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US defense chief claims China plans to 'invade' Taiwan in 2027
US defense chief claims China plans to 'invade' Taiwan in 2027

Iraqi News

time16 hours ago

  • Politics
  • Iraqi News

US defense chief claims China plans to 'invade' Taiwan in 2027

INA-sources US Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth said Saturday that China plans to "invade" Taiwan in 2027 and warned that any attempt could result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific region and the world. Hegseth urged US allies in the region to increase their defense spending as he addressed the Shangri-La Dialogue -- a key annual defense and security forum, in Singapore. "We know that (Chinese President) Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. The PLA (People's Liberation Army) is building the capabilities needed to do it -- at breakneck speed. The PLA is training for it, every day. The PLA is rehearsing for the real deal," he said, according to a transcript by the US Department of Defense. He added that Washington is not going to "sugarcoat it" but the threat China poses is real and it could be imminent. "But let me again be clear: The United States does not seek war. We do not seek to dominate or strangle China. We do not seek to humiliate China. We do not seek regime change. Instead, we seek peace. But we must ensure that China cannot dominate us — or our allies and partners." said Hegseth. He accused Beijing of harassing its neighbors in the South China Sea, but said Washington is watching China's actions closely. "Any unilateral attempt in the South China Sea to change the status quo by force or coercion is unacceptable," said Hegseth, adding Beijing wants to control the Asia region. He urged Asian and European allies to increase their defense spending.,"We must ensure that our defense spending reflects the dangers and threats we face today." Hegseth added that President Donald Trump is building the US military stronger as he proposes spending for the first time -- more than $1 trillion next year to do it. "The Golden Dome for America, our new sixth-generation fighter, the F-47; our new stealth bomber, the B-21; new submarines and destroyers are all a part of that. The best military equipment in the world," he said. Hegseth also announced defense cooperation projects under the Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience (PIPIR) -- a US-initiated forum of 14 allies and partners. He said the first project is to establish repair capability and capacity for P-8 radar systems in Australia, which will enable US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific operating the aircraft, including New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, to repair them within the region rather than relying on a single repair source in the US. Sources: AA

Rocket Lab to acquire EO/IR payload developer Geost in $275m deal
Rocket Lab to acquire EO/IR payload developer Geost in $275m deal

Broadcast Pro

time2 days ago

  • Business
  • Broadcast Pro

Rocket Lab to acquire EO/IR payload developer Geost in $275m deal

The strategic acquisition would create an entirely new category for Rocket Lab, positioning the company as a disruptor for national security space. Rocket Lab has announced a definitive agreement to acquire the parent company of Geost, an electro-optical and infrared (EO/IR) payload developer based in Tucson, Arizona. The $275m deal will be executed through a combination of $125m in cash and $150m in privately placed Rocket Lab common stock, along with the possibility of an additional $50m in cash earnouts tied to future revenue milestones. The acquisition, expected to close in the second half of 2025, represents Rocket Lab’s formal expansion into the satellite payload sector and significantly strengthens its position as a full-spectrum provider of national security space solutions. Geost, which has more than two decades of flight heritage supporting both classified and unclassified missions, specialises in advanced EO/IR sensor systems critical to missile warning and tracking, tactical intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), Earth observation, and space domain awareness. These capabilities align with the US Department of Defense’s push for resilient, proliferated space architectures such as the proposed Golden Dome and the Space Development Agency’s Tracking Layer. By bringing Geost’s payload expertise in-house, Rocket Lab aims to streamline the production of integrated spacecraft systems specifically tailored for US national security applications. The move is expected to reduce integration complexity, cut costs, and speed up delivery timelines. With Geost’s high-performance sensing solutions, Rocket Lab will be better equipped to support real-time threat detection and response, enabling warfighters and mission operators to operate more effectively in increasingly contested space environments. The acquisition also introduces a new capability category—Optical Systems—into Rocket Lab’s growing portfolio and reinforces its role as a disruptor in the national security space market. Rocket Lab founder and CEO, Sir Peter Beck, said: 'Rocket Lab was founded to disrupt the traditional space industry and we’re doing just that by expanding our ability to deliver complete, mission-critical space solutions. With the acquisition of Geost, we’re bringing advanced electro-optical and infrared payloads in-house to support secure, responsive, and cost-effective systems at scale. These technologies enable spacecraft that can detect, interpret, and respond to threats in real time, enhancing our role as a trusted provider of end-to-end space capabilities for the United States and its allies—with greater speed, intelligence, and operational control.” Bill Gattle, Geost’s General Manager and CEO of Lightridge Solutions, added: 'Integrating Geost’s advanced optical capabilities is a natural next step for Rocket Lab as the company expands its end-to-end space systems. By bringing high-performance optical technologies in-house, Rocket Lab is strengthening its ability to deliver responsive, full-stack solutions for government and commercial missions. Backed by the infrastructure to produce these systems at scale, Rocket Lab is well-positioned to meet accelerating demand for high-performance space solutions. The addition of payloads to its vertically integrated portfolio not only expands mission capability but also elevates Rocket Lab’s standing as a leading end-to-end space systems provider.' As part of the acquisition, Rocket Lab will assume ownership of Geost’s facilities and labs in Tucson and northern Virginia, along with its intellectual property, existing inventory and workforce. The deal will add 115 highly skilled professionals to Rocket Lab’s team, bringing the company’s total headcount to over 2,600. Rocket Lab’s global footprint now spans key locations across the United States, Canada, and New Zealand, reinforcing its commitment to delivering cutting-edge space technologies across a rapidly evolving aerospace landscape.

