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The Wire
6 days ago
- Business
- The Wire
India's Fighter Jet Ambitions: From Russian Roulette to Indigenous Dreams
For the best experience, open on your mobile browser or Download our App. Next Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Rahul Bedi 5 minutes ago After abandoning a $295 million joint project with Russia, India fast-tracks its indigenous fifth-generation fighter programme—but faces familiar challenges that have plagued its defence manufacturing for decades. In this image released by @SpokespersonMoD via X on May 27, 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the Execution Model for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will lead the project in partnership with Indian industry. (@SpokespersonMoD via PTI Photo) Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute Now Chandigarh: The Ministry of Defence's intent, announced earlier this week, to fast-track development of its indigenous fifth-generation fighter via the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme, is not its first brush with such lofty ambitions. For 11 years, until 2018, the MoD and the Indian Air Force (IAF) were in advanced negotiations with Russia's Sukhoi Design Bureau to co-develop a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) under a 2007 agreement, aimed at delivering a near-bespoke advanced stealth platform tailored largely to Indian requirements. Designated the Perspective Multi-Role Fighter by the MoD, the FGFA was based on the Sukhoi T-50—then known as PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks-Frontovoi Aviatsii)—which later morphed into the Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter. This putative 30-tonne, twin-engine platform promised super-cruise capabilities, advanced stealth, internal weapon bays and next-generation avionics. Consequently, in 2010-11 India paid $295 million towards the FGFA's preliminary design, as part of its equal financial but partial technical partnership. Thereafter, in 2013 Russia demanded an additional $5 billion as half its share to further progress the fighter's developmental costs, which it had pegged at around $10 billion. The MoD refused to pay but continued negotiating, and in 2016 reached a compromise under which it was agreed that each side would contribute $3.7 billion apiece—to be paid over six to seven years—towards the FGFA's further development, in addition to incorporating IAF-specific requirements on the platform. These comprised some 50-odd major and minor modifications, like replacing the fighter's NPO Saturn AL-41F1 engine with a more powerful power pack and improving its stealth features and weapons carriage system. The IAF also called for an advanced version of the fighter's nose-mounted Byelka electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, easier maintainability and assorted additional safety features. Industry sources said that at the time Sukhoi also agreed to share critical FGFA design information with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)—the platform's designated series manufacturing agency—which it had earlier withheld, and to try and restore its work share in the programme, which had been reduced by more than half to merely around 13%. This included providing tyres for the under-development fighter, basic navigation equipment, laser designation pods, heads-up displays and coolant for its radar, as there was little of major technological input that HAL or the IAF had to offer to the FGFA programme. Sukhoi also undertook, in principle, to deliver three single-seat FGFA prototypes by 2019-20 to the IAF for user trials, ahead of erecting a series production line for the fighters at HAL's facility in Nashik. Pulling the plug on Sukhoi Initially, the IAF had planned on procuring 200-250 single and twin-seat licence-built FGFAs, with deliveries scheduled to begin by 2017-18. This number was later reduced to 127 single-seat FGFAs, but soon after in April 2018, India opted to withdraw from the programme, forgoing all the money it had advanced to it. No accountability for any of the officials involved in the stillborn project was forthcoming. Many IAF veterans, however, were of the view that had India stayed the course with the FGFA project, by overcoming myriad shortcomings in its dealings with Russia, it would have been operating a fleet of Su-57-like fifth-generation fighters years earlier, like other advanced air forces, including China's. Besides, by staying the FGFA course, despite the hurdles, it could also have built up a firmer research and development base for future indigenous projects like the AMCA. Instead, it now faces a longer, costlier and technologically riskier path toward vindicating its fifth-generation combat aircraft goals. Industry sources, meanwhile, clarified that the decision to call off the FGFA was not taken lightly, as years of delays, cost escalation, performance shortfalls in the FGFA prototype and lack of transparency from the Russian side had steadily undermined Indian confidence. More critically, both the MoD and the IAF were dissatisfied with the level of technology transfer, the aircraft's underwhelming stealth profile and its engines, which did not meet the expected thrust-vectoring and super-cruise benchmarks. New attempt to fast-track 5th gen But the retreat from the FGFA programme did not signal a withdrawal from India's fifth-generation fighter ambitions, which sluggishly lumbered on until operational urgency thrust upon the IAF after Operation Sindoor prompted Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to pre-approve and advance the AMCA project on May 27. Alongside, the prevailing decline in the IAF's fighter squadrons from a sanctioned strength of 42.5 to merely 30-odd squadrons presently had also triggered urgency in the AMCA project. Under it, the MoD has sanctioned the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and HAL to develop a fifth-generation fighter from the ground up, by