Latest news with #OuterSpaceTreaty
NDTV
4 hours ago
- Science
- NDTV
Who Owns The Moon? Know What Outer Space Treaty Means For The World
Many countries have their flags on the Moon, but no one owns it. On July 20, the world celebrated 56 years since the Apollo 11 mission successfully landed on the lunar surface. NASA's mission has inspired other nations to explore the Moon, as four countries have successfully landed spacecraft there: the United States, Russia (formerly the Soviet Union), China and India. There's a race to land on the Moon, with NASA planning to send humans back to the Moon, with its Artemis astronauts aiming for a 2026 landing. On the other hand, China claims it will send humans to the Moon by 2030. Some scientists also say that the plan is to build permanent bases on the Moon. However, our Moon doesn't belong to anyone, thanks to the Outer Space Treaty, formally known as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The treaty provides a basic framework in international space law. The treaty had been adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 1962 (XVIII) in 1963, but it added a few new provisions. Here are some of the key provisions of the Outer Space Treaty Outer space is free to explore: All countries can explore and use outer space without claims of national appropriation or ownership. No use of nuclear weapons: Nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are prohibited in orbit around the Earth, on celestial bodies, or in outer space. Peaceful purposes: Outer space shall be used for peaceful purposes, and countries shall conduct their activities in accordance with international law. International cooperation: Countries shall cooperate with each other in the exploration and use of outer space.
Mint
12-07-2025
- Science
- Mint
Buying spacetech stocks? Don't get carried away by space wars
A couple of decades back, the term Space Wars could only mean a sequel to a sci-fi movie series. But today, new age global military conflicts could be dubbed as Space Wars. In April 2024, the US and Japan introduced a resolution to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) seeking to prohibit the deployment of nuclear weapons in outer space. This resolution underscored the obligations of the 115 states that are parties to the Outer Space Treaty, including the permanent members of the Security Council, to avoid placing any objects carrying nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction in Earth's orbit. The US has maintained a significant technological edge in space, relying on satellite infrastructure for vital military operations, such as communication, navigation, and intelligence. The establishment of the US Space Force in December 2019 marked a major milestone. It played a vital role in monitoring approximately 15 missile launches daily from various global hotspots, managing satellite deployments, and tracking space debris. The Space Force also oversees two newly launched robotic space planes In 2021, Russia conducted a controversial anti-satellite missile test, resulting in the destruction of a Soviet-era satellite, and generating a significant amount of hazardous space debris. The Ukraine-Russia conflict, which began in February 2022, further underscored reliance on space assets for military operations. Shortly before Russia attacked Ukraine, malware spread through part of the KA-SAT network, resulting in disruptions to the satellite internet modems of 50,000 European users, including Ukrainian military units. Over the past decade, China has rapidly expanded its satellite networks and launch capabilities, making it a significant player in space. In 2022, China achieved a new record for space launches, becoming the world's second most active space launch provider after the US. Both the US and Chinese missions are shrouded in secrecy when it comes to spacetech. Yet both involve spacecraft that have the capability to conduct prolonged missions, transport and retrieve payloads, and return to Earth for refuelling, potentially making them potent weapons. India's burgeoning spacetech sector is often hailed as the next frontier for economic growth, with ambitious projections for its market size in the coming decade. While government reforms and a vibrant startup ecosystem are propelling this vision, the journey is not without its significant challenges. Understanding the key risks for private players, the government's investment in R&D, and persistent policy bottlenecks is crucial for charting a sustainable course. First, space ventures are inherently capital-intensive and have long gestation periods. Despite growing interest, attracting sufficient seed-stage and long-term venture capital remains a significant hurdle. IN-SPACe is a single-window, independent, nodal agency that operates as an autonomous body in the Department of Space (DOS). It aims to facilitate technology access to private companies that still heavily rely on ISRO's testing facilities, launch pads, and ground stations. This dependency, at times, leads to bottlenecks, and increases operational costs due to limited availability or high charges. Despite indigenous advancements, India's spacetech sector still depends on imports for certain high-technology components and advanced electronic systems. This reliance impacts costs, supply chain security, and the pace of innovation. Second, the specialised nature of space technology demands a highly skilled workforce in areas like aerospace engineering, astrophysics, and satellite technology. While India has a large talent pool, finding and retaining professionals with niche expertise can be challenging. Indian private players also face stiff competition not only from a growing number of domestic startups but also from established global giants and well-funded international new-space companies. Maintaining competitiveness in terms of cost, quality, and innovation is a continuous challenge. As space assets become increasingly critical for national security and economic activities, they become prime targets for cyberattacks. Ensuring the robust security of satellite data and communication links is a growing and complex concern. The Indian government, primarily through the Department of Space (DoS) and ISRO, has been the traditional backbone of space R&D. A significant portion of this