Latest news with #Sangh
The Wire
a day ago
- Politics
- The Wire
When Vajpayee Chose to Fall in Line After Godhra
The following is an excerpt from Abhishek Choudhary's The Believer's Dilemma: A.B. Vajpayee and the Ascent of the Hindu Right. Even in late March 2002, after a month of riots, half a dozen people were getting killed in Gujarat every day. Vajpayee frequently called up Modi, often late in the night, for updates, advice, and rebukes. But his ire was not personal. He knew the failure was a mix of Modi's deliberate administrative inefficiency and the Sangh Parivar's planned vendetta. He hated Modi for strengthening himself by polarizing the atmosphere in Gujarat, though he was perfectly aware of the Sangh affiliates' intricate tapestry on the ground. Had Modi not allowed the local BJP–VHP– Bajrang Dal cadres to vent their anger, he risked becoming unpopular among his peers. But soon everyone – eight of the NDA's twenty-three allies, opposition, media, civil society – publicly demanded Modi's head.* Vajpayee thought it prudent to rehabilitate him in Delhi. He flirted with the idea of swapping Modi and his fellow Gujarati, Kashiram Rana, the textiles minister. (Talking to Delhi journalists in public, Modi had, in the recent past, mocked Rana as a 'maans khaane waala' – a meat-eater – not sufficiently self-aware that most Delhi journalists ate meat too, and what worked as a great joke in Gujarat didn't land nearly as well in the national capital.) Abhishek Choudhary's The Believer's Dilemma: A.B. Vajpayee and the Ascent of the Hindu Right. Picador (May 2025) Simultaneously, however, a four-member team was meeting every week at 7 RCR – Vajpayee, Advani, Kushabhau Thakre, Madan Das Devi – to discuss the matter. The other three disagreed. The party had lost all major assembly polls. Gujarat was the last bastion, awaiting polls in less than a year. Firing Modi would be a top-down decision, which would pit the centre against the local cadres, worsening the confusion on the ground. Instead, a mid-way solution might be to call for early elections. There seemed to be a Hindu resurgence at work, and they calculated that the party would massively benefit. Winning the POTO vote on 26 March proved that he could easily survive the exodus of an ally or two. Vajpayee still wanted to play safe and replace Modi. The prime minister was to make a week-long foreign trip in early April 2002. Partly out of the anxiety that he might be grilled abroad about evading his executive responsibilities, he decided to visit the riottorn state. In preparation, Vajpayee summoned Modi to explain why the rehabilitation had been sluggish. On 27 March, while Modi made a PowerPoint presentation at 7 RCR, Vajpayee sat with a pout. He snubbed the unflappable chief minister when the latter defended himself, claiming he had no funds to build houses for the victims whose homes had been burnt and were now living in the relief camps. Well, raise money from private agencies, the boss rebutted, like Patel had for the earthquake victims. Modi complained of exaggerated media reports. Vajpayee countered that he was not bothered so much about media or opposition, but what should he tell the NDA allies who enquired why the killings had not stopped. Advani sat by awkwardly. The prime minister landed in Ahmedabad on the morning of 4 April. Three helicopters flew his delegation to Godhra, where the remains of the S6 coach lay near an abandoned building in the railway yard. Vajpayee climbed into the coach using a special wooden chair. He walked through the coach with a stiff face. Only Modi followed his boss into the coach, his calm face concealing the awkwardness of the occasion. On return, the helicopters landed at a football ground near the Kankaria relief camp in Ahmedabad, the majority of whose inhabitants were Hindus. This quickly done, Vajpayee left for the Shah-e-Alam camp. Modi had never visited Shah-e-Alam, the largest of all relief camps, sheltering Muslims. The PMO had rejigged Vajpayee's itinerary the previous evening to include it. Vajpayee entered to find a 4,000-strong crowd – miserable, grieving, and agitated – waiting for him. Among the first things he heard was a slogan directed at the chief minister: 'Modi – haaye, haaye!' As Vajpayee caressed a five-year-old orphan's head, a young man pointed at Modi and screamed: 'He is the killer.'27 Another victim who had lost six members of his family broke down, saying the attacking mob had said they had been ordered by the government: 'Upar se hukum hai.' Yet another