Why the UK refuses to do the one thing that could stop Israel's 'intolerable' war on Gaza
Why the UK refuses to do the one thing that could stop Israel's 'intolerable' war on Gaza

Middle East Eye

time3 days ago

  • Politics
  • Middle East Eye

Why the UK refuses to do the one thing that could stop Israel's 'intolerable' war on Gaza

What Israel is doing in Gaza is 'morally wrong and unjustifiable', its actions 'intolerable' and 'an affront to the values of the British people'. These are not the words of a pro-Palestine activist, but of the UK foreign secretary, David Lammy, who has now suspended negotiations on a new free trade agreement and vowed to review co-operation on the 2030 bilateral road map. But the UK government still won't take the single fastest and most effective step: ending military cooperation with Israel and halting all arms sales. Lammy said in parliament that 'arms are not getting to Israel that could be used in Gaza'. This is false. The UK government last year suspended a small number of arms export licences - around 10 percent - after determining that Israel is not committed to complying with international humanitarian law, but it allowed UK participation in the F-35 fighter jet programme to continue. In addition, new data from both Israel and the UK raises concerns about the scale and end use of UK-supplied weaponry. New MEE newsletter: Jerusalem Dispatch Sign up to get the latest insights and analysis on Israel-Palestine, alongside Turkey Unpacked and other MEE newsletters In its September 2024 decision to restrict certain arms sales, the government decided on the narrowest possible approach: it suspended licences for weapons with a direct use in Gaza, but it did not halt wider arms exports to Israel for use by the army - such as for training purposes or for its illegal occupation of the West Bank - or for Israeli industry use. Yet there is a much wider pattern of British military collaboration with Israel and its illegal practices, beyond direct violence in Gaza. Even within the government's narrow position, there is a massive loophole. The suspension does not cover components that go to the USA to be put into F35s to be sent to Israel. UK companies provide 15 percent of every new F-35 fighter jet made. Neither does the suspension cover components that reach Israel via a global spare parts pool. The pool is coordinated by the US Department of Defense and arms companies Lockheed Martin and Pratt & Whitney. Yet apparently there is no system in place to track the movement of parts into and out of the pool - which the British government says makes it impossible for it to prevent UK-made parts from reaching Israel. Lack of political will This is hard to believe, to the point of absurdity. The world's largest military producer and massive arms companies, unable to track their supply chain? If faulty parts were found, you can bet they'd want to pinpoint where they came from. Instead, this appears to be a question of political will: tracking parts to avoid them being used in a genocide simply isn't on the agenda. We know that Israel is using F-35s to bomb Gaza, assist ground troops and implement the blockade. The Israeli army has reportedly conducted more than 15,000 flight hours and 8,000 missions over Gaza since 7 October 2023. This past March, Israel used F-35s to break the ceasefire, killing more than 400 Palestinians in a single day. Follow Middle East Eye's live coverage of the Israel-Palestine war UK parts have been central to this killing spree. The UK government licence for the F-35 was used 14 times more in 2023 than in any previous year. The UK government accepts that there is a clear risk that F-35 components might be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of international humanitarian law. Nonetheless, the government asserts in court documents that this is outweighed by the 'immensely serious and imminent risks to