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The Wire
4 days ago
- Business
- The Wire
Indian Army's Close-Quarter Battle Carbine Procurement Saga Poised to End with KSSL and Adani Deals
Rahul Bedi The process has underscored a key reality – for the MoD and the Indian Army, quick reaction weapons arrive at a glacial pace, if at all. Representative image of an Indian Army soldier with a weapon. Photo: PTI. New Delhi: It has been one of the longest procurement sagas in the Indian Army's history – nearly a quarter-century of tenders floated. scrapped, 'fast-track' acquisition contracts announced and abandoned, and intermediate or 'stopgap' fixes standing in for real solutions. And, finally last month it appeared that the Indian Army's close-quarter battle (CQB) carbine requirement of 425,318 units, pending since the late 1990s is likely to be met, to replace its legacy 9mm 1A1/2A1 sub-machine guns (SMGs) – local versions of the L2A3 Sterling machine gun – developed in England in the mid-1940s, and entering British Army service in 1953. For decades, these two SMG variants were licence-built for decades by the erstwhile Small Arms Factory at Kanpur, part of the erstwhile state-run Ordnance Factory Board, but their manufacture had ceased altogether on grounds of obsolescence by the early 2000s. Thereafter, the Indian Army had largely been operating without a CQB carbine, which operationally was critical to providing troops, much like its description suggests, with a compact, lightweight weapon for rapid, accurate fire in confined or urban environments, mountainous terrain and jungle environments. Since then, every attempt to replace the carbine has marched through the Ministry of Defence's (MoD's) familiar parade – tenders announced, trials held, everything voided, before sinking into the familiar swamp of bureaucratic futility with no weapon system. But industry sources now say that this cycle of ineptness had seemingly ended with the recent shortlisting of Kalyani Strategic Systems Limited and Adani Aerospace & Defence to supply 425,213 5.56×45 mm carbines to the Army in a potential Rs 2,800-crore deal that is expected to be imminently signed. According to the putative arrangement, KSSL, which had emerged as L1, or the lowest bidder, following trials, would supply the Army 60% or 255,190 CQB carbines of the overall tender from either its small arms unit at Jejuri or at Khed, near Pune. Additionally, Adani Defence, which was L2 or the second lowest bidder, is likely to be awarded the deal to provide the remaining 170,023 carbines from its facility at Gwalior, which it had acquired in 2020 from Punj Lloyd Raksha. Industry sources said that, in all likelihood, Adani Defence would match KSSL's L1 bid for the carbines in keeping with MoD standing operating procedures in selling them to the Army. The CQB carbine delivery timelines are expected to stretch over the next few years, with initial batches likely to be employed by Indian Army counter-insurgency units in Kashmir and the Northeast, where the absence of such a compact weapon small arms system has been most acutely felt. For soldiers used to presently lugging full-length assault rifles into tight alleyways or boarding helicopters with unwieldy weapons, the arrival of lightweight, rapid-firing CQB carbines will be more than an operational boost; it will finally usher in a vast operational change in counter-insurgency (COIN) operations. Meanwhile, KSSL will series produce the Joint Venture Protective Carbine (JVPC) engineered by the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO) Armament Research & Development Establishment (ARDE) in Pune, as part of a public-private partnership (PPP), under the MoD's atmanirbharta or self-reliance rubric. This carbine will also incorporate over 60% of content sourced indigenously. Weighing around three kg, the gas-operated JVPC features an ergonomic, ambidextrous design with a retractable stock and Picatinny rails for optics and accessories. Capable of firing over 700 rounds per minute to an effective range of 200-300m, it reportedly exhibits low recoil and is believed to demonstrate high reliability across extreme temperatures and in varied environments and incorporates a 120mm bayonet for hand-to-hand combat. Its service life is engineered for a service life of 15 years or 15,000 rounds, whichever comes first. Adani Defence, on the other hand, will produce the Israel Weapon Industries (IWI) Galil ACE CQB carbines-locally named 'Jeet', meaning 'victory'. It features a 368 mm long barrel, a weight of 3.2 kg, and a rate of fire between 650-750 rounds per minute to a 300-500 m range. Jeet incorporates a rotating bolt with a short-stroke gas piston, a full-length Picatinny rail for optics, a folding/telescopic stock, ambidextrous controls for quick handling, and compatibility with standard NATO magazines. The ACE CQB has also been deployed for extended periods by the Israel Defence Forces in its numerous COIN operations and other conflicts against Palestinians and many of its neighbours where firefights often occur in confined spaces. The two carbines were shortlisted after technical evaluations and field trials involving other domestic vendors, partnering with overseas small arms makers. These included Jindal Defence and Aerospace – associating with Brazil's Taurus Armas, BSS Material in New Delhi, linking up with Indo-Russian Rifles Private Limited and Bharat Electronics, which had tied up with Italy's Beretta. Over the years, the CQB carbine procurement process has been compelling and concerning, exposing both the Army's and MoD's procurement systems at their most ineffective, bogged down by delays, indecision, and missed opportunities. After acknowledging the operational shortcomings of the aging 9mm Sterling submachine gun in the late 1990s – particularly its limited range, stopping power, and accuracy – the Indian Army adopted a stopgap solution. It employed a shortened variant of the locally developed 5.56x45mm Indian Small Arms System (INSAS) assault rifle as part of its customary jugaad, or innovative fix, which only ended up highlighting its significant limitations and rendering it relatively ineffective for such specialised roles. Senior infantry officers said the INSAS rifle was not optimised for CQB scenarios, as its relatively longer barrel and overall dimensions made manoeuvring in confined spaces cumbersome. The absence of features like a folding stock or compact design further hindered its suitability