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3 days ago
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2025 NIF Translation Fellowships to translate texts from 10 Indian languages open for applications
The third edition of the New India Foundation's Translation Fellowships is accepting applications till December 31, 2025. The fellowships will be awarded across ten languages for translating non-fiction texts published from 1850 onwards. Each fellow will receive a grant of Rs 6 lakhs over a period of six months. The languages in consideration for this year's fellowship are Assamese, Bangla, Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Marathi, Malayalam, Odia, Tamil, and Urdu. The jury for these fellowships this year includes the NIF Trustees: political scientist Niraja Jayal Gopal, historian Srinath Raghavan, partner trilegal Rahul Matthan, and entrepreneur Manish Sabharwal, alongside the Language Expert Committee in all ten languages, comprising esteemed scholars, professors, academics and literary translators. Fellows are expected to publish the translated works, which will be an extension of their winning proposals. The New India Foundation's focus on translating historical texts from Indian languages into English hopes to create an expansive cultural reach for works which have thus far been confined to one language. The Fellowship has no constraints regarding the genre or style of the original text, the translator's nationality, or the material's ideology. Interested translators can apply here. The previous edition's winners are:
Hindustan Times
21-06-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Blinded by devotion to power and her son
Wednesday is the 50th anniversary of Indira Gandhi's Emergency. Her most authoritative and profound biographer, Srinath Raghavan, whose book Indira Gandhi and the Years That Transformed India is published this month, believes the Emergency was 'the single most traumatic experience in independent India's political history'. Today let's remind ourselves of how terrible it was. The truth is, as Srinath Raghavan's book points out, Indira Gandhi never thought very highly of democracy The cold facts of the Emergency are chilling; 34,988 people were detained under the Maintenance of Internal Security Act whilst 75,818 were arrested under the Defence of India rules; practically the entire Opposition was jailed; the press was censored; the Constitution brutally amended; and even the judiciary accepted that the right to life had been suspended. At the height of the Emergency, LK Advani wrote in his diary that Indian democracy was over and done with. At the time, most people would have agreed with him. There can be little doubt that the Emergency was declared to protect Gandhi's political career after the Allahabad High Court struck down her election and the Supreme Court only gave her a conditional stay. Her claim that it was necessary because the Opposition was trying to paralyse the government and Jayaprakash Narayan had called on the Army and the police to disobey orders was just a trumped-up excuse. Raghavan believes the actual declaration of the Emergency on June 25, 1975 was 'a coup d'etat'. First, under the Constitution there can only be one emergency at a time and in 1975 there was already an external emergency going back to the Bangladesh war of 1971. Second, under Article 352, the President can only proclaim an emergency on the written recommendation of the council of ministers. President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed didn't wait for that. He did it at the Prime Minister's personal request. Third, the mass arrests and the cutting of power to newspaper establishments on the night of June 25 /26 'had no legal basis and were done entirely at the behest of the Prime Minister'. At this point let's ask if Indira Gandhi was justified in claiming there was an 'imminent threat to the security of India'? The Intelligence Bureau had not submitted any such report nor did the state governments convey such information to the Union home ministry. So, did Indira Gandhi make up and manufacture this alleged internal threat? It seems like it. The truth is, as Raghavan's book points out, Indira Gandhi never thought very highly of democracy. She once wrote to the violinist Yehudi Menuhin: 'Democracy is not an end. It is merely a system by which one proceeds towards the goal. Hence democracy cannot be more important than the progress, unity or survival of the country.' Most people remember the Emergency for the two campaigns it is closely associated with – sterilisation and slum clearance. Both had at their head Gandhi's younger son, Sanjay. And both destroyed the credibility of the Emergency and Gandhi's personal reputation. Yet so dependent was Indira Gandhi on Sanjay that she was blind to this. She's even on record claiming he was like an elder brother. Certainly, she considered him her strongest and most loyal supporter after the Allahabad High Court verdict. As her principal secretary, PN Haksar, points out: 'She was absolutely blind as far as that boy was concerned.' To everyone's astonishment, in January 1977 Indira Gandhi called elections even though they weren't due for another year. It led to the collapse of her rule and the end of the Emergency. Did she do it because she thought she could win and legitimise the Emergency? Or was this a way of accepting it was a mistake and getting off the tiger's back? The truth is Indira Gandhi never apologised for the Emergency nor accepted it was a mistake. She only regretted aspects of it which she considered excesses. Asked by Paul Brass on March 26, 1978: 'Would you have done anything differently in relation to the Emergency?', her answer began with the word 'No'. It couldn't have been more pointed. Karan Thapar is the author of Devil's Advocate: The Untold Story. The views expressed are personal
