Security 🚨As Rahul Gandhi irresponsibly comments on #OperationSindoor, it's the perfect time to revisit how his family handled a real military crisis. Let's talk about Operation Brasstacks—the largest military exercise… — Amit Malviya (@amitmalviya) May 24, 2025 Malviya's framing finds echoes in the retrospective accounts of several senior military officers and analysts. Lieutenant General P.N. Hoon, then Commander-in-Chief of the Western Command, wrote in his 2015 memoir 'The Untold Truth' that Operation Brasstacks was not an exercise, but a plan for war—and that political leaders including Rajiv Gandhi, Arun Singh, and Natwar Singh were either unaware of or indifferent to the Army's actual operational objectives. Hoon's claims suggested that the military was ready, but political will faltered. Similarly, military scholar Ravi Rikhye, in his book 'The War That Never Was,' argued that Brasstacks was designed as a coercive strategy to compel Pakistan to roll back its support for insurgents, but it failed due to political indecision in Delhi. Rikhye was explicit in suggesting that figures like General Sundarji and MoS Defence Arun Singh sought a limited war, only to be overruled. Lieutenant General Vijay Oberoi, who helped plan the early phases of Brasstacks and later served as Vice Chief of Army Staff, is quoted in a 2018 Hindustan Times retrospective on Brasstacks as saying that the exercise was a no-holds-barred war rehearsal, and that Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi had been fully briefed on its scope. His statements contradict the narrative that the PM was kept in the dark, implying instead a deliberate political decision to stand down at the peak of escalation. Congress leaders defend the pullback as a move of prudence. In their view, the absence of a hot conflict and the successful defusing of tensions without bloodshed is evidence of political maturity. The risk of nuclear escalation, with no fail-safe communication protocols in place, made restraint not just desirable, but necessary. Yet, the legacy of Brasstacks is more complicated. Long before this, in 1974, following India's first nuclear test, then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had even offered to share India's nuclear technology with Pakistan—an offer that reflected the diplomatic optimism of the era but has since been viewed by critics as dangerously naïve. India gained no strategic concession. It exposed its conventional capabilities and then chose not to use them. Pakistan, in turn, adapted—not by matching force but by redefining the battlefield. CONCLUSION: FROM BRASSTACKS TO SINDOOR top videos View all Operation Sindoor, in the current narrative, is being framed as the antidote to Brasstacks—a moment when India no longer hesitates, when it chooses retaliation over retreat. Where Brasstacks culminated in Zia watching cricket in Jaipur, Sindoor follows a very different trajectory: punitive airstrikes, political messaging, and international assertiveness. Brasstacks is not just a military exercise frozen in time. It is a case study in political indecision, strategic signalling, and the importance of following through. It teaches India the price of blinking. As India and Pakistan once again navigate a climate of strategic uncertainty, marked by cross-border tensions, proxy threats, and shifting diplomatic equations, the lessons of 1987 remain as relevant as ever. Watch India Pakistan Breaking News on CNN-News18. Get breaking news, in-depth analysis, and expert perspectives on everything from politics to crime and society. Stay informed with the latest India news only on News18. Download the News18 App to stay updated! tags : Indian military Operation Sindoor Pakistan terrorism rajiv gandhi Location : New Delhi, India, India First Published: May 24, 2025, 13:48 IST News india Op Sindoor And The Shadow Of Brasstacks: What 1987 Reveals About Today's Posture
Hindustan Times
11-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Diaries from ‘Operation Parakram'
'Operation Parakram' was launched by the Indian military after the terrorist attack on its Parliament at New Delhi on December 13, 2001. The might of Indian military was mobilised for an impending war with Pakistan, the perpetrators of the said terrorist attack. I had assumed command of my tank regiment during august 2011 and were out in the field for routine training and field firing in the deserts of Rajasthan with skeleton equipment and crews which got supplemented with our complete wherewithal once orders were received to mobilise to our battle stations. Spirits were high, morale touching the sky and my men and tanks raring to march across the international border. Large-scale movement of troops on road and rail to get to their designated take-off zones for an offensive or defensive roles was witnessed by the world and as a young Commandant of a potent tank regiment, there seemed no doubt that the fortune of fulfilling the ultimate dream of going to battle may become a reality. It was on the night of Lohri, January 13, 