Latest news with #SunTzu
National Post
3 days ago
- Business
- National Post
NP View: Mark Carney's Trumpian moment
Article content In 'The Art of War,' the Chinese general Sun Tzu wrote: 'If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles.' By imposing tariffs on Canada's non-American trade partners, Prime Minister Mark Carney is taking that advice one step further — becoming the enemy he was elected to confront. Article content Throughout history, the prevailing international order has been overthrown countless times, but it doesn't always go out with a bang, as it did in 1914 when Archduke Franz Ferdinand took a bullet to the jugular, precipitating the First World War and leading to a precipitous decline in international trade. Article content At our current moment in history, we are witnessing the process of trade liberalization that was started after the Second World War go out with a whimper. Article content The dismantling of the postwar economic order was started by U.S. President Donald Trump, who began by targeting Canada and Mexico, and then extended his tariffs to the rest of the world. Article content But in every crisis lies an opportunity. For Canada, the opportunity was not only to develop the natural resources we have allowed to sit idle for years, but to forge an alliance of free-trading nations that could act as a counterweight to Trump's protectionist policies. Article content Carney is not only squandering this unique opportunity, he's introduced policies that will only serve to broaden the global trade war. Article content This week, the prime minister announced a series of measures intended to protect Canada's steel industry after Trump increased tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum to a punishing 50 per cent. Some of the more sensible policies include a pledge to use Canadian steel for domestic infrastructure projects and funds to help retrain affected workers. Article content But Carney also announced sweeping tariffs on foreign steel imports, including from countries that Canada has free trade agreements with. Article content Going forward, the tariff rate quota will be set at 50 per cent of 2024 levels for countries that don't have trade agreements with us and 100 per cent for those that do. Steel imports above those levels will be slapped with a 50 per cent tariff. Article content On the surface, the Liberals are following a certain logic: Trump's across-the-board steel and aluminum levies will lead to a glut of supply in producing countries, which they will try to dump into the Canadian market at rock-bottom prices, putting our domestic industry at risk. Article content But in doing so, Carney is all but inviting our trade partners to bring in retaliatory tariffs against Canadian products. Article content Following the Trudeau government's decision to impose a 100 per cent tax on Chinese electric vehicles and a 25 per cent levy on its steel and aluminum last fall, Beijing retaliated by sanctioning numerous Canadian products — including canola oil, fish, seafood and pork — which has had a deleterious effect on our agriculture industry at the most inopportune time. Article content The worst part is that Carney's tariffs are also being imposed on countries that have free trade deals with Canada, which will surely violate the spirit, if not the text, of those agreements. Article content If any of those countries are found to be dumping steel into Canada at below-market rates, the proper course of action would be to use the dispute-resolution mechanisms contained in our existing agreements, rather than imposing blanket tariffs on everyone. Article content When he made his announcement at a steel company in Hamilton, Ont., on Wednesday, the prime minister said that, 'Moving forward, we must diversify our trade relationships.' Article content But who's going to want to do business with a country that stabs its closest allies in the back? And how are we going to entice more countries to open their markets to Canadian products when Ottawa has shown that it can't be trusted? Article content Unfortunately, Carney has been so consumed with striking a deal with the United States — which he now admits is unlikely to fully eliminate tariffs on Canadian products — he has largely neglected the other side of the coin: expanding our trading relationship with other countries. Article content Yes, he travelled to Europe in June and signed a security and defence pact with the European Union, but it merely reiterates our commitment to the free trade deal we signed in 2016 but still hasn't fully come into force because not all EU member states have ratified it. Article content If Carney can't even convince his pals in Europe to ratify an agreement that's already been negotiated, it's hard to believe he will have much luck convincing other potential partners to cut new deals with us. Article content Especially given that one of the first things Canada's 45th Parliament did following the spring election was pass a law protecting supply management from future trade negotiations. Article content Article content