one stooped to touch Vajpayee's feet, begging him to stop the violence. They were whisked away. His voice choked and eyes welled up, Vajpayee addressed the crowd, asking half to himself: 'Have satanic forces overtaken humanity?' He promised, amid applause, that the refugee camps would continue as long as necessary, and the government would rehabilitate them all; and that widows, orphans, and the destitute would receive money as part of relief packages. The visit was to be wrapped up with a press conference at Ahmedabad airport. Asked whether he was considering a change of guard in the state, Vajpayee responded: 'I don't think so.' To another question, Vajpayee answered that Hindus were capable of safeguarding themselves: 'It is the minorities who need protection.' The PMO had planted the 'one last question' on a friendly scribe. She asked if Vajpayee had a message for Modi sitting on his left. Vajpayee paused for a few seconds before replying that he 'would want the chief minister to adhere to rajdharma'. He took another long pause, then added: 'Rajdharma – this word is imbued with meanings. I adhere to this principle too, have been trying to.' Modi feigned a smile but was beginning to look embarrassed. The prime minister went on: 'A king cannot treat his subjects unequally – not on the basis of birth, or caste or religion.' Unable to fight his urge to stay quiet, Modi retorted that he was doing his job rather fine: 'Hum bhi wahi kar rahe hain, saheb.' The crowd chuckled at his audacious response. Vajpayee closed the press interaction with an oblique, half-sarcastic remark, which could be interpreted in whichever way: 'I am certain Narendrabhai is doing exactly that.' This exchange is often invoked as a mark of Vajpayee's liberalism. It was at best an executive head's pusillanimous appeal. It proved that Vajpayee was admitting Modi's culpability but he just could not find the courage to sack him. Here was a crafty patriarch balancing his contradictory loyalties, hoping to prolong his survival in office. If the prime minister felt embarrassed by his subordinate's audacity, he had only his ego to swallow. As he sat aboard his flight to Singapore, Vajpayee feared being humiliated abroad. That the cursed place was not the Hindi heartland, rather India's fastest-growing state, could scare away potential investors. By the time he landed, he had found an answer. In a post-9/11 world, it was easier to fix the causality: India's communal problems were a consequence of a global jihadi network. He felt further encouraged after his hosts informed him that the Al-Qaeda tentacles had touched Singapore, and that they had recently arrested a dozen-odd suspects. The second leg of his trip, Singapore to Cambodia, was time-travel from the future into the past. His most significant engagement was signing an agreement to restore the Ta Prohm Temple in the Angkor Wat complex. Walking with the help of a stick, he took in the remnants of the old Hindu state of Kamboj, some of whose sky-high temples constructed a millennia ago still survived. While the prime minister was away, the Sangh Parivar carried out a fierce whisper campaign: Modi had to be defended at all costs; Vajpayee 2002: The Survivalist 337 was too out of sync with the party's dominant mood, too old in any case, and had led the party into one electoral mishap after the other. He had entered a fifth year of office: maybe he should demit in favour of Advani. The morning after he returned, he left for the national executive meet in Goa, where he had to formally deliver the verdict on Modi. Brajesh Mishra had arranged for the senior ministers to travel in Vajpayee's plane. Just before landing in Panaji, Advani agreed to ask Modi to offer – though only as roleplay – his resignation. At the national executive that afternoon, everyone played by the script. Though visibly tense, Modi rose to make a passionate defence of his conduct in the aftermath of Godhra. At the end, he offered his head. Suddenly, most of the 175-odd members gathered there began a chorus in his support. It was a stage-managed decision to be sure, so much so that even the Gujarat chief minister's sworn foes – Keshubhai Patel, Pramod Mahajan – trimmed their sail and vigorously backed him. Even so, Vajpayee was surprised by the force of Modi's backing. The BJP president Jana Krishnamurthi announced that the final decision would be discussed at 8 p.m., after the prime minister returned from a rally he was to speak at in Panaji. His authority fading, Vajpayee chose to fall in line.
