Latest news with #TripartiteAlliance
IOL News
11-08-2025
- Politics
- IOL News
Rethinking the Tripartite Alliance Elections Strategy: A Response to David Masondo
Current Tripartite Alliance leaders (from left) COSATU President Zingiswa Losi, ANC President Cyril Ramaphosa and SACP General-Secretary Solly Mapaila. We cannot afford the comfort of pacifist intellectualism when the structural conditions for rupture within the Alliance are already visible to the trained eye, says the writer. Image: Ayanda Ndamane/Independent Newspapers Zamikhaya Maseti This intervention is not a polite exchange of scholarly pleasantries, nor is it an attempt to curry favour with the architects of the paper under review. It is an unmandated, uncompromising rejoinder, rooted in the discipline of Marxist–Leninist analysis and sharpened by the lived experiences of liberation movements that have navigated the perilous waters of state power. The purpose here is to strip away the veils of South African exceptionalism, to expose the illusions that have sedated our strategic imagination, and to insist on a class-based reading of our current political moment. The critique that follows is not intended to undermine comradeship, but rather to strengthen it. True revolutionary discipline demands not silent agreement, but rigorous engagement with theory and history. We cannot afford the comfort of pacifist intellectualism when the structural conditions for rupture within the Alliance are already visible to the trained eye. This rejoinder must be read as both a warning and a call to arms, a reminder that history is unsparing to those who mistake sentiment for strategy, and that revolutionary survival rests on clarity of analysis, unity in action, and preparedness for the inevitable contradictions of post-independence governance. My enduring impression is that the paper is couched in a pacifist theoretical register. By pacifism in the intellectual sense, I am not referring to the noble ethics of nonviolence, but rather to a scholarly reticence —a reluctance to grapple with the antagonistic contradictions that define the post-independence political economy. It is a posture that seeks harmony where history demands confrontation, conciliation where dialectical necessity demands rupture, and in the process produces an analysis that is civil in tone yet anaemic in its engagement with the structural conditions that have historically brought ruling liberation movements to the precipice of decline after thirty years in power. This is neither conjecture nor abstraction; it is a recurring material reality recorded with painful regularity in Africa, in Latin America, and across the broader post-colonial world. The Democratic Deconsolidation Thesis is approached with tentative caution, as though the thesis may disintegrate when applied to the South African situation. This hesitancy cultivates a more profound danger, the entrapment in what I call the South African Exceptionalism Theory. This is the intoxicating belief that our liberation credentials, our democratic architecture, and our negotiated settlement have somehow immunised us from the political and electoral misfortunes that have undone other post-colonial states. Exceptionalism is the opiate of the governing elite; it sedates revolutionary vigilance, dulls the capacity for strategic foresight, and breeds complacency in the face of gathering contradictions. Antonio Gramsci's warning on the emergence of morbid symptoms in the interregnum is instructive. When the old is dying and the new cannot be born, a crisis of authority and legitimacy develops, producing distortions and political decay. South Africa is not exempt from this dialectic; in fact, the symptoms are already manifest, declining popular trust, factional decomposition, and the erosion of alliance cohesion. The lens of exceptionalism misreads these as episodic turbulence, when they are in fact structural signals of a deeper historical shift. Another theoretical lens that must be applied is the concept of the post-colonial predatory state. This analytical frame makes clear that national liberation does not dissolve the class struggle; it heightens it. As the post-independence political economy matures, class and ideological contradictions sharpen, and when these contradictions become irreconcilable, unity is no longer a revolutionary virtue but a political fiction. At that point, the rupture is not a betrayal; it is the dialectical outcome of the revolution's internal contradictions. The lessons of Latin American dependency theory, as articulated by Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Theotonio Dos Santos, and Ruy Mauro Marini, also bear repeating. Many liberation movements in state power, once embedded in the circuits of global capitalism, found their nationalist development agendas colliding with the imperatives of transnational capital. This collision intensified internal class cleavages, forcing strategic choices that fractured alliances from within. Nicaragua stands as a sobering historical example. Born of the anti-Somoza struggle, the Sandinistas forged a broad revolutionary alliance that combined