for rapid movement and handling in close and restrained urban situations. Soldiers found it challenging to quickly reposition and engage enemy targets, simply due to the rifle's size and weight. But despite these obvious limitations, these shortened INSAS alternates remained in widespread use for years and continue even today. However, in 2002-3, the first global tender was floated for 44,618 5.56x45mm CQB carbines, with under-barrel grenade launcher compatibility. Several trials took place, involving major overseas small arms makers like the US's Colt, Italy's Beretta and IWI. But in 2007-2008, after extended trials at the Infantry School at Mhow, in Madhya Pradesh, in the Rajasthan desert, Punjab's plains and high altitude regions in Sikkim and Himachal, the contract was terminated due to the Indian Army's 'overreach' in determining the carbines specifications or Qualitative Requirements (QRs) about their add-ons, like thermal-designated laser sights. A follow-on RfP was issued in December 2010 for an equal number of weapons. Then again, in 2013, after a protracted three-year trial process, the carbine procurement was once again thwarted, not by performance issues, but over a minor safety feature. One of the shortlisted carbines included a small, screw-like safety component designed to render the sights "eye safe" during low-intensity engagements, thereby preventing potential retina damage. Yet, this feature was not specified in the original tender's technical requirements, and a three-member, senior Army committee failed in resolving the 'discrepancy', leading again to the contract's cancellation, despite escalating insurgent activities in Kashmir and increasing Army casualties in COIN encounters. Industry sources noted that this time round, the tender was scrapped solely because the "safety screw" had not been included in the original specifications, irrespective of the protection it offered. Subsequently, in March 2018 the MoD issued yet one more RfP – its third in a decade, for 93,895 CQB carbines this time, in which the United Arab Emirates Caracal International's CAR 816 carbine was shortlisted, seven months later for procurement via the MoD's Fast Track Procedure (FTP), having bested its rival F60 model fielded by Thales of Australia in trials. Under the FTP route, through which the CAR 816s were to be procured, the $110 million tender was to have been completed within the mandated 12-14 months or by August 2019. But 13 months later, in September 2020, the MoD opted to arbitrarily ditch the deal for undeclared reasons. 'Processing the carbine purchase via the FTP indicated the operational urgency of the buy, but that too was bafflingly blocked,' said a senior army officer associated with the deal. The entire endeavour was simply incomprehensible and mystifying, he added, declining to be named, as he was not authorised to speak to the media. Conversely, in the ensuing years, the ARDE developed the JVPC in collaboration with KSSL, and Adani Defence partnered successfully with IWI to produce the 'Jeet', ostensibly clinching the CQB carbine buy as things presently stand. But it also underscored the reality that for the MoD and the Indian Army, quick reaction weapons arrive at a glacial pace, if at all. 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The Wire
02-08-2025
- Entertainment
- The Wire
Is India Going Through a Humour Crisis?
Culture Rahul Bedi Light-hearted joviality in offices is now policed for tone and political correctness, while in schools and colleges, humour amongst peers is more guarded and cautious, lest it be misconstrued. Chandigarh: Once known for its earthy wit, street-smart repartee, irreverence and instinctive ability to laugh at itself, Indian society today seems trapped in a growing humour deficit in its daily life. What was once casual banter till India's mid-adulthood, when humour was taken for granted, is now forensically dissected for imagined slights; witticisms and jokes risk being misconstrued as insults, provocations or veiled political statements, banter triggers offence, and satire is increasingly being labelled as sedition. Once a pressure valve for public frustration in drawing rooms, WhatsApp groups, comedy clubs or editorial cartoons, humour is now a potential trigger for outrage. Telling jokes at chai stalls, in drawing rooms and at addas across urban India, leg-pulling among friends, witty retorts in crowded buses, even irreverent mocking of netas and babus were markers of a society that did not take itself too seriously and was capable, in ample measure, of laughing at itself. Sadly, that's history. Light-hearted joviality in offices is now policed for tone and political correctness, while in schools and colleges, humour amongst peers is more guarded and cautious, lest it be misconstrued. Even in the privacy of homes, it often fails to even register, as elders and youngsters no longer share cultural references or tolerance levels, and the fear of saying the 'wrong thing' outweighs the unadulterated joy of shared spontaneous laughter. 'They (the authorities) have criminalised being funny,' stand-up comedian Kunal Kamra declared in an interview with The Wire in 2020, whilst the late celebrated cartoonist R.K. Laxman earlier declared that his 'Common Man' was silent and no longer amused. He was afraid to laugh in case someone got offended, he declared in the early 2000s. Stand-up comic Vir Das put it a little more starkly, following a severe backlash to his droll 'Two Indias' monologue at the Kennedy Centre in Washington in 2021. He tweeted that Indians were not losing their sense of humour, but that it was being taken from them (by officialdom), one complaint at a time. Other pro-establishment celebrities, however, argued that limits were both necessary and justified. Actor and BJP MP Kangana Ranaut, for instance, has frequently asserted that comedy should not be centred on criticising the country or its culture. That's not humour, she has said, but mockery under the guise of liberalism. Similarly, television anchor Sudhir Chaudhary contends that some comedians today used freedom of expression to promote ideological agendas. 