Chinese military exercises foreshadow a blockade of Taiwan

Economist

01-05-2025

SOMETIMES THE only answer to China's frequent threats to invade Taiwan is dark humour. At the National Palace Museum in Taipei guides tell visitors that the collection of imperial treasures, taken from the mainland when the defeated Nationalist regime fled to Taiwan in 1949, makes it one of the safest places on the island. 'China covets our collections so they would never bombard this place,' says one.
The joke captures a growing sense of foreboding. China's military might is growing, and it is relentlessly harassing Taiwan. The self-governing island's politics are polarising, even as its main backer, America, grows less reliable. Some observers see 'flashing warning lights' that China is preparing to bring about 'reunification' by force. Others reckon Xi Jinping, China's leader, will wait to reap the benefits of Donald Trump's wrecking-ball approach to alliances. Few doubt, however, that China will keep squeezing Taiwan through 'grey-zone' aggression, meaning coercion short of war. Indeed, the upheaval in global geopolitics may provide an opportunity to test new forms of intimidation.
Chinese forces often rehearse an amphibious invasion of Taiwan. They recently tested new barge-borne bridges, which both expand the number of potential landing spots and get troops onto the ground faster. Recently, however, these D-Day drills have been supplemented by rehearsals for a full or partial naval blockade (see map). And underwater communications cables keep getting cut.
In exercises in April called 'Strait Thunder 2025A' (the name suggests more to come), China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) said it had practised, among other things, bombing ports and energy facilities. 'If Taiwan loses its maritime supply lines, its domestic resources will quickly be depleted, social order will fall into chaos and people's livelihoods will be severely impacted,' boasted a PLA officer in a propaganda video, standing on a set mimicking the deck of an aircraft-carrier.
Still of lading
The threat of an interruption to shipping is unnerving for an island that imports most of its fuel and much of its food. It could also have global consequences, since Taiwan makes 90% of the world's most advanced semiconductors, and the Taiwan Strait is one of the world's main commercial waterways. Talk of cutting supply-lines, along with sabre-rattling drills and severed undersea cables, also contributes to China's campaign of 'cognitive warfare', which seeks to demonstrate its power, exhaust Taiwan, expose the limits of America's protection and, ideally, induce Taiwan's leaders to surrender without a fight.
Mr Trump's fickleness has made Taiwan's security seem more parlous. No one is sure how forcefully he would come to its defence, if at all, given his bullying of Ukraine and disparagement of alliances. He has threatened swingeing tariffs on goods not only from Taiwan, but also Japan, the Philippines and South Korea, whose help would be needed in any conflict. The likely cost to America of a war with China is growing steadily in tandem with China's military might. America's top brass now think less about defeating China and more of denying it a quick and easy victory, in the hope that the risk of a fierce and costly fight would be enough to put Mr Xi off.
Nonetheless, Taiwan's predicament is not as grim as Chinese propagandists make it seem. Although Mr Xi has reportedly instructed the PLA to be ready to invade by 2027, recent purges of PLA commanders suggest he lacks confidence in his forces. At least on paper, meanwhile, America is more committed than ever to defending Taiwan. A Pentagon strategy document that was leaked in April states that preventing 'a Chinese fait accompli seizure of Taiwan' is America's most important military task, in addition to defending the homeland. Many Trump officials talk tough on Taiwan. Some see the tariff war as a way to keep China in check.
But if America is able to deter Mr Xi from starting a war over Taiwan, that might raise the allure for China of acts short of war, in the grey zone or, as some now put it, the 'dark grey' zone. In particular, some scholars distinguish between a full naval blockade, which would probably be construed as an act of war, and a 'quarantine', which might only restrict some shipping and could be led by the Chinese coastguard rather than the navy. Recent military exercises have featured both the navy and coastguard, as well as maritime militia on fishing boats, deployed in a 'cabbage strategy' to wrap Taiwan in layers of forces.