leapfrogging technological barriers using local resources, timelines and control. The ADA-HAL combine aims to involve a wide consortium of public sector and private vendors like Bharat Electronics, Larsen & Toubro and Godrej Aerospace under the government's Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) policy, and from lessons drawn from past setbacks with the snail-paced Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) programme. Unlike the FGFA, the AMCA is being designed to meet specific Indian doctrinal needs from the outset. Conceived as a twin-engine, 25-tonne multi-role stealth fighter, the AMCA aims to integrate internal weapons bays, serpentine air intakes, radar-absorbent materials, AI-assisted mission systems and sensor fusion. It is also envisioned in two variants—a Mark 1 with an imported engine (possibly General Electric's GE F414 power pack) and a Mark II with an indigenous to-be-developed engine. Delivery of the first few prototypes is scheduled by 2035. Obstacles ahead Analysts, however, said the pathway to AMCA's development was riddled with multiple challenges. They maintained that though the FGFA was flawed, it did offer the IAF a relatively fast track to a stealth platform. Furthermore, by exiting the FGFA, India had ceded early stealth fighter experience that might have enriched its R&D ecosystem in the AMCA project. In contrast, the AMCA's development trajectory was wholly unproven. The technological risks—especially in stealth shaping, low-observable materials, propulsion and mission computers—were significant. The most pressing hurdle remained engine development, as India could still not produce a fifth-generation capable power pack, relying instead on US-origin General Electric GE F414 engines, whose full technology transfer under a 2023 agreement for HAL to make them locally remained riddled with uncertainties. GE has historically been cautious about sharing sensitive 'hot section' technologies with overseas customers, like those involving single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings and cooling channels—core to engine durability and thrust-to-weight ratios. And while India seeks full transfer of manufacturing know-how for these components to reduce dependence on the US, Washington's export control laws under its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and internal GE risk assessments had reportedly limited its scope. Indian officials had also flagged ambiguity over intellectual property (IPR) ownership for technologies co-produced or indigenised with regard to the GE-414s. The fundamental concern, industry sources said, was over HAL or the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), or both, not being able to modify, even minutely, any indigenously built version of the F414 power pack without GE consent. This, in effect, would put paid to jugaad or innovation that had, over decades, served India's military industry admirably. Moreover, establishing a full-scale production line domestically for a 4.5/5-generation jet engine is a massive industrial effort, for which HAL is reportedly still amassing specialised tooling and a quality-controlled supply chain ecosystem to meet GE's strict quality audits and oversight. Unhelpful history India's failure in building a domestic modern fighter manufacturing network can be traced back to the unravelling of the 2007-08 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, which many senior IAF officers and veterans consider a 'turning point' in which a major opportunity was lost. The MMRCA project sought to procure 126 fighter jets, with a clear mandate that 108 would be built in India under transfer of technology (ToT) agreements. France's Rafale emerged as the winner in 2012 from amongst six competing rivals, but protracted negotiations over cost, technology transfer and liability clauses led to the collapse of the deal in 2015. Instead, India opted for a direct purchase of 36 Rafales in flyaway condition, further delaying the development of indigenous manufacturing capability. This missed opportunity meant India continued to depend heavily on foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for advanced combat aircraft, without acquiring the institutional knowledge and industrial base needed for independent production. Unlike China, which leveraged joint ventures and aggressive reverse-engineering to build a competent domestic fighter aircraft industry, India's public sector defence units like HAL remained underfunded and over-regulated. In the meantime, indigenous programmes like the Tejas LCA were beset by delays and capability gaps, and when its Mk1 variant eventually entered limited service, its combat potential was initially constrained by issues related to engine performance, radar integration and weapons payload. Efforts to address these shortcomings through the Mk1A and Mk2 variants are presently underway, delayed by several years. In the interim, the FGFA was expected to usher India's entry into fifth-generation capabilities, but this too was called off, cumulatively delaying India's goal of building a robust domestic fighter manufacturing base. And though the AMCA project now seeks to course-correct—but without an established supply chain, proven stealth technology or a domestic jet engine—it faces an uphill battle. It proposes to feature a cleaner stealth profile fighter with internal weapon bays and fully indigenous avionics, including an AESA radar, AI-based sensor fusion and advanced electronic warfare systems. And unlike the FGFA, AMCA emphasises modularity, digital fly-by-wire systems and next-generation cockpit ergonomics, aiming for full design authority and autonomy in both development and future upgrades. That being said, India's ability to manufacture a fifth-generation fighter hinges not just on technology, but on policy coherence, private sector integration and decisive leadership—elements sorely missing in earlier decades. So unless these structural issues are swiftly and meaningfully addressed, India risks repeating its earlier FGFA missteps with the AMCA. World The French Are Anxious to Know the Fate of Rafales in Operation Sindoor Combat View More