multiple ideological tendencies. Yet under the combined pressures of U.S. economic warfare, counter-revolutionary destabilisation, and the intensification of internal class contradictions, the alliance unravelled. By 1990, the Sandinistas suffered an electoral defeat, proving that revolutionary legitimacy, once eroded by material pressures and internal fissures, cannot be recovered by nostalgia alone. This historical record teaches us that the Tripartite Alliance cannot be romanticised as political triplets conjoined for eternity like Siamese twins. It is a historically contingent formation, its unity resting on a material and ideological alignment that, once dissolved, cannot be restored through sentiment, through shared history, or liberation credentials. The Marxist Leninist duty before us is not to preserve the illusion of eternal unity, but to subject the alliance to a sober class analysis, to theorise the inevitability of rupture, to prepare for its consequences, and to manage the transition in a way that preserves the revolutionary gains of the National Democratic Revolution. South African exceptionalism will not save us. Only a clear-eyed, historically grounded, and uncompromisingly dialectical approach to the political economy of our moment can avert the fate that has already overtaken so many of our comrades in arms. This is the hour to return to the discipline of the revolutionary vanguard. We must train our cadre to think with the sharpness of Lenin, to see with the foresight of Marx, and to act with the decisiveness of those who understand that history is unforgiving to those who hesitate. We must cleanse ourselves of the narcotic of exceptionalism, steel the movement for the inevitability of rupture, and prepare organisationally to lead under new conditions. The revolution will not be defended by sentiment; it will be defended by clarity of theory, unity of action, and the courage to break with illusions before illusions break us. * Zamikhaya Maseti is a Political Economy Analyst. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
IOL News
11-08-2025
- Politics
- IOL News
Tripartite Alliance on the Brink as ANC, SACP Tensions Soar
Newly elected secretary general of South African Communist Party (SACP) Chris Hani (left)) and former secretary general Joe Slovo (right) walk together after addressing the media on the third day of the first SACP legal congress inside South Africa in 41 years, in Soweto on December 07, 1991. Tt is too early to say if the SACP's decision to contest elections marks the end of the Tripartite Alliance, says the writer. Image: WALTER DHLADHLA / AFP Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu In December 2024, the South African Communist Party (SACP) announced that henceforth, it will contest elections alone outside of the Tripartite Alliance comprising the ANC, COSATU and the SACP – as well as South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). This includes the much-anticipated upcoming 2026 Local Government Election (LGE). It was not the first time that the SACP had taken such a decision. But this time it sounds serious, and the ANC has conceded defeat in persuading it. This incident triggers a few questions. Firstly, what has prompted the SACP to take such a firm decision this time? Secondly, does this mark the end of the Tripartite Alliance? Thirdly, what impact will the SACP's decision have on the ANC during elections starting from 2026? Fourthly, could this incident have been avoided? Fifthly, what should the ANC do henceforth? On the first question, the decision by the SACP was not impromptu. For years, the party has complained about the ANC, which it accuses of undermining other Tripartite Alliance partners and has been contemplating this move. This has led to the SACP threatening to contest various elections under its name, not under the ANC's banner. This was the case, for example, under President Zuma's term. However, such a decision was rescinded on various grounds. Because of the SACP's lack of a decisive position on this matter, the ANC did not take the party seriously. It worked on the assumption that the SACP would make this threat but change its mind on the eve of an election. There was no expectation that the SACP would take a firm position, especially because its numbers are less than those of the ANC. What the ANC failed to understand or was oblivious to is that the political dynamics have changed significantly under President Ramaphosa. In 2019, the ANC fell below 60% for the first time, only obtaining 57%. In 2024, the ANC's support further declined to 40.18%. Regarding the second question, it is too early to say if the SACP's decision marks the end of the Tripartite Alliance. The other Alliance partners – COSATU and SANCO seem determined to continue supporting the ANC. The question is for how long? The third question is the most important one. The ANC must be worried about the SACP's decision on the eve of the 2026 LGE and as political parties prepare for the 2029 general election. Given the level of disgruntlement among ANC members and supporters as evidenced in the 2019 general election, 2021 