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Scoop
08-07-2025
- Politics
- Scoop
How Are Designated Terrorist Entities Selected In New Zealand? Here's What You Need To Know
Explainer - Who are the terrorist groups listed under New Zealand law, and who decides who names them? With news last week that the American far-right group the Proud Boys had been removed from the terrorist entity list, there are questions about exactly how such a designation works. Here's what you need to know about how terrorist entities are designated in New Zealand. What is a designated terrorist entity and how are they decided upon? A designated terrorist entity decision is made by the government against groups or individuals known for violent actions. Once an entity is on the list, it greatly restricts their financial activities, participation and efforts to recruit new members. John Battersby is a specialist on terrorism and counter-terrorism and a teaching fellow in the Centre for Defence and Security Studies at Massey University. Entities can end up on the list "broadly speaking, if an individual or group is active in perpetrating terrorist acts, and are internationally recognised as doing so," he said. This includes groups designated by the United Nations, "as well as any which the NZ prime minister (acting on advice) has 'good cause to suspect' have participated in committing a terrorist act". Who is on the list? There are basically two kinds of terrorist entities - ones that are listed by the United Nations which New Zealand is obliged to include, and ones that New Zealand has designated on its own. New Zealand has international counterterrorism obligations under a number of United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolutions. These came after the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 was passed, following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States. That act established a legal framework for the suppression of terrorism. Those on the UN list also on New Zealand's list include the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida, the Taliban and associated individuals, groups, undertakings and entities. The second set of entities designated in New Zealand are associated with UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which obliges us to outlaw the financing of, participation in and recruitment to terrorist entities. The UN's resolution leaves it to member states to identify the entities against which they should act. The New Zealand-designated group includes groups such as the Houthis, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Real Irish Republican Army and The Shining Path. The only individual listed is the convicted Christchurch mosque shooter. "Designating the offender is an important demonstration of New Zealand's condemnation of terrorism and violent extremism in all forms," former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern said in making that call in 2020. What happens if you're on the list? Once a group is on the list, it means it freezes their assets in New Zealand and it's illegal to deal with the entity's property or provide such an entity with property, financial or related services. It is also an offence to knowingly recruit for a group on the list, or participate in a group for the purpose of enhancing its ability to carry out a terrorist act, knowing, or being reckless as to whether the group is a designated entity. Action can be taken against designated entities' property, and Customs can seize and detain goods or cash they have "good cause" to suspect are tied to designated entities. However, "simple membership of a designated entity is not an offence," police say. Who makes the call who is on the list? Ultimately, the prime minister has the power. "The Prime Minister may designate an entity as a terrorist entity under this section if the Prime Minister believes on reasonable grounds that the entity has knowingly carried out, or has knowingly participated in the carrying out of, one or more terrorist acts," the Terrorism Suppression Act 2002 says. However, there's a lot of support and intelligence given before making that call. A Terrorist Designation Working Group chaired by New Zealand Police does the work of considering entities. It includes officials from the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, the National Assessments Bureau, the New Zealand Defence Force, Crown Law, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service. The working group then refers their information to the National Security Board, who make a determination whether or not to proceed with forwarding a recommendation to the prime minister. The prime minister also has to consult the Attorney-General before making the designation. Letters of recommendation are then given to the Commissioner of Police to be acted upon. "No specific factors are identified for the Prime Minister's consideration when exercising his discretion," police say. For example, in November Prime Minister Christopher Luxon designated the armed and political group Hezbollah a terrorist entity. "For any organisation [to be designated] ... we have to have evidence and we go through a number of tests under our legislation, that that organisation has knowingly undertaken terrorist activity," Luxon said then. "It's a standard process." How do you get off of the list? Any entity on the list or a third party can also apply to the prime minister to make a case to get the designation revoked. Of course, whether or not that happens is up to the government to decide. The designations on the list are made for a period of three years, and can simply expire