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The Star
27-07-2025
- Business
- The Star
Could China's Tibet mega dam help boost its sway with South Asian neighbours?
China's latest mega dam on the Tibetan Plateau could help draw neighbouring countries closer into its economic orbit by supplying electricity and boosting growth, analysts have argued. According to some estimates, the dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo will be the world's biggest, producing up to 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity each year, three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam. State news agency Xinhua said over the weekend that its output would 'primarily deliver electricity for external consumption' but would also meet local demand in Tibet. But the project has drawn concerns about the impact on water supply and ecological risks downstream in India and Bangladesh, where the river is known as the Brahmaputra, although Beijing has said it was not seeking to benefit at the 'expense of its neighbours'. India is also worried about Beijing's efforts to strengthen its influence in South Asia, and Chinese observers said the project could help increase its sway over countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, which have long struggled with power shortages. The project 'will undoubtedly become a major power hub for surrounding countries and related neighbouring regions', according to Zhu Feng, dean of the school of international studies at Nanjing University. 'It will have significant strategic value in boosting electricity supply and industrial growth in the surrounding regions,' he said. It would also play an important role in driving economic cooperation with its neighbours, something Beijing has made a priority in light of its rivalry with the US. Lin Minwang, deputy director of Fudan University's Centre for South Asian Studies, said that in the long run, the hydropower project could help draw Southeast and South Asian countries more closely into China's economic orbit through electricity exports. He said India might also benefit from the power generated from the dam, but border tensions would complicate the issue. 'The key issue is political relations,' said Lin. 'Northeast India is a highly sensitive area for New Delhi, and if electricity is to be sent to Bangladesh, it would require a transit route.' India has already been investing heavily in hydropower projects in Nepal and Bhutan to secure its own supplies. 'Whether those countries will choose China or India [for future power imports] is another much bigger question,' Lin added. The dam will be built close to the border with India and flows through Arunachal Pradesh, an Indian-controlled state that China claims as part of southern Tibet. Beijing has previously objected to Indian infrastructure projects in the state. Shi Yinhong, an international relations professor at Beijing's Renmin University, said the project was first of all designed to meet China's own power needs, and 'whether demand is sufficient in the present domestic economic downturn and whether it is environmentally less risky are other matters'. China has tried to address concerns about the environmental risk posed by the project and its impact on water supplies downstream, and said it would continue to strengthen cooperation with neighbouring countries. Foreign ministry spokesman Guo Jiakun said on Wednesday that the project 'aims to accelerate the development of clean energy' and 'comprehensive ecological and environmental protection measures' would be adopted. 'It will, as a by-product, aggravate the tensions with India and attract some Asean [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries to China's power diplomacy. So it has double effects both internal and external,' Shi said. 'It will correspondingly increase China's influence [in Southeast Asia], in a competitive geopolitical arena over which the US and its allies have somewhat preponderance, especially because of [Donald] Trump's most recent trade agreements.' Lu Gang, director of the Institute of International Studies at East China Normal University, said ensuring stable power supplies for its neighbours could 'help shape a positive image of China'. '[This] will build trust with other countries. And, naturally, economic dependence will follow,' Lu said. He also said the project may also have a longer-term strategic impact on regions such as Central Asia. 'For Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan – both have abundant hydropower resources, but their infrastructure is weak. So if the project in Tibet is successfully implemented and generates economic benefits, it will serve as a stimulus,' he said. - SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST
South China Morning Post
23-07-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
Could China's Tibet mega dam help boost its sway with South Asian neighbours?
Advertisement According to some estimates, the dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo will be the world's biggest, producing up to 300 billion kilowatt-hours of electricity each year, three times the output of the Three Gorges Dam. State news agency Xinhua said over the weekend that its output would 'primarily deliver electricity for external consumption' but would also meet local demand in Tibet. But the project has drawn concerns about the impact on water supply and ecological risks downstream in India and Bangladesh, where the river is known as the Brahmaputra, although Beijing has said it was not seeking to benefit at the 'expense of its neighbours' India is also worried about Beijing's efforts to strengthen its influence in South Asia, and Chinese observers said the project could help increase its sway over countries such as Nepal, Bhutan, Myanmar and Bangladesh, which have long struggled with power shortages. Advertisement The project 'will undoubtedly become a major power hub for surrounding countries and related neighbouring regions', according to Zhu Feng, dean of the school of international studies at Nanjing University.