LGE, and the 2024 general election, some traditional ANC supporters could vote for the SACP to punish the ANC. It remains unclear if the ANC is ready for that eventuality – especially because new political parties such as the MKP have seriously humbled the ANC at the polls. The fourth question speaks to a lack of visionary leadership. It is an indictment of the current ANC leadership. The reality is that the SACP's decision could have been avoided. The issues of concern raised by the SACP's Solly Mapaila point to a lack of leadership prowess on the side of the ANC, complacency, political negligence, political arrogance and trust deficit. When the ANC fell below 60% in the 2019 general election and continued to decline in subsequent elections, the ANC was supposed to bring the Tripartite Alliance together and take a collective decision on how to address this evident lack of popularity. In that meeting, the ANC should have drawn lessons from other former liberation movements across Africa, which lost power after having been in office for over three decades. Following the 2019 and 2021 elections, the writing was already on the wall that the ANC would not reach the fifty-plus-one threshold needed to constitute government. At this point, the ANC should have engaged its Alliance partners about the prospects of constituting a coalition government and the form such a coalition would take. Had the ANC done this, it would have been easier to form a coalition government after the 2024 general election with the support of all its Alliance partners. This did not happen. As it became clear during the counting of votes that the ANC was not going to meet the fifty-plus-one requirement, the ANC was in a frantic mode. It was during this time that it engaged the DA about the possibility of forming a grand coalition. When it faced stiff resistance from the Alliance partners, it then opted for the multiparty coalition (referring to it as the GNU). Such a decision did not please the SACP, which complained that there was no proper consultation, thus feeling betrayed by the ANC. So, the current dilemma that the ANC finds itself in could have been avoided. Question five is important in mapping the way forward for the ANC. A few issues should be considered here. Firstly, although ANC SG Fikile Mbalula boldly announced that the ANC's membership has grown to 1.5 million members, the reality is that the ANC's support is constantly declining. Secondly, time is of the essence as the ANC prepares for the 2026 LGE. Thirdly, in 2027, the party will hold its elective congress. What kind of a leader will emerge from that congress to lead the party to the 2029 general election? Will that individual enjoy the same support from the business community as Ramaphosa did, which is what saved him even after the notorious Phala Phala saga? These are just some of the questions which demonstrate that the ANC has a mammoth task to save itself. The question becomes: Does it have the right leadership to be equal to the task? Has the party learnt anything from its previous and current challenges? Only time will tell. Therefore, the decision by the SACP to contest next year's elections alone sounds like death knells for both the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance. Even if the Alliance were to survive, the ANC would be further weakened. Should Alliance supporters vote for the SACP, the ANC will feel the pinch! * Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu is Director of the Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy at Nelson Mandela University. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
Daily Maverick
07-08-2025
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
SACP hits back at ANC over ultimatum to ‘choose a side' before 2026 elections
As the SACP prepares to contest the 2026 local government elections independently, it insists members can still hold dual membership with the ANC. However, the ANC constitution prohibits supporting other parties and warns of disciplinary action. The South African Communist Party (SACP) has rejected the notion that its decision to contest the 2026 elections independently should force its members to choose between it and the ANC, insisting that dual membership remains a foundational principle of the Tripartite Alliance. This comes after comments made by ANC Secretary-General Fikile Mbalula, suggesting that individuals who are members of both the ANC and SACP and deployed in Cabinet positions might have to pick a side. Among those who may be forced to choose where their allegiance lies are recently appointed Higher Education Minister Buti Manamela, Mineral and Petroleum Resources Minister Gwede Mantashe and Science, Technology and Innovation Minister Blade Nzimande. 