A blockade, says Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund, a think-tank in Washington, may offer the worst mix of risk and reward for China: it could provoke an American military response without forcing Taiwan to surrender. That is why a quarantine is more likely. It could be less risky and more flexible, and China could present it as a matter of domestic law enforcement, says Lee Jyun-yi of the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, a think-tank linked to Taiwan's ministry of defence. Coastguard officers might board ships on the pretext of enforcing a new customs regime, halting the spread of disease or preventing certain weapons from reaching Taiwan. Such an approach 'gives China more space to de-escalate' when needed, explains Mr Lee.
China is already eroding the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Its forces regularly cross the median line, the informal border between Taiwan and the mainland, and enter Taiwan's 'air defence identification zone' (ADIZ). Chinese vessels probe the 'restricted' waters of outlying islands close to the mainland. The coastguard once inspected a Taiwanese vessel carrying tourists. Chinese drones and balloons periodically enter Taiwanese airspace.
As a country prone to typhoons and earthquakes, Taiwan has a comparatively good system of civil defence. But surviving economic strangulation would be daunting. Taiwan's government has started to run exercises on 'whole-of-society resilience', including setting up emergency field hospitals.
Electric avenue
The most serious vulnerability is energy. The island imported about 96% of its energy last year, including virtually all liquefied natural gas, which accounted for about 42% of electricity generation. Taiwan is increasing storage capacity, boosting renewables and laying plans to ration energy and restart old coal-fired stations in an emergency. Even so, minimum LNG stocks will increase from 11 days of consumption this year to just 14 days by 2027. The government is phasing out its last nuclear power plant this year and plans to increase imports of LNG, not least to reduce the trade surplus with America.
As for food, Taiwan imported about 70% of the calories its people ate in 2023, but is largely self-sufficient in rice, vegetables, fruit and seafood. It has stockpiled about seven months' worth of rice and 12 months of meat. There are contingency plans for instant noodles, too.
Taiwan is also preparing for an information blockade. In April the Chinese captain of a cargo ship was charged with deliberately dragging his anchor to cut a communication cable. Taiwan's 14 international undersea cables are vulnerable. It is exploring alternatives such as microwave, satellite and balloon-based systems, though none can match the capacity of undersea links. The Starlink satellite constellation, used by Ukraine's armed forces, has been ruled out owing to regulatory obstacles and the fear that its owner, Elon Musk, is partial to China. Indigenous Taiwanese satellites are making slow progress.
Taiwan's coastguard, tiny compared with China's, would be at the forefront of defending Taiwan's lines of communication. If trade is blocked, it hopes to open protected 'green routes' for shipping. Some experts advocate using cargo ships to obstruct Chinese vessels, although shipowners may not be keen to defy China.
All such measures can only buy time until help arrives. Japan and the Philippines think that preserving Taiwan's autonomy is vital to their own security. American officials have discussed mustering convoys to break any blockade. China worries about a counter-blockade, and has also stockpiled essential supplies. But would Mr Trump intervene? He is averse to war, thinks allies are free-riders and claims Taiwan 'stole' America's semiconductor industry. His usual threats, of tariffs and sanctions, have lost potency since he started a trade war. Some fear that, in pursuit of a grand bargain with China, he could make concessions on the status of Taiwan.
Consider the change of tone from Elbridge Colby, the Pentagon's under-secretary for policy. He has long argued that America should reduce commitments in Europe and the Middle East to concentrate on containing China, not least by explicitly guaranteeing Taiwan's security. Now he says Taiwan is not an 'existential' matter for America and suggests the island cannot be defended at acceptable cost. He says Taiwan should raise defence spending from 2.1% of GDP last year to 10%. The government has promised to exceed 3% this year, but has not persuaded the opposition-controlled parliament to go along.
A Taiwanese official expresses confidence about withstanding Chinese pressure. 'A blockade is an act of war. We will respond militarily. If China does that they might as well invade us,' he notes. A quarantine, he admits, 'will hurt us', but not enough to force surrender and would come at a cost to China's international standing. But a recent poll by the Brookings Institution, an American think-tank, finds that Taiwanese are losing trust in America, and a plurality think it would not intervene in a China-Taiwan war. Any waning of America's commitment is bound to weaken Taiwan's own will to resist. China is keen to stir such doubts, asserting that, with Mr Trump in the White House, Taiwan will be jettisoned as a 'discarded chess piece'. ■