The Wire
24-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
Another Round, No Results: India–US Carrier Talks Remain Stuck in Symbolism
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Another Round, No Results: India–US Carrier Talks Remain Stuck in Symbolism Rahul Bedi 19 minutes ago Was it anything more than a gesture – an illusion of continuity – made with the full knowledge that nothing substantive would emerge? The eighth Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation (JWGACTC) between the Indian and US navies held from May 13–16. Photo: Press Information Bureau Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now Chandigarh: The only 'significant milestone' the Ministry of Defence (MoD) could cite from the recent eighth Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation (JWGACTC) between the Indian and US navies is simply that it happened at all. The Press Information Bureau (PIB) noted that the three-day meeting – held from May 13-16 and co-chaired by the Indian Navy's Rear Admiral Vishal Bishnoi and the US Navy's Rear Admiral Casey Moton – took place under the aegis of the long-dormant Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), launched in 2012. As with its seven predecessors, the PIB highlighted 'valuable information' exchange and a joint statement, yet provided no concrete outcomes – underscoring the DTTI's legacy of lofty rhetoric and minimal delivery. Though not formally shuttered, the DTTI has remained effectively inactive for over a decade. Military officials and analysts widely regard it as a symbolic relic – functioning more as a placeholder for JWGACTC meetings than a credible mechanism for defence cooperation. 'Upmarket talking shop for avid navalists' The JWGACTC itself has long been dismissed by Indian Navy insiders as an 'upmarket talking shop for avid navalists,' largely due to the MoD's ongoing reluctance to approve a second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-2) following the commissioning of INS Vikrant in 2022. Discussions have repeatedly centred on Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) constructing a 65,000-tonne, conventionally powered carrier – tentatively called INS Vishal – with a US-made Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) from General Atomics, supporting CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) operations. However, defence industry sources confirm that Vishal remains far from sanctioned. Instead, the MoD is reportedly considering a more modest 'interim' step: commissioning a second Vikrant-class 40,000-tonne carrier. This would both preserve CSL's shipbuilding capacity and advance the Indian Navy's long-standing ambition of operating three carriers – one for each seaboard, with one in reserve. The DTTI, initially unveiled by then US Deputy Defence Secretary Ashton Carter in 2012, aimed to fast-track defence collaboration by bypassing bureaucratic roadblocks. India also signed four foundational defence agreements intended to deepen military cooperation and interoperability. The initiative began with four 'pathfinder' projects – including joint development of Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Systems (MEHPS) and chemical-biological protective clothing – but these, along with two later additions (the Raven UAV and ISR modules for the C-130J-30), languished due to tepid domestic interest and were eventually shelved. Subsequent attempts to revive the DTTI, including the addition of digital helmet-mounted displays, tactical biological detection systems, and proposals for joint development of ground combat vehicles and helicopters, similarly faltered. These clashed with indigenous programmes and met the same quiet demise. Also Read: Rafale-M Imports Will Spare Navy From Sailing World-Class Carrier Without World-Class Aircraft Even as India was designated a 'Major Defence Partner' by the US and the US Senate pushed for deeper defence cooperation via legislation, the DTTI remained mired in bureaucratic inertia. At one point, it included seven working groups across a range of technology domains, but these too faded without delivering results. Sources attribute the DTTI's collapse to persistent shortcomings: indecision on the Indian side, and a paternalistic US approach offering low-grade technology. A senior Indian military officer involved in DTTI negotiations remarked that the initiative's failure starkly contrasted the otherwise growing India–US strategic partnership. 'There was a major gap between ambition and delivery,' he said. 'Eventually, it all collapsed.' By January 2023, the DTTI was effectively replaced by the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET), launched in Washington under the guidance of both countries' National Security Advisers. ICET focuses on six broad areas: defence, space, next-gen telecom (including 6G), artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced biotechnology. In a Pentagon briefing in early 2024, Brigadier General Patrick Ryder described ICET as a shift from defence sales to joint innovation, calling it 'modular, scalable, and industry-driven.' ICET faces significant structural challenges But despite its ambitious design, ICET too faces significant structural challenges. Industry insiders note that while ICET aims to ease US regulatory barriers to advanced tech transfers, most American defence firms – which hold the intellectual property – operate independently of government mandates and are reluctant to share costly proprietary technologies. These firms remain bound by stringent export controls and are accountable primarily to shareholders, not US strategic policy – posing a fundamental obstacle to meaningful joint production or technology transfer. Current ICET deliverables include plans to manufacture General Electric's F-414 engines in India for the Tejas Mk-II and locally assemble 31 