'That's not freedom – it's propaganda through jokes,' he has stated. Meanwhile, the public space for irreverence, rather than being a means to poke fun at power or question state absurdities and corruption, has become a highly risky business, especially if it strays a little beyond the anodyne in a politically polarised environment. Even feeble attempts at lampooning authority or officialdom runs the risk of being greeted with vicious trolling, First Information Reports (FIRs) or incarcerations and in many instances, all three. The shift in humour from droll to dreary has been further eroded by the omnipotent online culture that provokes and rewards anger. In this tectonic shift, social media has replaced spirited street-corner banter with sanitised, filtered jokes, where 'likes' have become trophies of what passes for humour and mirth. Often, a harmless comment, stripped of context, can trigger a storm, robbing it of its intended spontaneity, mischief, and cordiality. The resultant humour remains cautious, sterilised, and often dull, reduced to safe subjects and recycled tropes, much like German jokes, which 19th century American writer and humourist Mark Twain said were no laughing matter. Real satire – one that poked fun at the powerful, questioned societal hypocrisies and norms, or exposed cultural absurdities – was near extinct and irreverence was no longer celebrated or encouraged, particularly in the formal electronic or print media. Alongside, the language of humour itself across urban India had narrowed, where largely Hinglish 'vegetarian' jokes lacked the knock-out punch of robust Punjabi ones from yesteryears, a wicked Malayali comeback or even a sly Tamil pun. A plethora of hilarious Punjabi jokes from countless impromptu gatherings in my youth – with their earthy punch and saucy irreverence – still linger as iconic, endlessly amusing memories, though now retold sotto voce. These gems were joyfully embellished over the years by generations of wickedly witty Punjabis, each adding their own quirky, risqué and deliciously inventive twists, turning simple jokes into sagas of mischief and social insight. Many carried pleasurably imaginative and bizarre plots, often laced with sharp social commentary reflective of their times. They weren't just jokes – they were mini-performances, a joy to recount, and an even greater pleasure to hear and relish. But, unfortunately, what was once shared freely is now whispered, the laughter tempered but not entirely silenced. These days, some of us greybeards diffidently ask – or are asked in return – 'Heard any genuinely funny new ones lately?' The standard answer is largely a sheepish 'No'. But in apologetic defiance, many of us reach defensively for their cell-phones to read out a recycled joke or to forward one via WhatsApp which has become today's ultimate humour crutch. And though fleetingly mirthful, this form of humour remains impersonal – a dehumanised, utilitarian exercise that misses the tone, tenor, body language, and above all, the theatricality accompanying a well-told, and at times, even the not-so-good joke. Doubtlessly, this WhatsApp substitute robs the moment of its pitch, spectacle, warmth and the vital human connection that only live, personal storytelling can evoke. Impersonally e-mailing jokes or circulating them via social media is the easier, more practical and lazier amusement alternative. Even stand-up comedy emerges like a poor substitute, part of the larger subcontracting syndrome in a world where, at a personal level, we're becoming more dour than droll, more reverential than refreshingly irreverent. Regrettably, our drift into this digital sphere has, for audiences, disappointingly put paid to raucous, thigh-slapping guffaw sessions, accompanied by gleeful shrieks and high fives as delightfully bawdy and lesser-rollicking jokes and irreverent tales surged at riotous gatherings years earlier. As an ageing humourist amusingly put it, these extravagant, albeit involuntary reactions of several generations of now aged Indians, erupted like a shaken soda-water bottle or beer can – sudden, loud and delightfully messy. These sessions were not only therapeutic and salutary, but even years later, hugely memorable. But to make matters worse, even unimpeded laughter, from the belly outwards, is now carefully rationed, considered impolite. In our age of curated seriousness, genuine, unfiltered mirth is decidedly frowned upon in polite company, and from being the accepted and desired norm in yesteryears, such riotous jollity is fast becoming the exception. It's also an indisputable fact that, as a people, most Indians tend to take themselves far too seriously – hobbled by an ancient caution, or perhaps superstition, that gratification in any form, especially laughter, is sinful or somehow licentious. Then there's that age-old statutory warning we've all grown up with: laugh too much, and providence will balance it out by making you cry just as hard. This inherent deterrence, combined with our increasingly overwrought, politically correct, uptight and terminally self-absorbed and politicised society, has brought us to a strange inflection point where most people have wilfully taken to gagging the gag. However, alternately, albeit often overlooked, there exists a seamy and unpleasant layer of humour – the scatological, slapstick and lowbrow strain that relies on bodily functions, sexual innuendo and crass exaggeration to appeal to our most basic instincts. This genre, often dismissed as crude, persists in limited quarters as it triggers instant, unfiltered laughter which appeals directly to raw emotion. And yet, in this growing humourless wasteland, all is not lost. Shades of the Indian sense of humour still endure in pockets: in memes, in regional comedies, in political cartoons that survive despite the risk, and most refreshingly, in rural India. In small towns, roadside dhabas, village squares, and paan -stained tea stalls, wit still remains earthy and spontaneous. Jokes here aren't merely told – they're enacted, lived and passed on like erstwhile oral tradition. Relatively free, for now, from the anxieties of self-censorship and political pressure, rural humour remains uncurated, unselfconscious and to some extent, relatively intrepid. But the everyday casualness with which humour was once exchanged – without fear or consequence – has faded, possibly permanently. Reclaiming that ease will not only necessitate rebuilding societal tolerance for disagreement, but also shedding hypocrisy and acknowledging our foibles and collective public infirmities. This remains essential; for when people fear to laugh in public or edit their witticisms before they speak, that society is not just cheerless, but has lost its soul. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments.
