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Asia Times
26-05-2025
- Business
- Asia Times
China's strategy for conquering Taiwan without firing a shot
China is refining a strategy to conquer Taiwan by weaponizing its critical infrastructure and transforming power plants, ports and data hubs into pressure points for systemic collapse, according to a Chinese military journal. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) reports that China could paralyze Taiwan without firing a shot by targeting key infrastructure—an approach likened to the 'butterfly effect' in the Naval and Merchant Ships journal. The article identifies 30 to 40 'super critical' nodes—power, water, communications, and liquified natural gas (LNG) facilities – that, if taken offline, could crash Taiwan's systems from within. It cites the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) recent Strait Thunder 2025A drill, which simulated an attack on Taiwan's largest LNG depot, highlighting China's growing tactical fixation on energy vulnerabilities. It claims that a well-timed strike, especially during peak conditions such as typhoons or electoral events, could rapidly destabilize Taiwan, eroding resistance and forcing capitulation under minimal military cost. Proposed methods include precision strikes, cyberattacks, electromagnetic pulses and engineered 'pseudo-natural disasters.' While the article may not reflect official doctrine, its scenarios mirror PLA drills and echo rising rhetoric around 'forced reunification.' Taiwan's dependence on imported energy leaves it strategically exposed. The US, its chief security partner, opposes unilateral moves to change the status quo and continues arms sales to shore up Taiwan's defenses. As cross-strait tensions rise, China's evolving doctrine signals a broader shift toward asymmetric warfare, victory through pressure, not open battle. An August 2024 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) report by Bonny Lin and other authors underscores Taiwan's fragility: 97% of its energy and 70% of its food are imported. Taiwan's stockpiles, they note, are limited: less than two months' worth of coal and gas, and just six months of crude oil and food. According to them, these stockpiles would be subject to Chinese bombardment in an invasion, reducing Taiwan's capability to resist. Chieh Chung, in an April 2025 Taiwan Times article, argues that destroying Taiwan's LNG terminals would cripple its energy grid, reducing the repair burden on Chinese occupation forces. While Taiwan has built air raid shelters, Chung notes it still lacks hardened logistics hubs to safeguard water, food and energy in wartime. Striking Taiwan's energy grid could pave the way for a broader Chinese 'decapitation strike' targeting sites like the Presidential Office, meant to neutralize leadership, paralyze defenses, demoralize civilians and seize the island before the US can respond. However, China's ability to execute such a strike is far from assured. In an October 2022 RAND report, Sale Lilly observes that PLA thinkers focus on quick, decisive wars, unlike the drawn-out battles in Fallujah, Aleppo, Bakhmut or Gaza. He adds that US decapitation strikes, like those in the 2003 Invasion of Iraq, had little impact on the protracted, grinding conflict that followed. Should an invasion of Taiwan turn into an occupation, Andrew Faulhaber mentions in an April 2025 article for the Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs that a Taiwanese insurgency could attrit and prolong a Chinese occupation by exploiting geographic advantages, disrupting PLA logistics and mobilizing civilian resistance. Faulhaber says Taiwan must trade space for time, luring the PLA deep into hostile terrain and using asymmetric tactics like guerrilla warfare, cyber strikes and maritime interdiction to destabilize the occupation. By eroding Chinese control through sustained resistance, he contends that Taiwan could force China into a strategic dilemma, whether to commit extensive resources indefinitely or withdraw to preserve domestic stability. However, Taiwan pulling off a successful insurgency against Chinese occupation hinges on its will to resist. Timothy Heath and other writers mention in a June 2023 RAND report that Taiwanese resistance is contingent on the quality of its political leadership and social cohesion. Heath and others point out that while hardship could rally Taiwanese support behind their leadership, sustained economic and combat losses could just as easily sap the will to resist. Critically, they highlight that while Taiwan could mount determined resistance for some time, without US military intervention, it would most likely fail given China's overwhelming resources and military advantage. While China's capabilities to mount a decapitation strike and Taiwan's will to resist are debatable, the performative aspect of the former's drills may be their most important attribute. Writing for the Global Taiwan Institute (GTI) in April 2025, John Dotson and Jonathan Hartmann argue that political warfare is central to China's military drills. Dotson and Hartmann say these exercises aim to intimidate Taiwan's population and hold Taiwan responsible for threatening regional peace by promoting the narrative that such exercises are a necessary response to 'Taiwanese independence forces.' In line with that, Vincent So mentions in an article this month for The Interpreter that China's threats, military exercises and propaganda aim to convince Taiwan that reunification, while not necessarily just, is inevitable. So writes that China's routine drills and gray zone tactics aim to portray reunification as inevitable, fostering resignation in Taiwan. At the same time, he says, China could exploit Taiwanese elites' family and commercial ties to the mainland, making quiet accommodation and ambiguity preferable to open confrontation and principled resistance. Asia Times has characterized such an approach as a 'squeeze and relax model,' gradually increasing military and gray zone pressure on Taiwan, followed by some relaxation, a pause for reflection and then high-level talks. So argues that such strategic encirclement could become a political invitation for bloodless, peaceful reunification. He further argues that the approach puts the US and its allies in a bind over whether military intervention is justified if Taiwan gives in under internal pressure.
