Latest news with #Umayyad
Hindustan Times
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Forgotten water war that led to the Indus Waters Treaty
Through the annals of history, we find the weaponisation of water as a crucial strategy among belligerent nations. In 680 CE, the Umayyad forces led by Yazid I effectively blocked the enemy's access to the Euphrates River, defeating the Prophet's grandson Husayn ibn Ali and his followers. While Yazid blocked the water, there were many examples of flooding as a war strategy in history. A study on the southwestern Netherlands by Adriaan de Kraker points to the cause of one-third of all floods between 1500 and 2000 to the deliberate human interventions during warfare. Thus, water as a weapon is a time-tested defence strategy that often forgets humanitarian or environmental concerns. Nearly 40% of the world population is sustained by 276 transboundary river basins, which produce 60% of global fresh water, resulting in acrimonious disputes across boundaries. And the recent decision of the Government of India to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty yet again aroused multifarious debates on the use of water as a weapon. To get a holistic and deeper understanding of the issue, one must look back into the history of the Indus Basin Irrigation System, the world's largest contiguous irrigation system. The transboundary Indus basin, with a total area of 1.12 million square kilometres, is shared between India, Pakistan, Tibet (China), and Afghanistan. The Indus system comprises the main river Indus and major tributaries: the Kabul, the Swat and the Kurram from the west and the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej in the east. Since the start of civilisation, the basin's waters have been used to irrigate agricultural land. But the British colonial project of bringing more land under the command of centralised irrigation metamorphosed the region like never before. The colonisers saw the technocratic taming of one of the world's largest river systems as a legitimising tool to portray the colonial regime as a benevolent one. The massive transformation of the region began in 1859 with the completion of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, intended to irrigate one million acres of land between the Ravi and the Beas. The disputes over water resources were not uncommon and were resolved by local authorities in pre-colonial times. But with the massive colonial infrastructure, disputes were between provinces, viz. Punjab, Sind, Bahawalpur and Bikaner. The interstate disputes over the water of the Indus system were neutrally mediated by the central government, and it appointed commissions to arbitrate them. Colonial records show various instances of appointment of such commissions, viz., Anderson Commission (1935) and Rau Commission (1942). To get an understanding of a colonial dispute, one must look into the circumstances behind the appointment of the Rau Commission. There was a tripartite agreement between Punjab, Bikaner and Bahawalpur in 1919 that led to the Sutlej Valley Project, and it was silent on the rights of lower riparian states such as Khairpur and Sind. The feeling of insecurity among Sind also arose after the sanctioning of the Triple Canal project of Punjab, and the Sind administration pushed with a proposal for the Sukkur Barrage Scheme (and a perennial canal system taking off from it). A formal complaint was filed with the Governor-General of India by the Sind administration about the Bhakra project being initiated by Punjab in October 1939. As irrigation was a provincial subject, the Indus Commission was appointed under Justice BN Rau with quasi-judicial powers in 1941. The arguments put forward by Sind were interesting, as they not only complained about Punjab-side encroachment upon their rights, but also forecasted future actions from Punjab. The Rau Commission, however, acknowledged the possible damages to the inundation canals of Sind by the Bhakra project and directed Punjab to contribute to the construction of two barrages--in Gudu and Kotri-Hyderabad--across the Indus River. The Rau Commission reiterated that the solution to water disputes must come from technical solutions aimed at the community's good rather than focusing on parochial political boundaries. Neither party accepted the decision of the commission and went ahead with an appeal to the central government. Having failed to come to a final accord after multiple meetings with the officials in 1947, the case was transferred to the office of the secretary of state for India. But the brewing political storms soon transformed this interstate dispute into an international conflict. The partition of British India (1947) into two independent nations – India and Pakistan – was a watershed moment in the history of the modern world. The event was preceded and followed by massive migrations and horrific violence, which displaced 15 million people and killed between one and two million people. This political process divided the Indus basin into two: 47% of the total land area went to Pakistan, and 39% to India. While India had a larger population dependent on the Indus water system – 31 million people, compared to 25 million in Pakistan (based on the 1941 census). Technically, the British kept their hands off from partitioning the Indus water system among the two newly independent nations. British technocrats found it difficult to digest the partitioning of a system they integrated as an engineering marvel. The chief engineer of Punjab, AMR Montagu, found that any attempt to allocate the partition boundary in the Indus system was a profitless exercise. As a technician, he preferred water that 'follows immutable laws of nature' over man who makes and breaks the law as he moves along. The man who drew the partition line, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, found it impossible to divide the system into separate and rationalised segments between the two countries. He reportedly suggested to Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah that they should