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Time of India
7 hours ago
- Politics
- Time of India
From solidarity to strategy: Richard Marles' visit to India elevates India–Australia strategic ties amid Indo-Pacific uncertainty
Dr. Ashok Sharma is a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is an Academic Fellow of the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne. His recent roles include Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University in the Department of Strategic & Defence Studies within the Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs, and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Canberra. There, he was the Head of the 'South Asia Strategic, State Fragile and Security Program' and Conjoint Head of the 'Indo-Pacific Strategic Issues and Major Powers Studies' at the National Asian Security Studies Centre. An alumnus of both Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University, Dr. Sharma's academic journey includes Faculty, Fellow, and Honorary positions at the Australian National University, the University of Melbourne, the University of Auckland, and Victoria University of Wellington, as well as the University of Delhi. Notably, he served as the Deputy Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Auckland Branch, from February 2012 to June 2022. Dr. Sharma, one of the leading voices in the global affairs and security studies, is also the accomplished author of significant works including book titled India's Pursuit of Energy Security: Domestic Measures, Foreign Policy and Geopolitics and Indian Lobbying and its Influence in US Decision Making: Post-Cold War. LESS ... MORE In the backdrop of the brutal Pahalgam terrorist attack and the growing instability across the Indo-Pacific, Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles' June 2025 visit to India has emerged as a significant reaffirmation of India–Australia strategic ties. At a time when the region is grappling with escalating security threats and strategic ambiguities—particularly regarding the unpredictability of the United States' posture towards China—Marles' presence in New Delhi sent a strong and timely message. It underscored Australia's determination not only to deepen its engagement with India but also to jointly shoulder the responsibility of maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific. The timing of Marles' visit could not have been more politically and symbolically potent. Occurring just days after India conducted precision strikes in response to the Pahalgam attack, which claimed 26 lives, his presence was far from a routine diplomatic gesture. It was an act of solidarity. Marles met with Defence Minister Rajnath Singh, External Affairs Minister Dr S. Jaishankar, and later Prime Minister Narendra Modi. In all three meetings, he made it unequivocally clear that Australia stood firmly with India in its fight against terrorism, condemning the Pahalgam attack in the strongest terms. Crucially, he lauded India's calibrated response, acknowledging New Delhi's sovereign right to self-defence while commending its strategic restraint—a nuanced formulation that reflected both support and shared democratic values. Defence Minister Singh welcomed Australia's strong show of support and reiterated that the India–Australia Comprehensive Strategic Partnership now constitutes one of the principal pillars of New Delhi's Indo-Pacific policy. Singh and Marles announced new initiatives to bolster bilateral defence-industrial cooperation, including a joint research programme on emerging defence technologies and enhanced collaboration between Indian and Australian small and medium-sized enterprises. This reflects a maturing relationship that has moved beyond symbolic military exercises and strategic dialogue into genuine co-development and capability-building. For India, striving to expand its indigenous defence manufacturing under the 'Make in India' programme, Australia's advanced defence-industrial base and innovation ecosystem provide both strategic synergy and long-term alignment. Marles also participated in in-depth discussions on expanding maritime security cooperation. With both countries increasingly concerned about China's assertive activities across the South China Sea, Indian Ocean, and Pacific Islands, the maritime domain has naturally emerged as a focal point for collaboration. Australia's recent gifting of a patrol boat to the Maldives—viewed as a strategic response to growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean—resonates with India's SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) initiative. Marles' declaration that Australia seeks 'a free and open Indo-Pacific where no country is allowed to dominate by force or coercion' echoed India's own strategic lexicon, signalling a deeper convergence of geopolitical perspectives. The broader regional environment lends further urgency to this strategic convergence. Although U.S. Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth reiterated Washington's Indo-Pacific commitment at the recent Shangri-La Dialogue, lingering doubts about American reliability persist. The advent of a second Trump presidency has unsettled many regional allies. Trump's transactional view of alliances and erratic approach to China—swinging between combative trade measures and abrupt conciliatory overtures—have contributed to an atmosphere of strategic uncertainty. Against this backdrop, India and Australia appear to be recalibrating their strategic postures. The emphasis is now on building robust bilateral mechanisms that can endure shifts in US foreign policy. This does not imply a sidelining of the Quad—of which both countries are founding members—but rather a determination to ensure that Indo-Pacific stability is not solely dependent on US leadership. This is a pragmatic recalibration. As the Indo-Pacific becomes a contested geopolitical arena, marked by economic rivalry, military build-up, and