Economist
01-05-2025
- Politics
- Economist
Chinese military exercises foreshadow a blockade of Taiwan
SOMETIMES THE only answer to China's frequent threats to invade Taiwan is dark humour. At the National Palace Museum in Taipei guides tell visitors that the collection of imperial treasures, taken from the mainland when the defeated Nationalist regime fled to Taiwan in 1949, makes it one of the safest places on the island. 'China covets our collections so they would never bombard this place,' says one. The joke captures a growing sense of foreboding. China's military might is growing, and it is relentlessly harassing Taiwan. The self-governing island's politics are polarising, even as its main backer, America, grows less reliable. Some observers see 'flashing warning lights' that China is preparing to bring about 'reunification' by force. Others reckon Xi Jinping, China's leader, will wait to reap the benefits of Donald Trump's wrecking-ball approach to alliances. Few doubt, however, that China will keep squeezing Taiwan through 'grey-zone' aggression, meaning coercion short of war. Indeed, the upheaval in global geopolitics may provide an opportunity to test new forms of intimidation. Chinese forces often rehearse an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. They recently tested new barge-borne bridges, which both expand the number of potential landing spots and get troops onto the ground faster. Recently, however, these D-Day drills have been supplemented by rehearsals for a full or partial naval blockade (see map). And underwater communications cables keep getting cut. In exercises in April called 'Strait Thunder 2025A' (the name suggests more to come), China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) said it had practised, among other things, bombing ports and energy facilities. 'If Taiwan loses its maritime supply lines, its domestic resources will quickly be depleted, social order will fall into chaos and people's livelihoods will be severely impacted,' boasted a PLA officer in a propaganda video, standing on a set mimicking the deck of an aircraft-carrier. Still of lading The threat of an interruption to shipping is unnerving for an island that imports most of its fuel and much of its food. It could also have global consequences, since Taiwan makes 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors, and the Taiwan Strait is one of the world's main commercial waterways. Talk of cutting supply-lines, along with sabre-rattling drills and severed undersea cables, also contributes to China's campaign of 'cognitive warfare', which seeks to demonstrate its power, exhaust Taiwan, expose the limits of America's protection and, ideally, induce Taiwan's leaders to surrender without a fight. Mr Trump's fickleness has made Taiwan's security seem more parlous. No one is sure how forcefully he would come to its defence, if at all, given his bullying of Ukraine and disparagement of alliances. He has threatened swingeing tariffs on goods not only from Taiwan, but also Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, whose help would be needed in any conflict. The likely cost to America of a war with China is growing steadily in tandem with China's military might. America's top brass now think less about defeating China and more of denying it a quick and easy victory, in the hope that the risk of a fierce and costly fight would be enough to put Mr Xi off. Nonetheless, Taiwan's predicament is not as grim as Chinese propagandists make it seem. Although Mr Xi has reportedly instructed the PLA to be ready to invade by 2027, recent purges of PLA commanders suggest he lacks confidence in his forces. At least on paper, meanwhile, America is more committed than ever to defending Taiwan. A Pentagon strategy document that was leaked in April states that preventing 'a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan' is America's most important military task, in addition to defending the homeland. Many Trump officials talk tough on Taiwan. Some see the tariff war as a way to keep China in check. But if America is able to deter Mr Xi from starting a war over Taiwan, that might raise the allure for China of acts short of war, in the grey zone or, as some now put it, the 'dark grey' zone. In particular, some scholars distinguish between a full naval blockade, which would probably be construed as an act of war, and a 'quarantine', which might only restrict some shipping and could be led by the Chinese coastguard rather than the navy. Recent military exercises have featured both the navy and coastguard, as well as maritime militia on fishing boats, deployed in a 'cabbage strategy' to wrap Taiwan in layers of forces. A blockade, says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund, a