Latest news with #militarystrategy
Al Bawaba
6 days ago
- Politics
- Al Bawaba
No way out but a deal: Hamas warns Israel of prolonged war and new captive attempts
Published July 18th, 2025 - 04:37 GMT ALBAWABA - Abu Ubaida, the military spokesman for the Al-Qassam Brigades (Hamas' armed wing), gave his first public speech since March. It was a recorded speech in which he talked about the group's military strategy, its views on current talks, and harsh criticism of players in the region and within Palestine. Abu Ubaida said that the resistance is still fully ready for a long war. He accused Israel of breaking a deal by starting its attack on Gaza again four months ago. He said that the resistance killed a lot of Israeli troops during this time and that Israeli soldiers were also suffering from more mental health problems. He said that Hamas's current operations are focused on "strategic attrition," which includes new military strategies, high-impact operations, and efforts to take Israeli soldiers, some of which he said had happened in the past few weeks. Arab and Islamic leaders are being criticized. According to Abu Ubaida, the Arab and Islamic worlds are very frustrating him. In a strong message, he criticized governments and leaders for not doing anything about what he called Israel's "genocide" in Gaza. He said that tens of thousands of innocent Palestinians had been killed and that the leaders of the area should take moral responsibility. He praised the Houthis in Yemen for setting up a strong front and thanked people around the world who are still taking chances to stand with the Palestinian people. Abu Ubaida said that Hamas fully supports the group that is currently in informal talks with Israel. He said that the resistance had offered to trade all of Israel's prisoners for Palestinian ones several times as part of a full prisoner swap deal. But he said that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu turned down the plans, which led people to think that the prisoners might be dead. ⭕️ Abu Ubaidah: 'We say to history, with all bitterness and pain, and in front of all the sons of our nation: O leaders of this Islamic and Arab nation, and its elites and major parties, and its scholars, you are our adversaries before Allah Almighty, you are the adversaries of… — MenchOsint (@MenchOsint) July 18, 2025 He said that if Israel doesn't change its mind, Hamas might back out of limited or staged deals, like the earlier offer to trade 10 prisoners. Abu Ubaida told those working with Israel in a direct message to turn away from their actions and return to their communities. He praised Palestinian families and groups that had officially turned their backs on traitors. He said that working with Arabs would not work and that anyone who did would be "burnt cards" in the eyes of the Palestinian people. Final Thoughts and Background Abu Ubaida ended by praising the strength and honor of the Palestinian people, saying that their unwavering determination to stay strong despite pain and lack continues to annoy their enemies. In a linked statement, Hamas said that since Israel had failed to use force to free the prisoners, the only way forward is to arrange a swap of prisoners. The group said that its changing strategies have caught Israel off guard many times, making the Gaza war a turning point in the conflict and showing what it called the "increasing fragility of the Israeli state." © 2000 - 2025 Al Bawaba (
The Guardian
13-07-2025
- Politics
- The Guardian
Dose of realism would allow Kyiv to focus on halting Russian advance
While Donald Trump – and other western leaders – are taking their time to catch up with reality, it is obvious that Vladimir Putin has no apparent desire to halt the war in Ukraine. A realistic future military and diplomatic strategy for Kyiv has to accept that fact – and formulate a new approach. The past six months have been dominated by the erroneous assumption that it would be possible for Trump to negotiate a ceasefire, even an armistice. That would be followed by the arrival of an Anglo-French led stabilisation force to secure the future of Ukraine. But Putin has shown no desire to stop attacking. A fresh Russian ground offensive is emerging towards Velykyi Burluk, 50 miles east of Kharkiv, and for now is making some rare gains: three miles in 10 days. More significantly, the cynical bombing of Ukraine's cities by missile and drone is only intensifying, straining Kyiv's air defences and leading to more civilian casualties. A record 728 Shahed drones and 13 missiles were launched on the night of 8 July and the next morning, many at Lutsk in the west, though the bombardment of 597 drones and 26 missiles on Friday night and Saturday morning showed no slackening of violent intent. It will be soon possible for Russia to attack with 1,000 drones in a night, Ukraine believes. In a paper written last month, Andriy Zagorodnyuk, a former Ukrainian defence minister, said 'an acceptable armistice may never formally arrive' and that Kyiv should formulate 'a revised theory of victory' – which accepts that the Kremlin considers itself engaged in a forever war against its smaller neighbour. The former minister describes the new approach as 'strategic neutralisation', a permanent and dynamic military effort to ensure that Russia's forces cannot advance and that Moscow becomes 'operationally incapable of disrupting key aspects of Ukrainian strategic, political, economic, and social life'. It accepts that