agree in advance on a joint management of the irrigation system post-partition. A member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Justice Muhammad Munir later remembered Sir Radcliffe was 'obsessed' with the effects of partition on the canal system – a monument to the benevolence of British colonial rule! Viewing it the other way, Historian Lucy P Chester argued that the British wanted to put the responsibility on Indians for the decisions, even when the former controlled the boundary demarcation process. The technocrats who managed the Indus irrigation system were status-quoists when it came to the allocation of authorised shares to both nation-States. It was evident by the arrangement made by the chief engineers of East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) in signing a Standstill Agreement on December 20, 1947, which maintained the existing water allocation till the end of the ongoing rabi crop, marked on March 31, 1948. The nature of the partition was that the diversion structures of some of the systems and the existing headwork of Upper Bari Doab Canal and the Sutlej Valley Project remained in India, while the lands irrigated by those waters were in Pakistan. This disputed position ensured that the larger storm was in the making, and it happened on April 1, 1948, when the authorities in East Punjab halted the supply of water from Ferozepur headworks to Dipalpur canal and the main branches of Upper Bari Doab Canal that flow into West Pakistan territory upon the expiration of the Standstill Agreement. The real reason behind such a move is still not known, but is often attributed to the inaction or indifference of the West Punjab side to negotiate for any further arrangement till the expiration. The assessment of South Asian commentators, like former civil servant Rushbrook Williams, was blunter as he found serious fault in the Pakistani side in not paying water dues, and justified that the East Punjab side applied the pre-partition rule of not allocating water. The April 1948 water stoppage affected the Pakistani morale in multifarious ways. Historian David Gilmartin opined that the stopping of the canal water as a singular event in the first year of Pakistan's existence brought 'natural' and 'national' meaning to the artificial boundary made by Radcliffe. The provincial capital of West Pakistan, Lahore, experienced the wrath of the water blockade as the Lahore branch of the Upper Bari Doab Canal bifurcated the city into civil lines and cantonment. The urban area's identity as a garden city soon gave way to narratives of green fields turning barren under 'the merciless sun' in national newspapers. The creation of 'apprehension and anxiety' in the Pakistani psyche was the major result of the blockade. A general sentiment of a 'national ordeal' was attributed to Pakistan's disadvantageous position as a lower riparian state. Pakistani author Saadat Hasan Manto's Yazid, aptly named after the Umayyad Caliph mentioned in the beginning of this essay, outlines the general feeling in West Pakistan about the decision, where a character, Jeena, on hearing about the Indian decision to 'close' the river, laughed in disbelief and responded that they are not speaking of a drain and closing the river is impossible. Apart from denying water to the 5.5 per cent of the sown area in the crucial kharif sowing phase and the municipal areas of Lahore, the power from the Mandi Hydroelectric Scheme was also cut off. Some of India's arguments were to assert its proprietary right over the Indus waters. At the same time, some scholars pointed to socio-political factors as the reason for the Indian blockade. That includes: Pressuring Pakistan to remove their 'volunteers' from Kashmir; to wreck the Pakistani economy and to demonstrate the inability and impracticality of Pakistan as a nation; and retaliation for the imposition of export duty on raw jute. Though the 1948 water blockade came as an East Punjab action, possibly to retaliate against the wounds of partition and to assert their authority over natural resources, the defence of that action by the central government before the international community points to the possibility of socio-political factors. Ruling out war as an option to reclaim their lost water, Pakistan chose the path of negotiation for restoring canal waters and sent a delegation to New Delhi. The Inter-Dominion conference was held in Delhi from 3-4 May 1948, and the Delhi Agreement was signed. The Indian side remained firm about its proprietary rights over the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), and insisted Pakistan pay for the water till they find a replacement. The Indian side claimed that the Pakistani agreement to pay acknowledged India's proprietary rights, while Pakistan maintained that it was the cost of operating and maintaining irrigation works. Pakistan got some breathing space, as in the spirit of goodwill and friendship, India assured that it would not suddenly withhold water and provided the former to develop alternative sources. Due to differences in interpreting provisions and a series of decisions and actions from both sides, Pakistan denounced the Delhi Agreement in 1950. Pakistan wanted to take this to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to the UN Security Council, while India denied any third-party involvement and sought to make the Delhi Agreement permanent. Despite being a short-lived agreement contrary to expectations, the Delhi Agreement provided a modus vivendi until a formal treaty came into being after international mediation in 1960. An exit from the ongoing stalemate occurred with the visit of David Lilienthal, former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the US Atomic Energy Commission, to India and Pakistan in February 1951. He did not view the Indus problem as a political or religious one, but rather found the feasibility of engineering solutions to deal with it. While commenting on Pakistan's proposal to bring the case to the ICJ, even though Pakistan may turn victorious, he cautioned not to antagonise India, which