think-tank in Washington, may offer the worst mix of risk and reward for China: it could provoke an American military response without forcing Taiwan to surrender. That is why a quarantine is more likely. It could be less risky and more flexible, and China could present it as a matter of domestic law enforcement, says Lee Jyun-yi of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think-tank linked to Taiwan's ministry of defence. Coastguard officers might board ships on the pretext of enforcing a new customs regime, halting the spread of disease or preventing certain weapons from reaching Taiwan. Such an approach 'gives China more space to de-escalate' when needed, explains Mr Lee. China is already eroding the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Its forces regularly cross the median line, the informal border between Taiwan and the mainland, and enter Taiwan's 'air defence identification zone' (ADIZ). Chinese vessels probe the 'restricted' waters of outlying islands close to the mainland. The coastguard once inspected a Taiwanese vessel carrying tourists. Chinese drones and balloons periodically enter Taiwanese airspace. As a country prone to typhoons and earthquakes, Taiwan has a comparatively good system of civil defence. But surviving economic strangulation would be daunting. Taiwan's government has started to run exercises on 'whole-of-society resilience', including setting up emergency field hospitals. Electric avenue The most serious vulnerability is energy. The island imported about 96% of its energy last year, including virtually all liquefied natural gas, which accounted for about 42% of electricity generation. Taiwan is increasing storage capacity, boosting renewables and laying plans to ration energy and restart old coal-fired stations in an emergency. Even so, minimum LNG stocks will increase from 11 days of consumption this year to just 14 days by 2027. The government is phasing out its last nuclear power plant this year and plans to increase imports of LNG, not least to reduce the trade surplus with America. As for food, Taiwan imported about 70% of the calories its people ate in 2023, but is largely self-sufficient in rice, vegetables, fruit and seafood. It has stockpiled about seven months' worth of rice and 12 months of meat. There are contingency plans for instant noodles, too. Taiwan is also preparing for an information blockade. In April the Chinese captain of a cargo ship was charged with deliberately dragging his anchor to cut a communication cable. Taiwan's 14 international undersea cables are vulnerable. It is exploring alternatives such as microwave, satellite and balloon-based systems, though none can match the capacity of undersea links. The Starlink satellite constellation, used by Ukraine's armed forces, has been ruled out owing to regulatory obstacles and the fear that its owner, Elon Musk, is partial to China. Indigenous Taiwanese satellites are making slow progress. Taiwan's coastguard, tiny compared with China's, would be at the forefront of defending Taiwan's lines of communication. If trade is blocked, it hopes to open protected 'green routes' for shipping. Some experts advocate using cargo ships to obstruct Chinese vessels, although shipowners may not be keen to defy China. All such measures can only buy time until help arrives. Japan and the Philippines think that preserving Taiwan's autonomy is vital to their own security. American officials have discussed mustering convoys to break any blockade. China worries about a counter-blockade, and has also stockpiled essential supplies. But would Mr Trump intervene? He is averse to war, thinks allies are free-riders and claims Taiwan 'stole' America's semiconductor industry. His usual threats, of tariffs and sanctions, have lost potency since he started a trade war. Some fear that, in pursuit of a grand bargain with China, he could make concessions on the status of Taiwan. Consider the change of tone from Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's under-secretary for policy. He has long argued that America should reduce commitments in Europe and the Middle East to concentrate on containing China, not least by explicitly guaranteeing Taiwan's security. Now he says Taiwan is not an 'existential' matter for America and suggests the island cannot be defended at acceptable cost. He says Taiwan should raise defence spending from 2.1% of GDP last year to 10%. The government has promised to exceed 3% this year, but has not persuaded the opposition-controlled parliament to go along. A Taiwanese official expresses confidence about withstanding Chinese pressure. 'A blockade is an act of war. We will respond militarily. If China does that they might as well invade us,' he notes. A quarantine, he admits, 'will hurt us', but not enough to force surrender and would come at a cost to China's international standing. But a recent poll by the Brookings Institution, an American think-tank, finds that Taiwanese are losing trust in America, and a plurality think it would not intervene in a China-Taiwan war. Any waning of America's commitment is bound to weaken Taiwan's own will to resist. China is keen to stir such doubts, asserting that, with Mr Trump in the White House, Taiwan will be jettisoned as a 'discarded chess piece'. ■