The Wire
06-06-2025
- Business
- The Wire
Post Op Sindoor, Experts Say India Should Look Beyond Traditional Suppliers For Defence Procurement
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Post Op Sindoor, Experts Say India Should Look Beyond Traditional Suppliers For Defence Procurement Rahul Bedi 36 minutes ago Countries like Sweden, Spain, Italy, Germany, South Korea, and Japan, though historically modest defence collaborators with India, offer immense promise. An Army personnel stands near a weapon system during a demonstration near the India-Pakistan border, Punjab on Monday, May 19, Army showcased a demonstration of how Indian Air Defence systems, including AKASH missile system, L-70 Air Defence Guns, thwarted attempts by Pakistan to target civilian and religious sites . Photo: PTI Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now Chandigarh: In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, Indian defence planners and service veterans are increasingly advocating a shift from traditional suppliers like the US, Russia, and Israel toward smaller European and technologically advanced Asian nations. This strategic pivot, backed by analysts and commentators aims to diversify India's defence procurement while reinforcing the Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliance) agenda. Brigadier Rahul Bhonsle (Retd) of Security Risks consultancy in New Delhi notes that these smaller nations – unlike the larger powers – tend to separate defence commerce from geopolitical agendas, focusing instead on industrial logic. Their political neutrality and limited entanglement in wars and global rivalries also rendered them lower-risk partners for co-development and technology transfer. Strategic necessity of diversifying India's defence procurement matrix India's changing threat environment and supply-chain shocks from traditional defence partners like Russia, the US, and Israel have highlighted the strategic necessity of diversifying its defence procurement matrix. Overdependence on a few suppliers – many of whom are either geopolitically distracted, technologically restrictive, or facing internal turmoil – has highlighted shortcomings after Operation Sindoor. In contrast, countries like Sweden, Spain, Italy, Germany, South Korea, and Japan, though historically modest defence collaborators with India, offer immense promise. Their advanced capabilities in precision munitions, missile systems, naval and AI-enabled network-centric platforms, cyber defence, and small arms – combined with flexible terms and political neutrality – make them ideal partners in India's push for strategic autonomy. These nations are more open to co-development, technology transfer, and localised production, aligning well with India's Atmanirbharta agenda. They also bring agility, innovation, and lower political baggage, helping India build a resilient, future-ready force structure. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Russia, the US, Israel, and France collectively accounted for 84% of India's total arms imports between 2019 and 2023. Russia remained, by far India's largest supplier with 36%, despite a decline from previous decades. But over 60% of platforms and sundry equipment currently in service across the Indian armed forces still originate from Russia. France followed with 29%, while the US and Israel contributed 11% and 8% respectively. Collectively these countries have equipped India with a broad array of platforms – combat and transport aircraft, heavy lift and attack helicopters, surveillance platforms, diesel-electric submarines, howitzers, small arms, armed and surveillance drones, missile systems, sensors, and precision-guided munitions amongst other sundry gear. The remaining 16% came from a diverse group including South Korea, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Ukraine, though all military ties with Kyiv ceased in 2022 following the ongoing war with Russia. Defence analysts like Major General A.P. Singh (Retd) argue that expanded collaboration with these smaller or less politically encumbered nations offers India 'transactional and balanced partnerships' – unlike traditional suppliers who often link defence ties to larger strategic considerations. Diplomatic friction, sanctions, and shifting alliances have repeatedly disrupted India's acquisitions, injecting operational uncertainty on many previous occasions, he added. For instance, Russia's invasion of Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions had delayed deliveries of critical systems to India like two S-400 Triumf SAM systems, four Admiral Grigorovich-class frigates, and the lease of a second Akula-class nuclear submarine. Spares for existing Russian-origin fighters, helicopters, submarines and other platforms and equipment had also faced persistent delays, affecting India's operational tempo during crises like Operation Sindoor. China's deepening military-strategic partnership with Russia a cause of worry for India Moreover, China's deepening military-strategic partnership with Russia – fueled by their joint exercises, defence technology exchanges, and arms sales – has raised concerns in New Delhi about Moscow's future reliability as an arms supplier. Beijing's growing sway over Moscow adds an unpredictable variable in India's long-standing dependence on Russian military hardware and needed a 'serious rethink' service veterans advised. They also said that the shifting axis between Russia and China had introduced 'strategic ambiguity' into India-Russia defence ties, prompting growing unease in Delhi. Moscow's increasing dependence on Beijing also raised concerns over the former's willingness to supply India with advanced weapon systems, sensitive technologies, or uninterrupted logistical support in a future conflict, particularly one involving China. The overlapping weapons ecosystems posed another risk. With both India and China operating similar Russian-origin platforms – like Sukhoi fighters and S-400 air defence systems – India faced the prospect of confronting adversaries well-acquainted with its military hardware. Coupled with supply delays and the weakening Russian defence industry, had led many Indian strategists to question the long-term reliability of Moscow as a defence partner. Also Read: Operation Sindoor Highlights That It's Time for the Indian Air Force to Make Key Procurements Simultaneously, defence ties with Israel have also come under strain. The October 2023 Hamas attacks and Israel's ensuing Gaza campaign have forced major Israeli firms like Rafael, Elbit Systems, and Israel Aerospace Industries to redirect resources toward domestic military needs. This shift had delayed component deliveries, disrupted joint development projects, and impacted India's access to technologies such as loitering munitions, UAVs, and air defence systems. There are reportedly also growing delays in sourcing components for the Israeli SPYDER