Latest news with #TridentII
Yahoo
13-05-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Airlines prepare for nuclear war
Airlines are taking steps to ensure that they can keep flying even after the outbreak of a nuclear war. Jets could continue to fly following an atomic blast under special insurance policies being drawn up to address the possibility of conflicts escalating in Ukraine and Kashmir. Current policies that date back to the 1950s would force the grounding of all civil aircraft worldwide in the event of a single nuclear detonation, based on the assumption that this would lead to the outbreak of a third world war. However, with the deployment of nuclear weapons now regarded as more likely to involve so-called tactical warheads used in a limited role on the battlefield, the insurance industry has developed plans to allow flights to continue in regions removed from conflict zones. Gallagher, the world's largest aviation insurance broker, began working on the scheme when Vladimir Putin threatened to deploy Russia's atomic weapons against Ukraine in 2022. Its plans have been given fresh impetus by the clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, where hostilities reached a level not seen for decades over the past week. Nigel Weyman, senior partner at Gallagher, said the Ukraine conflict had revived interest in nuclear-related insurance policies. He said: 'Back when the wording was drawn up, it was assumed that any hostile detonation meant that it would all be over, Armageddon. But what they didn't have in those days was tactical nuclear weapons that vary in size and impact and which are, ultimately, very usable.' The latest generation of the American B61 air-launched gravity bomb carries a nuclear warhead with a yield as low as 0.3 kilotons, for example. That compares with 15kt for the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, and 100kt for a single Trident II missile warhead. While Britain retired its last tactical nuclear weapons in 1998, Russia is believed to have almost 2,000. North Korea unveiled what it claimed was a tactical weapon in 2023, while Pakistan's Nasr missile can also carry a battlefield nuclear warhead. Mr Weyman said: 'Why should Air New Zealand, for example, be grounded in the event of a nuclear detonation in Europe that was quite minor, albeit not for the people near it? 'Airlines find workarounds for whatever challenges they face, safe corridors, minimum heights so that ground-to-air missiles can't reach them. 'Volcanic ash clouds affect big areas, but the world keeps flying. Yet a few words on an insurance policy can ground every jet there is.' The broker has come up with a plan that would see a select number of insurers evaluate where airlines should be permitted to fly after a nuclear detonation, aided by analysis from security experts at risk-management specialists Osprey Flight Solutions. The 15-strong group, which includes Allianz, the world's largest insurer, would meet within four hours of a detonation and evaluate the threat to airlines on a country-by-country basis. The plan would provide each carrier with $1bn (£750m) per plane of war cover for passengers and third parties, compared with $2bn or more under existing policies. Mr Weyman said the cost of the scheme will amount to less than the price of a cup of coffee per passenger, if ever triggered, something 'easily passed on in ticket prices'. Airlines spent about $1.3bn on insurance premiums last year to cover slightly over 4bn passenger journeys, indicating a current cost of around 33 cents per customer. Around 100 airlines have so far signed up to the plan, out of the 500 or so worldwide. About 60 in Europe have joined, though low-cost operators are proving reluctant, Mr Weyman said. Airlines could yet be grounded by other insurance stipulations, including a 'five powers war clause' that terminates cover in the event of a military clash between any of the UK, US, France, Russia and China. That could be invoked in the event of any British or French troops sent to Ukraine being fired on, according to some industry experts. Sign in to access your portfolio
Yahoo
28-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
For nuclear deterrence, US policymakers must rely on facts, not hype