Arab News
25-06-2025
- Business
- Arab News
Beijing, a longtime friend of Tehran, turns to cautious diplomacy in Iran's war with Israel
BEIJING: When Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago, the Chinese government, a longtime friend of Iran, jumped into action — at least, when it came to words. It condemned the attacks. Its leader, Xi Jinping, got on the phone with the Russian leader and urged a ceasefire. Its foreign minister spoke with his counterpart in Iran. But that's where China stopped. The usual rhetoric was delivered. De-escalation and dialogue were trumpeted. Yet China offered no material support. Despite Beijing's clout as a near-peer rival to the United States and its ambition to play a bigger role on the world stage, Beijing refrained from offering military support to Iran, let alone getting directly involved in the conflict. The decision underscored the limitations it faces in the Middle East. 'Beijing lacks both the diplomatic capabilities and the risk appetite to quickly intervene in, and to think it can successfully navigate, this fast-moving and volatile situation,' said Jude Blanchette, director of the China Research Center at RAND. Given the tangled politics of the Middle East, where China holds substantial economic and energy stakes yet wields minimal military influence, Beijing 'isn't inclined to stick its neck out,' Blanchette added. Instead, the Chinese government opts to remain 'a measured, risk‑averse actor.' China weighs commercial interests Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations at Nanjing University in eastern China, said volatility in the Middle East is not in China's interests. 'From China's point of view, the Israel-Iran conflicts challenge and impact China's business interests and economic security,' Zhu said. 'This is something China absolutely does not want to see.' After the Iranian parliament floated a plan to shut down the strategically located Strait of Hormuz over the weekend, China spoke against it. 'China calls on the international community to step up efforts to de-escalate conflicts and prevent regional turmoil from having a greater impact on global economic development,' said Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry. On Tuesday, following the ceasefire announcement, US President Donald Trump wrote in a social media post: 'China can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,' suggesting the ceasefire would prevent the disruption of Iranian oil production. A 2024 report by the US Energy Information Administration contained estimates suggesting that roughly 80 percent to 90 percent of the oil exported by Iran went to China. The Chinese economy could struggle to preserve its industrial production without the roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil and other fossil fuels provided by Iran. Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, summed up Beijing's responses as 'steady oil buys and ritual calls for 'dialogue'.' 'That's about it,' Singleton said. 'No drones or missile parts, no emergency credit line. Just words calibrated to placate Tehran without rattling Riyadh or inviting US sanctions.' Beijing's muted responses also expose the gap between China's great-power rhetoric and its real reach in the region. Said Singleton: 'China's Gulf footprint is commercial, not combat-ready. When missiles fly, its much-touted strategic partnership with Iran shrinks to statements. Beijing wants discounted Iranian oil and a 'peace-broker' headline, while letting Washington shoulder the hard-power risks.' In statements, China sides with Iran and pledges to mediate At the United Nations, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, teamed up with Russia and Pakistan in putting forward a draft resolution condemning 'in the strongest terms' the attacks against peaceful nuclear sites and facilities in Iran. They called for 'an immediate and unconditional ceasefire' even though the United States, another permanent member on the council, is almost certain to veto the proposal. Shortly after Israel attacked Iran, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and told him that 'China explicitly condemned Israel's violation of Iran's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.' Wang, using common diplomatic language, said China was 'ready to maintain communication with Iran and other relevant parties to continue playing a constructive role in de-escalating the situation.' Wang later spoke with foreign ministers of Oman and Egypt; both nations are key mediators in the region. And late last week, before the US got involved militarily, Xi spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin; the two agreed to stay in closer contact over Iran and work toward de-escalation. But China stayed away from any direct involvement, and Russia also had muted responses to the Israel-Iran conflict. Iran is an important link in Xi's ambitious global project Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2023 joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group by Russia and China to counter the US-led NATO. It has conducted joint exercises with China, including this year's 'Maritime Security Belt 2025' in the Gulf of Oman, in which Russia also took part. On Wednesday, Beijing will convene a meeting of defense ministers of SCO member nations. As important as Iran is to China, it is only part of Beijing's calculus, according to an analysis by the Soufan Center, a New York-based organization that focuses on global security challenges. In an intel brief, the center said the conflict has revealed that Beijing's support for its partners, especially those in confrontation with the United States, 'is limited by a complex matrix of interests, including its desire to avoid alienating major economic partners and escalating tensions with the West.'
