Pakistan secures key roles in UNSC committees: Should India worry?

Indian Express

11-06-2025

Pakistan in early June, roughly a month after Operation Sindoor, secured key roles as an elected non-permanent member for 2025-26 in two significant subsidiary bodies of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). It is now the Chair of the 1988 Taliban Sanctions Committee (TSC, established as a distinct committee in 2011), Vice Chair of the 1373 Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC), and a Co-Chair in two informal working groups of the UNSC.
India, during its last UNSC non-permanent membership (2021-2022), served as the Chair of three committees — the 1988 TSC, the 1970 Libya Sanctions committee, and the 1373 CTC.
While Sanctions Committees are set up to monitor and implement a specific sanctions regime against individuals and entities (such as the 1988 Committee) or states (such as the 1970 Committee), the CTC is the product of the Security Council's Resolution 1373. Adopted unanimously by the UNSC after the 9/11 terror attacks, the Chapter VII Resolution — these are binding on all UN member states — extensively laid down the responsibilities of states to counter terrorism.
How did Pakistan secure these positions? What do they mean substantially? And does India need to worry?
Pakistan's Chairmanship/Vice-Chairmanship of these Committees was procedurally inevitable. Each of these committees are considered 'subsidiary organs' of the Council, according to Article 28 of the UN Charter. Hence, both the 1988 TSC and 1373 CTC comprise all 15 members of the Council at any given time.
By virtue of its two-year UNSC membership, any elected non-permanent member invariably takes the helm of at least one of the Council's several subsidiary bodies, at some point in their tenure. This possibility is made more inevitable statistically, since the UNSC's permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the US) do not chair sanctions committees, to avoid conflicts of interest — given their significant roles in enforcing key sanctions against designated individuals and entities.
For instance, the United States holds significant influence over the international financial system which is crucial for sanctions implementation. and has its own extensive unilateral OFAC sanctions on the Taliban. But it has never Chaired the 1988 Committee.
However, this design of non-permanent members as Chairs has also resulted in an overburdened system. The 2018 Annual Briefing of the UNSC (by Committee Chairs) for instance, emphasised the need for 'a new system that ensures a fair distribution of chairmanships among permanent and elected members'. While this older system continues, the Council also looks to select its Committee Chairs in a 'balanced, transparent, efficient and inclusive way' — an effort explicitly acknowledged in a UNSC Presidential Note from July, 2016.
Pakistan being voted as a UNSC non-permanent member from the Asia-Africa grouping in June 2024 already set it up for eventual committee chairmanships. However, there is sufficient evidence to show that the capabilities, willingness, and political positions of a state influence the decision of the Council (expressed through its President) to appoint a member as the Chair of a certain committee.
It would thus seem that Pakistan has the confidence of the current Council to serve as the Chair of the 1988 Committee — and thus to hold the power to propose and prepare (with consultations) the Committee's agenda.
That said, the position of Chair does not bring with it any special substantial powers, and Pakistan's space to harm India's interests is limited. Here's why.
One, the 1988 Committee has had to work with a significant change in context vis-à-vis its list of sanctioned individuals and entities. Unlike in 2011, the Taliban have been Kabul's de-facto rulers for at least four years, and are working hard to gain international legitimacy.
And unlike in 2022, when India (as 1988 Committee Chair) oversaw the cancellation of waivers to key Taliban leaders such as Amir Khan Muttaqi (currently Acting Foreign Minister), New Delhi now engages the same individuals directly as it attempts engagement-without-recognition with the Taliban. The group's own relationship with Pakistan has also significantly deteriorated, but remains steady, with Muttaqi meeting both Indian and Pakistani officials since August, 2021.
Strictly within the context of the 1988 Committee — which oversees just over 130 Taliban-linked sanctioned individuals — the Chair's role is to monitor sanctions verification and consider modifications of the list. In any case, even without a consensus-based model, Pakistan would not be able to unilaterally push through the listing or de-listing of new individuals.
Two, unlike the UNSC itself, its subsidiary bodies like the CTC, are technical bodies with an ambit to ensure implementation by member states of UNSCR 1373 and linked resolutions. A majority of the CTC's tasks, along with that of its assisting body, the Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate, are focused on building states' capacity to counter terror, offer technical assistance, and promote best practices to ensure the implementation of UNSCR 1373.
The Global Implementation Surveys that the CTC conducts, show that the Committee has no role in investigating terror attacks, recommending sanctions on entities, or designating any individual or entity for terrorism. Pakistan's Vice Chairmanship of the CTC itself serves as proof of the Committee's design — one focused on working with states directly for capacity building rather than implementing punitive measures against violating parties.
This is especially as Pakistan has evidently continued to violate multiple operational clauses of UNSCR 1373, including those provisions obligating states to deny safe haven to terrorists or to ensure that those involved in terrorism are brought to justice.
Three, in the UNSC's subsidiary committees, Pakistan's instrument of influence has primarily been disabling and indirect — to prevent Indian efforts at designating key Pakistan based terrorists, with China's backing. This was recently evident in 2022, when India proposed sanctions on Abdul Rauf Azhar (then JeM Deputy Chief) in the 1267 Al Qaeda Sanctions committee. The proposal fell through with China the only hold out among the 15 UNSC members.
On the other hand, Pakistan has limited enabling or direct influence. It holds neither the Chairmanship nor the Vice Chairmanship of the 1267 Committee, where at least 50 sanctioned individuals are linked to Pakistan.
So, should India worry?
Pakistan's willingness and intent to leverage UN positions for its own ends, has long been evident. However, Pakistan's Chairmanship and Vice Chairmanship roles at the UNSC's subsidiary bodies do not represent a direct diplomatic threat to Indian interests at the UN.
Rather, Pakistan's continued preference for cross-border terrorism as a policy instrument against India, reflects the larger structural failures of both the Council and its subsidiary committees as effective instruments to check terrorism. Moreover, the lack of substantial debate in these committees, as well as its consensus model — where every member has to agree for a proposal to go through — has been cited even by past Chairs, such as Gerard van Bohemen of New Zealand in 2016, as the 'single biggest inhibitor to Committee effectiveness'.
It is Pakistan's membership in the Council as a whole — especially when it takes over the rotational Presidency in July — which presents a larger issue. In 2013, Pakistan attempted to use its rotational Presidency of the UNSC to redirect the UN's focus towards Kashmir.
It also sought to gloss over its own inadequacies in countering terrorism, by successfully initiating a ministerial debate on counter-terrorism presided over by then Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar, less than two years after US Navy Seals killed Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad.
Again, while the UNSC Presidency does not give Pakistan any special substantive powers, there are procedural advantages which Pakistan can use to its benefit. For example, the Presidency can bolster Pakistan's ability to convene closed door/informal consultations of the Council, given the UNSC President's sole authority to convene meetings in the Council's Provisional Rules of Procedure.