News18
7 days ago
- Politics
- News18
RSS At 100: A Century Of Service, Discipline And Nation-Building
When Hedgewar founded the RSS on Vijayadashami, India was still in chains, not just politically but mentally. He believed that mere political freedom would be hollow if society itself stayed divided by caste, region, and suspicion. He chose discipline and daily practice, not fiery speeches. The local shakha became the heart of this unique experiment. Even today, before sunrise in towns and villages, thousands of swayamsevaks gather in open fields for drills, games, patriotic songs, and discussions. It is here, far from cameras and microphones, that young boys and men learn values — self-restraint, respect for elders, duty towards society, and a quiet pride in India's ancient heritage. RSS swayamsevaks were never far from the call of freedom. Many swayamsevaks participated in local movements, aided underground nationalist activities, and supported leaders of the wider freedom struggle by quietly organising communities, maintaining discipline in gatherings, and preserving the social fabric during turbulent times. When the British left India in 1947, they carved it in two, leaving a subcontinent drenched in blood. Amid the horror of Partition, it was RSS swayamsevaks who ran refugee camps, organised food and medicine, protected caravans of fleeing Hindus and Sikhs, and helped countless families rebuild shattered lives. These stories rarely made headlines or history books, but they live on in oral memories of families across Punjab and Bengal who remember that it was often the swayamsevak who stood between them and death. Independent India brought new trials. In 1962 and 1965, when the nation went to war, thousands of RSS volunteers helped army camps, supplied rations and blood, and cared for wounded soldiers. During the 1975 Emergency, when democracy itself was crushed under Indira Gandhi's iron fist, the RSS network became the underground resistance — printing banned pamphlets, hiding opposition leaders and organising protests. Thousands of swayamsevaks were jailed without trial, yet their resolve never broke. Many would later help restore India's democracy when the Emergency was lifted, shaping political movements that still influence the country today. Beyond politics, the Sangh's real power lies in its grassroots presence. Today it runs one of India's largest networks of service projects under the Seva Bharati banner. These aren't just urban NGOs with flashy PR but lifelines for the poorest corners of India. From hostels for tribal children to free coaching for underprivileged students, from medical camps in remote hills to food drives in drought-hit regions, RSS swayamsevaks reach where few others do. During the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, the 2004 tsunami or the 2020 COVID crisis, it was often the Sangh's volunteers who arrived first, bringing food, medicines and hope — without waiting for the TV cameras. What makes the RSS different is not just its scale but its unique human network — swayamsevaks who act as living anthropologists of Indian society. They understand every street, dialect, custom, local tension and hidden need. They map village water shortages, caste equations, and even forgotten temples or folk traditions. They do this not for exploitation but for healing and empowerment. When a flood hits Assam or Kerala, or when riots threaten harmony, the local shakha becomes the first line of response — mobilising help, calming tempers and rebuilding trust. Taking Cultural Patriotism Global Contrary to the accusations that critics level at it, the RSS has repeatedly proven that its dream is a united Bharat. Its programmes to break caste barriers — inter-caste dining, marriages, and local mediation — continue to bring communities together. In its ecosystem, parallel organisations which are part of Sangh Parivar, Rashtriya Sevika Samiti and Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, nurture future generations in self-reliance and service. Even the Ram Mandir movement — once dismissed by Marxists and Opposition as fringe — was carried forward not through violence but through decades of patient mobilisation, legal battle and peaceful campaigns that culminated in the historic Pran Pratishtha in January 2024. For millions, that temple is not only a place of worship anymore — it is a civilisational statement that India can no longer be shamed into forgetting who it is. What is less known is how far the Sangh's ideals have travelled. As Indians migrated abroad, the RSS quietly inspired the birth of the Hindu Swayamsevak Sangh (HSS) in dozens of countries. Today, from New Jersey to Nairobi, young Indian-origin children gather on weekends to learn yoga, Sanskrit shlokas, traditional arts and festivals. These cultural anchors give diaspora children pride in their identity and keep families connected to India's living traditions. Whether it is raising funds for disaster relief abroad or helping stranded students during lockdowns, the spirit of seva crosses oceans. Now, as the RSS steps into its next century, its leadership under Sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat is clear-eyed about India's modern challenges. The Panch Parivartan — five broad missions — is guiding its future work: protecting the environment through tree plantation and water conservation; strengthening the family as the first school of values; bridging caste and regional divides through daily engagement; promoting healthy, disciplined living; and nurturing civic responsibility in every citizen. These goals sound simple, yet they strike at the root problems of a modern society where consumerism and selfishness often overshadow community and tradition. The Quiet