AllAfrica
4 days ago
- Health
- AllAfrica
Cog war's glaring and growing legal blind spot
Imagine waking up to the news that a deadly new strain of flu has emerged in your city. Health officials are downplaying it, but social media is flooded with contradictory claims from 'medical experts' debating its origin and severity. Hospitals are filled with patients showing flu-like symptoms, preventing other patients from accessing care and ultimately leading to deaths. It gradually emerges that a foreign adversary orchestrated this panic by planting false information – such as the strain having a very high death rate. Yet despite the casualties, no rules define this as an act of war. This is cognitive warfare, or cog war for short, where the cognitive domain is used on battlefields or in hostile attacks below the threshold of war. A classical example of cog war is a concept called 'reflexive control' – an art refined by Russia over many decades. It involves shaping an adversary's perceptions to your own benefit without them understanding that they have been manipulated. In the context of the Ukraine conflict, this has included narratives about historical claims to Ukrainian land and portraying the west as morally corrupt. Cog war serves to gain advantage over an adversary by targeting attitudes and behaviour at the individual, group or population level. It is designed to modify perceptions of reality, making 'human cognition shaping' into a critical realm of warfare. It is therefore a weapon in a geopolitical battle that plays out by interactions across human minds rather than across physical realms. Because cog war can be waged without the physical damage regulated by the current laws of war, it exists in a legal vacuum. But that doesn't mean it cannot ultimately incite violence based on false information or cause injury and death by secondary effects. The notion that war is essentially a mental contest, where cognitive manipulation is central, harks back to the strategist Sun Tzu (fifth century BC), author of The Art of War. Today, the online domain is the main arena for such operations. The digital revolution has allowed ever-more tailored content to play into biases mapped through our digital footprint, which is called 'microtargeting.' Machine intelligence can even feed us targeted content without ever taking a picture or recording a video. All it takes is a well-designed AI prompt, supporting bad actors' predefined narrative and goals, while covertly misleading the audience. Such disinformation campaigns increasingly reach into the physical domain of the human body. In the war in Ukraine, we see continued cog war narratives. These include allegations that the Ukrainian authorities were concealing or purposefully inciting cholera outbreaks. Allegations of US-supported bioweapons labs also formed part of false-flag justifications for Russia's full-scale invasion. During Covid, false information led to deaths when people refused protective measures or used harmful remedies to treat it. Some narratives during the pandemic were driven as part of a geopolitical battle. While the US engaged in covert information operations, Russian and Chinese state-linked actors coordinated campaigns that used AI-generated social media personas and microtargeting to shape opinions at the level of communities and individuals. Fake image of Donald Trump being arrested. Image: Wikipedia The capability of microtargeting may evolve rapidly as methods for brain-machine coupling become more proficient at collecting data on cognition patterns. Ways of providing a better interface between machines and the human brain range from advanced electrodes that you can put on your scalp to virtual reality goggles with sensory stimulation for a more immersive experience. DARPA's Next-Generation Nonsurgical Neurotechnology (N3) program illustrates how these devices may become capable of reading from and writing to multiple points in the brain simultaneously . However, these tools might also be hacked or fed poisoned data as a part of future information manipulation or psychological disruption strategies. Directly linking the brain to the digital world in this way will erode the line between the information domain and the human body in a way never done before. Traditional laws of war assume physical force such as bombs and bullets as the primary concern, leaving cognitive warfare in a legal grey zone. Is psychological manipulation an 'armed attack' that justifies self-defence under the UN charter? Currently, no clear answer exists. A state actor could potentially use health disinformation to create mass casualties in another country without formally starting a war. Similar gaps exist in situations where war, as we traditionally see it, is actually ongoing. Here, cog war can blur the line between permitted military deception (ruses of war) and prohibited perfidy. Imagine a humanitarian vaccination program secretly collecting DNA, while covertly used by military forces to map clan-based insurgent networks. This exploitation of medical trust would constitute