cyber threats, mid-level powers such as India and Australia have little choice but to assume greater responsibility for regional order. Marles' visit represents a deliberate move in this direction. His statement that 'India and Australia are now not just partners, but stakeholders in the region's security architecture' was far more than diplomatic nicety—it was a reflection of the shared conviction that the time has come for responsible regional powers to act proactively, not reactively. Meanwhile, trade and economic ties continue to gather momentum. Ongoing negotiations on the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) aim to build on the Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement (ECTA) signed in 2022. As global supply chains undergo strategic reconfiguration and nations seek to de-risk critical dependencies, the India–Australia economic corridor could emerge as a vital node in ensuring regional economic resilience. Additionally, both nations are cooperating on critical minerals—essential for clean energy transitions, semiconductors, and advanced defence systems. With Australia's rich mineral resources and India's burgeoning manufacturing sector, the complementarity is not only strategic but also timely. The evolution of India–Australia relations over the past decade has been profound. What was once a cautious engagement based primarily on shared democratic values has transformed into a robust strategic partnership. Today, the two countries are at the forefront of regional security dialogues, conduct advanced military exercises such as AUSINDEX and AUSTRAHIND, and are operationalising logistics and refuelling agreements to enhance interoperability. Recent developments include joint naval patrols in the Indian Ocean, expanded information-sharing protocols, and collaboration on emerging defence technologies. The elevation of the 2+2 Ministerial Dialogue and the growing engagement between defence industries underscore this momentum. Marles' visit was not merely a continuation of these efforts—it marked an inflection point, a shift to a phase where diplomacy, defence, economics, and innovation converge under a unified strategic vision. In an era defined by growing instability, terrorism, and shifting power dynamics, the actions of India and Australia are both bold and necessary. Together, they are crafting a reliable, rules-based, and inclusive Indo-Pacific order—anchored not in confrontation, but in cooperation, deterrence, and shared capacity-building. The June 2025 visit of Deputy Prime Minister Richard Marles thus marks yet another decisive milestone—signalling the transformation of the India–Australia partnership into a linchpin of Indo-Pacific strategy and a vital counterweight to coercive geopolitical manoeuvres. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
Time of India
21-05-2025
- Politics
- Time of India
Beyond the optics: Why the India-US strategic partnership must not be held hostage to Trump's whims
Dr. Ashok Sharma is a Visiting Fellow at the University of New South Wales Canberra at the Australian Defence Force Academy and is an Academic Fellow of the Australia-India Institute at the University of Melbourne. His recent roles include Visiting Fellow at the Australian National University in the Department of Strategic & Defence Studies within the Coral Bell School of Asia-Pacific Affairs, and Adjunct Associate Professor at the University of Canberra. There, he was the Head of the 'South Asia Strategic, State Fragile and Security Program' and Conjoint Head of the 'Indo-Pacific Strategic Issues and Major Powers Studies' at the National Asian Security Studies Centre. An alumnus of both Jawaharlal Nehru University and Delhi University, Dr. Sharma's academic journey includes Faculty, Fellow, and Honorary positions at the Australian National University, the University of Melbourne, the University of Auckland, and Victoria University of Wellington, as well as the University of Delhi. Notably, he served as the Deputy Chair of the New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Auckland Branch, from February 2012 to June 2022. Dr. Sharma, one of the leading voices in the global affairs and security studies, is also the accomplished author of significant works including book titled India's Pursuit of Energy Security: Domestic Measures, Foreign Policy and Geopolitics and Indian Lobbying and its Influence in US Decision Making: Post-Cold War. LESS ... MORE In recent weeks, a flurry of controversial statements by US President Donald Trump has once again drawn unwelcome attention to the India-Pakistan relationship and the enduring question of Kashmir. Claiming credit for a ceasefire between the two nuclear neighbours, Trump asserted in a public rally and in subsequent interviews that he 'helped bring peace' following India's counter-terrorism Operation Sindoor. India, for its part, has resolutely rejected any suggestion of external mediation or intervention, terming the cessation of hostilities as a 'strategic halt' driven by its own national security considerations. While Trump's statements reflect his characteristic bravado and transactional view of diplomacy, they also cast a spotlight on a more serious issue: the fragility of international perceptions when strategic partnerships are subjected to individual whims. The India-US relationship, which has evolved into a comprehensive global strategic partnership over the past two decades, must not be derailed by ill-informed remarks or outdated Cold War mentalities. From former President Bill Clinton's landmark visit to India in 2000 to George W Bush's civil nuclear agreement and Barack Obama's strategic embrace, the India-US partnership has grown consistently across administrations. Under Donald Trump's first term, there were some notable positives, such as the renaming of the US Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command—recognising India's centrality in the region—and the temporary suspension of aid to