Indian Express
23-04-2025
- Politics
- Indian Express
Opinion China is turning the heat on Taiwan
Since the inception of Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) leader Lai Ching-te's presidency in Taiwan, China's policy signalling vis-à-vis the island has become much harsher and more aggressive. China's stance on Taiwan has taken a more urgent and assertive turn in recent months. The unveiling of the new Shuiqiao amphibious vessels at Zhanjiang port in Guangdong, coupled with heightened activity and aggressive posturing by the PLA's Eastern Theater Command — including the recent Strait Thunder 2025A exercises — signals a sharpened focus on readiness and control. At the same time, internal probes into top military figures such as Central Military Commission (CMC) Vice-Chairman He Weidong, former Political Work Department head Miao Hua, and Eastern Theater Commander Lin Xiangyang have effectively dismantled what was known as the 'Taiwan-Fujian' faction within China's military leadership. Adding to the sense of impending conflict, some outlets, citing unnamed intelligence sources, have suggested that a Chinese invasion of Taiwan could occur within six months — further fueling anxiety and speculation. Further, Beijing's critique of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te and his party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has intensified, with official rhetoric often referring to him as a 'Thoroughly Dangerous Instigator' or 'Absolute Danger Maker', and calling out the DPP for spreading 'green terror.' This points to a significant lack of political will to resolve tensions through open lines of communication. In this regard, three politico-military developments from the last few months demand attention to understand the messaging from China on Taiwan. China has recently published a revised Cadre Reader on the Taiwan Issue of China (2024 Edition), compiled by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the CPC Central Committee and the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council. Launched at the National Library in Haidian, Beijing (the hub for China's armed forces) on March 18, the Cadre Reader is aimed at implementing the Central Committee's decisions and arrangements on Taiwan-related work, unifying ideological understanding, and strengthening publicity and education on Taiwan policies. At the launch event for the Reader, Song Tao, Director of both the Taiwan Affairs Offices of the Party and the government, stated that cadres involved in Taiwan-related work should deeply understand the historical context of the Taiwan issue in a bid to strengthen their 'sense of responsibility and mission,' and 'improve their competence and capabilities in handling Taiwan-related affairs.' In this light, the instruction to political cadres of the CPC on understanding the vitality of reunification with Taiwan, has become firmer. Further, as Beijing marked the 20th anniversary of the adoption and enactment of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law on March 14, China's top legislator, Zhao Leji, spelled similar (but not unusual) rhetoric on curbing Taiwan's 'independence' and getting rid of 'external interference.' Here, it is important to note that Article 8 of the Law stipulates: 'In the event that the 'Taiwan independence' secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan's secession from China, or that major incidents entailing Taiwan's secession from China should occur, or that possibilities for a peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.' In this light, it is quite interesting that a People's Daily commentary from April 2, authored by a 'Zhong Yiping' (a pen-name for a CPC member and reunification activist writing for the mouthpiece), refers to the Anti-Secession Law as a 'looming sword.' If mobilised, Zhong argued, it will lead Lai to 'dig his own grave.' These are strong words, in that in the recent past, the provisions of the Law regarding the use of non-peaceful means have rarely been used to incite fear and deterrence. At the Taiwan Affairs Work Conference that took place in February 2025, too, the phrase 