Washington finds itself in another season of hearings related to nuclear weapons, as Congressional leaders consider approving new defense appointees, negotiate the federal budget and hold annual hearings with military leaders. Such hearings are important, especially from a strategic perspective. Maintaining deterrence requires clear-eyed assessments of our own nuclear and conventional weapons, their doctrines for use, the health of the enterprise that operates them and the trade-offs inherent in all defense investments. This challenging work requires that policymakers plan against facts and best judgments, and avoid being distracted by misleading claims regarding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and those of other nations. Three chief narrative claims threaten to send Washington down costly, inefficient and indeed risky policy paths today. The first theme, which seemingly reemerges each year, is that U.S. nuclear weapons are ancient, and that this necessitates urgent action. This is true — Many U.S. nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are quite old. In these critical debates, this is sometimes portrayed as a new realization, and a problem for which the U.S. isn't yet pursuing solutions. In fact, this is a long-recognized challenge that the nation has been tackling with concerted action for years. At sites in Texas, Missouri, New Mexico, California and elsewhere, scientists, technicians and manufacturers are executing an expansive modernization of all three legs of the nuclear triad, to the tune of at least $1.7 trillion. The nation has been pursuing these plans for many years — long enough, in fact, that the real needs and costs of nuclear modernization become clearer each year. Second, policymakers will hear a rising chorus claiming that the U.S. does not have tactical nuclear weapons — or that we need even more. Both assertions are misleading, and several facts must remain central to any renewed policy debate on this subject. Just this January, the National Nuclear Security Administration announced that production is complete for upgraded B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs, which have the ability to be used with heightened precision and lower explosive yields, enabling tactical utility. The head of the agency publicly declared that they are 'fully forward deployed.' That's not all. During the first Trump administration, the U.S. quickly developed and fielded a low-yield variant of submarine-launched Trident II missiles. Additionally, development and testing continue for a new long-range standoff nuclear air-launched cruise missile, with the aim of it becoming operable by 2030. Washington pursued each of these nuclear capabilities with scenarios in mind that included adversaries using tactical nuclear weapons in conflict, and the need for the nation to have multiple types of response options available. The U.S. had — and chose to reduce — tactical nuclear weapons in the past, decisions that stemmed from deep military analysis, as well as knowledge of the operational, budgetary and weapons-capability trade-offs the military faced. These decisions also tied to the emergence and improvement of other technologies, including stealth, precision conventional weapons and the growth centrality of space in defense strategy and operations. These factors are only growing in importance in considering what nuclear capabilities are necessary for effective deterrence. Third, making hard decisions regarding U.S. investments toward deterrence requires the most precise accounting of the nuclear capabilities of countries like China and Russia that we can achieve — and measured consideration of how to handle any knowledge gaps we have. For example, some experts portray as a proven fact that China has nuclear weapons that are at serious risk of being fielded as tactical, battlefield weapons in conflict. This is not a settled fact, and it is a matter of hot debate. China has long avoided developing some types of nuclear weapons, such as those delivered by tactical cruise missiles. Its doctrine historically considered nuclear weapons to be solely strategic, and held firm to the concept that use of nuclear weapons was beyond the normal threshold for acceptable combat. And indeed, some of its recent actions raise concerns about whether the nation's leaders have altered course. Still, no one in the U.S. concretely knows the answer to this or other questions about China's nuclear capabilities and concepts of use. It will likely take the type of dialogues that President Trump has proposed, as well as sustained technical and political engagement at all levels, to gain clarity. Until that happens, in the name of maintaining deterrence, policymakers should be careful to discern what we know and what remains unclear in our knowledge of these nations' nuclear capabilities. Our nation's leaders face tough questions about how to keep deterrence stable and effective in an extraordinarily complex security environment. It will indeed require modernizing parts of the nuclear arsenal. However, the more-is-better