'In our view, the resolution of the SACP is forcing members to choose between the ANC and the SACP. So the notion of dual membership doesn't fall away, but the implication of that decision essentially says, choose between the ANC and the SACP,' Mbalula said on Wednesday, 7 August. He was briefing journalists at the party's headquarters, Luthuli House, on the resolutions of the NEC's meeting over the weekend. The SACP is of a different view. It believes that dual membership has long been central to the alliance and cannot be dismissed due to electoral competition. SACP spokesperson Mbulelo Mandlana said, 'The principle of dual membership in the alliance predates the electoral era of the South African revolution. The inconveniences of the era of elections should not be used to justify undermining the centrality of the principle of dual membership.' Daily Maverick understands that a task team was established during the parties' last bilateral meeting to look into how the two organisations would work together before and after the elections. However, the team has not met since its formation. Asked about this, Mandlana said, 'The task team tasked with developing the framework for how the alliance will function has not yet delivered any outcomes. The SACP remains committed to the process.' It is unclear how the two will proceed since ANC's constitution prohibits dual membership. Rule 4.19(b) states: 'Any member who supports a political organisation or party other than an organisation in alliance with the ANC in a manner contrary to the aims, objectives and policy of the ANC shall be liable for disciplinary action.' Slow start The SACP has long been a central partner in the Tripartite Alliance, alongside the ANC and Cosatu. Over the years, it has supported the ANC during elections, had access to its election strategies, participated in workshops and played a role in processes such as the selection of public representatives. But according to Mbalula, the SACP's latest decision means these longstanding arrangements will now have to be reviewed. Mounting tensions within the alliance, particularly under the presidency of Jacob Zuma, led the SACP to begin re-evaluating its position. At its congress in July 2017, the party resolved to explore the possibility of contesting elections independently, especially in areas where the alliance was seen as dysfunctional or where the ANC was no longer viewed as representing the interests of the working class. Later that year, in November, the SACP contested its first by-election in the Metsimaholo Local Municipality in the Free State. The party secured three out of 21 council seats and garnered about 6,000 votes. The by-election followed the dissolution of the 2016 municipal council due to political instability. Two weeks ago, the party contested yet another by-election, this time in Polokwane, and garnered only 70 votes, representing just 1%. Despite underperforming, Mandlana said the party had learnt lessons which would be key in the 2026 polls. 'Winning or failing to win at this point was not the focal point, but evaluating these dynamics by being on the ground was more primary than other considerations. To that end, the SACP derives neither disappointment nor satisfaction from the numerical results, but key strategic lessons to build from,' he said. Clinging on In a week or two, the NEC will hold a special meeting which will look at local government issues. Mbalula said the NEC would also use that meeting to finalise its position on how the two parties would work together, heading into the elections. Mbalula appeared to suggest that there would still be engagements with the SACP, possibly to reverse the decision, but this would be possible only once the party held its next congress. 'We may as well fail, at some point, to persuade them out of this thing of contesting for elections. And when that happens, we are now going to have to look into, in the next two weeks, the implications of this decision and how we are going to operate as the two parties going forward, because there's a lot of implications in relation to this decision,' Mbalula said. Mandlana said the talks between the SACP and ANC were simply an attempt by the two allies to work out how their alliance should function under new circumstances, especially now that the Communist Party was on the ballot for the first time since 1994. 'Persuasion to change the party decision was never on the table, in truth,' he said. Expanding the GNU The ANC is also dealing with challenges concerning the Government of National Unity (GNU). Last week, party president Cyril Ramaphosa said the NEC had reaffirmed that forming the GNU over a year ago was the right decision, as it had brought about stability. However, the NEC has also resolved to reconfigure the GNU and engage with political parties outside the current arrangement, specifically those aligned with the ANC's objectives that the party wouldn't need to constantly negotiate with for support on key parliamentary votes. The aim is to stabilise governance and push through important reforms. This follows the GNU's fragility since its formation, as well as ongoing policy differences. When asked how this reconfiguration would work and whether the ANC had considered the views of its current partners, particularly the DA, Mbalula said the party would first speak to existing members of the GNU. 'We have been mandated in terms of the Statement of Intent; we have to talk to the partners in the GNU, which is what we are going to do,' Mbalula said.