The Independent
25-06-2025
- Business
- The Independent
Beijing, a longtime friend of Tehran, turns to cautious diplomacy in Iran's war with Israel
When Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago, the Chinese government, a longtime friend of Iran, jumped into action — at least, when it came to words. It condemned the attacks. Its leader, Xi Jinping, got on the phone with the Russian leader and urged a ceasefire. Its foreign minister spoke with his counterpart in Iran. But that's where China stopped. The usual rhetoric was delivered. De-escalation and dialogue were trumpeted. Yet China offered no material support. Despite Beijing 's clout as a near-peer rival to the United States and its ambition to play a bigger role on the world stage, Beijing refrained from offering military support to Iran, let alone getting directly involved in the conflict. The decision underscored the limitations it faces in the Middle East. 'Beijing lacks both the diplomatic capabilities and the risk appetite to quickly intervene in, and to think it can successfully navigate, this fast-moving and volatile situation," said Jude Blanchette, director of the China Research Center at RAND. Given the tangled politics of the Middle East, where China holds substantial economic and energy stakes yet wields minimal military influence, Beijing 'isn't inclined to stick its neck out,' Blanchette added. Instead, the Chinese government opts to remain 'a measured, risk‑averse actor.' China weighs commercial interests Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations at Nanjing University in eastern China, said volatility in the Middle East is not in China's interests. 'From China's point of view, the Israel-Iran conflicts challenge and impact China's business interests and economic security,' Zhu said. 'This is something China absolutely does not want to see." After the Iranian parliament floated a plan to shut down the strategically located Strait of Hormuz over the weekend, China spoke against it. 'China calls on the international community to step up efforts to de-escalate conflicts and prevent regional turmoil from having a greater impact on global economic development,' said Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry. On Tuesday, following the ceasefire announcement, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote in a social media post: 'China can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,' suggesting the ceasefire would prevent the disruption of Iranian oil production. A 2024 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration contained estimates suggesting that roughly 80% to 90% of the oil exported by Iran went to China. The Chinese economy could struggle to preserve its industrial production without the roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil and other fossil fuels provided by Iran. Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, summed up Beijing's responses as 'steady oil buys and ritual calls for 'dialogue'.' 'That's about it," Singleton said. 'No drones or missile parts, no emergency credit line. Just words calibrated to placate Tehran without rattling Riyadh or inviting U.S. sanctions.' Beijing's muted responses also expose the gap between China's great-power rhetoric and its real reach in the region. Said Singleton: 'China's Gulf footprint is commercial, not combat-ready. When missiles fly, its much-touted strategic partnership with Iran shrinks to statements. Beijing wants discounted Iranian oil and a 'peace-broker' headline, while letting Washington shoulder the hard-power risks.' In statements, China sides with Iran and pledges to mediate Since the onset of the war, Beijing — which brokered a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 — stood by Iran's side and urged talks. At the United Nations, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, teamed up with Russia and Pakistan in putting forward a draft resolution condemning 'in the strongest terms' the attacks against peaceful nuclear sites and facilities in Iran. They called for 'an immediate and unconditional ceasefire" even though the United States, another permanent member on the council, is almost certain to veto the proposal. Shortly after Israel attacked Iran, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and told him that 'China explicitly condemned Israel's violation of Iran's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.' Wang, using common diplomatic language, said China was 'ready to maintain communication with Iran and other relevant parties to continue playing a constructive role in de-escalating the situation." Wang later spoke with foreign ministers of Oman and Egypt; both nations are key mediators in the region. And late last week, before the U.S. got involved militarily, Xi spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin; the two agreed to stay in closer contact over Iran and work toward de-escalation. But China stayed away from any direct involvement, and Russia also had muted responses to the Israel-Iran conflict. Iran is an important link in Xi's ambitious global project Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2023 joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group by Russia and China to counter the U.S.-led NATO. It has conducted joint exercises with China, including this year's 'Maritime Security Belt 2025' in the Gulf of Oman, in which Russia also took part. On Wednesday, Beijing will convene a meeting of defense ministers of SCO member nations. As important as Iran is to China, it is only part of Beijing's calculus, according to an analysis by the Soufan Center, a New York-based organization that focuses on global security challenges. In an intel brief, the center said the conflict has revealed that Beijing's support for its partners, especially those in confrontation with the United States, 'is limited by a complex matrix of interests, including its desire to avoid alienating major economic partners and escalating tensions with the West." ___ AP researcher Yu Bing in Beijing and writers Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations and Josh Boak in Washington contributed to this report.