could derail active partnership in future between the two nations. Lilienthal, in his famed article after his visit, pressed for treating and developing the Indus system as a single unit with the financial backup of India, Pakistan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereafter mentioned, World Bank). He asked for the management of the basin by an Indo-Pakistan joint body or a multinational body. Soon after the recommendations from Lilienthal, a quick positive response came from Eugene Black, the then President of the World Bank, to use his good office to negotiate for a settlement purely based on technical and engineering grounds. In this context, it is necessary to note that India had approached the World Bank for loans for the construction of the Bhakra-Nangal Project, which was objected to by Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan's financial requests for constructing the Kotri Barrage were objected to by India. Thus, the World Bank was the most suited international body to help negotiate an agreement on the Indus basin. Both parties agreed to the World Bank intervention on March 10 1952, and also agreed not to reduce the share of water for actual use till the mediations are over. The comprehensive plan of the World Bank, without accounting for sensitive issues, was rejected by both parties, ending the Bank's hopes for a quick resolution. While Pakistan pressed for their historical rights over the Indus waters, India argued that any future allocation shall not be based on the previous distribution. The most accepted solution was the allocation of the waters of western tributaries (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan and eastern tributaries (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India. Even then, there was a plethora of debates on this quantitative allocation of water. But this remained the best possible solution regarding the basin, which allowed the two nations to carry out development activities independently of one another, which was a clear departure from the single-unit management proposed by Lilienthal. The Indus Waters Treaty was hailed as a very successful international water arrangement globally. Despite multiple interventions by India to review the treaty in the past few years, after the barbaric terrorist attack on the tourists in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India suspended the Indus Waters Treaty. As expected, Pakistan threatened the decision with war cries as in 1947, and both countries had military skirmishes across the border. While Pakistan supports terror camps from their soil, it has been negligent in building its capacity. With the World Bank refusing to intervene, a crisis-stricken Pakistan had lost an important national resource. The suspension of a long-lived international treaty by the Indian government has become a diplomatic tool to isolate Pakistan and its State policy of supporting terrorism. This article is authored by Mahendranath Sudhindranath, senior research fellow, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Madras. Get 360° coverage—from daily headlines to 100 year archives.
Hindustan Times
22-05-2025
- Politics
- Hindustan Times
Forgotten water war that led to the Indus Water Treaty
Through the annals of history, we find the weaponisation of water as a crucial strategy among belligerent nations. In 680 CE, the Umayyad forces led by Yazid I effectively blocked the enemy's access to the Euphrates River, defeating the Prophet's grandson Husayn ibn Ali and his followers. While Yazid blocked the water, there were many examples of flooding as a war strategy in history. A study on the southwestern Netherlands by Adriaan de Kraker points to the cause of one-third of all floods between 1500 and 2000 to the deliberate human interventions during warfare. Thus, water as a weapon is a time-tested defence strategy that often forgets humanitarian or environmental concerns. Nearly 40% of the world population is sustained by 276 transboundary river basins, which produce 60% of global fresh water, resulting in acrimonious disputes across boundaries. And the recent decision of the Government of India to suspend the Indus Water Treaty yet again aroused multifarious debates on the use of water as a weapon. To get a holistic and deeper understanding of the issue, one must look back into the history of the Indus Basin Irrigation System, the world's largest contiguous irrigation system. The transboundary Indus basin, with a total area of 1.12 million square kilometres, is shared between India, Pakistan, Tibet (China), and Afghanistan. The Indus system comprises the main river Indus and major tributaries: the Kabul, the Swat and the Kurram from the west and the Jhelum, the Chenab, the Ravi, the Beas and the Sutlej in the east. Since the start of civilisation, the basin's waters have been used to irrigate agricultural land. But the British colonial project of bringing more land under the command of centralised irrigation metamorphosed the region like never before. The colonisers saw the technocratic taming of one of the world's largest river systems as a legitimising tool to portray the colonial regime as a benevolent one. The massive transformation of the region began in 1859 with the completion of the Upper Bari Doab Canal, intended to irrigate one million acres of land between the Ravi and the Beas. The disputes over water resources were not uncommon and were resolved by local authorities in pre-colonial times. But with the massive colonial infrastructure, disputes were between provinces, viz. Punjab, Sind, Bahawalpur and Bikaner. The interstate disputes over the water of the Indus system were neutrally mediated by the central government, and it appointed commissions to arbitrate them. Colonial records show various instances of appointment of such commissions, viz., Anderson Commission (1935) and Rau Commission (1942). To get an understanding of a colonial dispute, one must look into the circumstances behind the appointment of the Rau Commission. There was a tripartite agreement between Punjab, Bikaner and Bahawalpur