style of arms racing that the U.S. and Soviet Union pursued in the Cold War is not a fit for modern strategy. Initiating plans for nuclear weapons that exceed our capacity to build or maintain them does nothing to enhance deterrence and may risk strategic miscommunication. With this in mind, the nation can also benefit from the fact that we stand at a moment of strong, bipartisan agreement on numerous policy paths that aim to keep deterrence as effective as possible. For example, there is broad agreement that the U.S. should pursue defense acquisition reform and seek to out-innovate adversarial nations, both subjects for which Trump recently signed executive orders. The nation's nuclear weapons plans and policies should not be exempt from these important pursuits or the trade-offs they will entail. Second, there is significant agreement that the U.S. needs to invest more in its science, technology and industrial base that keeps the nuclear deterrent strong and secure. This must be adequately reflected in forthcoming budgets that support the national laboratories, the Department of Energy, the National Nuclear Security Administration and other relevant infrastructure. Third, most experts agree on the need to be creative in how we pursue deterrence, across nuclear and non-nuclear domains. Though some experts focus heavily on building more nuclear weapons as the primary answer, many of us agree that we should first maximize other approaches to complicating the decision-making of adversaries in ways that keep them back from the nuclear brink. This should include creative approaches to signaling U.S. capabilities and determination (including technical and strategic capabilities other than weapons systems), sharp messaging from senior leaders, and showcasing dedication to long-standing military alliances. While there is much work to do, we are already fifteen years into the implementation of a bipartisan program of record for a U.S. nuclear arsenal that is safe, secure and effective. By pursuing that program and the priorities noted above, our deterrent will remain second to none. Hon. Andy Weber is a senior fellow at the Council on Strategic Risks and previously served as assistant secretary of defense for nuclear, chemical and biological defense programs. Christine Parthemore is the CEO of the Council on Strategic Risks and previously served at the Pentagon.
Yahoo
28-04-2025
- Business
- Yahoo
Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMT): A Bull Case Theory
We came across a bullish thesis on Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMT) on Substack by Steve Wagner. In this article, we will summarize the bulls' thesis on LMT. Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMT)'s share was trading at $466.81 as of April 24th. LMT's trailing and forward P/E were 20.12 and 17.15 respectively according to Yahoo Finance. Copyright: scanrail / 123RF Stock Photo Lockheed Martin (LMT) delivered an impressive first-quarter 2025 performance, reinforcing its reputation as a reliable and well-managed defense compounder. Revenues grew 4% year-over-year to $18 billion, while net earnings climbed to $1.7 billion, translating to an EPS of $7.28 compared to $6.39 in Q1 2024. All four of the company's business segments saw improved operating margins, with Missiles & Fire Control notably increasing its margin from 10.4% to 13.8%, helping drive a 19% boost in segment operating profit. Free cash flow stood at a strong $955 million, and Lockheed's order backlog remained at a formidable ~$173 billion—equivalent to more than two years of revenue—underscoring the resilience of its long-term demand pipeline. Alongside earnings, Lockheed reaffirmed its full-year 2025 guidance, expecting ~$74 billion in sales and $27 in EPS, demonstrating management's confidence in navigating what it described as a "highly dynamic geopolitical and technical environment." Recent contract wins provide concrete support for that optimism, with the company securing major new awards across its missile systems portfolio—including Precision Strike, THAAD, and JASSM/LRASM programs—as well as a significant Trident II award. These contracts, totaling up to $10 billion in potential future revenue, add further strength to the already robust backlog and enhance visibility into long-term growth. In a move that underscores its commitment to maintaining technological leadership, Lockheed also announced the acquisition of Amentum's Rapid Solutions business. This bolt-on acquisition expands Lockheed's capabilities in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), advanced communications, and tactical systems—particularly through assets like electronically