budget supports ISRO's ambitious missions, including deep space exploration and human spaceflight programs like Gaganyaan, as well as the development of advanced launch vehicles and satellite technologies. While India has made commendable strides in opening up its space sector, addressing these risks and policy bottlenecks through a comprehensive legal framework, streamlined regulations, and sustained investment in both R&D and infrastructure will be critical. This will not only empower India's private spacetech companies to innovate and compete globally but also solidify India's position as a formidable player in the evolving global space economy. India' mapping primarily has only two listed companies in the core business of geospatial, CE Info Systems (commonly known by the name of its app MapmyIndia) and Genesys International. CE Info Systems offers location-based IoT technologies and AI-based solutions. These can be integrated with satellite data to provide enhanced services for fleet management, logistics optimisation, smart city initiatives, and more. CE Info Systems is a crucial downstream player in the Indian space ecosystem. It takes the data and capabilities provided by ISRO's infrastructure (like satellite imagery and NavIC signals) and transforms them into practical, marketable applications. The company's expertise in geospatial technology makes it a key enabler for the widespread adoption and commercialisation of India's growing space capabilities. A risk factor that has recently impacted investor sentiment is the decision to hive off the B2C (consumer-facing) business (Mappls) into a separate entity, managed by the founder's son. This move raised governance concerns among investors and proxy advisory firms, with questions about potential conflicts of interest and whether the terms of separation are fair to minority shareholders. The concern is that the new B2C entity, even if funded by promoters' personal funds, might benefit from the parent company's resources and incubation without the public shareholders participating in its potential upside. Investors worry that this restructuring could reduce MapmyIndia's overall growth potential, as the high-growth consumer segment is no longer fully consolidated. The new consumer-facing entity is expected to have significant cash burn in its initial stages, which, even if funded personally, can create an overhang or perception of risk related to the broader promoter group's financial strategy. The second company – Genesys International – specialises in photogrammetry, remote sensing, cartography, data conversion, and state-of-the-art terrestrial and 3D geo-content. While Genesys has a healthy order book, the project-based nature of its revenue leads to significant lumpiness in the business. Delays in project execution or billing can significantly hurt revenue as the company has a very concentrated client base. While both C.E Info Systems and Genesys have healthy operating margins, their net margins and return ratios need to find some stability. Investing in Indian spacetech companies holds immense long-term potential given government support and burgeoning private participation. Nevertheless, this requires a high degree of patience and diligent monitoring of evolving margins and return ratios. This is because the sector is still nascent, characterised by high R&D costs, long gestation periods, and significant upfront capital expenditure. Until these companies achieve sufficient scale, consistent commercialisation of their technologies, and demonstrate a clear path to sustainable revenue generation and efficient capital deployment, their valuations may remain volatile. Happy Investing. Disclaimer: This article is for information purposes only. It is not a stock recommendation and should not be treated as such. This article is syndicated from
Japan Forward
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Japan Forward
Japan Shifts Space Policy from Science to Security
As space becomes a contested, congested, and competitive domain, Japan is rapidly transforming its approach to space development. A recent lecture by Mitsuru Nodomi, former Director of the Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSIC) and retired Ground Self-Defense Force official, highlighted the urgency of integrating space into Japan's broader national security strategy. From GPS dependency to satellite warfare, his insights reveal why Japan can no longer afford to treat space as a purely scientific endeavor. Japan's early space development efforts were largely civilian and academic, led by the Ministry of Education and focused on scientific research. This orientation was further codified by Japan's adherence to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1969 Diet resolution restricting space use to "non-military purposes." However, this stance began to shift in 1998 after North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japanese territory. Within months, the Japanese government made an unprecedented Cabinet decision to launch its own information-gathering satellites. "That decision, made in just four months, marked a fundamental turning point," Nodomi explained. "Under normal circumstances, such a process would have taken years." Nodomi, who helped oversee Japan's information-gathering satellite programs, noted that this shift laid the groundwork for the current national space policy. The 2008 Basic Space Act formalized the integration of space into national defense, replacing "non-military" principles with a commitment to "non-aggressive" use. Mitsuru Nodomi Space is now integral to modern life, from GPS navigation and internet timing to financial markets and air traffic control. A loss of satellite function, Nodomi explained, could bring daily life to a halt. "A GPS outage wouldn't just affect your phone," he warned. "It would disrupt financial systems, power grids, and even air traffic. It's an invisible infrastructure we depend on every day." This dependency makes satellite infrastructure a tempting target. China, Russia, and others have already demonstrated anti-satellite capabilities. Japan, Nodomi emphasized, must be prepared to protect its own systems while remaining vigilant against adversarial threats. Nodomi identified three emerging trends: competition, congestion, and