if not renewed. Judicial reviews of the decisions are also possible, police say. So how did the Proud Boys get removed? The government's New Zealand Gazette notification on the Proud Boys delisting is extremely brief - it simply says their designation expired on 19 June, and any person who deals with the property of the group cannot be prosecuted under the Terrorism Suppression Act. Ardern designated the Proud Boys and another known white supremacist group, The Base, in June 2022. The Base designation was renewed in June and remains on the terrorist entity list, but the Proud Boys no longer do. Byron Clark, a researcher into right-wing extremist groups, pointed out that US President Donald Trump pardoned the group's leader Enrique Tarrio earlier this year along with many others involved in the 6 January 2021 Capitol riot. "They operate as an unofficial, but tacitly acknowledged, militant wing of Trump's Make America Great Again movement, and I think that makes it politically more difficult to designate them terrorists now that that movement holds power in the United States." Battersby agreed the changing political situation in the US may have played part in the expiration. "If 'the good cause to suspect' case against the Proud Boys and The Base was founded on convictions following the 2021 US Capitol Hill riot, the presidential pardons - from a legal perspective - could remove those grounds." The prime minister's office told Stuff journalist Paula Penfold, who has extensively investigated the Proud Boys, that the group "remain on the radar ... and if any new information comes to hand, they will consider it." In the past, a separate terror watch list of individuals the New Zealand Security and Intelligence Service was kept. That list had been reported to be around 30 to 40 individuals. In a statement to RNZ, NZSIS said it "does not discuss specific numbers of individuals who may be at risk of undertaking a violent extemist attack" and that it no longer keeps what could be called a "watchlist." "The concept of a 'watchlist' does not reflect how NZSIS assesses information about individuals, or how they are triaged and managed for follow up actions if required." NZSIS said attacks are still seen as likely to happen "with little or no warning". "The NZSIS continues to assess that another terrorist event in New Zealand remains a realistic possibility, with the most likely threat actor being an individual who has been self-radicalised, uses readily available weapons and seeks to avoid detection." "Most people on watchlists turn out to be incapable or unwilling to do any real damage," Battersby said, but noted "it's excellent that police and the NZSIS pay attention to suspect individuals, this is valuable and necessary work." Are these methods going far enough? Will they keep us safe? "New Zealand isn't safe - we have never been safe," Battersby said. "We have been fortunate in that we are politically insignificant globally - so no international terrorist group will waste any time here, and that anyone in New Zealand who has actually wanted to undertake acts of political violence has been mostly isolated and alone, largely unsuccessful inspiring any successive action." "Watchlists are one tool - they will catch the careless, lazy and unlucky; it is much more difficult to intercept a security conscious, careful planner (or group) which keep their heads down, or who play along legally (as the mosque shooter did) looking to exploit vulnerabilities which frankly exist everywhere." Battersby noted that both the Christchurch mosque shooter and Ahamed Samsudeen, who attacked shoppers at Auckland's LynnMall in 2021, were lone actors. "These people represent singular acts, so designation - in my opinion, is a largely unproductive exercise." Samsudeen had been under scrutiny for some time yet was still able to pull off his attack, while the mosque shooter "demonstrated what is possible when the risk is not identified," he said. "I think government terrorist group lists have some significant limitations," Clark said. "The Christchurch terrorist communicated extensively with far-right groups around the world, and even supported some financially, but wasn't formally a member of any, and the LynnMall terrorist was Isis-inspired but not actually a member of the organisation." Clark said it is still important that groups of concern in New Zealand continue to be monitored. "I do think there needs to be more scrutiny on far-right and Christian nationalist groups, the recent demonstrations by Destiny Church members targeting numerous minority groups demonstrate the threat they pose to social cohesion." Clark said that last year's defunding of research into violent extremism research being done at the He Whenua Taurikura research centre in Wellington was also troubling. "The defunding of He Whenua Taurikura means we've lost the other side of counter terrorism, which is researching these groups and their beliefs in order to have a more informed public, and greater awareness of where potential threats could come from. Less of that work is being done now, and I don't think adding more groups to terrorist designation lists could make up for that loss." Still, New Zealand remains less vulnerable to terrorism than many places, Battersby said. "It is important to keep all of this in perspective, however - terrorists or violent extremists pose a risk, but a very small one in statistical terms when you consider something like our road toll. The most dangerous thing you will do today is drive to work, and drive home again - you are vastly more likely to be killed doing that, than you ever will be by a terrorist in New Zealand."