low-level, quick-reaction (LLQRM) surface-to-air missile air defence system, designed to engage various aerial threats like aircraft, helicopters, UAVs, and cruise missiles. Uncertainty also prevails over future upgrades of Israeli-origin counter-drone and surveillance platforms deployed along India's borders. And, with Israel's strategic focus now fixed on managing multifront conflicts –including with Hezbollah and Iranian proxies – its ability to sustain overseas defence partnerships is under pressure. For India, long reliant on Israel for flexible terms and rapid delivery, this situation highlights the vulnerability of over-dependence on a narrow pool of suppliers. Simultaneously, political and financial turbulence during US's Donald Trump administration raised doubts in Delhi about Washington's long-term reliability as a defence partner. A key casualty was the General Electric-Hindustan Aeronautics Limited agreement to locally manufacture GE-F414IN20 after burning turbofan engines – vital for future Indian combat aircraft – which continues to face delays and unresolved hurdles. Moreover, US defence cooperation comes with rigid conditionalities, particularly on technology transfer and end-user monitoring. Washington is typically reluctant to share source codes or allow full proprietary access to its platforms, limiting India's ability to indigenise, integrate, or adapt them independently. More importantly, the US proscribes 'jugaad'-the Indian military's hallmark of innovative field-level improvisation – thereby constricting its operational flexibility. Besides, the US emphasis on interoperability, often aligned with its Indo-Pacific strategy, does not always sit well with India's emphasis on strategic autonomy. Despite closer ties in recent years-cemented through four foundational defence agreements-Delhi remains continually wary of becoming entangled in the Washington-led global security framework. 'These handicaps are reason enough for India to forge a more agile and diversified procurement and modernisation strategy involving smaller, commercially-driven nations,' said Gen Singh (Retd). Their political neutrality and willingness to support indigenisation make them better suited to India's Atmanirbharta objectives, he added. Sweden has made first 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in India's defence sector Sweden's SAAB, has established a facility in Haryana to co-produce the Carl-Gustaf M4 weapon system, marking the first 100% foreign direct investment (FDI) in India's defence sector. SAAB has also pitched its Gripen-E multirole fighter to the Indian Air Force (IAF) with robust domestic commitments, offering a cost-effective, high-performance solution to address the Force's alarming declining fighter squadron strength. SAAB has also proposed collaboration on India's fifth-generation Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA), alongside support in radar, electronic warfare (EW), cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence (AI)-assisted military programmes. Germany's ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) is close to finalising the Project-75 I (India) partnership with Mazagaon Dock Shipbuilders Ltd (MDL) that involves building six advanced diesel-electric submarines (SSK) with Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) and land-attack capabilities. Beyond P-75(I), Germany could provide expertise in next-generation submarine design, cyber defence, and EW systems. Meanwhile, India has been licence-producing Italy's Oto Melara 76mm Super Rapid Gun Mount (SRGM) for the Indian Navy (IN) since 1994. These guns equip the indigenously built aircraft carrier INS Vikrant and a variety of indigenous warships. Alongside, Italian firm Fincantieri supported Vikrant's propulsion system design, while Avio contributed to the carrier's platform management. And, more recently, Italy expressed interest in involving India in the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) a sixth-generation fighter initiative with the UK and Japan offered collaboration in jointly producing torpedoes, helicopters, radar, EW systems, UAVs, and miscellaneous naval platforms. Spain, a founding partner in Europe's Airbus Defence and Space, is presently executing a joint venture with Tata Advanced Systems Ltd (TASL) to import 16 C-295 medium transport aircraft and manufacture 40 more in Vadodara. Future tie-ups with Spain could include advanced radar and sensor systems for air defence and joint development of simulation and combat training platforms for the IAF And, in April 2025, India signed a $253 million deal with Larsen & Toubro for 100 additional K9 Vajra-T 155mm/52 calibre tracked self-propelled howitzers, under license from South Korea's Hanwha Defense – a follow-on to an analogous 2017 order. Prospects also include expanding K9-based artillery cooperation and co-developing Mine Counter Countermeasure Vessels (MCMVs), which the IN desperately needs. Also Read: India's Fighter Jet Ambitions: From Russian Roulette to Indigenous Dreams India-Japan, defence collaboration too has deepened in recent years, driven by shared strategic concerns over a hegemonic China and a mutual commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Japan has offered India dual-use technologies in robotics, autonomous systems, and space-based surveillance as well as possibilities of co-developing unmanned military ground vehicles and enhancing cyber-security frameworks. Consequently, all such potential collaborations, touched upon cursorily, could well provide India with the latest technological depth and resilience required for modern warfare in the post-Op Sindoor environment – where the basic nature of conflict itself was evolving through drones, EW and stand-off, long-range precision strikes. To engage in such wars, India's military needs to be not just well-equipped but agile and technologically integrated, for which a diversified defence portfolio is no longer optional – it is a strategic imperative. The Wire is now on WhatsApp. Follow our channel for sharp analysis and opinions on the latest developments. Make a contribution to Independent Journalism Related News Russian Ambassador Says 'Discussion Ongoing' On India Getting More S-400 Air Defence System Units: Report Four Things the CDS said at Pune that Deserve Our Attention The French Are Anxious to Know the Fate of Rafales in Operation Sindoor Combat The Opposition Owes the Indian public Some Answers 'Indo-Pacific Region Never Existed, Made Up to Drag India Into Anti-China Schemes': Russian FM Lavrov CDS Accepts Loss of IAF Fighter Jets Facing Pushback, Derision and Anger, BJP Says News of Sindoor Distribution Plans 'Fake' Three Things the CDS Interviews in Singapore Tell Us Vandalism of Karachi Bakery and the Weaponisation of Food to Portray a Shallow Form of Patriotism View in Desktop Mode About Us Contact Us Support Us © Copyright. All Rights Reserved.