Promise for Bharat's Future For its critics, the Sangh remains an enigma — too large to ignore, too rooted to dislodge, too silent to be easily understood. Yet, for millions, it is a source of quiet inspiration: a reminder that nation-building is not the job of governments alone but the duty of every family, every citizen. In its daily shakhas, modest schools, bustling charity kitchens and quiet disaster camps, the RSS has shown that true patriotism is built on discipline, humility and relentless service — not on headlines. One hundred years ago, Hedgewar or Guru Golwalkar could not have imagined the sheer scale their small experiment would achieve. But they knew that the real power of Bharat lay not in palaces or parliaments but in ordinary people ready to stand together for an idea bigger than themselves. In an age of noise, the Sangh's greatest strength remains its silence — the quiet promise that come what may, there will always be swayamsevaks ready to serve. A century down, the mission continues. The next hundred years belong to a resurgent Bharat — and the swayamsevak will be there, quietly watching over it, one morning shakha at a time. Prashanto Bagchi is an International Relations scholar at JNU, a columnist, and the founder of JNU INSIGHTS, an academic Society at Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Toshiba Shukla is a noted educationist, author, and a prominent voice in the realm of contemporary Hindutva thought. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily reflect News18's views. top videos View all
Time of India
16-07-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
RSS reshuffles over 60 dist pracharaks in UP
Lucknow: The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) has made major organisational changes, reshuffling more than 60 district pracharaks in Uttar Pradesh. The development marks Sangh's strategic recalibration even as the BJP gears up to intensify the spadework for the next year's panchayat elections and 2027 assembly polls. Sources said the changes were made recently to reinvigorate the organisational machinery while ensuring better and more efficient coordination at the ground level. District pracharaks are pivotal in mobilising cadres and aligning ideological outreach at the grassroots. RSS sources said the duty areas of at least 10 to 15 pracharaks have been changed in every prant. The Sangh recognises six prants – west UP (including Uttarakhand), Braj, Awadh, Goraksh, Kashi and Bundelkhand. A senior RSS functionary in Awadh Prant said the changes were part of a routine process which the Sangh undertakes to ramp up efficiency of its functionaries. This year, it is important in the wake of Sangh's centenary year celebrations. He, however, did not rule out the possibility of the exercise being linked to forthcoming electoral battles in Uttar Pradesh. "The ideological alignment of RSS and BJP happens ahead of any electoral contest," the RSS functionary said. by Taboola by Taboola Sponsored Links Sponsored Links Promoted Links Promoted Links You May Like [속보]'한 달만에 5cm 성장!?' 2개월치 무료증정 압도적 키성장 1위! 아이클타임 더 알아보기 Undo Analysts said the RSS and BJP are trying to strengthen their presence in UP which contributes the highest number of Lok Sabha seats (80) and holds a central place in parties' electoral ambitions. RSS's organisational activity, sources said, has become significant in UP after 2024 LS elections, in which BJP faced a setback with its tally plummeting to 33 from 62 in 2019. Sources said that the Sangh sought to keep a close watch on BJP's poll activity and lend adequate support as and when needed. RSS's organisational network, experts said, could also help the BJP overcome electoral challenges posed by the Samajwadi Party and Congress. Analysts said Sangh's nationalist narrative may particularly arm the BJP to counter the opposition's caste card – primarily the Pichhda, Dalit, Alpsankhyak (PDA) narrative, which is said to have dented the BJP in 2024. The RSS rejig also reflects on the performance evaluations and response to changing ground realities. Experts said that UP's political landscape is fluid, with growing caste-based and regional assertiveness of different political groups. Deploying pracharaks who understand these nuances may help the RSS regain lost ground or consolidate gains. Replacing older or underperforming functionaries with younger, more dynamic workers is consistent with RSS's organised efforts to modernise operations and connect with newer generations. It also prepares the cadre to be more tech-savvy and communication-efficient in an era of digital outreach.
India Today
12-07-2025
- Politics
- India Today
Ideology as the organisational compass: How RSS imagines the next BJP chief should be
The BJP has requisite quorum to elect its new national president. The party's discussions with its ideological parent, the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS), have happened. Senior Sangh leaders have emphasised to the BJP leadership that the appointment of their president was not a routine organisational exercise but a chance to recalibrate the backchannel discussions, Sangh functionaries have conveyed to the BJP top brass that the next president must do what the Narendra Modi-Amit Shah era in the party sidestepped: restore the organisational, ideological and cultural balance that once defined the Sangh-BJP ecosystem. Sangh leaders also want the new president to be the 36 state units, the BJP has elected (or re-elected) unit chiefs in 28 states; some crucial states, such as Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana and Gujarat, are works in progress. The party is also ready to announce the process and election of state chiefs in Jharkhand and Delhi. These two decisions could happen within a week before finalising the shortlisted panel for the national president and setting up the election leaders don't get involved in micro-management of any of the RSS affiliates, including the BJP. Yet they expect the affiliates to push their ideological narrative and build enablers in society. 