MQ-9 Reaper drones. But even here, progress has been slow. Technology transfer for the drones from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems is reportedly around 10-15% and includes establishing a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility for the UAVs in India. Ultimately, analysts say commercial realities and bureaucratic drag continue to undermine both DTTI and ICET. As one expert put it: the DTTI collapsed under the weight of mismatched expectations; ICET risks a similar fate unless these foundational issues are addressed. This begs the question: What was the purpose of convening the eighth JWGACTC under the DTTI banner? Was it anything more than a gesture – an illusion of continuity – made with the full knowledge that nothing substantive would emerge? Make a contribution to Independent Journalism Related News For Arms Dealers, Operation Sindoor Was Not a Crisis Conflict But a Business Opportunity Army Blames News Reports, Contradicts Corps Commander's Claim of Air Defence Guns at Golden Temple Statement by The Wire on the Government's Blocking and Unblocking of its Website One Dead, 9 Injured After Unidentified Aircraft Crashes in Bathinda One Dead, 9 Injured After Unidentified Aircraft Crashes in Bathinda One Dead, 9 Injured After Unidentified Aircraft Crashes in Bathinda MHA Directs States and Union Territories to Hold Civil Defence Mock Drills on May 7 'Did Not Hit Kirana Hills:' Air Force Dismisses Speculation Around Striking Pakistan's Nuclear Site Israel Allows Limited Aid To Enter Gaza; France, UK, Canada Call Move 'Wholly Inadequate' View in Desktop Mode About Us Contact Us Support Us © Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
The Wire
23-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
The ‘PM Factor': Why Pakistan Army's Nuclear Red Lines Are Much Lower than India's
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security The 'PM Factor': Why Pakistan Army's Nuclear Red Lines Are Much Lower than India's Rahul Bedi 59 minutes ago Pakistan's Punjabi leadership simply boosted the PMs' formidable and outsized influence over national security institutions and strategic policymaking. Representative image of Pakistan Army officials. Photo: Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now Chandigarh: In its combative and multi-dimensional engagement with nuclear-armed Pakistan, India is effectively confronted with a predominantly Punjabi mindset – one deeply imbued with a sense of its own omnipotence and invincibility. This derives not only from Punjab's dominating size and population, but also from its historical and continuing ascendency over almost all pillars of Pakistani society like the military, bureaucracy and mainstream politics. The Pakistan army, the state's most powerful institution, for instance, is disproportionately staffed by Punjabis – a legacy of British colonial recruitment policies for nearly a century till 1947 – and one that has only been furiously perpetuated thereafter. Pattern of domination by the 'Punjabi Musselman' (PM) This pattern of domination by the 'Punjabi Musselman' or PM also extended to Pakistan's vast paramilitary leadership, civilian bureaucracy, judiciary and political establishment, with Punjab province represented by 173 National Assembly seats, or more than half the total number of 336 seats. Hence, collectively these institutions reflect and reinforce the outsized influence of PMs over Pakistan's national security, foreign and economic policies, as well its chauvinistic media discourse. Their sway also extends into numerous other social, academic and intellectual spheres, and for the PM, nationalism is certainly not a quiet civic sentiment; it's a loud, strident and egotistical one-upmanship – an unapologetic and brash performance of dramatic Punjabi theatre played out on the national stage. A handful of Pakistani analysts privately conceded – somewhat wryly – that this theatre mirrored a well-worn Punjabi dictum: if you've got it, flaunt it, or in other words, perceived strength and posture must be boldly and unapologetically displayed at all times. India's strategic planners must recognise – if they haven't already – that PM dominance in Pakistan is not merely demographic – it is psychological and doctrinal, particularly during crises like Operation Sindoor. In such critical situations, India confronts a military and hostile national culture shaped by Punjabi ideals of daleri (valour), ghairat (honour) and badla (revenge) – manifested through defiance, escalatory nuclear posturing and a refusal to negotiate, even in the face of setbacks. This Punjabi-led power elite, forged by regional pride, celestial jazba (fervour) and entrenched institutional control over nearly eight decades, does not respond predictably to logic or conventional deterrence. It reacts viscerally to perceived slights, especially when framed as challenges to its honour or moral superiority, by what many within Pakistan's ruling elite view as a hostile Hindu India. Also Read: Asim Munir's Elevation to Field Marshal Likely to Disturb Military Norms, Succession Dynamics Its strategic behaviour is shaped by a self-perpetuated siege mentality, marked by the narrative of manipulation and tactical cunning, rather than reasoned restraint. Pakistan's predominantly PM military mindset consistently prioritises aggressive defence and national pride over compromise, restraint or quietly pursuing a path of peace and economic regeneration. Of its 16 Army Chiefs, seven (about 41%) have been Punjabis, and their tenures – most notably General Zia-ul-Haq's 11-year rule till 1988 and presently Field Marshal Asim Munir's – have often embodied this assertive ethos through cross-border confrontations, exaggerated levels of aggression and nuclear brinkmanship, or all three. Accordingly, India's national security establishment must therefore approach all military crises with Pakistan with a clear understanding of these ethnic and psychological underpinnings. It's up against Pakistani strategic