Latest news with #Taqaddum
Shafaq News
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Al-Halbousi's party to contest elections without alliances
Shafaq News/ On Thursday, the National Progress Party (Taqaddum), led by former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, announced its decision to contest the upcoming parliamentary elections independently, without forming any electoral alliance. In a statement, the party leadership confirmed it had formally registered under the 'Taqaddum Party' with the Independent High Electoral Commission on Thursday, May 22. Earlier, Iraq's judiciary cleared Al-Halbousi of all previously filed charges, paving the way for his candidacy in Baghdad in the upcoming parliamentary elections. In the 2021 elections, the former Speaker's party won 37 out of 329 seats, making it the second-largest bloc in parliament after the Sadrists.
Shafaq News
01-05-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Sunni political alliances shift as Iraq prepares for November elections
Shafaq News/ Iraq's Sunni political landscape is undergoing a renewed phase of realignment and strategic positioning ahead of the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 11. With internal competition, fading alliances, and the re-emergence of veteran figures, the Sunni front is mobilizing to secure its place in Baghdad and regain ground lost since the upheaval of 2014. Shafaq News has learned that four main forces are set to dominate the race in Sunni-majority provinces: Taqaddum (Progress) led by former Parliament Speaker Mohammed al-Halbousi, Al-Siyada (Sovereignty) under Khamis al-Khanjar, Azm (Determination) headed by Muthanna al-Samarrai, and the newly established New Baghdad Alliance, a coalition formed around Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani and several prominent Sunni figures. While some movements are already engaging in campaign activity, others appear hesitant, uncertain whether the political calendar will hold in the face of Iraq's broader institutional volatility. Legacy of Fragmentation Sunni representation in Iraq's post-2003 political system has been shaped by successive cycles of marginalization, reconfiguration, and resurgence. After the ISIS territorial takeover in 2014 devastated Sunni heartlands, Sunni factions saw their influence diminish. In the 2018 parliamentary elections, Sunni MPs secured just 73 of 329 seats—a steep decline from the 90 seats held in the prior cycle. That number rebounded in 2021 to approximately 94, but the gains were short-lived. Internal discord has continued to fragment Sunni representation. In January 2022, two major camps—al-Halbousi's Taqaddum and al-Khanjar's Azm—joined forces under the Al-Siyada Alliance, commanding a combined bloc of 71 seats. But unity proved fleeting. Al-Halbousi eventually withdrew, citing differences in strategy and leadership, effectively dissolving the coalition's momentum. In January 2025, a new attempt at consolidation emerged with the formation of the Sunni Leadership Alliance, announced in Baghdad. However, the alliance was notably launched without al-Halbousi's participation, a signal of enduring rivalry within the Sunni sphere. Despite its high-profile launch, the grouping has yet to translate its formation into a coherent electoral strategy or policy action. Sources close to recent negotiations confirmed that in March, Speaker Mahmoud al-Mashhadani hosted a private meeting among leading Sunni figures, including al-Halbousi. The participants reportedly agreed on the need to maintain communal cohesion and refrain from escalating personal rivalries, which many see as a key obstacle to unified Sunni leverage in national politics. Major Blocs And Early Mobilization While formal coalition-building remains limited, campaign activity has already begun in several key provinces. Taqaddum and Azm have taken the lead, investing in candidate selection, media outreach, and constituency visits. Political operatives linked to Taqaddum are supporting several provincial lists, including the Iraq Hawks Movement led by Yazan Mishaan in Saladin, Minister of Planning Mohammed Tamim in Kirkuk, and Industry Minister Khalid Battal in Al-Anbar. Influential tribal leader Ahmed Abu Risha is also reportedly preparing an electoral push aligned with Taqaddum-backed platforms. Azm, under the leadership of Muthanna al-Samarrai, is now regarded as the most extensive Sunni alliance. It includes several prominent political veterans such as former Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, former Deputy Prime Minister Rafi al-Issawi, and ideological affiliates like the Justice and Benevolence Movement (Harakat al-Adl wal-Ihsan). The coalition aims to present itself as a centrist bloc capable of bridging the Sunni political divide and reasserting influence in the national