Associated Press
25-06-2025
- Business
- Associated Press
Beijing, a longtime friend of Tehran, turns to cautious diplomacy in Iran's war with Israel
When Israel attacked Iran nearly two weeks ago, the Chinese government, a longtime friend of Iran, jumped into action — at least, when it came to words. It condemned the attacks. Its leader, Xi Jinping, got on the phone with the Russian leader and urged a ceasefire. Its foreign minister spoke with his counterpart in Iran. But that's where China stopped. The usual rhetoric was delivered. De-escalation and dialogue were trumpeted. Yet China offered no material support. Despite Beijing's clout as a near-peer rival to the United States and its ambition to play a bigger role on the world stage, Beijing refrained from offering military support to Iran, let alone getting directly involved in the conflict. The decision underscored the limitations it faces in the Middle East. 'Beijing lacks both the diplomatic capabilities and the risk appetite to quickly intervene in, and to think it can successfully navigate, this fast-moving and volatile situation,' said Jude Blanchette, director of the China Research Center at RAND. Given the tangled politics of the Middle East, where China holds substantial economic and energy stakes yet wields minimal military influence, Beijing 'isn't inclined to stick its neck out,' Blanchette added. Instead, the Chinese government opts to remain 'a measured, risk‑averse actor.' China weighs commercial interests Zhu Feng, dean of the School of International Relations at Nanjing University in eastern China, said volatility in the Middle East is not in China's interests. 'From China's point of view, the Israel-Iran conflicts challenge and impact China's business interests and economic security,' Zhu said. 'This is something China absolutely does not want to see.' After the Iranian parliament floated a plan to shut down the strategically located Strait of Hormuz over the weekend, China spoke against it. 'China calls on the international community to step up efforts to de-escalate conflicts and prevent regional turmoil from having a greater impact on global economic development,' said Guo Jiakun, a spokesman for the Chinese foreign ministry. On Tuesday, following the ceasefire announcement, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote in a social media post: 'China can now continue to purchase Oil from Iran,' suggesting the ceasefire would prevent the disruption of Iranian oil production. A 2024 report by the U.S. Energy Information Administration contained estimates suggesting that roughly 80% to 90% of the oil exported by Iran went to China. The Chinese economy could struggle to preserve its industrial production without the roughly 1.2 million barrels of oil and other fossil fuels provided by Iran. Craig Singleton, senior China fellow at the Washington-based think tank Foundation for Defense of Democracies, summed up Beijing's responses as 'steady oil buys and ritual calls for 'dialogue'.' 'That's about it,' Singleton said. 'No drones or missile parts, no emergency credit line. Just words calibrated to placate Tehran without rattling Riyadh or inviting U.S. sanctions.' Beijing's muted responses also expose the gap between China's great-power rhetoric and its real reach in the region. Said Singleton: 'China's Gulf footprint is commercial, not combat-ready. When missiles fly, its much-touted strategic partnership with Iran shrinks to statements. Beijing wants discounted Iranian oil and a 'peace-broker' headline, while letting Washington shoulder the hard-power risks.' In statements, China sides with Iran and pledges to mediate Since the onset of the war, Beijing — which brokered a diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 — stood by Iran's side and urged talks. At the United Nations, China, a permanent member of the Security Council, teamed up with Russia and Pakistan in putting forward a draft resolution condemning 'in the strongest terms' the attacks against peaceful nuclear sites and facilities in Iran. They called for 'an immediate and unconditional ceasefire' even though the United States, another permanent member on the council, is almost certain to veto the proposal. Shortly after Israel attacked Iran, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had a phone call with his Iranian counterpart, Abbas Araghchi, and told him that 'China explicitly condemned Israel's violation of Iran's sovereignty, security and territorial integrity.' Wang, using common diplomatic language, said China was 'ready to maintain communication with Iran and other relevant parties to continue playing a constructive role in de-escalating the situation.' Wang later spoke with foreign ministers of Oman and Egypt; both nations are key mediators in the region. And late last week, before the U.S. got involved militarily, Xi spoke with Russian President Vladimir Putin; the two agreed to stay in closer contact over Iran and work toward de-escalation. But China stayed away from any direct involvement, and Russia also had muted responses to the Israel-Iran conflict. Iran is an important link in Xi's ambitious global project Belt and Road Initiative, and in 2023 joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a security group by Russia and China to counter the U.S.-led NATO. It has conducted joint exercises with China, including this year's 'Maritime Security Belt 2025' in the Gulf of Oman, in which Russia also took part. On Wednesday, Beijing will convene a meeting of defense ministers of SCO member nations. As important as Iran is to China, it is only part of Beijing's calculus, according to an analysis by the Soufan Center, a New York-based organization that focuses on global security challenges. In an intel brief, the center said the conflict has revealed that Beijing's support for its partners, especially those in confrontation with the United States, 'is limited by a complex matrix of interests, including its desire to avoid alienating major economic partners and escalating tensions with the West.' ___ AP researcher Yu Bing in Beijing and writers Edith M. Lederer at the United Nations and Josh Boak in Washington contributed to this report.
