Tripartite Alliance on the Brink as ANC, SACP Tensions Soar
Image: WALTER DHLADHLA / AFP
Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu
In December 2024, the South African Communist Party (SACP) announced that henceforth, it will contest elections alone outside of the Tripartite Alliance comprising the ANC, COSATU and the SACP – as well as South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO). This includes the much-anticipated upcoming 2026 Local Government Election (LGE).
It was not the first time that the SACP had taken such a decision. But this time it sounds serious, and the ANC has conceded defeat in persuading it.
This incident triggers a few questions. Firstly, what has prompted the SACP to take such a firm decision this time? Secondly, does this mark the end of the Tripartite Alliance? Thirdly, what impact will the SACP's decision have on the ANC during elections starting from 2026? Fourthly, could this incident have been avoided? Fifthly, what should the ANC do henceforth?
On the first question, the decision by the SACP was not impromptu. For years, the party has complained about the ANC, which it accuses of undermining other Tripartite Alliance partners and has been contemplating this move. This has led to the SACP threatening to contest various elections under its name, not under the ANC's banner. This was the case, for example, under President Zuma's term. However, such a decision was rescinded on various grounds.
Because of the SACP's lack of a decisive position on this matter, the ANC did not take the party seriously. It worked on the assumption that the SACP would make this threat but change its mind on the eve of an election. There was no expectation that the SACP would take a firm position, especially because its numbers are less than those of the ANC. What the ANC failed to understand or was oblivious to is that the political dynamics have changed significantly under President Ramaphosa. In 2019, the ANC fell below 60% for the first time, only obtaining 57%. In 2024, the ANC's support further declined to 40.18%.
Regarding the second question, it is too early to say if the SACP's decision marks the end of the Tripartite Alliance. The other Alliance partners – COSATU and SANCO seem determined to continue supporting the ANC. The question is for how long?
The third question is the most important one. The ANC must be worried about the SACP's decision on the eve of the 2026 LGE and as political parties prepare for the 2029 general election. Given the level of disgruntlement among ANC members and supporters as evidenced in the 2019 general election, 2021 LGE, and the 2024 general election, some traditional ANC supporters could vote for the SACP to punish the ANC. It remains unclear if the ANC is ready for that eventuality – especially because new political parties such as the MKP have seriously humbled the ANC at the polls.
The fourth question speaks to a lack of visionary leadership. It is an indictment of the current ANC leadership. The reality is that the SACP's decision could have been avoided. The issues of concern raised by the SACP's Solly Mapaila point to a lack of leadership prowess on the side of the ANC, complacency, political negligence, political arrogance and trust deficit.
When the ANC fell below 60% in the 2019 general election and continued to decline in subsequent elections, the ANC was supposed to bring the Tripartite Alliance together and take a collective decision on how to address this evident lack of popularity. In that meeting, the ANC should have drawn lessons from other former liberation movements across Africa, which lost power after having been in office for over three decades.
Following the 2019 and 2021 elections, the writing was already on the wall that the ANC would not reach the fifty-plus-one threshold needed to constitute government. At this point, the ANC should have engaged its Alliance partners about the prospects of constituting a coalition government and the form such a coalition would take. Had the ANC done this, it would have been easier to form a coalition government after the 2024 general election with the support of all its Alliance partners.
This did not happen. As it became clear during the counting of votes that the ANC was not going to meet the fifty-plus-one requirement, the ANC was in a frantic mode. It was during this time that it engaged the DA about the possibility of forming a grand coalition. When it faced stiff resistance from the Alliance partners, it then opted for the multiparty coalition (referring to it as the GNU). Such a decision did not please the SACP, which complained that there was no proper consultation, thus feeling betrayed by the ANC. So, the current dilemma that the ANC finds itself in could have been avoided.
Question five is important in mapping the way forward for the ANC. A few issues should be considered here. Firstly, although ANC SG Fikile Mbalula boldly announced that the ANC's membership has grown to 1.5 million members, the reality is that the ANC's support is constantly declining. Secondly, time is of the essence as the ANC prepares for the 2026 LGE. Thirdly, in 2027, the party will hold its elective congress. What kind of a leader will emerge from that congress to lead the party to the 2029 general election? Will that individual enjoy the same support from the business community as Ramaphosa did, which is what saved him even after the notorious Phala Phala saga?
These are just some of the questions which demonstrate that the ANC has a mammoth task to save itself. The question becomes: Does it have the right leadership to be equal to the task? Has the party learnt anything from its previous and current challenges? Only time will tell.
Therefore, the decision by the SACP to contest next year's elections alone sounds like death knells for both the ANC and the Tripartite Alliance. Even if the Alliance were to survive, the ANC would be further weakened. Should Alliance supporters vote for the SACP, the ANC will feel the pinch!
* Prof. Bheki Mngomezulu is Director of the Centre for the Advancement of Non-Racialism and Democracy at Nelson Mandela University.
** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
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Many liberation movements in state power, once embedded in the circuits of global capitalism, found their nationalist development agendas colliding with the imperatives of transnational capital. This collision intensified internal class cleavages, forcing strategic choices that fractured alliances from within. Nicaragua stands as a sobering historical example. Born of the anti-Somoza struggle, the Sandinistas forged a broad revolutionary alliance that combined multiple ideological tendencies. Yet under the combined pressures of U.S. economic warfare, counter-revolutionary destabilisation, and the intensification of internal class contradictions, the alliance unravelled. By 1990, the Sandinistas suffered an electoral defeat, proving that revolutionary legitimacy, once eroded by material pressures and internal fissures, cannot be recovered by nostalgia alone. This historical record teaches us that the Tripartite Alliance cannot be romanticised as political triplets conjoined for eternity like Siamese twins. It is a historically contingent formation, its unity resting on a material and ideological alignment that, once dissolved, cannot be restored through sentiment, through shared history, or liberation credentials. The Marxist Leninist duty before us is not to preserve the illusion of eternal unity, but to subject the alliance to a sober class analysis, to theorise the inevitability of rupture, to prepare for its consequences, and to manage the transition in a way that preserves the revolutionary gains of the National Democratic Revolution. South African exceptionalism will not save us. Only a clear-eyed, historically grounded, and uncompromisingly dialectical approach to the political economy of our moment can avert the fate that has already overtaken so many of our comrades in arms. This is the hour to return to the discipline of the revolutionary vanguard. We must train our cadre to think with the sharpness of Lenin, to see with the foresight of Marx, and to act with the decisiveness of those who understand that history is unforgiving to those who hesitate. We must cleanse ourselves of the narcotic of exceptionalism, steel the movement for the inevitability of rupture, and prepare organisationally to lead under new conditions. The revolution will not be defended by sentiment; it will be defended by clarity of theory, unity of action, and the courage to break with illusions before illusions break us. * Zamikhaya Maseti is a Political Economy Analyst. ** The views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of IOL, Independent Media or The African.