perfidy under humanitarian law – but only if we start recognizing such manipulative tactics as part of warfare. So, what can be done to protect us in this new reality? First, we need to rethink what 'threats' mean in modern conflict. The UN charter already outlaws 'threats to use force' against other nations, but this makes us stuck in a mindset of physical threats. When a foreign power floods your media with false health alerts designed to create panic, isn't that threatening your country just as effectively as a military blockade? While this issue was recognized as early as 2017 by the groups of experts who drafted the Tallinn Manual on cyberwarfare (Rule 70), our legal frameworks haven't caught up. Second, we must acknowledge that psychological harm is real harm. When we think about war injuries, we picture physical wounds. But post-traumatic stress disorder has long been recognised as a legitimate war injury – so why not the mental health effects of targeted cognitive operations? Finally, traditional laws of war might not be enough – we should look to human rights frameworks for solutions. These already include protections for freedom of thought, freedom of opinion and prohibitions against war propaganda that could shield civilians from cognitive attacks. States have obligations to uphold these rights both within their territory and abroad. The use of increasingly sophisticated tactics and technologies to manipulate cognition and emotion poses one of the most insidious threats to human autonomy in our time. Only by adapting our legal frameworks to this challenge can we foster societal resilience and equip future generations to confront the crises and conflicts of tomorrow. David Gisselsson Nord is professor, Division of Clinical Genetics, Faculty of Medicine, Lund University and Alberto Rinaldi is postdoctoral researcher in human rights and humanitarian law, Lund University This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.
Al-Ahram Weekly
03-07-2025
- Politics
- Al-Ahram Weekly
Twelve days that reshaped modern war - World - Al-Ahram Weekly
The 12 days of the Israeli-Iranian war were closely observed by both the US and China, who viewed it as a case study for potential future confrontations More than a week has passed since a ceasefire was agreed between Israel and Iran in the 12-day war, one of the most intense conflicts both sides have witnessed in the past two decades. It offers priceless lessons to all nations that fight according to Eastern or Western military doctrines or those blending the two approaches. The Chinese writer Sun Tzu wrote in his book the Art of War that 'if you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained, you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.' In fact, both sides understand each other well and have even developed the necessary tactics to achieve optimal results, not only on the military level but also politically. Iran, like other Eastern countries, depends on the A2/AD concept of Anti-Access (A2) and Area Denial (AD). The former is a set of measures aimed at slowing or preventing unfriendly forces from reaching the operational theatre or even operating from long distances. The latter is a set of measures intended to obstruct the manoeuvering of unfriendly forces within the operational theatre. To succeed in such a defence-oriented approach, it is essential to possess advanced electronic and cyber-warfare systems capable of jamming, disrupting, and intercepting communications or radar signals. These systems must be complemented by long-range surveillance and reconnaissance platforms, airborne, ground-based, and naval, as well as a layered integrated air-defence system (IADS) composed of mobile ground-based air defences (GBADs) to counter both long- and short-range threats. These systems should be reinforced by air defence fighters and air superiority assets. Maritime borders must be secured with thousands of naval mines of various types. On the offensive side, it is crucial to maintain an arsenal of thousands of highly accurate guided munitions and missiles of various classes with long ranges that can be launched from land, sea, and air platforms. Significant attention must also be given to submarine warfare, enhancing its capacity to launch cruise missiles and anti-ship weapons. Israel depends on the NATO JAM-GC doctrine, or the 'Joint Access and Maneuver Concept for the Global Commons' that dates from 2015. From this point of view, the ideal solution to counter Eastern military doctrine lies in developing a deeply integrated and interoperable force. This involves merging the capabilities of different branches of the armed forces, air, land, sea, and space, into a unified combat framework. The aim is to conduct offensive operations deep within enemy territory, known as Non-Linear Integrated Attacks (NIA), to achieve three key objectives: disrupting, destroying, and defeating (D3) the adversary's A2/AD (Anti-Access/Area Denial) systems. By accomplishing these, the NATO doctrine can ensure that allied forces have the freedom to manoeuvre and operate across