in 1919 that led to the Sutlej Valley Project, and it was silent on the rights of lower riparian states such as Khairpur and Sind. The feeling of insecurity among Sind also arose after the sanctioning of the Triple Canal project of Punjab, and the Sind administration pushed with a proposal for the Sukkur Barrage Scheme (and a perennial canal system taking off from it). A formal complaint was filed with the Governor-General of India by the Sind administration about the Bhakra project being initiated by Punjab in October 1939. As irrigation was a provincial subject, the Indus Commission was appointed under Justice BN Rau with quasi-judicial powers in 1941. The arguments put forward by Sind were interesting, as they not only complained about Punjab-side encroachment upon their rights, but also forecasted future actions from Punjab. The Rau Commission, however, acknowledged the possible damages to the inundation canals of Sind by the Bhakra project and directed Punjab to contribute to the construction of two barrages--in Gudu and Kotri-Hyderabad--across the Indus River. The Rau Commission reiterated that the solution to water disputes must come from technical solutions aimed at the community's good rather than focusing on parochial political boundaries. Neither party accepted the decision of the commission and went ahead with an appeal to the central government. Having failed to come to a final accord after multiple meetings with the officials in 1947, the case was transferred to the office of the secretary of state for India. But the brewing political storms soon transformed this interstate dispute into an international conflict. The partition of British India (1947) into two independent nations – India and Pakistan – was a watershed moment in the history of the modern world. The event was preceded and followed by massive migrations and horrific violence, which displaced 15 million people and killed between one and two million people. This political process divided the Indus basin into two: 47% of the total land area went to Pakistan, and 39% to India. While India had a larger population dependent on the Indus water system – 31 million people, compared to 25 million in Pakistan (based on the 1941 census). Technically, the British kept their hands off from partitioning the Indus water system among the two newly independent nations. British technocrats found it difficult to digest the partitioning of a system they integrated as an engineering marvel. The chief engineer of Punjab, AMR Montagu, found that any attempt to allocate the partition boundary in the Indus system was a profitless exercise. As a technician, he preferred water that 'follows immutable laws of nature' over man who makes and breaks the law as he moves along. The man who drew the partition line, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, found it impossible to divide the system into separate and rationalised segments between the two countries. He reportedly suggested to Jawaharlal Nehru and Muhammad Ali Jinnah that they should agree in advance on a joint management of the irrigation system post-partition. A member of the Punjab Boundary Commission, Justice Muhammad Munir later remembered Sir Radcliffe was 'obsessed' with the effects of partition on the canal system – a monument to the benevolence of British colonial rule! Viewing it the other way, Historian Lucy P Chester argued that the British wanted to put the responsibility on Indians for the decisions, even when the former controlled the boundary demarcation process. The technocrats who managed the Indus irrigation system were status-quoists when it came to the allocation of authorised shares to both nation-States. It was evident by the arrangement made by the chief engineers of East Punjab (India) and West Punjab (Pakistan) in signing a Standstill Agreement on December 20, 1947, which maintained the existing water allocation till the end of the ongoing rabi crop, marked on March 31, 1948. The nature of the partition was that the diversion structures of some of the systems and the existing headwork of Upper Bari Doab Canal and the Sutlej Valley Project remained in India, while the lands irrigated by those waters were in Pakistan. This disputed position ensured that the larger storm was in the making, and it happened on April 1, 1948, when the authorities in East Punjab halted the supply of water from Ferozepur headworks to Dipalpur canal and the main branches of Upper Bari Doab Canal that flow into West Pakistan territory upon the expiration of the Standstill Agreement. The real reason behind such a move is still not known, but is often attributed to the inaction or indifference of the West Punjab side to negotiate for any further arrangement till the expiration. The assessment of South Asian commentators, like former civil servant Rushbrook Williams, was blunter as he found serious fault in the Pakistani side in not paying water dues, and justified that the East Punjab side applied the pre-partition rule of not allocating water. The April 1948 water stoppage affected the Pakistani morale in multifarious ways. Historian David Gilmartin opined that the stopping of the canal water as a singular event in the first year of Pakistan's existence brought 'natural' and 'national' meaning to the artificial boundary made by Radcliffe. The provincial capital of West Pakistan, Lahore, experienced the wrath of the water blockade as the Lahore branch of the Upper Bari Doab Canal bifurcated the city into civil lines and cantonment. The urban area's identity as a garden city soon gave way to narratives of green fields turning barren under 'the merciless sun' in national newspapers. The creation of 'apprehension and anxiety' in the Pakistani psyche was the major result of the blockade. A general sentiment of a 'national ordeal' was attributed to Pakistan's disadvantageous position as a lower riparian state. Pakistani author Saadat Hasan Manto's Yazid, aptly named after the Umayyad Caliph mentioned in the beginning of this essay, outlines the general feeling in West Pakistan about the decision, where a