steered array technologies. Though not transformational in size, the acquisition is strategically sound, providing Lockheed with niche technical capabilities that align well with its broader defense technology portfolio. The integration of Rapid Solutions into the Space segment will deepen Lockheed's ISR expertise and further support its mission to deliver next-generation solutions for high-priority defense applications. Taken together, Lockheed's first quarter results and its strategic acquisition strengthen the company's investment case. Execution remains tight, the balance sheet is healthy, and guidance is solid. Management's focus on backlog conversion, operational discipline, and incremental innovation suggest a durable growth trajectory. While not flashy, the Amentum acquisition adds depth to Lockheed's ISR suite and marginally widens its long-term runway in advanced defense technology. For investors, this is a clear reaffirmation of Lockheed's strength as a steady compounder with a growing technological edge. Lockheed Martin Corporation (LMT) is not on our list of the 30 Most Popular Stocks Among Hedge Funds. As per our database, 65 hedge fund portfolios held LMT at the end of the fourth quarter which was 58 in the previous quarter. While we acknowledge the risk and potential of LMT as an investment, our conviction lies in the belief that some AI stocks hold greater promise for delivering higher returns, and doing so within a shorter timeframe. If you are looking for an AI stock that is more promising than LMT but that trades at less than 5 times its earnings, check out our report about the cheapest AI stock. READ NEXT: 8 Best Wide Moat Stocks to Buy Now and 30 Most Important AI Stocks According to BlackRock. Disclosure: None. This article was originally published at Insider Monkey. Sign in to access your portfolio
India.com
23-04-2025
- Politics
- India.com
THESE are 10 most dangerous missiles in the world... India's Agni is at.... Pakistan misses the spot
THESE are 10 most dangerous missiles in the world... India's Agni is at.... Pakistan misses the spot Ballistic missiles are rocket-propelled weapons that follow a high, arcing trajectory after being launched, delivering warheads to a target using unpowered flight. They are powered initially by rockets, but then rely on inertia and gravity to reach their destination. In today's scenario, all the major powers of the world are developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, each more advanced than the other. Here are the top 10 intercontinental ballistic missiles in the world: The Minuteman III, in service since the 1970s, is a three-stage solid fuel ICBM. It has a range of about 13,000 km and can carry multiple MIRVs (Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles). Currently, these missiles are deployed in 400 silos in the US. The Trident II missile is developed by Lockheed Martin Space and is a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM). It is deployed on the US Navy's Ohio and British Vanguard-class submarines. Its range reaches 7,800 km with a full load and 12,000 km with a light load. Voyevoda, known by NATO name SS-18 Satan, is one of Russia's most dangerous missiles. It has a range of about 11,000 km and can carry more than 10 large thermonuclear warheads simultaneously. It was specifically designed to target the US. The Yars missile, also called the SS-29 or SS-27 Mod 2, is a lethal ICBM equipped with a MIRV with a range of 12,000 km. It was first tested in 2007 and has been in active deployment since 2010. This SLBM is capable of carrying 12 thermonuclear warheads and its range can reach 12,000 km with less load. It is specially designed for Russia's nuclear submarines. The DF-41 is China's most modern and long-range road mobile ICBM, with a range of 12,000 to 15,000 km. It is capable of carrying up to 10 MIRV warheads and is intended to reach US targets. Agni-5 is India's first intercontinental range ballistic missile. It has a range of 5,000+ km and can carry a nuclear payload of 1.5 tonnes. Under India's Strategic Forces Command (SFC), this missile has become a symbol of India's nuclear deterrence capability. The DF-31 is a three-stage solid fuel missile with an estimated range of 8,000 to 11,700 km. It is deployed on a mobile launcher from which it can be launched in quick response. The JL-3 missile, designed for Type 096 submarines, has a range of 9,000 to 12,000 km. It is going to become the backbone of China's maritime nuclear deterrence. The M51 missile was inducted into the French Navy in 2010. It is capable of carrying six to ten independent warheads and has a range of between 8,000 and 10,000 km.