2002, when Gen Pervez Musharraf, the president of Pakistan addressed his nation , an address laced with war rhetoric of an impending conflict with India, that we were quite certain that the balloon will go up. Well, we waited for the go ahead. Extensive reconnaissance, intelligence gathering and surveillance inputs were constantly fed to the fighting units to sharpen their tactics for a wholesome victory. We were at an operational briefing at a tactical headquarters and an interesting revelation through a radio intercept shocked us no end. Thus went the conversation between a tank regimental commander with his boss at the higher headquarters, 'Janaab, mere paas sirf 15 haathi (tanks) hain jo larai ke qabil hain baaki sab khalaas hain (Sir, I have only 15 tanks battle worthy out of a total of 45).' There was no surprise or shock in his response when the boss was quick to order, 'Bashir, chaurahe aur museum par khare haathion ko topi pehnaao aur apni fauj mein shaamil karo.. ginti poori honi chahiye (Bashir, remove trophy tanks at the roundabouts and public places and make up the total anyways)'. Similar intercepts of inadequacy in the war fighting machinery of our adversary came to light. Corresponding morale of Pakistani troops and its will to fight became evidently clear. Sadly, the war did not see the light of the day for whatever reasons and our dreams of visiting 'Sukkur' , a city in the Sind province of Pakistan, on our tanks, which was one of our objectives remained unfulfilled. But , this was the closest we came to an all out war after Operation Brass tacks in 1987, when cricket diplomacy bailed Pakistan out. Now, coming to the prevailing situation post-Pahalgam tragic episode. Both the nations are yet again on a sensitive brink. Pakistan is what it is. Rhetoric, false propaganda, denial and innocence in full demonstration. The situation of its economy, national strength and overall health has not seen an upward climb. Albeit, it has deteriorated since 2001, a good two decades and a half back when situation was precarious. It's military capability to get into an open confrontation with the fourth largest military of the world is slender to say the least. At best , cross border firings to expand its outdated ammunition is the recourse to show an offensive spirit. On the other hand, India's wiser strategy to stifle, suffocate and starve and keep 'cards close to the chest' will prove to be a force multiplier. Keeping our powder dry continues unabated, however. Like Sun Tzu, the famous Chinese general , philosopher and strategist righty remarked, 'The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.' avnishrms59@ (The writer is a Chandigarh-based freelance contributor, views expressed are personal)
India Today
25-04-2025
- Politics
- India Today
When India amassed 5 lakh troops at border, gave Pakistan war scare
"Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted. We are here to stay and let it be clear that we [Pakistan] shall use the [nuclear] bomb if our existence is threatened," a rattled Abdul Qadeer Khan, then Pakistan's chief nuclear scientist, told Indian journalist Kuldip Nayar. It was late January 1987, and the height of Operation Brasstacks of 1986-87, which was India's largest military exercise and saw half a million Army personnel, armoured and tank divisions, positioned within 180 km of the Pakistan border, nearly triggering a full-scale 40 years later, India-Pakistan tensions have soared again after Pakistan-sponsored terrorists killed 26 civilians in Pahalgam, prompting New Delhi to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty and Islamabad to scrap the Simla Agreement. Even as the nuclear threat from Pakistan persists, the Indian Air Force launched Exercise Aakraman, simulating strikes with Rafales and Sukhoi-30s. There are reports that Pakistan has moved some of its fighter jets from southern bases to the north, closer to the border with a full-scale war is highly unlikely between the two nuclear nations, India and Pakistan have engaged in limited wars. There also have been times when they pulled back from the brink. Operation Brasstacks of 1987 was one such moment. Operation Brasstacks, a military exercise in the winter of 1987 by India, made Pakistan nearly half of the Indian Army deployed near the Pakistan border, comprising 10 divisions and three brigades, Operation Brasstacks was larger than any NATO exercise the world had seen. It triggered a major military mobilisation and a war scare in Pakistan."Operation Brasstracks was the largest and most controversial peacetime military exercise in South Asian since World War II," The New York Times reported in March Khan's mention of the nuclear bomb then might sound chillingly similar to Dar's threat. That was the time when India had declared its nuclear capabilities while Pakistan was working covertly towards it. AQ Khan's threat was, in fact, a disclosure that Pakistan had managed to lay its hands on nuclear what was the trigger for Operation Brasstacks, the largest peacetime exercise by any country