character, Jeena, on hearing about the Indian decision to 'close' the river, laughed in disbelief and responded that they are not speaking of a drain and closing the river is impossible. Apart from denying water to the 5.5 per cent of the sown area in the crucial kharif sowing phase and the municipal areas of Lahore, the power from the Mandi Hydroelectric Scheme was also cut off. Some of India's arguments were to assert its proprietary right over the Indus waters. At the same time, some scholars pointed to socio-political factors as the reason for the Indian blockade. That includes: Pressuring Pakistan to remove their 'volunteers' from Kashmir; to wreck the Pakistani economy and to demonstrate the inability and impracticality of Pakistan as a nation; and retaliation for the imposition of export duty on raw jute. Though the 1948 water blockade came as an East Punjab action, possibly to retaliate against the wounds of partition and to assert their authority over natural resources, the defence of that action by the central government before the international community points to the possibility of socio-political factors. Ruling out war as an option to reclaim their lost water, Pakistan chose the path of negotiation for restoring canal waters and sent a delegation to New Delhi. The Inter-Dominion conference was held in Delhi from 3-4 May 1948, and the Delhi Agreement was signed. The Indian side remained firm about its proprietary rights over the eastern rivers (Sutlej, Beas and Ravi), and insisted Pakistan pay for the water till they find a replacement. The Indian side claimed that the Pakistani agreement to pay acknowledged India's proprietary rights, while Pakistan maintained that it was the cost of operating and maintaining irrigation works. Pakistan got some breathing space, as in the spirit of goodwill and friendship, India assured that it would not suddenly withhold water and provided the former to develop alternative sources. Due to differences in interpreting provisions and a series of decisions and actions from both sides, Pakistan denounced the Delhi Agreement in 1950. Pakistan wanted to take this to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or to the UN Security Council, while India denied any third-party involvement and sought to make the Delhi Agreement permanent. Despite being a short-lived agreement contrary to expectations, the Delhi Agreement provided a modus vivendi until a formal treaty came into being after international mediation in 1960. An exit from the ongoing stalemate occurred with the visit of David Lilienthal, former Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority and the US Atomic Energy Commission, to India and Pakistan in February 1951. He did not view the Indus problem as a political or religious one, but rather found the feasibility of engineering solutions to deal with it. While commenting on Pakistan's proposal to bring the case to the ICJ, even though Pakistan may turn victorious, he cautioned not to antagonise India, which could derail active partnership in future between the two nations. Lilienthal, in his famed article after his visit, pressed for treating and developing the Indus system as a single unit with the financial backup of India, Pakistan and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (hereafter mentioned, World Bank). He asked for the management of the basin by an Indo-Pakistan joint body or a multinational body. Soon after the recommendations from Lilienthal, a quick positive response came from Eugene Black, the then President of the World Bank, to use his good office to negotiate for a settlement purely based on technical and engineering grounds. In this context, it is necessary to note that India had approached the World Bank for loans for the construction of the Bhakra-Nangal Project, which was objected to by Pakistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan's financial requests for constructing the Kotri Barrage were objected to by India. Thus, the World Bank was the most suited international body to help negotiate an agreement on the Indus basin. Both parties agreed to the World Bank intervention on March 10 1952, and also agreed not to reduce the share of water for actual use till the mediations are over. The comprehensive plan of the World Bank, without accounting for sensitive issues, was rejected by both parties, ending the Bank's hopes for a quick resolution. While Pakistan pressed for their historical rights over the Indus waters, India argued that any future allocation shall not be based on the previous distribution. The most accepted solution was the allocation of the waters of western tributaries (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan and eastern tributaries (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India. Even then, there was a plethora of debates on this quantitative allocation of water. But this remained the best possible solution regarding the basin, which allowed the two nations to carry out development activities independently of one another, which was a clear departure from the single-unit management proposed by Lilienthal. The Indus Water Treaty was hailed as a very successful international water arrangement globally. Despite multiple interventions by India to review the treaty in the past few years, after the barbaric terrorist attack on the tourists in Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India suspended the Indus Water Treaty. As expected, Pakistan threatened the decision with war cries as in 1947, and both countries had military skirmishes across the border. While Pakistan supports terror camps from their soil, it has been negligent in building its capacity. With the World Bank refusing to intervene, a crisis-stricken Pakistan had lost an important national resource. The suspension of a long-lived international treaty by the Indian government has become a diplomatic tool to isolate Pakistan and its State policy of supporting terrorism. This article is authored by Mahendranath Sudhindranath, senior research fellow, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Madras.