Ukraine cannot retake territories already occupied by Moscow, or attack again into Russia, as happened into Kursk oblast last summer, and instead pursues an active defence. As an example for what might be possible, Zagorodnyuk refers to the situation in the Black Sea. Ukraine, which began the war without a navy, had managed to box in the Russian Black Sea fleet by mid-2023 by successfully sinking and threatening to sink warships with remotely piloted sea drones. The result is the 'functional defeat' of the Russian fleet, a phrase first used by a former British junior defence minister, James Heappey. Kyiv was able to unilaterally reopen a corridor for grain shipments from Odesa and nearby areas in 2023 without having to negotiate a special exemption for such traffic with Russia. One question is whether strategic neutralisation is possible on land. Russia has struggled to gain territory inside Ukraine during 2025, though it has collapsed the Kursk pocket, and its forces incurred casualty rates (killed and wounded) of about 1,100 a day in June – showing that Kyiv can roughly hold the line largely with the help of £300-£370 ($400-$500) first-person view (FPV) drones that it can manufacture in bulk. But the strategy goes further. The military aim in such a plan would be to extend the depth of FPV drone operations to 25, 50 or even 100 miles – to create a zone where it is effectively impossible for Russian forces to mass – and even to walk to the frontline. Rather than create a Korean style demilitarised zone, the effect would be to create a highly militarised zone in which Russian forces could not operate, a de facto border. The already slow rate of Russian advance suggests this approach may be possible, though an important question is what will happen once the last of the US military aid approved by former president Joe Biden tails off. It is also challenged by Russia's expanding volume of missile and drone attacks – which in turn come at a time of growing concern about the amount of available air defence interceptors. A series of ill-judged signals from the US reveal that the Pentagon is worried about the number of Patriot air defence missiles it has available, probably the single most important air defence system used by Ukraine. Weapons deliveries were halted at the end of last month amid fears US stockpiles were low (perhaps at 25% of the desired levels), though Trump has partially relented, sending a symbolic 10 Patriot missiles last week. The US president, finally acknowledging that Putin is stalling, has promised a 'major announcement' on Monday, which may involve extra sanctions on Russia and allowing European countries to buy more weapons for Kyiv. It would make strategic sense if whatever is offered comes with the recognition that Putin is not serious about peace – and gives Ukraine what it needs to neutralise the aggressor.
Russia Today
12-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
The Americans are leaving — and the post-colonial world is fine with that
A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.
Russia Today
11-07-2025
- Politics
- Russia Today
Not wanted here: Why Africa is turning away from US military might
A shift appears to be underway in US-Africa relations, judging by the remarks of Vice President J.D. Vance and AFRICOM Commander General Michael Langley. Speaking to new US naval graduates on May 23, Vance talked about re-evaluating the American military role around the world and declared that 'The era of uncontested US dominance is over" and that open-ended military engagements 'belong to the past.' Four days later General Langley, while attending an African defense chiefs' meeting in Gaborone, Botswana, suggested that the US Africa Command (AFRICOM) might be integrated into Central Command (CENTCOM). 'If we're [AFRICOM] that important to (you), you need to communicate that and we'll see,' Langley said, adding that the US is 'reassessing' its military role in the continent. This sends a clear signal that Washington may dismantle or repurpose AFRICOM as part of broader cuts to US global military posture. The statements, in line with President Donald Trump's 'America first' mantra, reflect Washington's growing impatience with costly foreign entanglements, while hinting at a fundamental transformation of how the US engages with Africa's complex security landscape. Since its creation in 2008, AFRICOM has served as the centrepiece of US military strategy on the continent. Over nearly two decades, the command has expanded its reach and budget significantly, shaping security partnerships and playing a pivotal role in regional conflicts. Yet today, AFRICOM's future is uncertain, caught at the crossroads of shifting US priorities, rising African assertiveness, and intensifying competition from rival powers such as Russia and China. Africa has long figured into the broader framework of US global military and political strategy. During the continent's era of anti-colonial struggle and liberation movements, Washington, obsessed with countering Soviet influence, viewed nearly every liberation movement through the narrow lens of Cold War anti-communism. AFRICOM was established by President George W. Bush, who emphasized its importance by stating that it would 'strengthen our security cooperation with Africa and create new opportunities to bolster the capabilities of our partners.' AFRICOM was intended to centralize US military operations on the continent, replacing the fragmented structure