behaviour, under PM leadership, that is driven less by calibrated calculation, but more by identity-driven posturing and an inflated self-image. There is also the ingrained figurative notion of the 'muchh' or moustache, closely associated with respect, privilege, honour and above all machismo for Punjabi's. The allegorical muchh also represents national and racial ego with most PMs subscribing to the age-old adage of 'muchh nahi, te puchh nahi'. Translated this means: he who has no moustache has no standing. In Pakistan's Punjab, loss of face is locally likened to cutting off ones moustache, widely considered an unpardonable insult that can, and often does, lead to prolonged feuds. There are innumerable folk tales that recount with great detail how an enemy was humiliated and humbled by having his physical moustache shaved off by an antagonist and the vendettas this spawned. In 21st century nuclear and military terms this muchh stands for deterrence posturing, arms race and heightened military reaction to preserve this symbol. Pushing reactive competitiveness with India to absurd extremes However, Pakistan's PMs often push this reactive competitiveness with India to absurd – and at times, comical – extremes. Since 2017, for example, both countries have been embroiled in a symbolic standoff at Wagah, vying to outdo each other in flagpole height. Pakistan's effort to hoist its Parcham-e-Sitara-o-Hilal higher than India's 410-foot tricolour has become emblematic of this almost theatrical rivalry. This impulse for one-upmanship spills far beyond strategic and military arenas – whether in the tit-for-tat nuclear tests of May 1998, where Pakistan conducted six underground detonations to India's five, or in their parallel quests for advanced defence hardware and global political recognition. The rivalry permeates everyday life with PMs claiming their mangoes, melons, and grapes to be sweeter; their singers, music, and television more refined; their fashion sense and hospitality more elegant and generous. They also assert – with some claiming credible evidence – that their people were more stylish, better-looking, and endowed with greater chutzpah than their Indian counterparts. Moreover, assertions of superiority also extended to claims that poverty is more visibly rampant in India, that Indians were less gregarious, and that PMs possessed a sharper wit, better humour, and a deeper sense of tehzeeb (etiquette). In addition to being one of Pakistan's four provinces, Punjab – though geographically smaller than the sparsely populated, yet vast Balochistan – holds demographic dominance. As per the 2023 census, Punjabis comprise the country's largest ethnic group, numbering approximately 127 million or nearly 52% of Pakistan's total population of 241.5 million. Remarkably, PMs constitute the world's second most populous subnational polity, surpassed only by the Han Chinese. Such demographic primacy contributes significantly to their entrenched sense of superiority, indomitability, and, at times, grossly misplaced Rambo-like overconfidence. These shared attributes largely shape Pakistan's antagonistic, militant, and security-centric posture towards India. And, though the PMs drive this militarised approach, Pakistan other three Province –Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), and Baluchistan – tend to demonstrate relatively greater openness to economic engagement, cultural reconnection and overall peace with India. Sindhis, for instance, with their small but affluent Hindu and even smaller Parsi communities, are generally more moderate. Karachi's business elites, in particular, and Muhajirs or Muslim migrants from India after Independence, have historically shown an interest in furthering economic and cultural ties with India. In KPK, ethnic and tribal links to neighbouring Afghanistan create a different set of concerns. Many Pashtun nationalists have criticised the Pakistani Army's India-centric worldview, arguing that it diverts attention from pressing domestic issues. Opposition within Pakistan to Punjabi domination They have also periodically opposed Punjabi-officer led military operations in predominantly Pashtun areas, seeing them as exploitative, heavy-handed and brutal. And Baluchistan, long marginalised and subjected to resource exploitation by the Punjabi-dominated federal government, has endured repeated insurgencies seeking greater autonomy. Unsurprisingly, Baloch leaders often view India more favourably – as a potential counterweight to Punjabi dominance. Islamabad's Punjabi establishment, in turn, routinely accuses India of fomenting unrest in the province, further entrenching the mutual cycle of hostility and suspicion. Federally administered regions like Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir/Azad Jammu and Kashmir and adjoining Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) areas too had, in recent decades grown increasingly resentful of Islamabad's PM-led centralised control. Local Shia's further accused the army of Sinicising the region by settling PMs in the area with the aim of ultimately dominating the disputed territory. Meanwhile, the history of recruiting PMs into the British Indian Army began in the aftermath of the 1857 Rebellion, which exposed to the British the risks of over-reliance on high-caste Hindus and Muslim sepoys from Bengal and Awadh, who proved duplicitous during the fighting. In response, the colonial administration overhauled its recruitment strategy and formalised the theory of 'Martial Races' – patronisingly designating certain ethnic groups as naturally suited to soldiering. Among these, the British turned decisively to Punjab, particularly PMs whom they perceived not only as physically robust but also loyal and inherently martial. Also Read: India's Outreach to Kabul Amid Simmering 'Pashtunistan' Demand Could Give It Leverage Over Pakistan By the early 20th century, PMs constituted over 50% of the British Indian Army, with 'dedicated' recruitment and cantonment centres established