Hindustan Times
19-06-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
The Emergency and its external dimension
The pain inflicted by the 21-month Emergency rule in India on its body politic and its people continues to hurt even after 50 years. The domestic dimensions of the Emergency have been discussed at length. A recent study by Srinath Raghavan ably explores its structural dimensions – of the gradual evolution of a powerful executive, creeping encroachments on freedoms and rights and authoritarian tendencies of governance — that have been building for long. However, Indira Gandhi's oft repeated allegations about the role of 'foreign hand' (of the United States of America) in destabilising her government have often skipped rigorous scrutiny. Her political opponents, many media commentators, and even serious historians like Ramchandra Guha and Bipin Chandra have dismissed these allegations in want of hard, concrete evidence, as a pretext to justify her authoritarian streak. This was also the position of the various US official organs, as expected. The prevailing intellectual narrative clearly underlines that transformational changes in developing countries result from a conscious or coincidental coalition of domestic and external forces. Over the years, many new archives have opened and the present ruling dispensation in New Delhi has brought the issue back to the forefront of India's political dynamics. The narrative of the US pushing Indira Gandhi towards the Emergency decision and supporting the peoples' uprising against its repressive regime deserve a second dispassionate look. This may be done at three levels. First, regime change, through covert as well as overt means, against Communist/ socialist or Left-oriented governments in Latin America (Chile) and Asia (Iran) has been an integral part of the toolkit of US policy since the Cold War years. According to American scholar Lindsey O'Rourke, the US carried out 64 covert regime-change operations between 1947 and 1989. Another scholar, David S Levins (2020), claims that the US carried out the largest number of foreign electoral interventions during 1946-2000. The use of covert operations for regime change in developing countries brought about extensive criticism of the US's democratic credentials, forcing the US Congress to appoint The Church Committee to investigate the matter. In its report in 1976, this Committee came down heavily on CIA operations and blamed it for having a worldwide network of several hundred individuals to have access 'to a large number of news agencies, radio and television stations, commercial publishers and media outlets' for covert operations. Secondly, at the regional level in South Asia, the US National Security Council's policy document, NSC 98/1, was adopted by President Truman in January 1951. It asked US policy in the region to take 'more frequently accept calculated risks' in ensuring that the Communist (as also, socialist and Communist supported) governments did not remain in power. Only such governments were acceptable that 'would assist the United States and its allies to obtain the facilities desired in the time of peace or required in the event of war'. The Nixon (1969-1974)-Kissinger (1969-1977) team of the US had a strong focus on South Asian regimes in its endeavour to cultivate China and isolate the Soviet Union. Between 1975 and 1977, major developments took place in South Asia. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (1975) in Bangladesh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1977) in Pakistan were deposed brutally by military regimes. Sheikh Mujib's Bangladesh in 1971 had emerged in strategic defiance of the US, and Bhutto had defied the US on the nuclear issue. Bhutto's daughter, Benazir, was reported to have disclosed Kissinger's threat in November 1976 to Bhutto to make a horrible example of him if he pursued the nuclear path. Nepal (Zone of Peace, 1975) and Sikkim (the American queen of the Chogyal sponsored independent status, 1974-75) had explicit support from the US so as to distance them from India. Lastly, at the bilateral level, Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' paranoia was a reflection of these regional developments. She had the worst of relations with the Nixon-Kissinger team both on the Bangladesh (1971) and the nuclear (implosion, 1974) issues. It was problematic for the US establishment that Indira Gandhi, whom the CIA supported in dethroning the Communist regime in Kerala in late 1950s, was during 1967-69, leaning on the Indian