Shafaq News
07-05-2025
- Business
- Shafaq News
Iraq's 2025 Elections: A mix of political realignment and fragile stability
Shafaq News/ Iraq is preparing for the parliamentary elections on November 11, 2025, as the country enters a period of political reshuffling and heightened regional tension. With alliances shifting among Shiite, Sunni, and Kurdish blocs, the vote is expected to influence not only the composition of parliament but the broader balance of power in Baghdad. Behind this unfolding political realignment lies a climate of uncertainty. As regional actors monitor the evolving dynamic between the United States and Iran, the internal scene remains unsettled. Iraqi parties are recalibrating their strategies, aware that external developments could rapidly alter domestic calculations. Since assuming office in 2022, Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani has presided over relative calm. Yet that stability masks a fragile arrangement, maintained by a precarious consensus among Iraq's leading political forces. Former Member of Parliament and State of Law Coalition figure Zuhair al-Jalabi described the current governing structure as a temporary balancing act. 'There has been a shared understanding to distribute gains and positions according to mutual agreement,' al-Jalabi noted. 'But this arrangement is fragile, especially in light of Iraq's worsening financial troubles.' Although state institutions continue to function, the economic foundations beneath them remain shaky. Iraq's reliance on oil revenues leaves it vulnerable to global price swings, and those vulnerabilities are being compounded by delays in implementing the national budget. Long-standing inefficiencies and poor fiscal planning persist, raising the stakes as the campaign season approaches. Economists warn that these structural weaknesses could turn into political flashpoints. Discontent over service delivery, employment, and inflation may fuel voter frustration—and spark new rivalries within and between major political blocs. As pressure builds, competition is expected to intensify not only on the campaign trail but within corridors of power where deals are made long before ballots are cast. In Iraq's post-2003 political system, elections are as much about behind-the-scenes negotiations as they are about the vote itself. Coalition-building remains central to forming a government, and this year's contest will likely hinge on how parties position themselves during both the campaign and the talks that follow. Creating chaos As Iraq moves toward national elections, a rising political lobby is subtly redrawing the contours of the Shiite landscape. Former lawmaker and prominent State of Law Coalition figure Zuhair al-Jalabi described the group as part of a Turkish-backed initiative that unites a Shiite faction with two Sunni blocs. Though it resembles the earlier Tripartite Alliance in form, al-Jalabi stressed to Shafaq News that 'it operates through different mechanisms.' 'This lobby is maneuvering to pit al-Sudani against the Coordination Framework,' he remarked, referring to the Shiite alliance that played a pivotal role in establishing the current government. He pointed to a discreet meeting between Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani and Syrian transitional President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Qatar, viewing it as an early indication of behind-the-scenes friction. Despite its success in the 2023 provincial elections, where it secured 101 out of 285 council seats (After Muqtada Al-Sadr's withdrawal), the Coordination Framework is now facing mounting internal tensions. Its electoral dominance was achieved through three distinct lists: one led by the Badr Organization and Asaib Ahl al-Haq, another by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, and a third by more centrist figures such as Ammar al-Hakim and Haidar al-Abadi. In recent months, cracks within the alliance have become more visible. Prime Minister al-Sudani and Al-Ameri are reportedly advancing efforts to establish a broader electoral alliance from within the Framework itself. This initiative seeks to unify a diverse spectrum of Shiite forces while reaching out to Sunni and Kurdish partners—a move insiders describe as a preparatory step toward forming a cross-sectarian parliamentary majority. However, this plan for a new electoral bloc, Tahaluf Qarar (Decision Alliance), has unraveled before its formal launch. Disagreements between al-Sudani and al-Ameri led to a decision to contest the November 11 vote on separate lists, sources said. Al-Jalabi cast doubt on the durability of the current governing structure. 'There has been a shared understanding to distribute gains and positions according to mutual agreement,' he explained. 