international peace and security' posed by a suspension of F-35 parts. What are these immensely serious and imminent risks? The UK government's position is growing increasingly untenable, and seems more brittle by the day Apparently, they are too sensitive for the public to know. Court documents are heavily redacted, leaving only vague claims about damage to the credibility of Nato war plans and a potential reduction of Nato air control in the event of prolonged disruption or conflict in other parts of the world. These ambiguous risks are apparently deemed to be more serious than genocide or other war crimes against Palestinians, and more imminent than the actually occurring, live-streamed devastation of Gaza. Cloaked in the language of national security, and hidden behind the black pen of redactions, we are asked to take these claims at face value, despite what we know is happening in Gaza. In addition to the F-35 loophole, a new report by the Palestinian Youth Movement, Workers for a Free Palestine and Progressive International - relying on data from the Israel Tax Authority - suggests that the UK might have continued directly shipping F-35 parts to Israel even after the suspension. MP Zarah Sultana and 41 of her colleagues, along with a number of other groups, have demanded that Lammy respond to questions raised by the report. The government did not respond to the letter, and was challenged in Parliament about this failure. Contorted justifications Furthermore, the latest UK government licensing data shows that licences worth £127.6 million ($172m) were granted to Israel between October and December 2024, the months following the suspension. That's more licences than in 2020-23 combined. The equipment licensed is mostly military radars, components, software and targeting equipment, prompting the parliamentary business and trade committee to ask government ministers for oral evidence in an effort to understand how they can be certain this equipment isn't being used in Gaza. Ignore Starmer's theatrics. Gaza's trail of blood leads straight to his door Read More » As all of this has been going on, the UK government has been in court on a case brought by the Palestinian human rights organisation Al-Haq and the Global Legal Action Network. They have spent the past year and a half fighting the government over its arms export policy, and more recently over its decision to exempt F-35 parts from the licensing suspension. The government's main strategy has been to claim the court. If the judges accept this, it will be a death knell for arms export control policy. If the courts cannot assess whether the government implemented its own legally binding policy properly, what is the point of having controls? The UK government's position is growing increasingly untenable, and seems more brittle by the day. Its suspension of trade talks with Israel is a paltry response to what it calls an intolerable situation. Just hours after Lammy's statement, another RAF surveillance plane took off towards Gaza to provide intelligence to Israel; and days later, UK trade envoy Lord Austin visited Israel to, in his words, 'drum up business for Britain'. The mismatch between government practice and Lammy's confected outrage speaks volumes. Meanwhile, the government is using counter-terrorism legislation to punish Palestine activists, prompting UN experts to criticise its heavy-handedness. Ongoing public and parliamentary opposition to Israel's actions in Gaza is forcing the government into ever-more contorted justifications to avoid the one thing that would materially force Israel to reconsider its practices: suspending all arms transfers to and from Israel, and halting all military cooperation. This would have a swift and concrete effect on Israel's ability to carry out its assault on Palestinians and its occupation of Palestinian land. The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Eye.

