Latest news with #Rouhani
Asharq Al-Awsat
16-03-2025
- Politics
- Asharq Al-Awsat
Rouhani: Khamenei's Stance on US Talks Might Shift
Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani suggested on Saturday that the Supreme Leader's opposition to negotiations with the United States could change depending on circumstances, describing the situation in Iran as 'dangerous.' 'Leader (Ali Khamenei) is not opposed to negotiations on the nuclear program, his position is influenced by the current circumstances, but after a few months, he may agree to negotiate under different circumstances,' Rouhani said during a meeting with former ministers. 'Did we not negotiate with the US on Iraq, Afghanistan, and the nuclear deal? Even back then, the Supreme leader was a witness and an observer,' the former President added. Iran's Big Losses Rouhani then listed his country's financial losses from the non-implementation of the nuclear deal. He said since the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2018, 'Iran has lost $100 billion per year.' Rouhani described the situation in the country as 'dangerous,' especially with 'a weakened military deterrence capability, which deepened after internal disputes prevented the purchase of advanced defense systems.' The former president then criticized the disorder of Iran's decision-making system in various fields. He said, 'Anyone who looks from the outside understands what is happening in this country, and sees that we seem to have no plan at all.' Rouhani also said that solving Iran's economic problems is not possible without constructive engagement with the world, according to a video posted on his website. The video featured Mohammad Javad Zarif, who recently resigned from his post as deputy to President Masoud Pezeshkian, due to pressure from the conservative current in the Iranian parliament. Earlier, Zarif said he negotiated with the US side on Iraq in coordination with former Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) commander Qassem Soleimani. On February 7, Khamenei said talks with the US were 'not smart, wise, or honorable,' days after US President Donald Trump said he would 'love to make a deal' with Iran. His remarks were interpreted as orders to ban any direct talks with the US President. Meanwhile, head of the National Security and Foreign Policy Committee of the Iranian Parliament, Ebrahim Azizi, said there was 'no point in holding talks with the US unless Iran's interests are achieved.' 'Tehran does not reject the principle of dialogue and negotiation. But we should avoid any steps that do not serve our interests,' he said. For his part, Ali Larijani, member of the Expediency Discernment Council, said US officials have two options with dealing with Iran. 'Either to respect the shared economic interests, or fall into the trap of thinking that confrontation with Iran will be of low cost,' he said, according to Tasnim, the semi-official news agency associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Russian Mediation In Moscow, Mikhail Ulyanov, Russia's Permanent Representative to international organizations in Vienna, said he had discussed Iran's nuclear program with Rafael Grossi, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). '[I've] met today with IAEA Director General Mr. Rafael Mariano Grossi. We discussed a number of issues related to the Iranian nuclear program,' the Russian diplomat wrote on X. Russia's decision to act as an intermediary between the United States and Iran over Tehran's nuclear program reflects a conviction at the Kremlin that new ties with the Trump administration would allow both sides to lay the groundwork for a more comprehensive deal.
Yahoo
13-03-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Commentary: Is Trump actually interested in talking with Iran?