at Rawalpindi, Jhelum, and Sialkot. And, of the 1.5 million Indian troops who served in the First World War, roughly 3,60,000 were PMs, alongside Sikhs and other so-termed martial races like Jats, Marathas, Dogra's, Rajput' and of course, Gurkha's. The PM number nearly doubled during the Second World War, reflecting the continued reliance on Punjab to sustain Allied fighting manpower. Following Partition, Pakistan received 33% of British Indian Army personnel and assets, but only 19 % of the overall population of united India and 17% of its economic resources. This, in turn, gave rise to the oft-repeated maxim, popular even today, that while other countries had an army, the Pakistan Army had a country. Additionally, this military bequest almost completely buttressed PMs' dominance in the new Pakistan Army and the traditional recruiting hubs of Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Attock, and Sargodha continued to supply it recruits, and still do. In essence, Pakistan's Punjabi leadership simply boosted the PMs' formidable and outsized influence over national security institutions and strategic policymaking., which shows no sign of abating. There is, however, another worrisome aspect to the PMs' control over the army, which is that many senior personnel do not reportedly look upon nuclear weapons as mere deterrents in the abstract, but rather as credible instruments of use-especially under extreme tactical battlefield pressure. PMs don't view nuclear weapons as mere strategic leverage Their faith in 'full spectrum deterrence', which includes the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in response to conventional Indian military incursions onto its territory, remains rooted in a mix of Pakistani military doctrine and institutional culture that has been largely shaped by the ascendent PM lobby. This faction looks upon TNWs-like the Nasr missile – not as weapons deterring nuclear war, but as instruments discouraging conventional war, implying their use in battlefield scenarios. Numerous PM generals and officials had, at varying times articulated, directly or indirectly, that Pakistan's nuclear red lines were lower than India's; not employing nuclear weapons when national survival or pride was at stake for the PM, equated buzdili, or cowardice. In fact, former Railway Minister Sheikh Rashid, a PM himself, publicly declared in 2019 that Pakistan had 125-250-gram nuclear bombs to hit 'targeted areas'. His comments, echoed similarly over years by other PMs came amidst tirades by then Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan on the possibility of a military confrontation with India over Kashmir. So, in conclusion, Pakistan's ethnic PM military and broadly official mindset does not view nuclear weapons as mere strategic leverage; it believes in their conditional usability, rendering crisis management in the region highly hazardous during military standoffs like Op Sindoor. Make a contribution to Independent Journalism Related News Asim Munir's Elevation to Field Marshal Likely to Disturb Military Norms, Succession Dynamics Pakistani Army Chief Asim Munir Elevated to Field Marshal Rank India Dismisses Pakistan's Claim of Role in Balochistan Attack as 'Baseless' ISI Chief is Pakistan's New NSA. What Does This Dual Appointment Mean? Row Over Army Statement That India's Air Defence System Shielded Golden Temple From Pakistan's Strikes Who Matters in Today's Pakistan? Here are Those Shaping its Posture Against India Army Blames News Reports, Contradicts Corps Commander's Claim of Air Defence Guns at Golden Temple Guns Have Fallen Silent but India's Pakistan Dilemma Remains Unsorted How Separatist Movements Have Created Pakistan's Two and a Half Front Dilemma About Us Contact Us Support Us © Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
The Wire
16-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
High-Stakes Nuclear Poker: How Pakistan's Deterrent Still Checks India—Even After Operation Sindoor
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now World High-Stakes Nuclear Poker: How Pakistan's Deterrent Still Checks India—Even After Operation Sindoor Rahul Bedi 39 minutes ago By weaponising its nuclear arsenal as a tool of coercive diplomacy, Islamabad has mastered the art of strategic brinkmanship – forcing world powers to play by its rules, again and again. Pakistan's Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif chairs the meeting of the National Security Committee, in Islamabad, Pakistan, Thursday, April 24, 2025. Photo: AP/PTI Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Donate now Chandigarh: In the smoke-filled casinos of global geopolitics, where nations bluff, raise and fold in their poker hands with gigantic stakes involving the future of states, national power, prestige and military conflicts, one player continues to doggedly game the house – Pakistan. Ostensibly, it holds a feeble hand. It is besieged by a struggling economy, accelerating debt, political chaos, countless ethnic insurgencies and armed movements for autonomy. Its conventional military is outmatched by India, which dismembered Pakistan in 1971 and created Bangladesh, prevailed in Kargil and last week delivered – going by New Delhi's claims – punitive admonishment to Islamabad via Operation Sindoor which reportedly led it to sue for cessation of hostilities. Yet, despite such debilitating handicaps, Pakistan deftly plays the high-stakes game of global diplomacy like a high roller, having mastered the art of nuclear poker. With its stash of 165-odd nuclear warheads, piled up on its side of South Asia's green-baized poker table, and a bank of highly enriched uranium and plutonium to augment this stockpile, it has ensured that India and the world treat it with gravity, crossing it only at great risk. Pakistan has yet to be decisively out-played at the tables, though its obituary as a nation-state has been written countless times. Pakistan's nuclear ace But over the past 26 years, after emerging from the nuclear closet