How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly
How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly

Asia Times

time3 days ago

  • Business
  • Asia Times

How SE Asia can break China's rare earth monopoly

Last week, Australia's Lynas Rare Earths produced heavy rare earth elements (HREEs) at a commercial scale in Malaysia, marking the first time this has ever happened outside of China. This breakthrough, which includes elements like dysprosium and terbium, is no small feat in a market dominated by China, which is responsible for around 60% of global rare earth production and virtually 100% of the world's HREE supply. Rare earth elements (REEs) are critical for the US and other advanced economies: they power technologies from electric vehicles to defense systems. The US Department of Defense, for instance, has identified HREEs as vital for missile systems, radar and advanced communications. Yet, the US itself produces only about 12% of global REEs—and almost none of the heavy types. Without secure access to these materials, Western industries risk supply chain disruptions that could slow the clean energy transition and compromise national security. It is for these reasons that the US recently signed an agreement with Ukraine to secure preferential access to its mineral resources—including, notably, REEs—in exchange for establishing a Ukraine reconstruction fund, as well as certain payback for the estimated US$150 billion the US has provided Ukraine since the war started. However, a significant portion of Ukraine's known REE reserves lies in the Donetsk region, which remains under Russian control, highlighting the fragility of relying on politically contested sources. In this context, Lynas' progress is not just a technical achievement but a geopolitical shift. It positions not only Malaysia, but also Southeast Asia, as a key hotspot for the future of sourcing REEs. Until recently, there were few incentives to produce REEs in the region. But market shifts, the strategic push for supply chain diversification and the growing capacity of Southeast Asian countries to process REEs domestically promise to unlock vast potential. Vietnam, in particular, holds some of the world's largest REE reserves—estimated at around 3.5 million tonnes (with some sources suggesting as much as 20 million tonnes), nearly twice the size of US reserves. Yet its production today is negligible, representing less than 1% of global output. Major deposits in the country's northwest, such as Dong Pao and Nam Xe, remain largely untapped, while significant areas across the country are still unexplored. Still, Southeast Asia's potential REE suppliers face substantial challenges: (1) environmental concerns, notably the management of radioactive byproducts like thorium; (2) a lack of technical expertise and processing infrastructure, with China still controlling key separation technologies; and (3) market and geopolitical pressures, as these countries navigate a landscape dominated by Chinese pricing power, potential retaliation and complex export dynamics. If Southeast Asia—especially Vietnam and Malaysia—can overcome these challenges, the region could emerge as a critical node in global REE supply chains, offering the US, Europe, Japan and others an alternative to China's near-monopoly. However, this will require more than favorable geology; it demands investment in refining capacity, strict environmental standards, and strategic partnerships that ensure technology transfer and long-term market access. For the West, the stakes are clear: support Southeast Asia's rare earth ambitions—or remain perilously dependent on a single Chinese supplier. Patricio Faúndez is country manager at GEM Mining Consulting

The West is recycling rare earths to escape China's grip — but it's not enough
The West is recycling rare earths to escape China's grip — but it's not enough