'Politics and governance are not the goal but means to achieve larger goals,' said a senior RSS pracharak. By now, there is little doubt that the tectonic plates beneath India's ruling party have shifted. The Modi-led BJP is in power, yet the party no longer wears the aura of unchallengeable dominance. Denial of an outright majority after the 2024 Lok Sabha elections triggered not only a rethink within the saffron bloc but also an unmistakable ideological rumble from the RSS headquarters. The RSS made no bones about its desire for introspection—and perhaps more importantly—course-correction by the the past year, the Sangh has grown increasingly vocal. In June last year, RSS chief Mohan Bhagwat's now widely-discussed address —wherein he lamented about the rise of arrogance, the decline of dialogue and the BJP's disconnect from civilisational humility—was more than a sermon. It was a coded critique of what many in the Sangh see as the BJP's over-centralised, personality-driven sermon landed just as the BJP had entered its most vulnerable phase in a decade, forced into coalition management at the Centre with the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) and the Janata Dal (United), or JD(U), struggling to contain factional frictions in Maharashtra and Karnataka, and facing organisational drift in some former bastions, including Uttar is clarity among both Sangh and BJP leaderships that they need each other and can't have independent futures. There is also growing acceptance of the Sangh's ideas but, notably, also the enduring popularity of Prime Minister Modi across ideological spaces. The Sangh has been able to piggyback on this popularity to expand into new demographics and geographies.A top Sangh pracharak told INDIA TODAY that a towering figure like Modi does help, and that one doesn't have to remind him of the ideological stances. 'He is much clearer on the subject than anyone else. Yet we have the role of a custodian and watchdog to play, to caution our colleagues working in the various affiliates from time to time,' he the last week of June and the first week of July, several RSS pracharaks from around the country had camped in Delhi, particularly for the three-day annual convening of prant pracharaks at the RSS office in the national capital. Speaking to them gives one a sense of what the RSS would like to see in the next BJP the Sangh, the BJP president must not be a mere electoral strategist or seat-sharing tactician, but rather a custodian of political dharma—grounded in the BJP's ideological moorings, respected by the Sangh and trusted by the cadre. In closed-door conversations, Sangh seniors have stressed on the need for a president with an organisational mind. The appointee should be someone who understands the pulse of the party, and can engage with not just ministers and state presidents but also booth workers, shakha volunteers and RSS pracharaks, who increasingly feel is not that the incumbent J.P. Nadda or his predecessor, Amit Shah, never did so. They built infrastructure and programming for communication, including the robust mechanism of panna samitis, and kept cadre engaged via various party programmes. However, the Sangh wants the internal communication to become sharper and is particular concern over how the BJP, in its quest for electoral expansion, has become 'transactional'. The Sangh is uneasy about the growing influence of technocrats, political migrants (turncoats) and public relations operatives in shaping the BJP's public persona. The worry is not just that these newcomers dilute the party's ethos but that they hollow it out from ideal president, in the Sangh's eyes, will be one who can reinstate ideological clarity—not only around classic Hindutva issues, such as the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) or population control, but also in domains like education, family values and cultural build the quorum, BJP has elected 28 new state unit chiefs, and nominated a working president in Punjab. Most of the state chiefs are hands-on politicians and dyed-in-the-wool Sangh leaders. 'They could still make mistakes but at least, they will not deviate from the core philosophy of the Sangh,' remarks a more. July 2025 marks a critical moment in the BJP's succession calendar. Modi turns 75 in September. While there is no formal resignation mechanism tied to that age in the party, the transition moment—anticipated for years—is no longer abstract. A week before Modi, RSS sarsanghchalak Mohan Bhagwat will also turn 75. And within a fortnight, the Sangh will be celebrating its in BJP nor in the Sangh is there any anticipation that Modi will make space for a successor soon. There is consensus that Modi is the best bet to push the ideological agenda, take everyone in the ideological sphere together and re-strengthen the narrative. In fact, some Sangh ideologues believe Modi is needed for a longer term to set the trajectory to bring 'civilisational change' in the wider Hindu on July 10, Bhagwat surprised everyone when he said that people in public life must make way for their successors after attaining the age of 75. He was speaking at the launch of a biography of veteran pracharak Moropant Pingale, who himself retired after 75 years of age. Whether Bhagwat's statement was aimed at Modi or a general comment, only time will tell. Yet it has stirred a political BJP preparation for a post-Modi era will require a lot of hard work. It would