Telegraph
08-03-2025
- Business
- Telegraph
Britain's nuclear weapons fiasco is a nightmare for Rachel Reeves
Sir Keir Starmer was the first Labour leader in three decades to visit the Barrow shipyard where Britain's next generation of nuclear submarines are being assembled. The Prime Minister, on the opposition benches at the time, was unflinching in his support for the UK's submarines-based nuclear deterrent – a continuous at-sea presence that the Royal Navy has maintained since 1969. But while keeping Britain safe may be priceless, being ready for war doesn't come cheap. Trident, Britain's nuclear deterrent, gobbles up a significant share of our defence budget, leaving the share devoted to troops and guns far below the 2pc Nato baseline. While the Treasury said in October that its commitment to the UK's nuclear deterrent was 'absolute', many have warned that costs are spiralling out of control, piling more pressure on a Chancellor who is already struggling to balance the books. Dominic Cummings, who helped mastermind Boris Johnson's 2019 election victory, wrote this week that parts of our nuclear deterrent had been left to 'rot', with huge financial implications. The MoD insists that major costs are under control. So who is right? At least one nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarine has constantly patrolled the seas for more than five decades, undetected at all times but ready to respond to threats of war. On board are Trident II ballistic missiles which carry Mk4/A 'Holbrook' nuclear warheads that can each generate a 100 kiloton blast five times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Nagasaki during the Second World War. But the four submarines in service – known as the Vanguard class – have already had their in-service life extended three times in a move that will ultimately stretch their overall lifespan to four decades. Extending again is not an option. The cutting of steel for the next generation of submarines began in October 2016, when the Dreadnought programme got underway. Construction of four new vessels, each the length of three Olympic-sized swimming pools and big enough to house 130 crew, three chefs and a doctor, is now in its most intense phase, with the switch from Vanguard to Dreadnought starting in the early 2030s. The estimated cost of renewing the submarines is £31bn, compared with £25bn when the project was still on paper in 2011. The MoD was also granted a £10bn overdraft or contingency to account for cost overruns. It has already spent a fifth of that. A list of MoD major projects shows that higher prices have also taken their toll. It updated Dreadnought's whole life cost from £34bn to £36.7bn in January, blaming 'inflation costs increases' for the rise. Maintaining the submarines once they enter service costs roughly £3bn a year in today's prices, though going forward this estimate has been folded into a broader ring-fenced budget. Concern has also been raised with the MoD itself when it comes to overall spending on nuclear programmes. Spending on equipment in the decade to 2033 has been forecast at £117.8bn, of which just £109.8bn has been budgeted for, leaving a £7.9bn deficit. The public accounts committee warned last year that managing this would be a 'huge challenge' that would ultimately be 'difficult to deliver'. There isn't a rainy day fund to pay for cost overruns, either. The Dreadnought contingency fund is funded through the same Treasury reserve or overdraft that Rachel Reeves repeatedly lambasted the Tories for using to bankroll projects ranging from defending Ukraine to asylum programmes. Sidharth Kaushal, at the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi) think tank, says Trident funding is likely to be a point of contention within Whitehall going forward. He says: 'The Treasury might take the position that the MoD must find the money from within the defence equipment plan, which could have ramifications for conventional capabilities. 'All of this is to say that while the nuclear deterrent is sufficiently vital that the additional funds will be found one way or another, the question of whether it will come from the defence equipment plan will likely be a point of debate between the Treasury and MoD.' There is another looming headache for the Chancellor. Britain is beginning the process of designing a new generation of nuclear warheads, while simultaneously maintaining and upgrading the existing ones. The Nuclear Weapons Capability Sustainment Programme (NWCSP) responsible for this has also been plagued by cost overruns and lengthy delays. Take Project Pegasus as an example. The new enriched uranium storage and manufacturing facility was meant to be up and running in Aldermaston in 2019. It is now not expected to be fully functional until 2030. Time is, of course, money. The original approved cost of the programme was £634m. As at 2023, the costs stood at £1.7bn. Or Mensa, the warhead facility at Burghfield in Berkshire that was meant to be up and running in 2017. Technicians use this crucial facility to carefully take apart old nuclear warheads and put them back together again to check they're still functional. In the event of an accidental