West Australian

time3 days ago

  • Automotive
  • West Australian

The West is recycling rare earths to escape China's grip — but it's not enough

As China tightens its grip on the global supply of key minerals, the West is working to reduce its dependence on Chinese rare earths. This includes finding alternative sources of rare earth minerals, developing technologies to reduce reliance, and recovering existing stockpiles through recycling products that are reaching the end of their shelf life. 'You cannot build a modern car without rare earths,' said consulting firm AlixPartners, noting how Chinese companies have come to dominate the supply chain for the minerals. In September 2024, the US Department of Defense invested $US4.2 million ($6.5m) in Rare Earth Salts, a startup that aims to extract the oxides from domestic recycled products such as fluorescent light bulbs. Japan's Toyota has also been investing in technologies to reduce the use of rare earth elements. According to the US Geological Survey, China controlled 69 per cent of rare earth mine production in 2024, and nearly half of the world's reserves. Analysts from AlixPartners estimate that a typical single-motor battery electric vehicle includes around 550 grams (1.21 pounds) of components containing rare earths, unlike gasoline-powered cars, which only use 140 grams of rare earths, or about 5 ounces. More than half of the new passenger cars sold in China are battery-only and hybrid-powered cars, unlike the U.S., where they are still mostly gasoline-powered. 'With slowing EV uptake (in the U.S.) and mandates to convert from ICE to EV formats receding into the future, the imperative for replacing Chinese-sourced materials in EVs is declining,' said Christopher Ecclestone, principal and mining strategist at Hallgarten & Company. 'Pretty soon, the first generation of EVs will be up for recycling themselves, creating a pool of ex-China material that will be under the control of the West,' he said. Only 7.5 per cent of new US vehicle sales in the first quarter were electric, a modest increase from a year ago, according to Cox Automotive. It pointed out that around two-thirds of EVs sold in the U.S. last year were assembled locally, but manufacturers still rely on imports for the parts. 'The current, full-blown trade war with China, the world's leading supplier of EV battery materials, will distort the market even more.' Of the 1.7 kilograms (3.74 pounds) of components containing rare earths found in a typical single-motor battery electric car, 550 grams (1.2 pounds) are rare earths. About the same amount, 510 grams, is used in hybrid-powered vehicles using lithium-ion batteries. In early April, China announced export controls on seven rare earths. Those restrictions included terbium, 9 grams of which is typically used in a single-motor EV, AlixPartners data showed. None of the six other targeted rare earths are significantly used in cars, according to the data. But April's list is not the only one. A separate Chinese list of metal controls that took effect in December restricts exports of cerium, 50 grams of which AlixPartners said is used on average in a single-motor EV. The controls mean that Chinese companies handling the minerals must get government approval to sell them overseas. Caixin, a Chinese business news outlet, reported on May 15, just days after a US-China trade truce, that three leading Chinese rare earth magnet companies have received export licenses from the commerce ministry to ship to North America and Europe. What's concerning for international business is that there are barely any alternatives to China for obtaining the rare earths. Mines can take years to get operating approval, while processing plants also take time and expertise to establish. 'Today, China controls over 90 per cent of the global refined supply for the four magnet rare earth elements (Nd, Pr, Dy, Tb), which are used to make permanent magnets for EV motors,' the International Energy Agency said in a statement. That refers to neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium and terbium. For the less commonly used nickel metal hydride batteries in hybrid cars, the amount of rare earths goes up to 4.45 kilograms, or nearly 10 pounds, according to AlixPartners. That's largely because that kind of battery uses 3.5 kilograms of lanthanum. 'I estimate that around 70 per cent of the over 200 kilograms of minerals in an EV goes through China, but it varies by vehicle and manufacturer. It's hard to put a definitive figure on it,' said Henry Sanderson, associate fellow at The Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security. However, there are limits to recycling, which remains challenging, energy-intensive and time-consuming. And even if adoption of EVs in the U.S. slows, the minerals are used in far larger quantities in defence. For example, the F-35 fighter jet contains over 900 pounds of rare earths, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, based in Washington, DC. China's rare earths restrictions also go beyond the closely watched list released on April 4. In the last two years, China has increased its control over a broader category of metals known as critical minerals. In the summer of 2023, China said it would restrict exports of gallium and germanium, both used in chipmaking. About a year later, it announced restrictions on antimony, used to strengthen other metals and a significant component in bullets, nuclear weapons production and lead-acid batteries. The State Council, the country's top executive body, in October released an entire policy for strengthening controls of exports, including minerals, that might have dual-use properties, or be used for military and civilian purposes. One restriction that caught many in the industry by surprise was on tungsten, a US-designated critical mineral but not a rare earth. The extremely hard metal is used in weapons, cutting tools, semiconductors and car batteries. China produced about 80 per cent of the global tungsten supply in 2024, and the U.S. imports 27% of tungsten from China, data from the U.S. Geological Survey showed. About 2 kilograms of tungsten is typically used in each electric car battery, said Michael Dornhofer, founder of metals consulting firm Independent Supply Business Partner. He pointed out that this tungsten is not able to return to the recycling chain for at least seven years, and its low levels of use might not even make it reusable. '50 per cent of the world's tungsten is consumed by China, so they have business as usual,' Lewis Black, CEO of tungsten mining company Almonty, said in an interview last month. 'It's the other 40 per cent that's produced (in China) that comes into the West that doesn't exist.' He said when the company's forthcoming tungsten mine in South Korea reopens this year, it would mean there would be enough non-China supply of the metal to satisfy US, Europe and South Korean needs for defence. But for autos, medical and aerospace, 'we just don't have enough.'

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