As if President Donald Trump isn't busy enough taking a woodchipper to the federal bureaucracy, threatening to wage economic war in North America, putting the screws on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to pressure him into peace talks with Russia and giving impromptu interviews in the Oval Office every other day, he has added another weighty item to his 'to-do' list: negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran. During an interview with Fox News, Trump let it be known that he sent a letter to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to begin a line of communication. The gist of the missive was clear enough: I'm interested in striking a deal with you on Tehran's nuclear program, but if you refuse to come to the table, there will be trouble. 'Something is going to happen one way or the other,' Trump said after revealing news of the letter. 'I hope that Iran, and I've written them a letter, saying I hope you're going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it's going to be a terrible thing for them.' This isn't the first time Trump has openly expressed his desire to engage in diplomacy with Iran. Even during his first term, when his administration enacted a yearslong maximum pressure campaign that drove Iran's crude oil exports down by 75%, Trump flirted with the prospect of negotiations. In September 2019, on the sidelines of the annual U.N. General Assembly meeting, Trump was waiting for Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian president at the time, to pick up the phone, much as Rouhani did with Barack Obama six years earlier. The conversation with Trump, however, never occurred; Rouhani wasn't keen on becoming Iran's version of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who sat with Trump for two summits with nothing to show for it. In the days since Trump sent his letter, not much has changed in Iran's outlook. Khamenei, the man who will decide whether or not Tehran re-enters a diplomatic track with Washington, told the Americans to shove it. The Supreme Leader clearly has 2018 stuck in the back of his mind, the year when Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Barack Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (colloquially referred to as the 'Iran nuclear deal') and re-imposed the very sanctions Washington lifted a few years prior. As the old saying goes, 'fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.' This isn't the answer Trump wants to hear, but he can't be surprised by it either. One of the Trump administration's first foreign policy acts upon reentering the White House on Jan. 20 was an executive order reinstituting the maximum pressure policy in the hope of driving Tehran's oil exports to zero (the definition of an impossible task). The Treasury Department has announced several sanctions on Iran since early February. In fact, the second Trump administration is going further on the sanctions front than it did during the first; the previous U.S. waivers permitting Iraq to pay Iran for electricity supplies are no longer available. Trump officials are also currently deliberating over a policy that would enlist other countries in an effort to stop Iran from exporting its crude at sea by seizing ships carrying Iranian barrels. The Iranians obviously won't take kindly to any of these moves. Although the Trump administration and Iran hawks in Congress consistently make the point that the stick is the only thing that will drive Tehran to the negotiating table, history doesn't support this common talking point. In reality, the more pressure the U.S. brings to bear on Iran economically, politically and militarily, the more likely Iran will escalate rather than submit. We need to look no further than Trump 1.0. The U.S. at the time assumed that if the Iranian government suffered enough financial strain, Khamenei would have only one option if he wanted to save his regime: crawl back to the negotiating table and give the Americans everything they asked for. Washington was so confident the Iranians would eventually cave that then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined a series of demands about as idealistic as they were preposterous — no more enrichment at any level, an end to missile production, the withdrawal of all support to Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the demobilization of Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq and a cutoff of military support to the Houthis in Yemen. Needless to say, Khamenei rejected this proposal about as quickly as an 8-year old rejects broccoli. Iran used Trump's destruction of the JCPOA as an opportunity to boost enrichment to new heights and install more advanced centrifuges. International inspectors, who once had the power to monitor Iran's nuclear fuel production cycle from its very inception, were now forced to make do with far less access. When the International Atomic Energy Agency censured Iran for stonewalling its investigation, Iran retaliated yet again by removing the cameras and barring some of the most qualified IAEA technicians from entering the country. Iran's nuclear work only accelerated during Joe Biden's term, partly as a consequence of his administration dropping formal nuclear talks after the Iranians cracked down on domestic protests. The result: Iran now has enough nuclear fuel to make six bombs if it chooses to do so. This is the problem Trump inherits. I think his interest in diplomacy with Iran is sincere. But in the grand scheme, that's far less important than whether Trump has the political will to offer the concessions required to get to an agreement and whether he can settle for anything less than the ideal. Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. _____ Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune. _____
Chicago Tribune
11-03-2025
- Politics
- Chicago Tribune
Daniel DePetris: Is Donald Trump actually interested in talking with Iran?