The Wire
29-05-2025
- Business
- The Wire
India's Fighter Jet Ambitions: From Russian Roulette to Indigenous Dreams
For the best experience, open on your mobile browser or Download our App. Next Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Rahul Bedi 5 minutes ago After abandoning a $295 million joint project with Russia, India fast-tracks its indigenous fifth-generation fighter programme—but faces familiar challenges that have plagued its defence manufacturing for decades. In this image released by @SpokespersonMoD via X on May 27, 2025, Defence Minister Rajnath Singh approved the Execution Model for the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme. The Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) will lead the project in partnership with Indian industry. (@SpokespersonMoD via PTI Photo) Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute Now Chandigarh: The Ministry of Defence's intent, announced earlier this week, to fast-track development of its indigenous fifth-generation fighter via the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA) programme, is not its first brush with such lofty ambitions. For 11 years, until 2018, the MoD and the Indian Air Force (IAF) were in advanced negotiations with Russia's Sukhoi Design Bureau to co-develop a Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) under a 2007 agreement, aimed at delivering a near-bespoke advanced stealth platform tailored largely to Indian requirements. Designated the Perspective Multi-Role Fighter by the MoD, the FGFA was based on the Sukhoi T-50—then known as PAK-FA (Perspektivnyi Aviatsionnyi Kompleks-Frontovoi Aviatsii)—which later morphed into the Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter. This putative 30-tonne, twin-engine platform promised super-cruise capabilities, advanced stealth, internal weapon bays and next-generation avionics. Consequently, in 2010-11 India paid $295 million towards the FGFA's preliminary design, as part of its equal financial but partial technical partnership. Thereafter, in 2013 Russia demanded an additional $5 billion as half its share to further progress the fighter's developmental costs, which it had pegged at around $10 billion. The MoD refused to pay but continued negotiating, and in 2016 reached a compromise under which it was agreed that each side would contribute $3.7 billion apiece—to be paid over six to seven years—towards the FGFA's further development, in addition to incorporating IAF-specific requirements on the platform. These comprised some 50-odd major and minor modifications, like replacing the fighter's NPO Saturn AL-41F1 engine with a more powerful power pack and improving its stealth features and weapons carriage system. The IAF also called for an advanced version of the fighter's nose-mounted Byelka electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, easier maintainability and assorted additional safety features. Industry sources said that at the time Sukhoi also agreed to share critical FGFA design information with Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL)—the platform's designated series manufacturing agency—which it had earlier withheld, and to try and restore its work share in the programme, which had been reduced by more than half to merely around 13%. This included providing tyres for the under-development fighter, basic navigation equipment, laser designation pods, heads-up displays and coolant for its radar, as there was little of major technological input that HAL or the IAF had to offer to the FGFA programme. Sukhoi also undertook, in principle, to deliver three single-seat FGFA prototypes by 2019-20 to the IAF for user trials, ahead of erecting a series production line for the fighters at HAL's facility in Nashik. Pulling the plug on Sukhoi Initially, the IAF had planned on procuring 200-250 single and twin-seat licence-built FGFAs, with deliveries scheduled to begin by 2017-18. This number was later reduced to 127 single-seat FGFAs, but soon after in April 2018, India opted to withdraw from the programme, forgoing all the money it had advanced to it. No accountability for any of the officials involved in the stillborn project was forthcoming. Many IAF veterans, however, were of the view that had India stayed the course with the FGFA project, by overcoming myriad shortcomings in its dealings with Russia, it would have been operating a fleet of Su-57-like fifth-generation fighters years earlier, like other advanced air forces, including China's. Besides, by staying the FGFA course, despite the hurdles, it could also have built up a firmer research and development base for future indigenous projects like the AMCA. Instead, it now faces a longer, costlier and technologically riskier path toward vindicating its fifth-generation combat aircraft goals. Industry sources, meanwhile, clarified that the decision to call off the FGFA was not taken lightly, as years of delays, cost escalation, performance shortfalls in the FGFA prototype and lack of transparency from the Russian side had steadily undermined Indian confidence. More critically, both the MoD and the IAF were dissatisfied with the level of technology transfer, the aircraft's underwhelming stealth profile and its engines, which did not meet the expected thrust-vectoring and super-cruise benchmarks. New attempt to fast-track 5th gen But the retreat from the FGFA programme did not signal a withdrawal from India's fifth-generation fighter ambitions, which sluggishly lumbered on until operational urgency thrust upon the IAF after Operation Sindoor prompted Defence Minister Rajnath Singh to pre-approve and advance the AMCA project on May 27. Alongside, the prevailing decline in the IAF's fighter squadrons from a sanctioned strength of 42.5 to merely 30-odd squadrons presently had also triggered urgency in the AMCA project. Under it, the MoD has sanctioned the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) and HAL to develop a fifth-generation fighter from the ground up, by leapfrogging technological barriers using local resources, timelines and control. The ADA-HAL combine aims to involve a wide consortium of public sector and private vendors like Bharat Electronics, Larsen & Toubro and Godrej Aerospace under the government's Aatmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) policy, and from lessons drawn from past setbacks