mean building a second-rung leadership, mentoring state-level satraps and restoring inner-party democracy. The high-command culture—long typified by Modi-Shah-Nadda's closed-circle style—is now being seen as pracharaks call for a renewed focus on cadre-building. The post-Covid years have seen an explosion in electoral technology—apps, data dashboards, call centres, and so on. But Sangh functionaries complain that ideological education has weakened. Shakhas may be growing, but the party, they say, is losing character. In states like Bihar, West Bengal and Telangana, the BJP's growth has to be complemented with depth. The new president will be expected to rebuild the training architecture in order to elevate not just performers but believers in the is also a political imperative: the BJP's coalition compulsions in 2024 forced it to compromise on long-pending ideological agendas. The Sangh believes that only a grounded, ideologically attuned BJP president can safeguard the party's convictions in the coalition era. On contentious issues like the UCC or education reforms, there is apprehension that coalition partners will demand dilution or may bargain Sangh would obviously want a party chief who knows how to balance alliance pragmatism with ideological persistence. It is looking for someone with organisational experience and depth, a long innings in the trenches and the ability to engage with both the Delhi leadership and the shakha the BJP's internal climate has grown more brittle. Post-2024, state units have begun asserting themselves again. Fissures have opened in Maharashtra, Karnataka, Telangana and West Bengal. Leaders once overshadowed by Modi-Shah are staking claims. Sangh leaders do see this decentralisation as healthy but only if channelled by a party president who can mediate between ambition and alignment. Someone who respects feedback, tolerates constructive dissent and rebuilds what insiders call the 'invisible glue' of the leaders are mindful of how the BJP engages with the larger non-political ecosystem. In recent years, several movements—on Sanskrit education, decolonisation of history, Ayurveda and cultural revival—have emerged from Sangh affiliates. Yet, the BJP's attention has been new president, the Sangh hopes, will institutionalise these linkages. Not just through photo-ops but policy direction and party philosophy. In short, the RSS wants the BJP to remember who it is. The party may have won 240 Lok Sabha seats, but in the Sangh's reckoning, the election was a wake-up call. It proved that Modi alone can no longer win the war. It underlined that governance, ideology and organisation must now go together. And it reminded the BJP that even empires need choice of the new BJP president will signal the direction of that renewal. Will the BJP tone down on centralised charisma? Will it continue to treat ideology as a campaign asset or re-embed it as a moral compass? The Sangh has made its preference clear: it wants a president who is less of a war general and more of a civilisational steward. One who leads not from the stage but from the Sangh knows it cannot dictate terms to today's BJP. But it also knows that the BJP cannot afford to ignore the ideological umbilical cord that made it what it is. In the year after the 2024 Lok Sabha poll verdict, the Sangh's mood has changed—from celebration to scrutiny, endorsement to expectation. As the BJP prepares to anoint its next chief, the message from Nagpur is clear: course-correct or risk to India Today Magazine- EndsTune InMust Watch
Scroll.in
12-07-2025
- Politics
- Scroll.in
What India's Hindutva ecosystem gets wrong in its fantasy of restoring Nepal's monarchy
The rising calls over the past few months for Nepal to restore its monarchy has caught the attention of many in India, especially within the Sangh ecosystem. Hindutva hardliners such as Uttar Pradesh Chief Minister Adityanath have enthusiastically promoted the idea that if Nepal were to revert to being a Hindu kingdom, a structure it abolished in 2008, it would be a beacon of stability – and have a natural cultural affinity for its giant neighbour. This narrative, often spun with little grounding in Nepal's complex history or present realities, suggests that a restored monarchy would serve as a reliable ally for India against China and a stabilising force amidst Kathmandu's political chaos: since the restoration of democracy in 2008, there have been 15 distinct prime ministerial terms in a span of less than 17 years. Yet this simplistic vision borders on fantasy and reflects the Bharatiya Janata Party's romanticisation of authoritarianism and majoritarian symbols, though these are at odds with India's own democratic and pluralistic values. Historically, Nepal's monarchy was never the straightforward ally many in the BJP claim it to be. In 1950, King Tribhuvan Shah fled to India to escape the oligarchy of the Ranas, who had served as hereditary prime ministers, with the Shah rulers merely being figureheads. Jawaharlal Nehru's government helped facilitate Tribhuvan's return. It supported the establishment of constitutional monarchy and the end of the Ranas' 103-year regime. This moment was foundational for modern Nepali democracy and symbolised India's active support for representative governance in the Himalayan region. However, King Mahendra's 1960 royal coup dismissed the elected cabinet and crushed Nepal's fledgling democracy. He dismissed pro-India politicians, and realigned Nepal's foreign policy closer to China – actions that sowed long-term distrust toward India. Between 2005-'08, the power grab by Mahendra's son, Gyanendra, plunged Nepal into further instability. It accelerated the country's tilt toward Beijing, even as Gyanendera railed against Indian 