contested battlefields without constraints. This strategy succeeds through three primary goals: first, disabling the enemy's command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems; second, destroying the adversary's integrated defence architecture; and third, neutralising any weapons systems introduced into the battlefield during the conflict. These goals are achieved in two main operational phases. The first focuses on the launch of military operations. It begins with resisting the enemy's initial strikes, whether on the frontlines or rear positions of NATO and allied forces, and limiting losses through defensive tactics and manoeuvre warfare. It continues with precision counterstrikes against pre-selected targets, especially command centres and strategic facilities that could disrupt enemy operations. These attacks also include strikes against ballistic missile stockpiles and launchers to neutralise the opponent's offensive capabilities. Simultaneously, efforts are made to regain the initiative across all domains: air, land, sea, and even space. The second phase, called follow-on operations, is designed to maximise bargaining power in any subsequent negotiations. It includes expanding the scope of combat to sustain dominance across all theatres of war, imposing blockades through military force or economic sanctions, and maintaining logistical supply lines alongside ongoing operations. Crucially, it also involves accelerating military production, especially of precision-guided munitions, to keep pace with the demands of high-intensity warfare. All this raises the essential question of which of these two doctrines is the best? Western military doctrine is built on achieving the highest level of combat effectiveness in the shortest possible time, primarily due to the extremely high cost of operations and the complexity of logistical support. In contrast, Eastern doctrine focuses on denying the adversary its points of superiority for as long as possible. It relies on endurance and the low cost of equipment and logistics, albeit with initially lower effectiveness compared to Western systems. However, over the medium and long term, the effectiveness of the Eastern doctrine approaches that of its Western counterpart through adaptive combat learning, studying the enemy, and employing a variety of evolving tactics. This differs sharply from the Western approach, which consistently seeks to impose its own rules of engagement on the battlefield. As a result, the 12-day war witnessed a significant shift and began moving towards its conclusion due to its staggering cost, reaching $2.9 billion in just 12 days for Israel, solely from the use of precision-guided munitions. These expenditures spanned across air defence systems such as Arrow, David's Sling, and Iron Dome, as well as the Israeli Air Force, which played a decisive role in the early stages of the conflict. This role included the use of ballistic missiles like Golden Horizon and Rocks, along with precision-guided bombs such as JDAMs and their Israeli counterparts the MPR500 and Spice series. These were delivered by F-35 fighter jets, which had a critical mission at the beginning of the campaign: penetrating and completely neutralising Iran's air defence network. Israel was spending millions of dollars per day in an intense war of attrition, while Iran was losing a significant portion of its air defence arsenal, air force, and even its missile capabilities, reportedly depleted by two-thirds. Despite these losses, Iran invested its remaining resources in prolonging the conflict as much as possible. It relied almost exclusively on drones of various types, particularly the Shahed-136, 238, and 101 families, as well as Al-Quds cruise missiles. Although these systems achieved limited success due to Israel's resilient air defences, they maintained a high threat level within Israel, with at least one drone reportedly reaching deep into Israeli territory. On the other side, Iran was unable to launch the intense barrages that were initially expected. However, even the small number of missiles that it did launch had a significant psychological impact, arguably more than operational, and this helped prolong Iran's presence in the conflict despite its mounting losses. Iran also employed hypersonic missiles such as the Khorramshahr and Fattah, which managed to breach Israeli air defences, along with highly manoeuverable systems like Kheibar Shekan and Haj Qassem Basir. Additionally, it deployed missiles capable of carrying glide vehicles such as the Emad and Ghadr as well as cluster-munition-equipped variants like the Shahin-3. This diversity of missile threats posed a daily danger to Israel that could not be underestimated. Even a single successful strike had the potential to cause significant destruction. Even when victorious, modern warfare can cost millions of dollars each day alongside the immense logistical challenges required to maintain battlefield dominance. This financial and operational burden is precisely what pushed the 12-day war towards a swift conclusion. Israel accepted