in May 1998, it has deftly finessed its hand with its nuclear ace. And, in possibly the most turbulent era in the region in recent times, it has finagled loan waivers, survived sanctions, acquired advanced weaponry from the United States and China, hustled financial handouts and much else, by simply intoning its kamikaze mantra, which spooks the world each time: If we go down, we'll take the whole neighbourhood and beyond with us. Earlier this week, Pakistan's deliberate shuffling of the deck led Washington to conclude the threat of uncontrolled escalation required its active intervention. What happened after is well-known; US President Donald Trump has already spoken of it six times in the past few days. Rawalpindi's flexible 'minimum credible deterrence' doctrine has adequate built-in ambiguity to leave adversaries and allies guessing its poker-playing strategy. Simply put, this canon proclaims that Pakistan would activate its 'full spectrum capabilities', including nuclear, if it perceived an existential threat to its territory and the core of its military apparatus, especially the Army. This cunningly flexible and adaptable doctrine has rewarded Pakistan for decades – not just militarily and strategically vis-à-vis India, but also financially in its dealings with global institutions. In such transactions, Islamabad has repeatedly asserted that a bankrupt nuclear-armed Pakistan posed a far greater risk than a financially mismanaged one.' Another, more quietly voiced concern from Islamabad centers on the unthinkable scenario: that Islamic insurgents – some of whom, like Lashkar-e-Tayyaba and Jaish-e-Mohammad, enjoy overt military support – might seize Pakistan's nuclear assets amid a fiscal collapse. These fears were further stoked by revelations that senior Pakistani nuclear scientist Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood had once briefed top al-Qaeda figures on weapons of mass destruction, though nothing ultimately came of it. Also Read: Operation Sindoor Highlights That It's Time for the Indian Air Force to Make Key Procurements Hence, each time Pakistan teeters on the brink of a World Bank or International Monetary Fund (IMF) default, most member states quietly relent, faced inherently with the even more horrific and apocalyptic alternative. Many domestic and international security analysts argued that the IMF's approval of a $2.02 billion loan to Pakistan on May 10 and 14, in two tranches, was not purely economic. Ostensibly it may have been driven by concerns to stabilise Pakistan's finances and, by extension, ensure the security of its nuclear arsenal. The disbursement was part of the IMF's $7 billion Extended Fund Facility, and the remaining $4.98 billion too are likely to be cleared without issue by its October 2027 deadline, reportedly for analogous considerations. Earlier, in October 2022, Pakistan was, after four years, removed from the 'grey list' of the Financial Action Task Force (FAFT), a global organisation combating money laundering and terror financing, following quiet lobbying by the US. Analysts again pointed to Pakistan's nuclear status as a 'quiet but significant' factor, with its economic collapse seen as a global security risk – highlighting how its deterrence brinkmanship extended far beyond the battlefield. This deterrence has further enabled Pakistan to defy norms and push the envelope with India and the world, with little consequences. During the 1999 Kargil conflict, for instance, where over 500 soldiers died on each side, US President Clinton intervened to end the fighting, influenced by Pakistan's incipient nuclear threat. Thereafter, India invited Pakistan's President Musharraf for peace talks in Agra, which expectedly failed, but the entire episode effectively, yet again acknowledged its looming nuclear weapons salience. Around the same time, Dr. A.Q. Khan, Pakistan's top nuclear scientist, was exposed for proliferating uranium enrichment technology to Iran, North Korea, and Libya, even delivering centrifuges via military aircraft to process it. Yet US penalties in this complex saga were mild – mostly reputational – given Islamabad's role as a key Washington ally in the post-9/11 war in Afghanistan. An emboldened Pakistan also denied the International Atomic Energy Agency and the US access to Khan, and other Western powers played along, unwilling to push Islamabad too hard and risk destabilising the region. US military and economic aid to Pakistan too continued unabated, and between 2001 and 2010 Pakistan, received over $20 billion from Washington, in a subtle endorsement of Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme. The morbid mastery of playing both sides of the global table In 2001, Jaish gunmen attacked the Indian parliament, prompting Delhi to mobilise its army along the Pakistan border. But in this high-stakes standoff, Islamabad's nuclear red lines held firm and 10 months later, India's forces withdrew – their equipment battered, and morale dented. Seven years later, in 2008, Lashkar operatives struck two of Mumbai's five-star hotels, Victoria Terminus, and a Jewish seminary, killing 166 people. Once again, Pakistan's nuclear deterrent ensured that no major punitive response followed. Meanwhile, Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence directorate (ISI) – one of the world's primary high-rollers in the geopolitical casino – faced allegations from Washington of backing al-Qaeda elements for the 9/11 attacks. Later, it was also accused of sheltering Osama bin Laden, who was ultimately killed in 2011 by US Special Forces just miles from Pakistan's Kakul military academy in Abbottabad in the north-west. Yet again, few repercussions followed and Pakistan's nuclear programme continued to expand, as did its morbid mastery of playing both sides of the global table. Need logistics for the US-led war in Afghanistan? Pakistan's your man. Seeking Arabian Sea access for the Belt and Road Initiative? China, step right in. Caught aiding militants? Let's discuss it – over a