India Today
10-05-2025
- Politics
- India Today
Pak's jihadist delusions and its own past
Those who do not learn from recent history are condemned to repeat their mistakes. And what happens to those who do not learn from mediaeval history? They turn into a jihadist Pakistan, a delusional nation that dreams of dividing the Subcontinent yet again on religious Saturday, the world witnessed the launch of a fresh season of Pakistan's perennial chimera of a fragmented India when it announced 'Bunyan-un-Marsoos', a military strike on India. The symbolism of the operation and the surrounding propaganda underlines a larger insidious plan to use Islam as a ruse to support terror, rally support and destabilise the Subcontinent. It had deja vu, or more like delusional vu, written all over INSIDIOUS PLAN'Bunyan Ul Marsoos' is an Arabic word derived from the Quran. It implies a solid structure-symbolising strength and unity. According to the Pakistani media, the operation was launched soon after the morning prayers. The launch was accompanied by visuals of ecstatic soldiers chanting the slogan of god's greatness - "Naara-e- takbeer, Allahu Akbar". Many armies use religious cries and symbolism to fire up their soldiers. So, the Pakistanis have every right to resort to religious fervour in their fight against India. But, according to CNN, this religio-military zeal was accompanied by a wider call for jihad, even to Muslims in the conflict, CNN's international diplomatic editor, Nic Roberstson, reported the Pakistani state media was calling for "Muslims in India, Bangladesh and east of India to rise up and join them in this fight."advertisementThe media was taking its cue from the government's poisonous agenda. Just a few hours before its announcement of 'Bunyun Ul Marsoos', Pakistan's military spokesperson claimed India had fired on its own territories in Punjab, and on targets in Afghanistan-a canard aimed to divide and MEDIAEVAL OBSESSIONThis is not Pakistan's first experiment with Islamic imagery. In 1947, Pakistan launched 'Operation Gulmarg', led by 'General Tariq' - a pseudonym for Brigadier Akbar Khan. It was inspired by the Umayyad General Tariq ibn Ziyad, conqueror of Spain in 711 1965, Pakistan trained razakars and army regulars as guerrillas and sent them into Kashmir in 9–10 groups, each named after a mediaeval unit of fighters. Its name, 'Operation Gibraltar', was drawn from the 8th-century Umayyad assault on these adventures had a common theme. They were based on the hope that the people of Kashmir would rise against India and help Pakistan annexe the Valley. What actually transpired shocked Pakistan: the people of Kashmir reported the intruders to the administration, and helped the Indian Army drive them back to their camps in LIONS OF INDIA What does Pakistan know about India's Muslims and Sikhs? On current evidence, nothing. Reams can be written about the valour of India's Sikh and Muslim patriots. But a few examples would refresh Pakistan's jihad-addled the Pakistani invaders entered Kashmir in 1947, the commander of the Indian Army in Jammu and Kashmir was Major General Kulwant Singh. The 1, Sikh Regiment that threw out the first wave of intruders was led by Colonel Harbaksh Singh. And who can forget Brigadier Mohammad Usman, the Lion of Naushera?In December 1947, when the Pakistanis captured Jhangar, the base of the Indian Army on the Mirpur-Rajouri axis, Brigadier Usman vowed to sleep on the floor in the cold of Kashmir until he had reclaimed Jhangar from the February 1948, Brigadier Usman repulsed a massive attack by the Pakistanis on Naushera, pushing them back even when his forces were outnumbered. A few days later, on the eve of the battle, Brigadier Usman wrote a letter to his soldiers that is etched in gold in Indian history:"The eyes of the world are on us. The hopes and aspirations of our countrymen are dependent on our must not falter-we must not fail every man upon this earth,Death cometh soon or late,advertisementAnd how can man die better,Than facing fearful the ashes of his fathers,And the temples of his forward friends, fearless we go to Jhangar. India expects everyone to do his duty."A few days later, when India had recaptured Jhangar, a cot was finally laid out for the brave Brigadier, and his name was forever etched in the annals of Indian history as the Lion of is living in a fool's paradise if, even after several attempts, it is expecting Indian patriots on religious lines. At the cost of repeating a cliche, Islamabad needs to be reminded that more Muslims decided to stay back in India after the Partition-and a large number of them taught unforgettable lessons to Pakistan in the subsequent wars. Remember, Param Vir Abdul Hameed, the hero who sank eight Patton tanks with a gun in the Battle of Asal Uttar?THE JOKE CALLED 'TWO-NATION THEORY'Vagaries of history had handed over two gifts on a platter to Pakistan-Eastern Pakistan because of the Partition, and Afghanistan because of the 'Cold War.'Because of its own follies, Pakistan lost its eastern wing, turning it into a graveyard of Bengalis because of ethnolinguistic differences. In 1971, it launched 'Operation Searchlight'- a murderous assault on Bengali politicians, intellectuals, artists, and even security genocide led to the largest humanitarian crisis in the Subcontinent after the 1947 Partition. Millions were displaced, thousands were killed because of Pakistan's policy of ethnic cleansing. Its butchers invited India's wrath, and the humiliating defeat, surrender and dismemberment in the 1971 is now inviting the same Bangladesh it was planning to decimate for a war against India. Does Pakistan even realise this isn't just ironic, it is clownery befitting a delusional country that suffers from incurable amnesia?The same can be said of its pathetic attempt to incite Afghanistan with fake narratives of an Indian assault. In the entire history of the world, there is no match for Pakistan's treachery in Afghanistan. It first helped the US fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Later, in the post-9/11 era, it became an international joke with its policy of hunting terrorists in Afghanistan with the US and hiding them in its own has been Pak's shameless double-speak on Afghanistan, that Kabul now sees it as an enemy, a resounding slap of reality to Islamabad's dream of an Islamic axis against in the world knows Pakistan is a failed state, driven to suicide by its own obsession with India, and its jihadist dreams. Every few months, it goes around the world begging for funds. But for China's support, Pakistan would have been a global pariah because of its flawed policy and finances. Two of its provinces are fighting to separate from Pakistan, incensed by the hegemony of its a nut case cut-off from reality would dream of enlisting the support of others in its war against India. But, those who don't learn from their own past, are destined to suffer Pakistan's InTrending Reel