legislature. Despite Al-Siyada's continued presence under al-Khanjar, the coalition has yet to mount a clear electoral strategy for November. A political source close to the group suggested that al-Khanjar remains skeptical that elections will proceed as planned, citing the risk of a broader political transition that could sideline the current electoral timeline altogether. Nonetheless, insiders revealed signs of quiet coordination between Taqaddum and Al-Siyada, raising the possibility of a post-election alliance should mutual interests align. While no formal agreement has been reached, observers note that electoral pragmatism could override past tensions in pursuit of a stronger Sunni parliamentary bloc. Baghdad And Beyond: Key Battlegrounds Sunni parties are expected to compete fiercely in several strategic provinces, most notably Al-Anbar, Saladin, Nineveh, Diyala, and parts of Baghdad. The capital's mixed constituencies will be a crucial testing ground for the New Baghdad Alliance, which seeks to mobilize moderate urban Sunni voters disillusioned with established factions. Mahmoud al-Mashhadani is betting on his stature to draw in support for a platform grounded in technocratic governance and Sunni-Shiite dialogue. His coalition includes former civil servants and professionals aiming to offer an alternative to the dominant tribal- and personality-based politics in Sunni areas. Meanwhile, efforts are being made to incorporate younger voices and grassroots movements into campaign lists. While these initiatives remain limited in scope, they reflect a broader generational shift underway across Iraq's political spectrum. Opportunity Amid Uncertainty With less than seven months remaining before the scheduled vote, Iraq's Sunni political scene remains in flux. While Taqaddum and Azm appear most organized, the absence of a unified electoral front could weaken Sunni influence in a post-election government formation process. The legacy of mistrust, divergent leadership ambitions, and regional competition continues to challenge collective action. Yet the potential for realignment remains. Observers suggest that electoral outcomes in Sunni areas will depend not only on intra-bloc rivalries but also on national political developments, including potential electoral law changes, federal court rulings, and the fate of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's government. In this fluid environment, Iraq's Sunni leaders face a familiar dilemma: to compete or to coalesce. The answer, and its timing, may well determine the bloc's future relevance in a country still struggling to balance representation, stability, and reform.
Shafaq News
20-04-2025
- Politics
- Shafaq News
Over 1 million voters: Iraq's Al-Anbar prepares for high-stakes election
Shafaq News/ Former Speaker of Parliament Mohammed al-Halbousi is leading three electoral lists ahead of the upcoming November elections, a senior Iraqi official revealed on Sunday. Hikmat Suleiman, Secretary-General of the National Brotherhood (Ikhaa) Party, told Shafaq News that al-Halbousi leads 'Taqaddum,' 'Qimam,' and 'al-Sarh al-Watani," predicting these lists could secure between nine and eleven seats in the province, with additional contenders including the 'Azm' Coalition led by Muthanna al-Samurrai and another bloc aligned with Khamis al-Khanjar, whose final list configuration remains unclear. He expects smaller parties, including 'al-Taawun,' the Islamic Party, and the Tribal Mobilization, to run under a joint list. According to the Independent High Electoral Commission's Al-Anbar office, around 1.2 million voters are currently eligible to participate in the upcoming polls, with that number expected to rise in the coming months. A source familiar with the electoral landscape told Shafaq News that the use of political influence and financial power has already begun to shape early campaigning. 'There are near-daily meetings in tribal guesthouses,' the source said, noting that these gatherings include tribal figures and local political leaders. Campaign activity has also led to tensions on the ground. On April 5, a confrontation over campaign posters in Ramadi's Zangoura district escalated into a physical altercation, amid a charged atmosphere in which promotional materials begin appearing across the province. In the last parliamentary elections in 2021, Al-Anbar recorded a 43% turnout. Al-Halbousi's Taqaddum bloc secured 37 seats nationwide, second only to the Sadrist Movement's 73. Khamis al-Khanjar's faction of the Azm coalition won 14 seats, while the wing led by Muthanna al-Samarrai claimed 12. The Independent High Electoral Commission has confirmed that formal campaigning will begin shortly ahead of election day.
Al Jazeera
20-02-2025
- Politics
- Al Jazeera
After splinter, can Sudan's anti-war coalition reinvent itself?