few billion dollars in aid, naturally. And more recently, even as Operation Sindoor unfolded – with high-tech air, missile, and drone duels and deadlocked media narratives – Pakistan held firm. As India and the world awaited escalation, Islamabad calmly deployed its Chinese-origin JF-10C fighters armed with lethal PL-15E missiles, a pointed reminder that while the hardware may come from Beijing, the game was entirely Pakistan's. Thereafter, in the fog of near-war, Pakistan appeared unfazed for a few days, sensing that India's threshold for escalation remained constrained by the unspoken threat of nuclear 'overreaction' – despite New Delhi's protestations to the contrary. Once again, in poker terms, India held the stronger, conventional hand, with superior military tech, but Pakistan controlled the fear in the room – backed by its arsenal of 165–170 nuclear warheads, the only such stockpile in the world managed by a military known for being a revisionist, rather than a status quo, power. According to the Federation of American Scientists and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, this arsenal includes short-range, low-yield tactical nuclear weapons, designed for battlefield use against Indian forces. Despite its economic crisis, Pakistan is reportedly expanding this stockpile –potentially to over 200 warheads – making it the world's fifth-largest nuclear weapons holder, aimed almost exclusively at India. Also Read: Pahalgam Attack Exposes Deep Fault Lines in India's Security Apparatus Such growth would place it ahead of Israel, India, and North Korea, but behind the US, Russia, China, and France. Some analysts suggest Operation Sindoor's escalation was checked by this implicit nuclear threat –underscored by a Reuters report on May 10 stating that Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif had convened Pakistan's National Command Authority (NCA). Though later denied by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif, the report is believed to have caused alarm in global capitals, including Washington, and catalysed a US-led push to broker a ceasefire between the two adversaries. Tellingly, just a day earlier, US Vice President J.D. Vance had told Fox News that the India-Pakistan conflict was 'fundamentally not [America's] business' and beyond its control. Yet, mere hours later –likely in response to reports of Pakistan's National Command Authority convening – Vance emerged as a key interlocutor, alongside Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in efforts to de-escalate the crisis. According to media reports Vance even spoke with Modi late on May 10 or early the next morning. Soon after, Pakistan's Director General of Military Operations, Major General Kashif Abdullah, contacted his Indian counterpart, Lieutenant General Rajiv Ghai, to initiate a ceasefire – one that, for now, continues to hold. Pakistan is not 'winning' but continues to play dangerously This is not to suggest that Pakistan is 'winning.' Far from it. Its economy remains on IMF life support, its politics is in disarray, and it faces serious internal threats – from former Taliban allies backing the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), to Baloch rebels pushing for autonomy, amid a host of multiple serious challenges. But like a seasoned poker hustler, Pakistan plays just dangerously enough that India hesitates to call its bluff outright, irrespective of Modi's claims of standing up to its threats of 'nuclear blackmail', which is deterrence by another name. And in an era of armchair generals, media theatrics, and precision-strike hashtags, sometimes that's all it takes for Pakistan to survive – yet again. After its devastating loss in the 1971 war, Pakistan realised that fighting India toe-to-toe with combat aircraft, tanks, artillery, troops and warships was a recipe for disaster. Accordingly, in line with classic deterrence logic, then Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto reasoned Pakistan needed to raise the cost of aggression so high that war itself with India would become irrational and non-viable. Bhutto believed that nuclear weapons were the ultimate power currency, an equaliser and instrument of leverage, especially for weaker states like Pakistan. This conviction prompted his iconic 1972 declaration: that Pakistanis would eat grass, even go hungry, but would still develop nuclear weapons. The phrase became a powerful symbol of Pakistan's nuclear resolve that was publicly vindicated 26 years later, on May 28, 1998, but having privately achieved this capability much earlier with Beijing's assistance. Also Read: With Simla Agreement Questioned, Does UN Military Observer Group Have Any Role Left? China's involvement in aiding Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme is well documented, as is the US's connivance and that of other Western nations that simply looked away and pretended that nothing was amiss, despite knowing fully well what was afoot. At the time, however, the US and its NATO allies needed Islamabad to channel weapons and trained mujahideen into Soviet-occupied Afghanistan and sanctions were occasionally imposed but just as often lifted, waived, or quietly bypassed. In effect, it's now evident that Pakistan's bomb didn't just arise from defiance – it was cultivated in the fertile soil of Western complicity. Islamabad didn't play the game alone; it was enabled, rationalised, and bankrolled by these very powers that preferred buying short-term stability over enforcing long-term norms. Ironically, these are the same powers now seeking détente between Delhi and Islamabad to prevent a nuclear conflagration over Kashmir. And while the house cards will change – from proxy militants to drone warfare to diplomatic muscle and much else – the nuclear bluff remains the ace up Pakistan's sleeve. The real question is how long the other players at the table, especially India and the West, will follow the old rules in this new Great Game. 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