contestation. Space is no longer the exclusive domain of superpowers. Over 80 nations now possess satellites, and private companies like SpaceX have revolutionized launch frequency and cost. Japan's participation in the global space economy will depend on its ability to reduce launch costs and scale up production. "We're in a world where the number of actors in space has exploded," Nodomi said. "That means more debris, more potential collisions, and more risks, including military ones." The rise of commercial constellations such as Starlink introduces both opportunities and vulnerabilities. These networks offer high redundancy and low latency, but their proliferation has drastically increased the risk of orbital collisions and debris. China's 2007 anti-satellite missile test and Russia's 2021 satellite destruction created thousands of hazardous fragments. Nodomi also highlighted the growing use of small satellites for real-time imaging, surveillance, and communication. While cheaper and more agile, they require resilient architectures to ensure functionality amid potential attacks. The war in Ukraine has shown how space assets can alter battlefield dynamics. Ukraine, lacking its own satellite infrastructure, has leveraged commercial satellites for intelligence and communications. "Ukraine has no military satellites of its own," Nodomi noted. "But thanks to commercial constellations, it's been able to fight a 21st-century war. That's a game changer." The counteroffensive of the Ukraine forces near Bakhmut in May 2023 (©Serhii Nuzhnenko, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/the Meanwhile, Russia's hesitancy to destroy United States commercial satellites used by Ukraine underscores the geopolitical risks of targeting space assets. Nodomi emphasized that modern combat depends on real-time intelligence, positioning data, and resilient communication links. All of these are satellite-dependent. In future conflicts, attacks on satellites or ground-based control centers, through missiles, cyberattacks, or jamming, are highly plausible. Japan has already taken steps to adapt. The CSIC is expanding its satellite constellation, aiming for 10 satellites by FY2031. The Japanese version of GPS, the MICHIBIKI system, is being expanded from 4 to 10 satellites. The Ministry of Defense is also expanding the Space Operations Group, originally established in 2022, with plans to significantly enhance its capabilities and mission scope by 2026. In 2022, Japan's National Security Strategy explicitly named "space security" for the first time. A year later, the government released a dedicated Space Security Initiative identifying anti-satellite weapons and space debris as key threats. The strategy also emphasized international cooperation, particularly with the US. "We've come a long way from the days of leaving space policy to science ministries," Nodomi said. "Now, it's about national survival." Despite these developments, Japan still faces major hurdles. Its domestic space industry lags behind competitors in launch frequency, satellite manufacturing, and solutions-based services. Rocket costs remain high, and the failure to scale small satellite launch platforms like Epsilon remains a concern. Nodomi noted that for Japan to become a true space power, it must foster a virtuous cycle between security and industry. "National security needs should drive technological innovation," he said. "That innovation, in turn, can fuel commercial growth, but only if we get the legal and policy environment right." Author: Daniel Manning
The Hindu
08-07-2025
- Politics
- The Hindu
On the Golden Dome: how Trump's missile shield tests space law
From golden citadels to divine shields, rulers across time have dreamt of impregnable security. But in every age, these ambitions have either collapsed under their own weight or have provoked greater instability. In 2025, this ancient dream went to orbit. In May, U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled a bold new national defence initiative called the 'Golden Dome', a $175-billion space-based missile shield designed to fend off ballistic, hypersonic, and orbital threats. The plan involves deploying a constellation of satellite interceptors, potentially armed with kinetic or directed-energy weapons, to form a protective layer over the U.S. Framed as a defence move, the project has sparked concerns worldwide for its geopolitical ramifications as well as for its implications under international space law. In particular, the Golden Dome challenges the Outer Space Treaty's limits, raises constitutional concerns within the U.S., and puts pressure on key strategic partners such as India. Loophole or legal red line? At the heart of the legal debate is Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty (OST), 1967. It prohibits placing 'nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction' in orbit or stationing them 'in outer space in any other manner'. It further mandates that celestial bodies shall be used 'exclusively for peaceful purposes'. The language of Article IV, particularly its explicit focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs), has created a loophole for conventional weapons in space. The term 'peaceful purposes' has been subject to various interpretations, with some nations claiming that it permits all non-aggressive military use, while others insist it implies complete demilitarisation. The treaty further states: 'The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on celestial bodies shall be forbidden.' The use of military personnel for scientific research or any other peaceful purposes isn't prohibited, however. The use of any equipment or facility necessary to peacefully explore the moon and other celestial bodies is also not prohibited (Article IV). Because the Golden Dome's interceptors are not classified as WMDs, they don't violate the letter of Article IV per se. There are a few concerns nonetheless. In arms control, the practical outcome must always take precedence over the technical details or official classifications of a weapon. This means what a weapon is called matters far less than its actual strategic effect. For instance, if kinetic interceptors are used to disable or destroy missiles or satellites, their impact could fundamentally alter the balance of power in