Yemenat
08-05-2025
- General
- Yemenat
Castrating Mind
I still remember the scene of them castrating the Eid ram. I watched in horror as they descended upon it with all their strength and weight. They grabbed its four legs, head, and rear, laying it on the ground and spreading its legs apart while it kicked and struggled in vain. They placed a smooth, hard stone near its thighs, laid its testicles upon it, and began to strike them with a hammer. The ram suffered and resisted, but to no avail, under the relentless force descending upon it like fate. When they had completed their task, they released it after having destroyed its masculinity with the iron hammer. I was engulfed in shock, unable to comprehend what they were doing. They had not told me anything beforehand about their intentions or what they were about to do. I was bewildered as to why they were striking its testicles. What had those testicles done to deserve such treatment? I was the only one present who felt the pangs of the moment and shared in the pain of the victim. I was the only one lost in astonishment at what was happening. The only one grappling with questions while others paid me no mind, ignoring me completely. I had no power to prevent their brutal acts. My curiosity, which had long been confined within me, could not object but did manage to ask my mother after everything had ended: 'What did you do, and why?' Her answer was, 'So it can grow quickly, and its meat can be good for Eid.' However, her answer did not satisfy my yearning. What did its testicles have to do with what she claimed? When I grew older, I read about the castration of singers to enhance their voices. * * * As I grew up, I encountered even stranger and more astonishing stories. I came across a legal opinion stating that artists should be castrated to prevent them from tempting women. It was said that Caliph Abdulmalik ibn Marwan, due to his concubine pouring water away from his hands to listen to the voice of a distant singer, ordered his castration out of concern for Muslim women. Similarly, Caliph Suleiman ibn Abdulmalik, while on an outing, ordered the castration of a singer upon hearing his melodious voice, believing he posed a danger to the chastity of Muslim women. Even more remarkable was what the historian Al-Asfahani recounted: a fly led to the castration of singers in the city when one of the Umayyad caliphs ordered the governor of the city to 'castrate' the singers. The governor mistakenly saw a dot on the letter 'h' left by a fly, causing the word to transform from (castration) to (counting), prompting him to command that they all be castrated. Among those castrated was 'Al-Dalal,' one of the most famous and charming singers of the city.' Castration was also practiced on slaves working in the palaces of sultans and the homes of women to prevent sexual relations with them. They also castrated children and boys of enemies who were enslaved, aiming to cut off their lineage and curb any sexual urges. * * * During the era of the Imams in Yemen, particularly under Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din, I read in 'The Hostage' by Zaid Mutai Dhamaj that their method for subjugating tribes and ensuring loyalty involved a system of hostages. The Imam would take the sons of tribal leaders as hostages, and those who attempted to escape were captured and shackled in the Cairo fortress for life. Boys among the hostages, who had not yet reached puberty, were chosen to serve the Imam's harem and his elite. When they reached puberty, they were either returned to the fortress or castrated if they were assigned to palace service to prevent any immoral acts. They were called 'Duwidar,' acting as the castrated servants. Zaid Mutai Dhamaj narrates in 'The Hostage' that those who performed the duties of 'Duwidar' and returned to the Cairo fortress had strange and astonishing tales. He noted that most of the returnees had changed significantly, their faces pale and their bodies unusually soft, with signs of flabbiness and premature decay. He also observed the guards' interest in these soft-skinned, high-pitched boys, dressed in clean garments trailing to the ground, and 'kawafi' adorned by palace women to conceal their styled hair, from which wafted the scent of fragrant oils that the guards inhaled with delight. They maintained their women's purity by forcibly castrating these boys, treating their own deficiencies with a greater deficiency. They were burdened with permanent injuries and disabilities. At this point, one could invoke the popular saying: 'You want a fault or a donkey.' * * * Today, things have become worse and more painful than yesterday. We now witness a broader and more horrific form of castration, where minds, voices, pens, and actions are all subdued. This is a more severe and painful form of mutilation! I have come to understand how power practices the castration of men and robs them of a future we have long aspired to. I have seen how men are transformed from equals and exceptional individuals into mere bearers of incense—subservient followers stripped of will and action, powerless and helpless. I have learned how authority and wealth exert their influence over many intellectuals, holders of advanced degrees, and academics, turning men into trumpets lacking will, stance, or conscience. I have recognized the emptiness of the intellectual and the media figure who distorts awareness, following politicians like a rope or a sheep led to slaughter without resistance. I have encountered many who have been castrated and have certainly recognized the ugliness of power that practices castration and treachery. I have understood the fragility of the intellectual who sells his conscience at the first offer. This fragility collapses at the first blow of a hammer on the head or the testicles. An intellectual who has become a follower, revolving in the orbit of his idol, losing his conscience and existence. I have seen followers devoid of reason, principle, or values, and men devoid of masculinity, virility, or existence. In contrast, I have also encountered remarkable individuals, towering like palm trees and steadfast as the mountains. They are free spirits who prefer sacrifice over surrender, resistance over submission, and courage over fear.