Pakistan for its duplicity on terrorism. That duplicity was most starkly exposed when Osama bin Laden, the world's most wanted terrorist, was found hiding in plain sight in Abbottabad, just a stone's throw from Pakistan's military academy—laying bare Islamabad's double game. Yet, Trump brought a distinctively unpredictable flavour to diplomacy. His public claim to mediate the Kashmir issue—a red line for India—was met with swift rebuttals from New Delhi. India has consistently maintained that Kashmir is its internal matter and that it will not countenance any third-party involvement. Prime Minister Modi reiterated this stance in his recent address, underscoring the autonomy and intentionality behind the recent ceasefire, without so much as a reference to Washington. Perhaps more troubling than his claim of brokering peace is Trump's historically inaccurate assertion that India and Pakistan have been fighting for 'centuries.' This statement not only ignores the basic fact that Pakistan was created in 1947 but also reveals a fundamental misunderstanding of South Asia's modern geopolitical realities. While senior U.S. officials—especially in the Pentagon and State Department—have typically demonstrated a sound understanding of regional complexities, Trump himself appears untutored on the finer nuances of the India-Pakistan dynamic. This underscores a critical weakness in the personalisation of foreign policy: when leaders make off-the-cuff statements without consulting institutional advice, they risk undermining longstanding strategic relationships. Given the unpredictability of Trump's second term, India must redouble its efforts in strategic lobbying. The India Caucus in the US Congress—one of the largest bilateral caucuses—must be actively engaged, and Indian diplomatic missions across the US should intensify their outreach to legislators, think tanks, and media. Lobbying in the American context is not just about policy influence—it is about narrative correction. Indian diplomats and lobbyists must continue to educate American stakeholders on the evolving Indo-Pacific security architecture, India's domestic policy imperatives, and its counter-terrorism priorities. While the institutional backbone of India-US relations is strong—built on more than 60 platforms—it is important that the political leadership in Washington remains aligned with those institutional foundations. At the heart of the India–US strategic partnership lie two defining priorities: countering terrorism and managing China's rise. Since the 9/11 attacks, intelligence cooperation between the two democracies has deepened, helping to foil numerous terrorist plots. The 2008 Mumbai attacks further strengthened this collaboration, ushering in greater information sharing and joint operations. In the Indo-Pacific, China's growing assertiveness has driven closer alignment between Washington and New Delhi. The Quad—comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia—now serves as a key strategic counterweight to Beijing. The renaming of the US Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command during Trump's presidency was more than symbolic; it reflected a structural shift in how Washington views New Delhi's role. It is precisely for this reason that any careless comments from US leaders risk undermining the very partnership Washington needs to balance China's rise. As of 2024, China's trade with India exceeded $135 billion, yet strategic distrust remains high. India's role as a democratic counterweight to China is crucial not just for regional stability but for maintaining a liberal international order. During Trump's first term, trade friction emerged over issues such as tariffs on Harley-Davidson motorcycles and disputes over medical devices and data localisation. Trump's recent remarks urging Apple CEO Tim Cook to 'move out of India' and return manufacturing to the US echo a similar protectionist stance. However, India's tech and manufacturing landscape has evolved. Initiatives like 'Make in India' and 'Production-Linked Incentives (PLI)' are aimed at making India a global hub for electronics, semiconductors, and renewable technologies. The iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies), launched under the Biden-Modi partnership, has further deepened cooperation in AI, quantum computing, space, and defence startups. India is no longer a passive recipient in global supply chains—it is an active player. Any US policy that seeks to roll back this cooperation will find itself at odds not only with Indian aspirations but also with the long-term US interest of reducing reliance on Chinese manufacturing. India–US relations have matured to a point where they can weather occasional turbulence. However, no strategic partnership is immune to political short-sightedness. New Delhi must engage Trump through institutional diplomacy rather than personal rapport. Prime Minister Modi and Trump may have boasted of their chemistry during the 'Howdy Modi' and 'Namaste Trump' events, but the future of bilateral ties cannot rest on stage-managed optics. This relationship must continue to be guided by shared interests in defence, energy, trade, technology, and regional stability. As the global order becomes increasingly multipolar, the US must recognise that India is no longer the India of the Cold War. It is a confident, re-emerging and inevitable great power with its own interests, agency, and global vision—and an indispensable partner in the Indo-Pacific. Donald Trump may take credit where it is not due, but the India-US relationship is too strategically rooted to be swayed by rhetoric. While New Delhi must stay vigilant and proactive, Washington too must introspect. A durable partnership requires not just shared interests, but mutual respect and understanding. That is the only way this defining partnership of the 21st century can truly live up to its name. Facebook Twitter Linkedin Email Disclaimer Views expressed above are the author's own.