with the snail-paced Tejas light combat aircraft (LCA) programme. Unlike the FGFA, the AMCA is being designed to meet specific Indian doctrinal needs from the outset. Conceived as a twin-engine, 25-tonne multi-role stealth fighter, the AMCA aims to integrate internal weapons bays, serpentine air intakes, radar-absorbent materials, AI-assisted mission systems and sensor fusion. It is also envisioned in two variants—a Mark 1 with an imported engine (possibly General Electric's GE F414 power pack) and a Mark II with an indigenous to-be-developed engine. Delivery of the first few prototypes is scheduled by 2035. Obstacles ahead Analysts, however, said the pathway to AMCA's development was riddled with multiple challenges. They maintained that though the FGFA was flawed, it did offer the IAF a relatively fast track to a stealth platform. Furthermore, by exiting the FGFA, India had ceded early stealth fighter experience that might have enriched its R&D ecosystem in the AMCA project. In contrast, the AMCA's development trajectory was wholly unproven. The technological risks—especially in stealth shaping, low-observable materials, propulsion and mission computers—were significant. The most pressing hurdle remained engine development, as India could still not produce a fifth-generation capable power pack, relying instead on US-origin General Electric GE F414 engines, whose full technology transfer under a 2023 agreement for HAL to make them locally remained riddled with uncertainties. GE has historically been cautious about sharing sensitive 'hot section' technologies with overseas customers, like those involving single-crystal turbine blades, thermal barrier coatings and cooling channels—core to engine durability and thrust-to-weight ratios. And while India seeks full transfer of manufacturing know-how for these components to reduce dependence on the US, Washington's export control laws under its International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) and internal GE risk assessments had reportedly limited its scope. Indian officials had also flagged ambiguity over intellectual property (IPR) ownership for technologies co-produced or indigenised with regard to the GE-414s. The fundamental concern, industry sources said, was over HAL or the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), or both, not being able to modify, even minutely, any indigenously built version of the F414 power pack without GE consent. This, in effect, would put paid to jugaad or innovation that had, over decades, served India's military industry admirably. Moreover, establishing a full-scale production line domestically for a 4.5/5-generation jet engine is a massive industrial effort, for which HAL is reportedly still amassing specialised tooling and a quality-controlled supply chain ecosystem to meet GE's strict quality audits and oversight. Unhelpful history India's failure in building a domestic modern fighter manufacturing network can be traced back to the unravelling of the 2007-08 Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) deal, which many senior IAF officers and veterans consider a 'turning point' in which a major opportunity was lost. The MMRCA project sought to procure 126 fighter jets, with a clear mandate that 108 would be built in India under transfer of technology (ToT) agreements. France's Rafale emerged as the winner in 2012 from amongst six competing rivals, but protracted negotiations over cost, technology transfer and liability clauses led to the collapse of the deal in 2015. Instead, India opted for a direct purchase of 36 Rafales in flyaway condition, further delaying the development of indigenous manufacturing capability. This missed opportunity meant India continued to depend heavily on foreign original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) for advanced combat aircraft, without acquiring the institutional knowledge and industrial base needed for independent production. Unlike China, which leveraged joint ventures and aggressive reverse-engineering to build a competent domestic fighter aircraft industry, India's public sector defence units like HAL remained underfunded and over-regulated. In the meantime, indigenous programmes like the Tejas LCA were beset by delays and capability gaps, and when its Mk1 variant eventually entered limited service, its combat potential was initially constrained by issues related to engine performance, radar integration and weapons payload. Efforts to address these shortcomings through the Mk1A and Mk2 variants are presently underway, delayed by several years. In the interim, the FGFA was expected to usher India's entry into fifth-generation capabilities, but this too was called off, cumulatively delaying India's goal of building a robust domestic fighter manufacturing base. And though the AMCA project now seeks to course-correct—but without an established supply chain, proven stealth technology or a domestic jet engine—it faces an uphill battle. It proposes to feature a cleaner stealth profile fighter with internal weapon bays and fully indigenous avionics, including an AESA radar, AI-based sensor fusion and advanced electronic warfare systems. And unlike the FGFA, AMCA emphasises modularity, digital fly-by-wire systems and next-generation cockpit ergonomics, aiming for full design authority and autonomy in both development and future upgrades. That being said, India's ability to manufacture a fifth-generation fighter hinges not just on technology, but on policy coherence, private sector integration and decisive leadership—elements sorely missing in earlier decades. So unless these structural issues are swiftly and meaningfully addressed, India risks repeating its earlier FGFA missteps with the AMCA. World The French Are Anxious to Know the Fate of Rafales in Operation Sindoor Combat View More
The Wire
24-05-2025
- Politics
- The Wire
Another Round, No Results: India–US Carrier Talks Remain Stuck in Symbolism