'interference' in the kingdom's affairs. These kings reinforced Hindu nationalism not to strengthen ties with India, but to consolidate internal control and assert Nepal's sovereignty in ways that often ran counter to Indian interests. If Gyanendra were to return as an absolute ruler, he might tighten control through repression, exacerbating political instability and alienating both democratic forces and India. If he were reinstated as a constitutional monarch, his past record suggests he would resist ceding real power. His fraught relationship with India during his reign raises questions about whether a restored monarchy under his influence would truly align with New Delhi's strategic interests. Importantly, Nepal's monarchs have historically been treated as divine figures – incarnations of Vishnu – whose decrees were to be obeyed without question. This lends the institution a theocratic aura that undermines democratic scrutiny and public accountability. By contrast, Nepal's elected communist leaders – while not without their nationalist posturing – have generally exhibited a pragmatic streak in their dealings with India. Leaders such as KP Sharma Oli and Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), despite fiery rhetoric during border disputes or political crises, have kept channels open for economic cooperation, hydropower projects, and transit agreements. Their elected mandates compel them to maintain at least a working relationship with India, since Nepal's economy remains deeply integrated with its southern neighbour. Among other democratic actors, more moderate figures such as Sher Bahadur Deuba have shown greater amenability to Indian influence, emphasising stability and development over confrontational nationalism. That said, parties such as the Nepali Congress and Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) have at times also echoed the call for a Hindu state, even as they oppose monarchical revival. The Congress Mahasamiti has formally endorsed the idea of a Hindu state, highlighting the complex overlap between religious and political identities in Nepal. This complexity invites a deeper question: are today's royalist demonstrations more about restoring monarchy or about reinstating Nepal as a Hindu state? The two ideas are often conflated, but not all who support one necessarily support the other. Many secular politicians across party lines are sympathetic to cultural Hinduism but wary of authoritarian centralisation under a monarch. The distinction is crucial, as it suggests possible scenarios where Nepal reverts to a Hindu identity without abandoning democratic structures. This is where Nepali Hindu nationalism and Indian Hindutva are at fundamental conceptual odds: opposition to the BJP does not go hand in hand with also wanting a Hindu state, something that does not translate well in Kathmandu. The fervour of monarchist supporters is often fuelled by a potent mix of frustration with democratic stagnation and anxieties over religious and demographic change. Some claim that the population of Christians and Muslims is rising disproportionately. One major driver is disillusionment with federalism itself. A popular phrase captures this sentiment: 'Earlier we had one king, now we have 761' – a reference to the number of governments at the various levels, from village council to federal. This reflects a widespread belief that federalism has created layers of political inefficiency and corruption, without delivering real benefits. Public trust in federal structures has been further eroded by elite capture, bureaucratic inertia and poor service delivery at the local level. The symbolism of one unified authority – the king – is nostalgically contrasted with a fragmented political system seen as unstable and ineffective. Meanwhile, narratives around Christianisation and Muslim immigration are often exaggerated. According to the 2011 census, Hindus constituted roughly 81% of the population, Buddhists about 9%, Muslims 4.4% and Christians 1.4%. Updated estimates suggest Christians may now represent around 4%, with growth largely in urban and hill regions. The increase is notable but still far from a major demographic shift. While incidents of communal violence have occurred in some border areas, the situation has been contained. There is no evidence of a mass influx of Muslim refugees from India's North East. These claims – largely circulated in Indian Hindutva circles – lack support in Nepal. The demographic fear-mongering seems more rooted in ideological agendas than in reality. This paranoia aligns closely with the Sangh ecosystem's broader Hindu nationalist agenda, which often weaponises anxieties about religious minorities to mobilise support. Such ideological exports from India do little to stabilise Nepal's internal tensions and risk aggravating already delicate balances. Nepal's democratic experiment since the end of the Maoist civil war in 2006 has faced severe challenges. Economic growth has been uneven and insufficient to meet rising aspirations. The World Bank reports that GDP growth averaged around 4% annually from 2008 to 2022 – well below the South Asian average of 6%-6.4%, especially given Nepal's already low base. Structural problems like poor infrastructure, overreliance on remittances (nearly 30% of GDP), and limited industrialisation have hampered sustained development. Outmigration has soared: over four million Nepalis (roughly 13% of the population) now work abroad. Youth unemployment exceeds 30%, particularly in rural districts that were once Maoist strongholds. Political instability compounds these economic woes. No elected government has completed a full term since the monarchy was abolished in 2008. Frequent reshuffles, coalition breakdowns, and