explosion, the roofs of these so-called Gravel Gerties are designed to collapse, enabling the gravel to pour in and prevent plutonium from being blasted into the air. The original budget was £734m. MoD records show it has spent £2.7bn so far. In fact, an increasing number of major defence projects are unlikely to be delivered by their deadlines. The MoD has a traffic light system indicating how each project is going. Just two of its 49 major projects are currently deemed to be on time and on budget. The majority are either deemed 'unfixable' as currently stands or in the case of Dreadnought and Mensa 'feasible' but with 'significant issues'. The Government puts the blame on several factors, including high inflation, and 'challenging net zero targets', although this applies across all major government projects. There is also the issue of renewing the warheads themselves, which sit within the US-manufactured missiles. Some of this funding is due to be set out in the Spending Review on June 11. Government efforts to lobby the United States for financial support also stretch back to the start of the decade. Cummings' assessment is withering. 'They've let the nuclear enterprise rot, as I've recounted many times since 2021,' he writes on his blog. 'It now relies on vast Pentagon subsidies of money, materials and intellectual property. Which also gives DC vast leverage over a British PM.' I've said repeatedly since 2021 that multiple parts of the infrastructure chain for nuclear deterrent has been appallingly handled for decades and created bills in the many tens of billions that are hidden from ~100% of MPs. Since then a nuke sub nearly sank and the test was an… — Dominic Cummings (@Dominic2306) August 3, 2024 But Tobias Ellwood, former Tory chairman of the defence select committee, warns that it is easy for people like Cummings to pick holes in the current system. 'This stuff is complicated by design,' he says. 'When you design a new car, you create a prototype, you make a mess, you make it wrong, you fix it, and then you make millions of them because you've got it right. 'When it comes to nuclear weapon systems and your platforms, your prototype is your final product. If you've only got one sort of shot at it and you're making just four of them, it becomes as complicated as designing a space shuttle.' But with our systems so intertwined, many more are warning that the implications of a US retreat from Trident are serious. 'Having to recreate all the infrastructure without US support would be over £100bn,' warns Cummings. 'The odds of Starmer facing this openly and explaining how taxes will have to rise by vast amounts so we can bounce more Ukraine rubble are close to zero.' Elwood insists this is a distraction from a genuine concern about defence funding. 'Kings Bay in Georgia houses a pool of weapons that we use. They've got an eight-year shelf life, roughly. And therefore the weapons that we've got will outlast Donald Trump doing anything radical under his tenure,' he adds. 'Now that's not to say that JD Vance [the US vice president] might then win another election and then continue this forward, but I think common sense will prevail and recognising that this isn't where the British American relationship should really go.' He adds that a revolving door of defence procurement ministers all wanting to make their mark hasn't helped. There have been a dozen since 2010, with each one taking months to get up to speed. Others say that incentives are baked into the system not to rush projects. Some point to the regulation of so-called 'single source' contracts where typically there is only one contractor able to deliver a certain piece of equipment because of national security reasons, for example. Typically in defence, these contracts include caps in the profit companies can earn on contracts awarded without competition. It is policed by the Single Source Regulations Office (SSRO), and creates an incentive to low ball when bidding then move at a pedestrian pace once projects are commissioned. One defence source says this became clear during the whole Trident renewal process in the 2010s. 'When the initial costs were being talked about and being approved, every incentive whether it came from politicians or civil servants or industry was: let's say how quickly and cheaply we can do this.' The MoD insists that Dreadnought remains on track to enter service in the early 2030s. Elwood says Britain must bolster all its defences to prepare for the new world order. 'I think America is going to dial back in a major way,' he says. 'We cannot dismiss the idea that Trump will pull out of Nato.' That means tough choices in Elwood's mind. 'You have tell the British people that s--- is coming over the hill, we've got to get ready, and then the British people will say, 'oh my God! I'm happy for you to increase my taxes – what I don't want to do is start having to learn Russian.'' A Ministry of Defence spokesman said: 'The UK's nuclear deterrent keeps us safe 24/7. 'The Dreadnought programme remains on track to manufacture four Dreadnought Class submarines within the original cost estimate. The First of Class, HMS Dreadnought, will enter service in the early 2030s.'