As if President Donald Trump isn't busy enough taking a woodchipper to the federal bureaucracy, threatening to wage economic war in North America, putting the screws on Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy to pressure him into peace talks with Russia and giving impromptu interviews in the Oval Office every other day, he has added another weighty item to his 'to-do' list: negotiating a nuclear agreement with Iran. During an interview with Fox News, Trump let it be known that he sent a letter to Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, to begin a line of communication. The gist of the missive was clear enough: I'm interested in striking a deal with you on Tehran's nuclear program, but if you refuse to come to the table, there will be trouble. 'Something is going to happen one way or the other,' Trump said after revealing news of the letter. 'I hope that Iran, and I've written them a letter, saying I hope you're going to negotiate because if we have to go in militarily, it's going to be a terrible thing for them.' This isn't the first time Trump has openly expressed his desire to engage in diplomacy with Iran. Even during his first term, when his administration enacted a yearslong maximum pressure campaign that drove Iran's crude oil exports down by 75%, Trump flirted with the prospect of negotiations. In September 2019, on the sidelines of the annual U.N. General Assembly meeting, Trump was waiting for Hassan Rouhani, the Iranian president at the time, to pick up the phone, much as Rouhani did with Barack Obama six years earlier. The conversation with Trump, however, never occurred; Rouhani wasn't keen on becoming Iran's version of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un, who sat with Trump for two summits with nothing to show for it. In the days since Trump sent his letter, not much has changed in Iran's outlook. Khamenei, the man who will decide whether or not Tehran re-enters a diplomatic track with Washington, told the Americans to shove it. The Supreme Leader clearly has 2018 stuck in the back of his mind, the year when Trump withdrew the U.S. from the Barack Obama-era Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (colloquially referred to as the 'Iran nuclear deal') and re-imposed the very sanctions Washington lifted a few years prior. As the old saying goes, 'fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me.' This isn't the answer Trump wants to hear, but he can't be surprised by it either. One of the Trump administration's first foreign policy acts upon reentering the White House on Jan. 20 was an executive order reinstituting the maximum pressure policy in the hope of driving Tehran's oil exports to zero (the definition of an impossible task). The Treasury Department has announced several sanctions measures on Iran since early February. In fact, the second Trump administration is going further on the sanctions front than it did during the first; the previous U.S. waivers permitting Iraq to pay Iran for electricity supplies are no longer available. Trump officials are also currently deliberating over a policy that would enlist other countries in an effort to stop Iran from exporting its crude at sea by seizing ships carrying Iranian barrels. The Iranians obviously won't take kindly to any of these moves. Although the Trump administration and Iran hawks in Congress consistently make the point that the stick is the only thing that will drive Tehran to the negotiating table, history doesn't support this common talking point. In reality, the more pressure the U.S. brings to bear on Iran economically, politically and militarily, the more likely Iran will escalate rather than submit. We need to look no further than Trump 1.0. The U.S. at the time assumed that if the Iranian government suffered enough financial strain, Khamenei would have only one option if he wanted to save his regime: crawl back to the negotiating table and give the Americans everything they asked for. Washington was so confident the Iranians would eventually cave that then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo outlined a series of demands about as idealistic as they were preposterous — no more enrichment at any level, an end to missile production, the withdrawal of all support to Hamas, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the demobilization of Iranian-backed Shia militias in Iraq and a cutoff of military support to the Houthis in Yemen. Needless to say, Khamenei rejected this proposal about as quickly as an 8-year old rejects broccoli. Iran used Trump's destruction of the JCPOA as an opportunity to boost enrichment to new heights and install more advanced centrifuges. International inspectors, who once had the power to monitor Iran's nuclear fuel production cycle from its very inception, were now forced to make do with far less access. When the International Atomic Energy Agency censured Iran for stonewalling its investigation, Iran retaliated yet again by removing the cameras and barring some of the most qualified IAEA technicians from entering the country. Iran's nuclear work only accelerated during Joe Biden's term, partly as a consequence of his administration dropping formal nuclear talks after the Iranians cracked down on domestic protests. The result: Iran now has enough nuclear fuel to make six bombs if it chooses to do so. This is the problem Trump inherits. I think his interest in diplomacy with Iran is sincere. But in the grand scheme, that's far less important than whether Trump has the political will to offer the concessions required to get to an agreement and whether he can settle for anything less than the ideal. Don't let the perfect be the enemy of the good. Daniel DePetris is a fellow at Defense Priorities and a foreign affairs columnist for the Chicago Tribune.