Hindustan Times
23-06-2025
- Business
- Hindustan Times
FATF's Pak challenge: Tracing routes of funds
At one level it seems like a huge win for India. At least one major body has focused on the Pahalgam terror attack rather than the operation that followed it, and ensuing calls for restraint. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the foremost authority on money laundering and terrorist finance, has not just condemned the terror attack, but, last week, resolved to launch a probe noting that it could not have been carried out 'without money and the means to move funds between terrorist supporters'. Unlike various groups asking for proof of who did the attack, the FATF proposes to find it for itself. The Pulwama terror attack that killed 40 security personnel happened even as Islamabad was threatened with blacklisting. (Waseem Andrabi/HT) The FATF was formed in 1989 by the G-7 countries, the European Commission and eight others (who are not listed), to combat money laundering, including 'terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'. Over the years, it steadily increased its mandate to include all manner of actors including narcotics networks. India joined in 2010, after a rigorous examination of its banking systems, a review which happens periodically to protect the global system from danger. In 2024, India again got an 'outstanding' report for its financial stability and probity, though the FATF warned about 'non-profit' associations being used for terrorist finance. A number of NGOs were shut down, causing a cry of illiberalism. Pakistan, on the other hand, was put on a 'grey list', which means its financial systems have significant deficiencies, three times: Once in 2008, and taken off the list in two years after some improvements; again in 2012 for not curbing terrorist financing among other things; and again in 2018 for the same reason. This time it kept it there until October 2022, during which period Islamabad sentenced Lashkar-e-Taiba leader Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi to five years imprisonment, Hafiz Saeed to 33 years in jail, and set in place legislation including an Anti-Terrorism Act (Amendment) Bill, 2020 which updated the legal definition of terrorism to international standards. A legislation was introduced to bring Pakistan's laws in line with the UN laws on terrorist financing, 20 years after Resolution 1373 had been enacted, and further gave the State Bank of Pakistan a degree of autonomy to implement much of this. That was when Imran Khan was in office, against an Opposition which feared their large unaccounted funds would come under scrutiny. Khan, who had a clean record on corruption, warned that going onto the 'black list' would mean an economic crash. A country on the black list is sealed off from the rest of the world in financial terms and faces serious difficulties in securing loans. At that time, Pakistan's external debt was 37.6% of GDP! But terrorism did not stop. The Pulwama terror attack that killed 40 security personnel happened even as Islamabad was threatened with blacklisting. It paused after India retaliated with air strikes deep inside Pakistan for the first time. Subsequently, government reports showed a significant drop in infiltration attempts from 216 incidents in 2019 to 53 in 2022 (according to MHA reports). But terrorist tactics simply shifted. Narcotics trafficking long associated with terrorism in Punjab returned. According to reports, some 251 transborder sorties by drones brought in weapons and drugs, this time mostly methamphetamine and derivatives from Lahore, even as underground tunnels were spotted along the international border. Second, terrorist groups became smaller in size but better trained and equipped. The personnel could live off the land for months in thick forests and were equipped with phones that evaded mobile towers. Then Pahalgam happened. As the FATF swoops in, two things matter. The first is whether our forces have managed to crack the communication system of terror groups to trace the source areas. That is vital. Second, Pakistan, despite the Taliban's crackdown on opium cultivation, seems to be able to access vast amounts of meth, as seen in the 300-kg seizure in April 2025 off the Gujarat coast. Pakistan also has money to continuously raise not just its defence budget — now far above the mandated 1.9% of its GDP when pensions are included — but also the pay of parliamentarians (by 138%) and defence personnel. Then, the FATF has to examine how Chinese funds are coming in to support the army, since none of it is evident in the budget papers. The FATF may also find other sources of financing, from outside the country. The sum of all this is to find out why Pakistan doesn't seem to care even if access to international financial assistance, crucial for it, is cut off. If Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif's call for peace has some basis, he could start by emulating Indian initiatives like linking national identity cards with bank accounts, use its very capable investigative agencies to root out terrorist accounts, and those of 'charitable' organisations such as the highly suspect Al Khidmat Foundation. The army will, of course, oppose this. But major financial institutions must back the politicians, by linking aid with democracy. Otherwise nothing at all will move forward. Meanwhile, India had better look at hawala networks at home. Money has no nationality and no morals, and it could be used by hostile agencies as well. Time to get cracking for our own interests. Meanwhile, the Sharifs might actually find the going easier as terrorists are curtailed, and the army's powers with it. Tara Kartha is director (research), Centre for Land Warfare Studies. The views expressed are personal.