space. This capability could create a dangerous first-strike advantage for one nation, thereby eroding the principle of mutual deterrence, which relies on the threat of retaliation to prevent an attack. Such a development would undermine the core goal of arms control treaties, which is to foster stability through restraint, and could trigger a significant and destabilising shift in the dynamics of power in outer space. UN General Assembly resolutions under the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) Treaty, while lacking legal enforceability, have successfully established an interpretive norm against the militarisation of space. The deployment of space-based interceptors, therefore, directly threatens this norm and could trigger a cascade of similar actions by other nations. These systems are plagued by dual-use ambiguity. A kinetic interceptor, ostensibly for missile defence, possesses the inherent capability to be instantly repurposed to neutralise an adversary's vital communication or surveillance satellites. This inherent uncertainty risks inflaming suspicion and driving miscalculation, especially during heightened crises involving major space powers like China and Russia, both of which have already explicitly condemned the proposed deployment. Partners in crossfire India, a rising space power and a key U.S. partner in satellite tracking and space situational awareness, now finds itself tactically aligned but normatively conflicted. Quiet cooperation in areas like debris monitoring could tacitly link India to the Golden Dome's strategic ecosystem. However, India is also a vocal champion of peaceful space use. It has consistently supported PAROS resolutions and has positioned itself as a leader of the Global South in advocating for equitable and demilitarised space governance. Supporting or even appearing to tolerate the Golden Dome could undermine that credibility, damaging India's image as a responsible spacefaring nation and a potential norm-setter in future treaty negotiations. Conversely, non-cooperation might strain its growing strategic ties with Washington. This dilemma becomes even more consequential in the context of India's pending Space Activities Bill, which will shape how the country defines and regulates dual-use platforms, private-sector participation, and treaty compliance. The Golden Dome is thus more than a U.S. policy issue: it's a litmus test for India's own legal and diplomatic posture and could significantly influence the direction and content of the Space Activities Bill. Less than golden precedent The broader concern is that the Golden Dome will normalise the weaponisation of outer space. If the U.S. crosses this threshold without facing legal repercussions, China, Russia, and other actors are likely to follow suit. This could trigger a destabilising cycle of orbital arms races, forcing smaller nations to resort to asymmetric capabilities, such as cyberattacks, jamming or even the deliberate generation of debris in orbit. Such developments would not only weaken the OST's authority but could also unravel the fragile consensus that has governed space for over half a century. In the absence of updated and enforceable treaties, outer space risks becoming a legal grey zone or, worse, a battlefield governed by force rather than law. Thus, the Golden Dome is more than a military gamble or a political spectacle. It's a legal inflection point for space governance in the 21st century. It exposes loopholes in a 58-year-old treaty, reveals structural weaknesses in domestic oversight, and underscores the urgent and immediate need for modern legal instruments that can keep pace with technological realities. Strategic partners, such as India, along with like-minded spacefaring nations, should notably push to clarify and modernise the OST, especially the parts pertaining to dual-use and conventional space-based weapons. Advocacy for legally binding instruments on the non-deployment of weapons in space is of paramount importance. This pursuit of international agreements, which play a crucial role, should be complemented by establishing comprehensive transparency mechanisms for military space projects to reduce ambiguity and mistrust. It's also crucial that national laws, such as India's Space Activities Bill, include clear guidelines for defence cooperation in space, fostering responsible practices both domestically and globally. Shrawani Shagun is pursuing a PhD at National Law University, Delhi, focusing on environmental sustainability and space governance.
The Sun
26-06-2025
- Business
- The Sun
Malaysia joins UN space treaties to boost global space role
PUTRAJAYA, June 26 (Bernama)** – Malaysia is set to become a party to key space treaties under the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCOPUOS), marking a significant step in the nation's space industry development. The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation (MOSTI) confirmed the decision today following Cabinet approval. Malaysia will accede to two of the five major space treaties: the Outer Space Treaty (OST 1967) and the Registration Convention (REG 1975). This move follows the full enforcement of the Malaysia Space Board Act 2022 (Act 834) on January 1, which established a legal framework for domestic space activities. 'This accession aligns with Malaysia's national space industry interests and reinforces our commitment to peaceful space exploration,' MOSTI stated. The treaties outline principles such as the peaceful use of outer space and the prohibition of militarisation. MOSTI's Space Authority Division (BPAngkasa) will now work with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to complete the ratification process, including submitting necessary documents to treaty depositaries in London, Moscow, or Washington. Minister Chang Lih Kang described the decision as historic, elevating Malaysia's role as a responsible player in the global space sector. 'This ensures Malaysia can effectively advocate for its interests while upholding the peaceful and sustainable use of outer space,' he said. The move supports Thrust 5 of the National Space Policy 2030 (DAN2030), which focuses on strengthening international cooperation. Malaysia's participation underscores its commitment to maintaining space as a domain of peace and collaboration.