Middle East Eye
28-01-2025
- Politics
- Middle East Eye
Trump's shift away from Iran hawks opens door to potential deal
With US President Donald Trump back in the White House, talks about a potential nuclear deal between Tehran and Washington have resurfaced in Iran. While the idea of a new agreement is being widely discussed, the path to such a breakthrough is fraught with significant challenges. In 2015, Iran and the United States, under former president Barack Obama, along with other world powers, successfully reached a historic agreement on Tehran's nuclear programme. The deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), involved Iran limiting its nuclear activities in exchange for the lifting of crippling international sanctions. While Tehran remained committed to its obligations under the agreement, Trump, surrounded by advisors hostile to Iran, unilaterally withdrew from the accord in 2018, reimposing sanctions and escalating tensions. Despite the adversarial rhetoric from both sides, there were moments during Trump's first presidency when Iran and the US appeared close to reaching a new understanding. However, these efforts were consistently derailed by a range of obstacles. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters According to a source from the administration of former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021), the Iranian leadership did not grant Rouhani or his foreign minister, Javad Zarif, permission to engage in direct negotiations with the Trump administration. The source recalled a notable instance during Rouhani's visit to New York for the United Nations General Assembly when Trump and Rouhani were reportedly on the brink of meeting. However, the meeting ultimately did not materialise, as Rouhani hesitated due to fears of a backlash in Tehran, where he lacked the necessary authorisation from the Iranian leadership. Interestingly, the source revealed that, at one point, the establishment did permit Rouhani to move forward with indirect negotiations. "A proposal was crafted and approved by the Iranian leadership to be conveyed to Trump via Russian President Vladimir Putin. This proposal was indeed communicated to Trump, who expressed his approval. However, [then secretary of state Mike] Pompeo eventually entered the field, derailing the entire effort," the source told Middle East Eye. Trump's frustration with Iran hawks Trump's strained relationship with prominent Iran hawks, such as Pompeo, ex-national security advisor John Bolton, and former Iran special representative Brian Hook, has been evident. All three individuals, once central to Trump's foreign policy team, have now been sidelined, barred from rejoining his team. Is Trump adopting a restrained approach with Tehran? Read More » In a surprising move, Trump has also appointed officials with unconventional views on the Middle East to significant positions. For instance, Michael DiMino, who previously served in the CIA and the Pentagon, was recently named deputy assistant secretary of defence for the Middle East. DiMino has expressed skepticism about military confrontations with Iran and has advocated for a more measured US approach in the region. This shift in Trump's team composition has been met with approval from many Iranian analysts and media outlets. A foreign policy commentator writing for reformist outlets noted, "The exclusion of hawks from Trump's circle is a positive development for both Iran and the US. Figures like Pompeo and Bolton were major obstacles to diplomatic efforts and repeatedly blocked potential breakthroughs." He further suggested that Iran should seize the opportunity to establish direct and effective channels of communication with Trump, possibly through intermediaries like his Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff or even Elon Musk. "Such a move would allow talks to proceed swiftly and without interference from third parties," he explained. Trump is expected to put Witkoff, a real estate investor who played a pivotal role in securing the Gaza ceasefire, in charge of the Iran file. Divisions within Iran While some within the Iranian government see a renewed opportunity for engagement, conservatives remain deeply opposed to any dialogue with the US. 'This is a unique opportunity for comprehensive engagement. Both sides should take advantage of it to build a new foundation for cooperation' - Iranian policymaker Speaking to MEE, an analyst close to the principlist faction argued that the country's current economic challenges, combined with mixed signals from certain government officials, could be part of a strategy to create internal pressure, thereby paving the way for negotiations - much like the lead-up to the 2013 talks that resulted in the JCPOA. A source familiar with internal debates within the Iranian government meanwhile revealed to MEE that the establishment has recently granted President Masoud Pezeshkian permission to explore the possibility of talks with the US. However, this move has not gone unchallenged. Conservatives have organised demonstrations and issued public statements condemning Pezeshkian and any potential agreement with Washington. Their aim, according to the source, is to stir public and clerical opposition to such negotiations, thereby pressuring the leadership to withdraw its approval. Calls for a new path forward A policymaker who served during Rouhani's presidency told MEE that the time is ripe for both Iran and the US to reverse the trajectory of their strained relationship. "This is a unique opportunity for comprehensive engagement. Both sides should take advantage of it to build a new foundation for cooperation," he said. Iran nuclear deal opponents conspired to oust US special envoy Robert Malley Read More » Similarly, a former senior diplomat in Europe said he believed that Iran should bypass traditional channels and engage Trump's team through discreet means. "To prevent interference from hawks, Iran must privately negotiate a framework for discussions and a potential deal. Establishing mutual trust is crucial at this stage," he said. The diplomat added that the best form of negotiation between Iran and the United States is comprehensive talks, including on some level of cooperation and understanding in the region. As discussions about a possible agreement continue to evolve, the road ahead remains uncertain. Both sides face domestic and international challenges that could either pave the way for a breakthrough or perpetuate the current cycle of hostility.