'peaceful reunification' was newly missing from the government work report, even as CPPCC Chairman Wang Huning emphasised 'advancing the cause and trajectory of reunification.' To that, Chen Binhua had clarified that China will 'strive for peaceful reunification with the greatest sincerity' as long as Taiwan separatists do not 'provoke, coerce, or challenge the bottom line and cross red lines.' To further involve the public in its Taiwan strategy, the Party and State Council's Taiwan Affairs Offices recently launched a new grassroots mechanism: A special platform where citizens can report individuals accused of persecuting pro-China Taiwanese. Introduced on March 26, this reporting column reportedly received 323 submissions within its first nine hours, according to Taiwan Affairs Office spokesperson Chen Binhua. The early targets of these reports span a wide spectrum — from government officials and legislators like Liu Shih-fang, Shen Boyang, Wu Sih-yao, and Huang Chieh, to prosecutors, activists, and internet personalities including Black Bear Academy's Tsao Hsing-cheng and prominent influencers Wen Ziyu and Chen Boyuan. Even a politically outspoken dentist, Shih Shuhua, was named, underscoring the wide net cast by this campaign. The decision to publicise citizen complaints against Taiwanese politicians and influencers appears to serve a dual purpose: Rallying domestic sentiment against perceived mistreatment of pro-China voices in Taiwan, and portraying Beijing's tough stance as rooted in public will rather than solely directed by the party-state. This strategy aligns with the enforcement of a legal directive issued in June 2024 — The Opinion on Lawfully Punishing Stubborn 'Taiwan Independence' Separatists — which was jointly released by China's top judicial and security bodies. The document outlines a strict legal framework for punishing separatist activity, with penalties ranging from multi-year prison terms and loss of political rights to life imprisonment or even capital punishment in the most severe cases. Finally, and most importantly, China's large-scale military drills and advancements in the PLA Eastern Theatre Command's defence systems, have continued to ring alarm bells for Taiwan. The most recent of the drills that kicked off in August 2022 has been the 'Strait Thunder-2025A', conducted on April 1/ 2, 2025. We know from the 'Joint Sword' Exercises of 2024 that if there is an 'A', there will also be a 'B', and potentially also a 'C', for the Strait Thunder series. What is different about these exercises is also that they were much more comprehensive, widespread, and involved different components — Carrier Battle Group exercises and PLA Rocket Force demonstrations — along with a relatively usual spike in joint sea- and air-related sorties, including beyond the median line of the Taiwan Strait and into the island's Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ). The PLARF testing involved testing of its 'cross-Straits killing machines'— multiple modular long-range rocket artillery systems — to carry out live-fire ammunition exercises. These were likely the PHL-16/ PCL-191 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRSs) that have a range of about 300 km, and can easily target sites in the Strait and on Taiwan proper. It is widely reported that the schematics of the target the barrage of 16 missiles was launched at, resemble an LNG storage facility in Kaohsiung's Yong'an District. As much as 40 per cent of Taiwan's electricity grid is powered by LNG — making such energy facilities and key port areas like Kaohsiung province strategically vital targets for the PLA. The assessment of these drills can be combined with more static developments such as the sudden building of commercial Shuiqiao ships in Guangdong province, whose main characteristic are the tusk-like 'Bailey Bridge' extensions that can deploy forces for an amphibious campaign. Analysts have likened these to the artificial floating Mulberry Harbours created by the British to support their D-Day operations against France in 1944. A preliminary assessment suggests the Strait Thunder 2025A set of drills was not as gigantic as the Joint Sword 2024B exercises. While a few targeted simulations were undertaken to demonstrate resource control and choking, the focus was not on testing the 'actual combat capabilities' of troops (as was the case with the latter, which included establishing strike positions, conducting land and naval live-fire exercises, and conducting joint assaults). Nonetheless, the routine of the drills demonstrates that China continues to take the threshold of conflict higher, and its brinkmanship has created a new, dangerous normal in the Strait that makes peace seem elusive.