Voice of Belady
17-04-2025
- Politics
- Voice of Belady
Religion and Leadership: Examining Religious Principles in Choosing a Ruler Through Abdel Rahman Sharqawi's "Al-Hussein Thairan"
Awny Seif, Cairo. Abdel Rahman Sharqawi's play, "Al-Hussein Thairan" (Hussein, the Revolutionary), offers a powerful exploration of the complex relationship between faith and leadership in Islamic society. The play, centered around the story of Imam Hussein's rebellion against the Umayyad Caliph Yazid, serves not only as a historical narrative but also as a potent commentary on the ethical considerations that should govern the selection of a ruler. Through the lens of this dramatic work, we can analyze how religious principles, particularly justice, piety, and consultation, are crucial factors in determining legitimate leadership, and how their absence can lead to societal unrest and moral decay. One of the central problems highlighted in the play is the blatant disregard for justice and ethical governance under Yazid's rule. Yazid's ascension to the Caliphate, achieved through inheritance rather than consultation with the community, directly contradicts the Islamic principle of Shura, or consultation. This principle, frequently cited in the Quran (e.g., Surah Ash-Shura, 42:38, which mentions the believers 'conducting their affairs by mutual consultation'), emphasizes the importance of collective decision-making and the participation of the community in choosing their leaders. Sharqawi skillfully portrays the discontent simmering among the people, who feel disenfranchised and burdened by Yazid's perceived tyranny. This resonates with the historical reality and reflects a deeper theological argument: that a leader who fails to uphold justice and ignores the voice of the people forfeits his legitimacy. As Imam Hussein himself declares in the play, "A ruler who oppresses his people is not worthy of respect' (Sharqawi, n.d., Act III). While a specific page number is unavailable due to the nature of theatrical scripts, the sentiment is consistently conveyed throughout Hussein's speeches. The play further underscores the importance of piety and moral integrity in leadership. Yazid's character is depicted as morally flawed, indulging in worldly pleasures and disregarding religious precepts. This contrasts sharply with the portrayal of Imam Hussein, who embodies piety and unwavering commitment to Islamic values. The narrative implicitly suggests that a ruler's personal conduct profoundly impacts the moral fabric of society. A leader who embodies piety serves as a role model, inspiring righteous behavior and fostering a sense of ethical responsibility among the populace. This concept aligns with the Islamic understanding of leadership as a trust (Amana), requiring the leader to act in accordance with divine guidance and prioritize the well-being of the community. Ultimately, "Al-Hussein Thairan" proposes a solution to the problem of unjust rule through the act of resistance and the reaffirmation of foundational religious principles. Imam Hussein's decision to confront Yazid, despite the overwhelming odds, is portrayed as a morally righteous act undertaken to uphold justice and defend the true spirit of Islam. His sacrifice serves as a powerful reminder that challenging oppressive rule, when all other avenues are exhausted, is not only permissible but also a religious obligation. This resonates with the Islamic concept of Amr bil Ma'ruf wa Nahi anil Munkar (enjoining good and forbidding evil), a fundamental principle that requires believers to actively work towards the betterment of society and to speak out against injustice. As articulated by scholar Khaled Abou El Fadl, "Resistance to tyranny is not just a right; it is a religious duty, especially when that tyranny is perpetrated in the name of religion itself" (Abou El Fadl, 2001, p. 12). In conclusion, Abdel Rahman Sharqawi's "Al-Hussein Thairan" provides a compelling and enduring exploration of the vital link between faith and leadership. By depicting the consequences of unjust rule and the courageous resistance of Imam Hussein, the play argues for the necessity of upholding religious principles – justice, piety, and consultation – in the selection and conduct of a ruler. The play serves as a timeless reminder that legitimate leadership rests not merely on power or inheritance, but on the moral authority derived from adhering to divine guidance and serving the best interests of the community. The lessons gleaned from "Al-Hussein Thairan" remain relevant today, offering valuable insights into the ethical considerations that should guide the pursuit and exercise of power in any society striving for justice and moral integrity. Abou El Fadl, K. (2001). Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law. Cambridge University Press.