Indian Express
11-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Pakistan secures key roles in UNSC committees: Should India worry?
Pakistan in early June, roughly a month after Operation Sindoor, secured key roles as an elected non-permanent member for 2025-26 in two significant subsidiary bodies of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is now the Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee (TSC, established as a distinct committee in 2011), Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and a Co-Chair in two informal working groups of the UNSC. India, during its last UNSC non-permanent membership (2021-2022), served as the Chair of three committees — the 1988 TSC, the 1970 Libya Sanctions committee, and the 1373 CTC. While Sanctions Committees are set up to monitor and implement a specific sanctions regime against individuals and entities (such as the 1988 Committee) or states (such as the 1970 Committee), the CTC is the product of the Security Council's Resolution 1373. Adopted unanimously by the UNSC after the 9/11 terror attacks, the Chapter VII Resolution — these are binding on all UN member states — extensively laid down the responsibilities of states to counter terrorism. How did Pakistan secure these positions? What do they mean substantially? And does India need to worry? Pakistan's Chairmanship/Vice-Chairmanship of these Committees was procedurally inevitable. Each of these committees are considered 'subsidiary organs' of the Council, according to Article 28 of the UN Charter. Hence, both the 1988 TSC and 1373 CTC comprise all 15 members of the Council at any given time. By virtue of its two-year UNSC membership, any elected non-permanent member invariably takes the helm of at least one of the Council's several subsidiary bodies, at some point in their tenure. This possibility is made more inevitable statistically, since the UNSC's permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) do not chair sanctions committees, to avoid conflicts of interest — given their significant roles in enforcing key sanctions against designated individuals and entities. For instance, the United States holds significant influence over the international financial system which is crucial for sanctions implementation. and has its own extensive unilateral OFAC sanctions on the Taliban. But it has never Chaired the 1988 Committee. However, this design of non-permanent members as Chairs has also resulted in an overburdened system. The 2018 Annual Briefing of the UNSC (by Committee Chairs) for instance, emphasised the need for 'a new system that ensures a fair distribution of chairmanships among permanent and elected members'. While this older system continues, the Council also looks to select its Committee Chairs in a 'balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way' — an effort explicitly acknowledged in a UNSC Presidential Note from July, 2016. Pakistan being voted as a UNSC non-permanent member from the Asia-Africa grouping in June 2024 already set it up for eventual committee chairmanships. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that the capabilities, willingness, and political positions of a state influence the decision of the Council (expressed through its President) to appoint a member as the Chair of a certain committee. It would thus seem that Pakistan has the confidence of the current Council to serve as the Chair of the 1988 Committee — and thus to hold the power to propose and prepare (with consultations) the Committee's agenda. That said, the position of Chair does not bring with it any special substantial powers, and Pakistan's space to harm India's interests is limited. Here's why. One, the 1988 Committee has had to work with a significant change in context vis-à-vis its list of sanctioned individuals and entities. Unlike in 2011, the Taliban have been Kabul's de-facto rulers for at least four years, and are working hard to gain international legitimacy. And unlike in 2022, when India (as 1988 Committee Chair) oversaw the cancellation of waivers to key Taliban leaders such as Amir Khan Muttaqi (currently Acting Foreign Minister), New Delhi now engages the same individuals directly as it attempts engagement-without-recognition with the