a temporary end to hostilities after securing air superiority over Iranian territory, much like its ongoing operational posture towards Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Syrian regime. Iran, for its part, accepted the ceasefire to begin rebuilding its military forces following severe losses in weapons systems. The outcome was closely observed by both the United States and China, who viewed the conflict as a critical case study for learning lessons applicable to potential future confrontations in the Pacific. Sun Tzu defined the golden rule for victory and the supreme art of war as the ability to subdue the enemy without fighting. This is an accurate description of what is now known as 'strategic deterrence.' This primarily relies on a balance between effective strategic planning, efficient tactical execution, and a prudent political approach that avoids rushing into military operations. It denies the adversary an opportunity to fully assess and adapt to a state's military capabilities, something that could otherwise embolden it to escalate small-scale provocations into broader military campaigns. This dynamic played out with Iran, which engaged in repeated limited clashes before eventually escalating its operations. A similar pattern occurred with Israel during the events of 7 October 2023, which followed a series of prior skirmishes with Hamas. * A version of this article appears in print in the 3 July, 2025 edition of Al-Ahram Weekly Follow us on: Facebook Instagram Whatsapp Short link:
The Print
30-06-2025
- Politics
- The Print
Indian Armed Forces' PR mechanism is sluggish. Information is warfare now
The Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Armed Forces' 'wheels within wheels' PR machinery has consistently fallen short during crises, even when we held the initiative. From LoC to the LAC, Balakot to the Brahmos missile incident and Pulwama to Pahalgam, perceptions have often been shaped by adversaries exploiting an information vacuum—created more often than not, by our inability or unwillingness to dominate information space. This highlights that warfare by information should not be seen just as a subcomponent of warfare but as warfare itself. Despite the global recognition of information warfare's criticality, the Indian Armed Forces seem to be struggling to even reach a reasonable level of information sharing, often confusing it with mere advertisement. In an increasingly digital world, where conflicts are waged not just on battlefields but in the information space, the Indian Armed Forces face an urgent imperative to redefine their communication strategies. Historical examples like Mahabharata's ' Ashwathama hato hata …..' and recent global conflicts such as Russia- Ukraine and Israel-Hamas, clearly reflect what was famously written by Marshall McLuhan in Culture Is Our Business : 'While World War I & WW II were waged using armies and mobilized economies, WW III will be a guerrilla info war with no division between military & civilian participation.' This allows the injection of disinformation and turns narratives against our great nation. Existing PR mechanism is sluggish and less effective due to the cumbersome 'elephantine' clearance process, low tolerance to mistakes, often sharing too little, too late and generally 'happy' chasing a narrative which is already in public domain. In stark contrast, adversaries operate with greater aggression, efficiency and agility. Also read: Army warns veterans against posting 'false narratives' on social media, says pensions could be withheld Dominating the narrative The core principle in this battle of narratives is that the digital world rewards virality and has very little or no time for morality or veracity. The fight invariably is on whose story wins; therefore, OUR STORY MUST WIN, it's non-negotiable. This requires a deep understanding of narrative, space, information, and domination. A narrative is defined as a coherent story influencing perceptions and shaping behaviour to achieve psychological dominance. It's the 'art of storytelling,' demanding a clear target audience and compelling content, even amid the challenges of information overload and disinformation. Drawing from Sun Tzu's Art of War principle of subduing the enemy without fighting, influence operations must focus on dominating the cognitive space. A Whole of Nation (DIME) approach—integrating diplomatic, information, military, economic, social and diaspora elements—is vital for strategic communication, both domestically and internationally. Information itself has become a weapon of mass disruption, distraction and deflection, serving as a breeding ground for misinformation and disinformation. Unknown, anonymous, well-informed keyboard warriors on both sides bombard the audience with competing messages and information, which is neither true nor factual. Domination of information space is even more relevant in today's fast-moving battle of narratives. Social media, a weapon in plain sight, has exponentially amplified the reach of information, breaking down hierarchies and merging