'But this arrangement is fragile, especially in light of Iraq's worsening financial troubles.' He also disclosed that the emerging lobby—still in its formative stages—is working to build an alternative coalition capable of challenging the Coordination Framework's dominance. Its ties with Sunni factions and its external support from Turkiye suggest a broader regional strategy at play. Moreover, not all lawmakers interpret these developments in the same way. While al-Jalabi views them as a calculated attempt to fracture Shiite unity, others see a strategic realignment. From their perspective, the new efforts are not intended to divide the Shiite political sphere, but rather to modernize it by fostering more inclusive and diversified alliances. Potential Revival Sunni political figures are intensifying their efforts to restore unity and strengthen their influence after years of internal division. A series of emerging alliances reflects a coordinated attempt to reshape the Sunni political landscape and take on a more active role in steering Iraq's future. One of the most prominent shifts involves a partnership between the Mutahidoun Party, headed by former Parliament Speaker Osama al-Nujaifi, and the Azm Alliance, led by Muthanna al-Samarrai. The coalition is focused not only on electoral cooperation but also on addressing critical issues such as reconstruction and service provision in Sunni-majority governorates, political marginalization, and systemic neglect. Momentum continues to build with the creation of the National Resolution Alliance, also known as Al-Hasm. This newly formed front brings together influential Sunni figures including Jamal al-Karbouli, Rafie al-Issawi, and current Defense Minister Thabet al-Abbasi. The alliance is seen as having a broader ambition to forge a unified platform capable of engaging in parliamentary negotiations and assuming a more substantial role in governance. However, despite the growing number of strategic alignments, political cohesion remains incomplete. Mohammed Qutaiba, a member of parliament representing the Taqaddum bloc, outlined the nature of the evolving landscape in remarks to Shafaq News. Rather than viewing the developments as signs of deeper division, he framed them as the natural outcome of competing perspectives within a maturing political environment. 'These are not splits,' Qutaiba explained. 'There are simply alliances that come with divergent views. Reconciling these differences is possible, but resolving the contest over leadership within the Sunni component remains complex.' Qutaiba also pointed to the fluidity of Iraq's political dynamics, suggesting that current alignments may shift following the election results. He anticipated new configurations that could transcend both sectarian and intra-sectarian lines. 'It is very likely that Sunni and Shiite blocs will cooperate after the results. Even within the Sunni house, new alignments are possible,' he noted. Finding Power in Unity Efforts to bring the Kurdish political spectrum together are also on the spot, with a potential alliance between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) capturing growing attention. Political analyst Al-Azzawi highlights the significance of these developments, suggesting that the two dominant Kurdish parties could soon announce a joint electoral platform, reminiscent of the "Kurdistan Alliance" used back in 2009. This partnership, should it materialize, is seen as a strategic move to safeguard the Kurdish Region's interests, particularly in light of long-standing disputes with Baghdad over critical issues such as budget allocations, oil exports, and the implementation of Article 140, which deals with the status of disputed territories. In comments to Shafaq News, Al-Azzawi emphasized that Kurdish unity is more crucial than ever for addressing both political and financial challenges at the federal level. 'The Kurdish leadership needs internal unity to defend its interests in Baghdad,' he noted. 'Many of their key demands remain unaddressed. This election could reset federal relations if managed wisely.' Within the KDP, optimism is rising. Senior party figure Wafa Mohammed Karim shared that the process of forming the next Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is largely complete, with only a few ministerial positions left to negotiate. She expressed confidence in the broader Kurdish political landscape, suggesting that it may ultimately be more cohesive than either the Sunni or Shiite blocs. 'We may well see the return of a joint Kurdish list in parliament,' she added, hinting at the possibility of stronger unity heading into the next elections. The momentum for unity doesn't stop with the KDP and PUK. A broader effort is underway to include a wider range of Kurdish voices in the political process. The emerging Kurdistan Region Alliance—comprising the Kurdistan Social Democratic Party, the Kurdistan Communist Party – Iraq, and the Kurdistan Toilers' Party—reflects a growing strategy to bridge intra-Kurdish divides. While still in its early stages, this alliance aims to offer a more unified front and amplify the Kurdish voice on the national stage. However, according to analysts, the road to a unified Kurdish political landscape is far from clear. The Region is facing an increasingly severe economic crisis, exacerbated by the suspension of oil exports due to ongoing disputes with Baghdad and Ankara. The economic fallout has led to delayed salaries, widespread public frustration, and intensified calls for reform and transparency within the KRG. Adding to the complexity is the rise of the opposition New Generation Movement, led by Shaswar Abdulwahid. The group made significant strides in the 2024 elections, securing 15 seats and positioning itself as a strong challenger to the traditional power structure. Yet, controversy has marred the election results, with several opposition factions accusing the process of electoral fraud and manipulation. These allegations, however, have been firmly rejected by both the Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) and the victorious parties.