since World War II? Here's a look at the political and geopolitical context of the time to grasp why an operation of this scale was considered necessary by India. BACKGROUND: THE PUNJAB INSURGENCY AND KASHMIR FLASHPOINTIndia was being led by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi at the time of Operation Brasstacks. He assumed office after his mother and former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's assassination in Punjab insurgency and Pakistan-manufactured unrest in Kashmir challenged India's stability. Pakistan, under military dictator Zia-ul-Haq, was, of course, looking for "strategic depth" in India by creating trouble notorious spy agency ISI and the army were constantly fanning the unrest in Punjab and Kashmir with arms, money, training and psychological Rajiv, keen on addressing internal security challenges, was also looking to strengthen international diplomacy and project India as a stable, forward-looking Cold War context was important too. Although the United States had been an ally of Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War and had armed it heavily, Washington was gradually shifting its focus towards Islamabad's nuclear weapons programme. So was New on the other hand, had already conducted its first nuclear test in 1974 (the Smiling Buddha). And it was rapidly modernising its military after fighting three wars against Pakistan and one against China. Tensions with Pakistan were bound to escalate. Codenamed Smiling Buddha, India's first nuclear test in 1974 marked its entry into the nuclear club. It sent shockwaves into Pakistan, prompting it to fast-track its own nuclear ambitions. (File/India Today) advertisementOPERATION BRASSTACKS COMMENCES IN DECEMBER 1986Launched in December 1986, Operation Brasstacks was conceived by General Krishnaswamy Sundarji, then Army then, General Sundarji, who had been leading an overhaul of the Indian Army, was eager to put his new mechanised warfare strategies to the test on real mid-November, New Delhi's Director-General of Military Operations picked up the hotline and gave Islamabad a heads-up: 'Indian troops will soon be moving into Rajasthan'. Operation Brasstacks, a massive corps-level exercise, was gearing up for its act, with the final phase of ground manoeuvres scheduled for February and March, reported India Today Magazine in Pakistan was running its own military drills, the Saf-e-Shikan, in the Bahawalpur-Marot sector across the border from Rajasthan. Two other Pakistani divisions were nearby in the Ravi-Chenab corridor. The Pakistani groups were to wrap up by mid-December. In December 1986, during Operation Brasstracks, Indian troops were strategically positioned within 180 km of the Pakistan border, with around 5,00,000 personnel, 10 divisions, and multiple armored units deployed across the vast Rajasthan desert sector. (India Today Magazine) advertisementPAK SCRAMBLED FOR DEFENCE AFTER OPERATION BRASSTRACKS BUILD-UPHowever, alarmed by Indian troops and tanks marching along the deserts between Bikaner and Jaisalmer in Rajasthan, the Pakistan Army moved its northern reserve to the Upper Chenab Canal. With infantry, tank, and armoured divisions fitted with modern computer-based warfare systems, Indian forces in Rajasthan remained firmly in position. Mirroring the stance were the Pakistani counterparts across the late January, around 3,40,000 troops stood face to face along a 400-km stretch of the border, from the central deserts to the northern mountains, with rising concerns on both sides about the risk of an accidental war, reported The New Yotk Times in 1987."A tense situation developed in which even a minor clash could have triggered a major conflict... It was held in northern Rajasthan, which is the most likely 'jump-off' area for India in any future hostilities...," strategic thinker and former Director of the Institute of Defence and Strategic Analysis (IDSA), PR Chari, wrote in his 2003 paper, Nuclear Crisis, Escalation Control, and Deterrence in South an Indian invasion, the Pakistan Air Force kept operating its satellite bases in full Rawalpindi (Pakistan Army HQ) dispatched its infantry and armoured reserves from nearby areas to reinforce them, reported India Today Magazine in 1987. Forward locations were stocked with first and second-line ammunition, with an additional 15 days of reserves. Service leaves were cancelled. Civilians from villages were evacuated. Some bridges near Lahore were rigged with demolition paramilitary units, Mujahids and Jaanbaz, responsible for manning air defences, were put on high alert and were activated, the report the focus of Operation Brasstacks shifted to Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab as Pakistan moved its strike reserves closer to these sensitive areas. To counter this, India expanded its military posture to prevent any surprise assault. By January 1987, Operation Brasstacks had stretched from Rajasthan to the northern plains of Punjab and the mountains of Jammu and Kashmir. (India Today Magazine) The Pakistani