local, national, and international boundaries. It allows alternate facts (fake news), rumours, photoshopped pictures and canards to go viral rapidly, capable of portraying victory as defeat and vice versa, rendering traditional notions of victory obsolete. Hence, this vital virtual ground cannot be ceded to the adversary at any cost. Also read: There's an all-new N-word now. And India's soft power has become its hard liability Strategies for countering disinformation Effective perception management hinges on a clearly identified target audience and end state. Our intent has to be very clear because intent decides the content, content projects our intent and collectively they facilitate the desired connect with the target audience. This necessitates a sharp focus on the message, messenger and target audience. Recognising that advanced media or skillfully packaged information alone are insufficient without addressing the specific audience and information gaps. The Armed Forces, while proficient in combat, must equally prioritise winning the perception war to prevent adversarial narratives from undermining public psyche and credibility. Therefore, narrative 'management' should be more crucial than the actual act. Also read: Rafale's Sindoor strike thrilled TV war rooms—'Painted Pakistan red', 'Dharam bata diya' Integrated and proactive communication A critical need is to integrate all mediums—print, electronic and cyber —under a unified platform to align political-military aims with credible messaging. This calls for a common Tri-Services Information Warfare (IW)/PR organisation under the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), replacing the current fragmented structure of multiple information-sharing agencies. The proposed organisation would feature tri-services verticals of IW, Cyber & Electronic Warfare and Strategic Communication, with dedicated officers overseeing various aspects. The three services PROs must be completely delinked from the Directorate of Public Relations (DPR). With a very vibrant IW Branch at the formation level, the current system of 25 Regional PROs needs to be revisited, preferably done away with. In any case, PROs cannot even share basic information with the Press without clearance from Service HQs. Designated spokespersons (Brigadier/Colonel) at Formation Headquarters to swiftly disseminate initial '5 Ws & 1 H' (Who, What, When, Where, Why & How) on social media, followed by detailed press releases, is strongly recommended. The guiding principles for media engagement should be ABC: Answer, Convey, Bridge and CCD: Confident, Credible, Direct. Furthermore, the strategy emphasises generating high-quality, transparent and concise communication with strong visual content for emotional engagement. Continuous monitoring of social media for fact-checking and filling information vacuum with speed, credibility, and accuracy is crucial. The present approach toward information sharing is often ad hoc with no clear end state in mind, driven in isolation by individual media management initiatives and jumping from crisis to crisis. Employment of specialists and academic researchers as part of a military-private partnership in centres of excellence for long-term influence operations, including environment scanning and narrative development, is also recommended. Therefore, collaboration and corroboration among counter-terrorist operation stakeholders are deemed a strategic necessity. Prompt information sharing prevents impatience and frustration, while 'half-baked information' can be detrimental to national/organisational interests. Hence, proactive damage control, exposing adversaries and preemption through joint rapid response teams for fact-checking are vital to amplify positive narratives. As Yuval Harari states, 'The power of humanity lies in the capacity to tell great stories: it is the ability of humans to think imaginatively, to fictionalize, weave & tell stories effectively that makes Homo sapiens superior to other species. It is a belief in different stories of religion, history, civilization and cultural notions, laws & rights as also systems of governance that have spawned conflict. Hence, info flow shapes questions of war and peace.' In conclusion, the outdated Defence Technical Publicity Rules (DTPR) of 2004 demand a new communication strategy for the Indian Armed Forces to convey, control and ensure 'our story to win.' Overcoming the 'sound byte problem' by adopting 'Tell it all, tell it early, tell it yourself' is paramount. The era of chasing narratives is over; being proactive rather than reactive is the imperative for navigating the complexities of modern information warfare. Col Rajesh Kalia (Retd) was the media coordinator for the historic Siachen trek for civilians in 2007. He has served as the Defence Spokesperson in the North East covering MoD-related events in Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur & Meghalaya. Views are personal. (Edited by Theres Sudeep)
Globe and Mail
24-06-2025
- Politics
- Globe and Mail
Is this the first, big step toward ending the Iran war?