On February 10, Sudan's largest antiwar coalition, Taqaddum, finally splintered. The disagreement was over whether to participate in a new parallel government being set up by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), one of the belligerent parties in Sudan's nearly two-year war. Formed in October 2023, the Taqaddum coalition included armed movements, political parties and civil society activists and was headed by Abdalla Hamdok, the former prime minister overthrown by Sudan's army and the RSF in 2021. Now, Taqaddum has split into two. The members taking political positions in the RSF's parallel administration are now known as Taasis (Foundation). They are mostly armed movements, analysts told Al Jazeera, who wagered on turning their weapons into leadership roles in the new RSF government. 'Armed groups don't have a constituency, so they rely on a big, armed actor [like the RSF] as a guarantor for a political seat,' said Kholood Khair, founding director of the Confluence Advisory think tank. Traditional political leaders, including Hamdok, who chose not to join the RSF formed a smaller antiwar coalition called Somoud (Resilience), trying to preserve their neutrality and reputations, she said. 'Political parties don't need [a guarantor] and it would be political suicide for them to form a government with the RSF… they don't want to be seen as forming a government with genociders,' she added, referring to the United States' determination that the RSF committed genocide in Sudan's Darfur region. Tainted label Taqaddum was originally an antiwar coalition mediating an end to the conflict that had broken out between the RSF and the army in April 2023, following a dispute over how and when to integrate the former into the latter. The conflict has triggered the largest humanitarian crisis by most measures, with tens of thousands killed in armed conflict, famine declared in several regions and some 12 million people uprooted from their homes. Taqaddum was already struggling for relevance, with many of its civilian politicians perceived as being too close to the RSF during mediation talks – ostensibly aimed at ending the war and restarting a transition to democratic rule that the 2021 coup derailed. Taqaddum's reputation took a much bigger blow when it signed a Declaration of Principles (DoP) with the RSF in January 2024. The DoP allegedly aimed to restore service provisions in areas under RSF control and to ensure the group would respect basic laws of war. But the deal came days after the RSF captured Wad Madani, capital of Sudan's breadbasket Gezira state, where it committed atrocities including rape, looting and extrajudicial killings, according to local monitors. At the time, Taqaddum was seen by many as whitewashing RSF abuses by signing the DoP. The agreement had also caused many Western diplomats 'growing concern that parts of Taqaddum were RSF-aligned', said Alan Boswell, an expert on Sudan for the International Crisis Group. Hamid Khalafallah, a Sudan policy analyst and a PhD candidate at the University of Manchester, agreed that the signing exacerbated Taqaddum's legitimacy crisis. 'There was an issue of Taqaddum cosying up with the RSF or being slightly more in line with the RSF because the RSF kept saying what Taqaddum wanted to hear and the army was quite resistant [to peace talks],' Khalafallah told Al Jazeera. New start? Analysts told Al Jazeera that the splinter may be a 'blessing in disguise' since it allows members of Somoud to distance themselves from the RSF, 'reinvent themselves', and better connect with Sudanese civilians. Boswell believes Somoud is now less tainted than Taqaddum but also noticeably smaller as a coalition and predicts the West will 'wait and see' before deciding whether to consider Somoud a neutral actor. He also believes that, at best, Somoud may be part of a broader civilian unity government, where most officials are aligned with one of the two warring parties as part of a power-sharing agreement to end the war. Khalafallah said Somoud should do more outreach to local organisations and activist groups and ensure its rhetoric is not disconnected from the realities of Sudanese civilians on the ground. 'They can acknowledge that people have better experiences when [the army] recaptures territory and that there is support for the army,' Khalafallah told Al Jazeera, stressing that Somoud could preserve its neutrality as such an acknowledgement would not contradict their call for the army and RSF to quickly end this war. Somoud spokesperson Bakry Elmedni, associate professor at the School of Business, Public Administration and Information Sciences at Long Island University, says Somoud has always done outreach and believes any criticism that Taqaddum was too close to the RSF was part of an army-backed smear campaign against the antiwar coalition. He claims the army helped write the DoP and was invited to the signing but refused to attend, instead exploiting the DoP to frame Taqaddum as a coalition that 'sympathises or supports' RSF. 'We knew from day one the accusations [against Taqaddum] were part of a political campaign… Everyone knew they were lies,' he told Al Jazeera. 'However, it did affect the impression of Taqaddum, but to tell you frankly, I don't believe there was any evidence to suggest Taqaddum was supporting the RSF.' Many civilians across the country despise the RSF and welcome the army's recapture of territory, saying the army brings some form of stability. However, the army has also been accused of committing a wave of reprisal killings against perceived RSF sympathisers. Attacks are often across ethnic lines or against activists and local relief workers, say human rights groups, UN monitors and activists on the ground.