Taliban. The group's own relationship with Pakistan has also significantly deteriorated, but remains steady, with Muttaqi meeting both Indian and Pakistani officials since August, 2021. Strictly within the context of the 1988 Committee — which oversees just over 130 Taliban-linked sanctioned individuals — the Chair's role is to monitor sanctions verification and consider modifications of the list. In any case, even without a consensus-based model, Pakistan would not be able to unilaterally push through the listing or de-listing of new individuals. Two, unlike the UNSC itself, its subsidiary bodies like the CTC, are technical bodies with an ambit to ensure implementation by member states of UNSCR 1373 and linked resolutions. A majority of the CTC's tasks, along with that of its assisting body, the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, are focused on building states' capacity to counter terror, offer technical assistance, and promote best practices to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1373. The Global Implementation Surveys that the CTC conducts, show that the Committee has no role in investigating terror attacks, recommending sanctions on entities, or designating any individual or entity for terrorism. Pakistan's Vice Chairmanship of the CTC itself serves as proof of the Committee's design — one focused on working with states directly for capacity building rather than implementing punitive measures against violating parties. This is especially as Pakistan has evidently continued to violate multiple operational clauses of UNSCR 1373, including those provisions obligating states to deny safe haven to terrorists or to ensure that those involved in terrorism are brought to justice. Three, in the UNSC's subsidiary committees, Pakistan's instrument of influence has primarily been disabling and indirect — to prevent Indian efforts at designating key Pakistan based terrorists, with China's backing. This was recently evident in 2022, when India proposed sanctions on Abdul Rauf Azhar (then JeM Deputy Chief) in the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions committee. The proposal fell through with China the only hold out among the 15 UNSC members. On the other hand, Pakistan has limited enabling or direct influence. It holds neither the Chairmanship nor the Vice Chairmanship of the 1267 Committee, where at least 50 sanctioned individuals are linked to Pakistan. So, should India worry? Pakistan's willingness and intent to leverage UN positions for its own ends, has long been evident. However, Pakistan's Chairmanship and Vice Chairmanship roles at the UNSC's subsidiary bodies do not represent a direct diplomatic threat to Indian interests at the UN. Rather, Pakistan's continued preference for cross-border terrorism as a policy instrument against India, reflects the larger structural failures of both the Council and its subsidiary committees as effective instruments to check terrorism. Moreover, the lack of substantial debate in these committees, as well as its consensus model — where every member has to agree for a proposal to go through — has been cited even by past Chairs, such as Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand in 2016, as the 'single biggest inhibitor to Committee effectiveness'. It is Pakistan's membership in the Council as a whole — especially when it takes over the rotational Presidency in July — which presents a larger issue. In 2013, Pakistan attempted to use its rotational Presidency of the UNSC to redirect the UN's focus towards Kashmir. It also sought to gloss over its own inadequacies in countering terrorism, by successfully initiating a ministerial debate on counter-terrorism presided over by then Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, less than two years after US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad. Again, while the UNSC Presidency does not give Pakistan any special substantive powers, there are procedural advantages which Pakistan can use to its benefit. For example, the Presidency can bolster Pakistan's ability to convene closed door/informal consultations of the Council, given the UNSC President's sole authority to convene meetings in the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure.