Last week, before he joined the Israeli air offensive against Iran's nuclear program, U.S. President Donald Trump posted this on social media: 'UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER!' That was apparently his proposal for Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Unconditional surrender is a dangerous thing to demand. It's the international relations equivalent of Michael Corleone in The Godfather: 'My offer is this: nothing.' Two and a half millennia ago, the Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu described nine types of ground on which conflict can take place. The last of these he called 'desperate ground' or 'death ground.' Death ground is where, if you lose, 'there is no chance of survival.' In The Art of War, read to this day in military academies and strategic studies programs, Sun Tzu counselled generals to do something paradoxical: Always seek to put their own side on death ground. Put your forces in a place where retreat is not an option and escape is not possible, and thus their only hope for survival is to fight harder than ever. 'For it is the nature of soldiers to resist when surrounded,' he wrote. 'Throw the troops into a position from which there is no escape and even when faced with death they will not flee.' Iran and Israel agree to a 'complete and total' ceasefire, Trump says Donald Trump's claim that Iran's nuclear sites were 'obliterated' seems stretched But Sun Tzu's advice has a flip side: Don't put your enemy on death ground. Offer him a way out – a path to retreat, to concede, and to survive. The Trump administration must be careful not to put the Islamic Republic of Iran on death ground, unless it wishes a wider and longer war. Attacking its nuclear program is one thing; demanding regime change is another. To the extent that this conflict is only about ending the possibility of Iranian nuclear weapons, not ending the regime, it may be possible for Mr. Khamenei to accept an outcome that allows him to save at least some face, and save his rule, while giving in on the substance of American demands. Iran's military-theocratic dictatorship is homicidal, but not suicidal. For all its otherworldly rhetoric about eternal judgment on the spiritual plane, it has always shown itself primarily interested in its physical existence down here on the material plane. Mr. Trump has a habit of wandering off message in late night Truth Social postings, but the administration's strategy, if it can stick to it, appears to involve offering an off-ramp to Mr. Khamenei. On Sunday, when Vice-President JD Vance was asked if the U.S. was at war with Iran, he replied, 'No, we're not at war with Iran, we're at war with Iran's nuclear program.' It's a crucial distinction, and one Washington must try to maintain. 'What we said to the Iranians is we do not want war with Iran; we actually want peace. But we want peace in the context of them not having a nuclear weapons program,' Mr. Vance said. 'If they leave American troops out of it and they decide to give up their nuclear weapons program once and for all, then I think ... we can have a good relationship with the Iranians.' He added that, 'I actually think it provides an opportunity to reset this relationship, reset these negotiations and get us in a place where Iran can decide not to be a threat to its neighbours, not to be a threat to the United States.' This is, admittedly, rather sunny talk for the day after a military strike. And the thing about war is that, no matter how strong you are, the other side also gets a vote. And to borrow from the language of late U.S. secretary of defence Donald Rumsfeld, Iran's nuclear program still has many known unknowns. We know that we don't know what has happened to the stockpile of enriched uranium. We know that we don't know precisely how damaged by bombing are all of Iran's nuclear facilities. We know that we don't know for certain that it does not have other secret facilities; Israel destroyed Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, but a decade later it was discovered that Saddam Hussein had secretly continued to pursue weapons development. As for Mr. Khamenei's government, it has always insisted the nuclear program is not in any way a weapons program, while devoting extraordinary national resources to it, and tying the regime's prestige to the effort. Karim Sadjadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimates that the program has cost Tehran around US$500-billion. Mr. Khamenei will be reluctant to give up on whatever is left of this work. But the 86-year-old – in poor health, in hiding, with many senior advisers now obituaries – is almost certainly even more interested in the survival of his life's work, which is the regime. On Monday, Iran launched a missile attack on a U.S. base in Qatar. It was apparently more of a PR show than a military move. There were no casualties, and Mr. Trump even thanked Iran for 'giving us early notice' of the strike, assisting in its defeat. Also notable: The price of oil didn't shoot up on Monday. It plunged. Early on Monday evening, Mr. Trump posted that 'a complete and total CEASEFIRE' had been reached. If true, it would mean that Iran was given an off-ramp from a worse defeat, and took it – allowing a big step back from military escalation and toward diplomatic resolution.