South China Morning Post
03-04-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
PLA takes aim at Taiwan's coastal fuel depot in Strait Thunder 2025A war games
The People's Liberation Army has released footage of a coastal strike exercise simulating precision attacks on a mock liquefied natural gas (LNG) terminal – a drill devised clearly with Taiwan 's largest such facility in mind. Advertisement The exercise was part of its drill on Wednesday code-named Strait Thunder 2025A The video, released the same day, showed PLA ground forces firing 16 live 300mm rockets at a target zone 70km (44 miles) away. The mock target had six white round areas that mirrored the six semisubterranean fuel storage tanks at the Yongan LNG receiving station at the port in Kaohsiung, on Taiwan's southern coast. The Yongan LNG receiving terminal in Kaohsiung. Photo: Handout The drill was meant to test the PLA forces' ability to enforce a blockade and sent a message about the military's ability to block the island's energy imports.
The Independent
02-04-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
China unveils ‘paralysing strikes' poster as it shares code name of live-fire drills around Taiwan
The Chinese military unveiled a poster titled 'paralysing strikes' as it carried out live-fire drills around Taiwan in the latest show of force amid rising tensions in the region. The Eastern Theatre Command of the People's Liberation Army said on Wednesday that the latest wargames were part of its 'Strait Thunder 2025A' drills, suggesting that they could be followed by group B exercises in the near future. The drills on Wednesday employed the Shandong aircraft carrier task group to simulate strikes on ground and maritime targets east of Taiwan. The exercises included vessel-aircraft coordination, seizure of area air superiority, and strikes on ground and maritime targets, the military said in a statement. The new poster, state media outlet Global Times reported, was captioned, 'Against the tide of history. Heading for a dead end'. The message, seen as a thinly veiled threat to Taiwan and its Western allies, came a day after a video announcing the drills called Taiwanese president Lai Ching Te a 'parasite', depicting him as a cartoon bug held up by a pair of chopsticks above a burning Taiwan. Senior colonel Shi Yi, spokesperson for the Eastern Theatre Command, said the 'Strait Thunder 2025A' exercises were conducted in the central and southern parts of the Taiwan Strait and focussed on 'the implementation of inspection and identification, warning and expelling, interception and seizure and other subjects'. The military said the drills were meant to practice precision strikes on port and energy facilities but did not offer details on the exact location. The exercises came on the heels of US defence secretary Pete Hegseth 's ongoing tour of Asia during which he visited many countries and criticised China, emphasising that countering its threat to Taiwan was a key priority for Washington. China, which considers Taiwan as its territory, has carried out numerous drills around the island in recent years. Beijing has escalated its rhetoric against Mr Lai, who was elected last year, denouncing him as 'separatist' for pushing for sovereignty. In view of the surprise military drills, China's Maritime Safety Administration announced closure until Thursday night of the shipping zone in the northern part of the eastern province of Zhejiang, more than 500km from Taiwan. Taiwan's defence ministry, in its latest update on Wednesday, said 76 Chinese aircraft and 15 warships had operated around Taiwan in the past 24 hours. An unnamed Taiwanese security official told Reuters that more than 10 Chinese warships operated in the island's "response zone" on Wednesday morning and that China's coast guard was participating with "harassment" drills. It's likely that China will conduct a second round of the exercises, following the precedent set by last year's major war games Joint Sword 2024A and Joint Sword 2024B. Taiwan's security officials said Beijing was attempting to normalise drills near Taiwan as it had been carrying out such patrols near the island every 7-10 days on average. Taiwan has faced the threat of a Chinese invasion since 1949 when the Republic of China government retreated to the island after losing the civil war to Mao Zedong's communists. In spite of ongoing tensions, however, the two sides have not engaged in direct military conflict.