Communists in her struggle for power within her own party. The CIA activities during Indira Gandhi's regime had become so unacceptable even to the US embassy in New Delhi that ambassador Patrick Moynihan had to ask the state department to withdraw CIA operations. The imposition of Emergency was publicly disapproved by the US state department and American media. The US secretary of state Kissinger in his memo to President Ford in September 1975 said that the Emergency had discredited Indian democracy, adding, 'We should avoid any overt involvement that could confirm her allegations of foreign subversion'. Did this imply that covert operations to subvert the Emergency could go on? The post-Emergency regime was headed by Morarji Desai, who American journalist Seymour Hersh alleged was a CIA mole in Indira Gandhi's cabinet. Desai fought a libel case in the US against Hersh unsuccessfully. President Carter visited India in January 1978 to acclaim the post-Emergency regime, and asked Prime Minister Desai to desist from the nuclear path. Thus, there are ample leads at all the three levels to revisit the question of the 'foreign hand' and see if it had any links with the popular protests. British scholar Paul Garr in his study, Spying in South Asia (2024), says that Indira Gandhi's 'foreign hand' was an exaggeration sometimes, but her fears about the CIA were 'genuine' and valid. Our reliance only on the structural theories and Indira Gandhi's authoritarianism do not explain her decision to end the Emergency, as also how she managed to stage an impressive electoral comeback in less than three years. SD Muni is professor emeritus, JNU, former ambassador and special envoy, Government of India. The views expressed are personal.
BBC News
08-06-2025
- Politics
- BBC News
Indira Gandhi: The forgotten story of India's brush with presidential rule
During the mid-1970s, under Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's imposition of the Emergency, India entered a period where civil liberties were suspended and much of the political opposition was jailed. Behind this authoritarian curtain, her Congress party government quietly began reimagining the country - not as a democracy rooted in checks and balances, but as a centralised state governed by command and control, historian Srinath Raghavan reveals in his new Indira Gandhi and the Years That Transformed India, Prof Raghavan shows how Gandhi's top bureaucrats and party loyalists began pushing for a presidential system - one that would centralise executive power, sideline an "obstructionist" judiciary and reduce parliament to a symbolic in part by Charles de Gaulle's France, the push for a stronger presidency in India reflected a clear ambition to move beyond the constraints of parliamentary democracy - even if it never fully materialised. It all began, writes Prof Raghavan, in September 1975, when BK Nehru, a seasoned diplomat and a close aide of Gandhi, wrote a letter hailing the Emergency as a "tour de force of immense courage and power produced by popular support" and urged Gandhi to seize the moment. Parliamentary democracy had "not been able to provide the answer to our needs", Nehru wrote. In this system the executive was continuously dependent on the support of an elected legislature "which is looking for popularity and stops any unpleasant measure".What India needed, Nehru said, was a directly elected president - freed from parliamentary dependence and capable of taking "tough, unpleasant and unpopular decisions" in the national interest, Prof Raghavan model he pointed to was de Gaulle's France - concentrating power in a strong presidency. Nehru imagined a single, seven-year presidential term, proportional representation in Parliament and state legislatures, a judiciary with curtailed powers and a press reined in by strict libel laws. He even proposed stripping fundamental rights - right to equality or freedom of speech, for example - of their urged Indira Gandhi to "make these fundamental changes in the Constitution now when you have two-thirds majority". His ideas were "received with rapture" by the prime minister's secretary PN Dhar. Gandhi then gave Nehru approval to discuss these ideas with her party leaders but said "very clearly and emphatically" that he should not convey the impression that they had the stamp of her approval. Prof Raghavan writes that the ideas met with enthusiastic support from senior Congress leaders like Jagjivan Ram and foreign minister Swaran Singh. The chief minister of Haryana state was blunt: "Get rid of this election nonsense. If you ask me just make our sister [Indira Gandhi] President for life and there's no need to do anything else". M Karunanidhi of Tamil Nadu – one of two non-Congress chief ministers consulted - was Nehru reported back to Gandhi, she remained non-committal, Prof Raghavan writes. She instructed her closest aides to explore the proposals further. What emerged was a document titled "A Fresh Look at Our Constitution: Some suggestions", drafted in secrecy and circulated among trusted advisors. It proposed a president with powers greater than even their American counterpart, including control over judicial appointments and legislation. A new "Superior