party infighting have eroded faith in the system. Some recent pro-monarchy protests have turned violent, targeting private property and key government buildings. They reflect deep disillusionment, but not yet a decisive popular shift toward monarchy. India's relationship with Nepal is complicated. The countries have open borders, which allow their citizens to travel and work freely in each place. But India's image in Nepal is shaped by grievances both real and imagined. On one hand, India has taken actions that have deeply affected Nepali society and politics. Two undeclared blockades by India stopping goods entering the land-locked country – in 1989 and again in 2015 – caused widespread hardship and are etched in public memory. These episodes, coupled with allegations that India maintains deep political influence through Nepal's party elites and intelligence agencies, reinforce perceptions of Indian overreach. Nepal's landlocked geography compounds this sense of vulnerability, as trade routes, fuel access, and transit infrastructure remain subject to India's cooperation – or its withholding. On the other hand, some anti-India sentiment is driven by persistent, though unfounded, conspiracy theories, most notably, claims linking India to the 2001 royal massacre. These theories lack credible evidence and contradict basic logic. India, a Hindu-majority nation battling its own Maoist insurgency at the time, could have had no reason to orchestrate the murder of a Hindu royal family to usher Nepal's Maoists into power. Yet the narrative persists, often amplified by nationalist or monarchist factions seeking to deflect blame or exploit public emotion. The traction they get reflects deeper anxieties – about sovereignty, inequality in bilateral ties and a legacy of structural asymmetry. In this context, India is both an assertive actor and a symbolic scapegoat, viewed through a lens shaped by both history and myth. For India, the stakes are high. A stable, democratic, and pluralistic Nepal remains the most desirable outcome. But the BJP's romanticisation of monarchy risks undermining that goal. Such leaders are not necessarily ignorant of Nepal's reality; rather, they may be cynically exploiting the monarchy narrative for domestic gain. The appeal of being seen as defenders of Hindu civilisation resonates with their core voters, even at the cost of diplomatic prudence. The geopolitical stakes for India in Nepal are amplified both by China's assertive engagement and by Pakistan's covert operations. China's influence in Nepal has grown steadily over the past decade through strategic investments in infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative, increased diplomatic outreach, and soft power efforts that include media partnerships and cultural diplomacy. Beijing has positioned itself as a 'non-interfering partner', which plays well with Nepali nationalist narratives – especially when contrasted with perceptions of Indian hegemony. Chinese-funded projects such as highways, hydropower stations, and digital connectivity initiatives have deepened Kathmandu's economic dependence on Beijing. In recent years, there has been rising concern in New Delhi about the Chinese army's quiet but steady engagement with Nepal's security establishment. Meanwhile, Pakistan's use of Nepal as a staging ground for anti-India jihadist activity presents a direct national security threat. Indian intelligence agencies have long warned of networks backed by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence outfit operating through Kathmandu to smuggle arms, move operatives, and plan attacks inside India. The porous open border between India and Nepal, though historically a symbol of close ties, also creates vulnerabilities that hostile actors have exploited. In this strategic context, any political vacuum or instability in Nepal could become a doorway for adversarial infiltration – via economic capture, ideological influence or covert operations. India must prepare for various trajectories: a strengthened democracy, a weakened federal system or a symbolic monarchical revival. Regardless, it should prioritise economic cooperation, institutional reform, and pluralism. Pragmatic diplomacy and visible development will do more to stabilise Nepal than ideological alignment. India has already delivered substantial, on-the-ground projects, such as constructing high-capacity cross-border transmission lines and supporting major hydropower developments. India has enabled Nepal's first-ever power exports – to Bangladesh and Bihar – by integrating it into its electricity grid. Rail links such as Jaynagar-Bardibas and Jogbani–Biratnagar have been completed, with work progressing on the Raxaul–Kathmandu corridor. India has also invested in schools, health posts, cultural restoration, and rural housing across all seven provinces. These visible benefits – electricity, mobility, education, trade access, and jobs – not only improve lives but also physically integrate Nepal into a regional ecosystem that promotes mutual resilience and trust. India's unique position – as both a powerful neighbour and the world's only other Hindu-majority nation – gives it enormous soft-power leverage. But this must be exercised with sensitivity and consistency. Betting on a crown over a constitution is not a sound strategy. One unresolved question lingers: do Nepal's royalist supporters seek both monarchy and a Hindu state? The answer may determine the future direction of Nepali nationalism – and how India responds to it. A clear understanding of this dual demand will help India engage more with both Nepali state and society to effectively promote stability, respect sovereignty and build lasting ties with its Himalayan neighbour.