positioning threatened to isolate key regions of India, Gurdaspur, Amritsar, and Ferozepur, by targeting the bridge at the Harike barrage, thereby cutting off access to the Jammu and Kashmir sector."A massive airlift and ground movement of troops was then undertaken by India to occupy their defensive positions along the border, resulting in a further escalation of tensions," IDSA's Chari wrote. Far from the border in Rajasthan, Indian and Pakistani forces were also virtually eyeball-to-eyeball along the borders of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, with each side maintaining a tense standoff."This [Indian Army] is not a third-world army... This is a modern army, fully competent for any mission, easily as good as the Chinese, the Koreans or the French," an unnamed western diplomat was quoted as saying by the was amid these peaking tensions that AQ Khan revealed that Pakistan had enriched uranium to weapons-grade and could simulate a nuclear test, warning, "Nobody can undo Pakistan or take us for granted... We shall use the bomb if necessary".Later, however, Khan, known as the father of Pakistan's atomic bomb, softened his stance, saying his remarks were BRASSTRACKS: MILITARY EXERCISE OR WAR POSTURING?"The 1986–87 exercises, then, presented a unique opportunity to pressurise Pakistan, to remind it of its vulnerability to India's superior might. The eventual aim: get it to rethink its policy of supporting separatists, however limited," military scholar and author Ravi Rikhye wrote in his book, War That Never chief Sundarji, however, insisted Operation Brasstracks was "purely for training purposes" and aimed at validating India's new mechanised warfare strategy."This was, is and always has been a training exercise," Sundarji said, brushing aside Pakistani fears as paranoia. But for Pakistan, watching massive formations inch close to its borders, it looked like a precursor to India-Pakistan military build-up had all the ingredients of a potential full-scale war but was eventually de-escalated through diplomatic March 1987, India and Pakistan reached an agreement to pull back 1,50,000 troops from the Kashmir region, followed later that month by a second pact to reduce military presence in the desert areas of Rajasthan and southern Punjab. General Krishnaswamy Sundarji Sundararajan served as the Chief of the Army Staff of the Indian Army from 1986 to 1988. He was the last former British Indian Army officer to command the Indian Army. (India Today/File) India consistently reassured Pakistan that there was no cause for March 1987, the Indian Army, however, simultaneously initiated the final leg of Operation Brasstracks with 1,50,000 troops, the NYT reported."This was, is and always has been a training exercise," General Sundarji told the OPERATION BRASSTRACKS A DEEPER GAME?However, PM Rajiv Gandhi's decision to publicly dismiss Foreign Secretary AP Venkateswaran during the ongoing crisis only deepened the sense of uncertainty and raised eyebrows. VP Singh, who would later go on to become the PM, was brought in as the new defence contradicting the official stance that Operation Brasstacks was merely a routine military exercise by the Indian government and Army, Lieutenant General (retired) PN Hoon, then commander-in-chief of the Western Command, claimed that the army was actually preparing for a war with Pakistan. In the 1980s, the Indian Army carried out rapid mechanisation and modernisation. It inducted the Soviet T-72M1 'Ajeya' tanks, upgraded artillery, and expanded mechanised infantry. (Image for Representation/India Today) "Brasstacks was no military exercise; it was a plan to build up a situation for a fourth war with Pakistan. And what is even more shocking is that the then Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, was not aware of these plans of a war," Lieutenant General Hoon wrote in his 2015 book, The Untold Truth."It is my belief that the Prime Minister, Arun Singh (then junior defence minister), Natwar Singh (foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister), RAW, and General Sundarji were all, for their own separate reasons, trying to get a war with Pakistan going," Ravi Rikhye wrote in his book, War That Never Was."It was a power game. Sundarji wanted to become a Field Marshal and Arun Singh wanted to become the Prime Minister," Lt Gen Hoon said, answering why Arun Singh and General Sundarji pursued a "war" allegedly without informing the Prime are claims and counter-claims, and the historical backdrop has to be remembered while understanding the massive build-up. Operation Brasstacks came as Pakistan was arming Khalistani and Kashmiri terrorists. It was also the time that India knew that Pakistan was covertly pursuing a nuclear might have been the trigger for Operation Brasstracks, the massive troop build-up gave Pakistan a chilling reminder of India's military superiority and readiness to strike, forcing Islamabad to rethink its strategic assumptions and accelerate its nuclear deterrence posture, even before it could come out so InMust Watch