Menu हिंदी తెలుగు اردو Home Politics Economy World Security Law Science Society Culture Editor's Pick Opinion Support independent journalism. Donate Now Security Another Round, No Results: India–US Carrier Talks Remain Stuck in Symbolism Rahul Bedi 19 minutes ago Was it anything more than a gesture – an illusion of continuity – made with the full knowledge that nothing substantive would emerge? The eighth Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation (JWGACTC) between the Indian and US navies held from May 13–16. Photo: Press Information Bureau Real journalism holds power accountable Since 2015, The Wire has done just that. But we can continue only with your support. Contribute now Chandigarh: The only 'significant milestone' the Ministry of Defence (MoD) could cite from the recent eighth Joint Working Group on Aircraft Carrier Technology Cooperation (JWGACTC) between the Indian and US navies is simply that it happened at all. The Press Information Bureau (PIB) noted that the three-day meeting – held from May 13-16 and co-chaired by the Indian Navy's Rear Admiral Vishal Bishnoi and the US Navy's Rear Admiral Casey Moton – took place under the aegis of the long-dormant Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI), launched in 2012. As with its seven predecessors, the PIB highlighted 'valuable information' exchange and a joint statement, yet provided no concrete outcomes – underscoring the DTTI's legacy of lofty rhetoric and minimal delivery. Though not formally shuttered, the DTTI has remained effectively inactive for over a decade. Military officials and analysts widely regard it as a symbolic relic – functioning more as a placeholder for JWGACTC meetings than a credible mechanism for defence cooperation. 'Upmarket talking shop for avid navalists' The JWGACTC itself has long been dismissed by Indian Navy insiders as an 'upmarket talking shop for avid navalists,' largely due to the MoD's ongoing reluctance to approve a second indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-2) following the commissioning of INS Vikrant in 2022. Discussions have repeatedly centred on Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL) constructing a 65,000-tonne, conventionally powered carrier – tentatively called INS Vishal – with a US-made Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) from General Atomics, supporting CATOBAR (Catapult Assisted Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) operations. However, defence industry sources confirm that Vishal remains far from sanctioned. Instead, the MoD is reportedly considering a more modest 'interim' step: commissioning a second Vikrant-class 40,000-tonne carrier. This would both preserve CSL's shipbuilding capacity and advance the Indian Navy's long-standing ambition of operating three carriers – one for each seaboard, with one in reserve. The DTTI, initially unveiled by then US Deputy Defence Secretary Ashton Carter in 2012, aimed to fast-track defence collaboration by bypassing bureaucratic roadblocks. India also signed four foundational defence agreements intended to deepen military cooperation and interoperability. The initiative began with four 'pathfinder' projects – including joint development of Mobile Electric Hybrid Power Systems (MEHPS) and chemical-biological protective clothing – but these, along with two later additions (the Raven UAV and ISR modules for the C-130J-30), languished due to tepid domestic interest and were eventually shelved. Subsequent attempts to revive the DTTI, including the addition of digital helmet-mounted displays, tactical biological detection systems, and proposals for joint development of ground combat vehicles and helicopters, similarly faltered. These clashed with indigenous programmes and met the same quiet demise. Also Read: Rafale-M Imports Will Spare Navy From Sailing World-Class Carrier Without World-Class Aircraft Even as India was designated a 'Major Defence Partner' by the US and the US Senate pushed for deeper defence cooperation via legislation, the DTTI remained mired in bureaucratic inertia. At one point, it included seven working groups across a range of technology domains, but these too faded without delivering results. Sources attribute the DTTI's collapse to persistent shortcomings: indecision on the Indian side, and a paternalistic US approach offering low-grade technology. A senior Indian military officer involved in DTTI negotiations remarked that the initiative's failure starkly contrasted the otherwise growing India–US strategic partnership. 'There was a major gap between ambition and delivery,' he said. 'Eventually, it all collapsed.' By January 2023, the DTTI was effectively replaced by the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies (ICET), launched in Washington under the guidance of both countries' National Security Advisers. ICET focuses on six broad areas: defence, space, next-gen telecom (including 6G), artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and advanced biotechnology. In a Pentagon briefing in early 2024, Brigadier General Patrick Ryder described ICET as a shift from defence sales to joint innovation, calling it 'modular, scalable, and industry-driven.' ICET faces significant structural challenges But despite its ambitious design, ICET too faces significant structural challenges. Industry insiders note that while ICET aims to ease US regulatory barriers to advanced tech transfers, most American defence firms – which hold the intellectual property – operate independently of government mandates and are reluctant to share costly proprietary technologies. These firms remain bound by stringent export controls and are accountable primarily to shareholders, not US strategic policy – posing a fundamental obstacle to meaningful joint production or technology transfer. Current ICET deliverables include plans to manufacture General Electric's F-414 engines in India for the Tejas Mk-II and locally assemble 31 MQ-9 Reaper drones. But even here, progress has been slow. Technology transfer for the drones from General Atomics Aeronautical Systems is reportedly around 10-15% and includes establishing a maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) facility for the UAVs in India. Ultimately, analysts say commercial realities and bureaucratic drag continue to undermine both DTTI and ICET. As one expert put it: the DTTI collapsed under the weight of mismatched expectations; ICET risks a similar fate unless these foundational issues are addressed. This begs the question: What was the purpose of convening the eighth JWGACTC under the DTTI banner? Was it anything more than a gesture – an illusion of continuity – made with the full knowledge that nothing substantive would emerge? 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