Indian Express
09-06-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Pakistan's UNSC posts present diplomatic challenge for India's fight against terror
Written by Shivam Shekhawat On June 5, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif announced Pakistan's appointment as chair and vice chair of two important United Nations Security Council (UNSC) committees: The Taliban Sanctions Committee formed through Resolution 1988 and the Counter-Terrorism Committee, which monitors the implementation of Resolution 1373, formed after 9/11. Islamabad is now also a co-chair of two working groups: One on documentation and procedural issues with Denmark and another, newly formed one with Greece tasked with analysing the effectiveness of UN sanctions. Pakistan is also set to preside over the council next month. In the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and India's efforts to engage with the international community to highlight Pakistan's nefarious role in fomenting terrorism, the appointments have raised concerns about their possible implications for New Delhi. After being elected to the UNSC in June last year, Pakistan started its tenure as a non-permanent member on January 1. Its term will end on December 31, 2026. Marking its eighth stint at the UNSC, Pakistan's Permanent Representative to the UN, Asim Iftikar Ahmad, restated the country's commitment to utilise the platform to highlight the Kashmir issue and work towards preventing the adverse impacts of terrorism. There can be no doubt that Islamabad will leverage its membership to further its anti-India agenda. The statement released by the Security Council condemning the Pahalgam terror attack was relatively watered down from previous iterations of support to India. Then, on May 5, the UNSC held a closed-door consultation on the 'India-Pakistan Question', the first time after 2019. Thus, cognisant of the possible role Pakistan can play in the UNSC, India's post-conflict outreach to the world focused on reaching out to permanent and non-permanent members except Pakistan, China and Somalia. Similar to India's outreach, Pakistan also sent its delegation to the UN headquarters in New York, as well as to Washington DC, Moscow, Brussels and London. These delegations, led by senior current and former ministers, are urging for the immediate resumption of the Indus Waters Treaty. While the all-party delegations sent by New Delhi have made a clear case for India's imperative to target terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan and the threat it faces from its western neighbor, the road ahead, to win the narrative war, will not be easy. India has been urging a rethink of the financial support offered to Pakistan by the IMF and the World Bank, and its possible utilisation by Rawalpindi to fund activities against India. India has also decided to revamp its push for Pakistan's re-inclusion in the FATF's grey list after it was removed in 2022. For India, this is important to prevent Pakistan from strengthening its terror-military scaffolding further. While ties between Kabul and Islamabad plummeted in the last few months, they have now decided to elevate their relationship to the ambassadorial level, the agreement for which was reached during the informal meeting between the foreign ministers of Pakistan, Afghanistan and China, further changing the dynamics in the region. Both sides have had continued communications, even when the conflict between India and Pakistan broke out. While the Taliban is trying to play both sides, China's close strategic partnership with Pakistan and its openness to engaging with Kabul makes the situation difficult for India. There has been a close synchronisation between Islamabad and Beijing against India at the UNSC and other international platforms. Pakistan will leverage the platform to propagate false claims of India's support for terrorist attacks in the country, particularly the attacks by Baloch outfits. Islamabad has also tried to pin the blame for the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan's actions on both Afghanistan and India. While the UNSC posts will not offer Pakistan a lot of leeway directly, it will give it more space to bring up issues that align with its own interests and deflect attention from India's concerns. Pakistan will also vehemently oppose India's permanent membership bid at the UNSC. The writer is a junior fellow with ORF's Strategic Studies Programme
Business Recorder
06-06-2025
- Business
- Business Recorder
High-profile United Nations bodies: PM hails Pakistan's appointment
ISLAMABAD: Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on Thursday welcomed Pakistan's appointment to several high-profile United Nations committees, calling it a sign of the international community's confidence in the country's counterterrorism record. On Wednesday, Pakistan was named chair of the UN Security Council committee established under Resolution 1988 (2011), which oversees sanctions against the Afghan Taliban. The country was also appointed vice chair of the council's Counter-Terrorism Committee, responsible for monitoring the implementation of Resolution 1373 (2001), a key component of the UN's counterterrorism framework. In addition, Pakistan will serve as co-chair of two subsidiary bodies: the Informal Working Group on Documentation and the newly formed Working Group on Sanctions. 'These key appointments validate the international community's confidence and trust in Pakistan's counterterrorism credentials,' Sharif said in a post on X. He described the recognition as a source of national pride, emphasising Pakistan's long and costly battle against terrorism. Sharif cited more than 90,000 casualties and economic losses exceeding $150 billion since Pakistan joined the global war on terror. The Pakistani Mission to the United Nations hailed the appointments as a significant diplomatic achievement, noting that they reflect the country's active engagement with the UN and its current role as a non-permanent member of the Security Council. Pakistan began its eighth two-year term on the Security Council on January 1, representing the Asia-Pacific group. It is scheduled to assume the council's rotating presidency in July. While non-permanent members do not hold veto power, they often wield considerable influence in sanctions-related bodies, where decisions are made by consensus. The appointments come as the international community grapples with intensifying conflicts in Gaza, Kashmir and Syria – regions where the Security Council's effectiveness continues to face scrutiny. Copyright Business Recorder, 2025