Council of Judiciary", chaired by the president, would interpret "laws and the Constitution" - effectively neutering the Supreme sent this document to Dhar, who recognised it "twisted the Constitution in an ambiguously authoritarian direction". Congress president DK Barooah tested the waters by publicly calling for a "thorough re-examination" of the Constitution at the party's 1975 annual idea never fully crystallised into a formal proposal. But its shadow loomed over the Forty-second Amendment Act, passed in 1976, which expanded Parliament's powers, limited judicial review and further centralised executive amendment made striking down laws harder by requiring supermajorities of five or seven judges, and aimed to dilute the Constitution's 'basic structure doctrine' that limited parliament's also handed the federal government sweeping authority to deploy armed forces in states, declare region-specific Emergencies, and extend President's Rule - direct federal rule - from six months to a year. It also put election disputes out of the judiciary's was not yet a presidential system, but it carried its genetic imprint - a powerful executive, marginalised judiciary and weakened checks and balances. The Statesman newspaper warned that "by one sure stroke, the amendment tilts the constitutional balance in favour of the parliament." Meanwhile, Gandhi's loyalists were going all in. Defence minister Bansi Lal urged "lifelong power" for her as prime minister, while Congress members in the northern states of Haryana, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh unanimously called for a new constituent assembly in October 1976."The prime minister was taken aback. She decided to snub these moves and hasten the passage of the amendment bill in the parliament," writes Prof December 1976, the bill had been passed by both houses of parliament and ratified by 13 state legislatures and signed into law by the Gandhi's shock defeat in 1977, the short-lived Janata Party - a patchwork of anti-Gandhi forces - moved quickly to undo the damage. Through the Forty-third and Forty-fourth Amendments, it rolled back key parts of the Forty Second, scrapping authoritarian provisions and restoring democratic checks and was swept back to power in January 1980, after the Janata Party government collapsed due to internal divisions and leadership struggles. Curiously, two years later, prominent voices in the party again mooted the idea of a presidential 1982, with President Sanjiva Reddy's term ending, Gandhi seriously considered stepping down as prime minister to become president of India. Her principal secretary later revealed she was "very serious" about the move. She was tired of carrying the Congress party on her back and saw the presidency as a way to deliver a "shock treatment to her party, thereby giving it a new stimulus".Ultimately, she backed down. Instead, she elevated Zail Singh, her loyal home minister, to the serious flirtation, India never made the leap to a presidential system. Did Gandhi, a deeply tactical politician, hold herself back ? Or was there no national appetite for radical change and India's parliamentary system proved sticky? There was a hint of presidential drift in the early 1970s, as India's parliamentary democracy - especially after 1967 - grew more competitive and unstable, marked by fragile coalitions, according to Prof Raghavan. Around this time, voices began suggesting that a presidential system might suit India better. The Emergency became the moment when these ideas crystallised into serious political thinking."The aim was to reshape the system in ways that immediately strengthened her hold on power. There was no grand long-term design - most of the lasting consequences of her [Gandhi's] rule were likely unintended," Prof Raghavan told the BBC."During the Emergency, her primary goal was short-term: to shield her office from any challenge. The Forty Second Amendment was crafted to ensure that even the judiciary couldn't stand in her way."The itch for a presidential system within the Congress never quite faded. As late as April 1984, senior minister Vasant Sathe launched a nationwide debate advocating a shift to presidential governance - even while in power. But six months later, Indira Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in Delhi, and with her, the conversation abruptly died. India stayed a parliamentary democracy.
Scroll.in
05-06-2025
- Business
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Srinath Raghavan
How Indira Gandhi's nationalisation of banks enhanced the infrastructural power of the Indian state An excerpt from 'Indira Gandhi and the Years That Transformed India', by Srinath Raghavan. Srinath Raghavan · 4 minutes ago How the US managed the presence of 200,000 soldiers in India in World War II with dynamic propaganda America needed to foster sympathy for its troops in India while steering them clear of the country's politics, Srinath Raghavan writes in a new book. Srinath Raghavan · Jun 15, 2018 · 08:30 am No officers, no equipment, no money – or, how the Indian army had to be built Not enough suitable candidates, and an economy in the doldrums, made things very difficult. Srinath Raghavan · Apr 24, 2016 · 08:30 am