inherited from the Cold War era, when Africa was divided among three different US military commands. Then-Secretary of Defense Robert Gates described the move as a long-overdue correction to an 'outdated arrangement left over from the Cold War.' Between 2008 and 2025, the cost of sustaining AFRICOM and financing its activities is estimated to have risen from around $50 million to between $275 million and $300 million. It is not a huge amount because the command borrows personnel and equipment from other US military commands, meaning the cost is accounted for anyway. This is likely to draw scrutiny from President Trump, who has made slashing federal spending a key priority. His administration has launched a dedicated initiative within the Office of Management and Budget – dubbed DOGE (Department of Government Efficiency) – to identify and eliminate what it considers excessive international and domestic expenditures. Trump's return to office in 2025 marked a clear strategic pivot: a retreat from costly overseas commitments in favor of a narrow, transactional approach to foreign policy. The Sahel region illustrates the consequences of America's retrenchment in Africa. Once a central focus of US counterterrorism efforts, countries such as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have witnessed the gradual reduction of American military presence amid growing local resistance. Coupled with political upheavals and anti-French sentiment, US forces have faced mounting pressure to leave or scale back operations. The withdrawal has left a security vacuum that regional powers and international actors struggle to fill, fueling instability and humanitarian crises. This retreat highlights the limits of America's influence and the complexities of African geopolitics in an era of shifting alliances. A stark example of the US pullback is Niger, where the military coup in 2023 prompted the expulsion of American forces and the shutdown of a $100-million drone base critical to regional surveillance and counterterrorism. The abrupt exit underscored the fragility of US military footholds amid shifting political dynamics. Meanwhile, Russia has swiftly moved to fill this security vacuum, leveraging military cooperation, renewed political ties with the region and arms deals to become a preferred partner for several African states. Moscow's approach – often perceived as less conditional and more respectful of sovereignty – has resonated with governments disillusioned by Western interference and demands, accelerating realignment in Africa's security landscape. African nations approach foreign military partnerships with a mix of pragmatism, skepticism, and growing assertiveness. Many governments are wary of traditional Western powers, associating them with a legacy of colonialism, exploitative aid, and conditional alliances that undermine sovereignty. In contrast, Russia's more transactional and less intrusive engagement style appeals to some leaders seeking security support without political strings attached. However, this trust is far from uniform – some African civil society groups and international observers often warn against swapping one form of dependency for another, emphasizing the need for genuine partnerships that respect African agency and prioritize long-term stability over geopolitical rivalry. African countries' relative trust in Russia compared to the US or former European colonial powers stems from historical and ideological factors. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union supported numerous African liberation movements, often standing in opposition to Western-backed regimes and colonial interests. Unlike Western powers, Russia's approach has often emphasized non-intervention in internal politics, focusing primarily on military cooperation and economic deals without pressing for political reforms. This contrasts sharply with Western demands for governance changes as a precondition for aid or security support. As Malian analyst Amina Traore noted, 'Russia does not come with lectures or conditions; it offers partnership based on mutual respect and shared interests.' Similarly, Senegalese former defense official Cheikh Diop remarked, 'African countries want security partners who respect their sovereignty and do not drag them into endless conflicts or political battles.' These sentiments underscore why Russia has gained ground as a preferred security ally, even as questions linger about the long-term implications of this pivot. The possible disappearance or transformation of AFRICOM signals a shift in US military engagement across Africa. Whether integrated into other commands or scaled back significantly, this change reflects Washington's recalibration of its global military priorities amid domestic pressures and evolving international dynamics. For Africa, the retreat of a long-standing security partner opens a strategic vacuum – one increasingly filled by Russia and other global actors eager to expand their influence. The shift challenges US policymakers to rethink their approach beyond military presence, emphasizing genuine partnerships based on respect, shared interests, and support for African-led security solutions. Ultimately, the future of US-Africa relations will depend on Washington's ability to adapt to a multipolar world where influence is no longer guaranteed by military might alone, but by diplomacy, economic engagement, and mutual respect.
South China Morning Post
06-07-2025
- Politics
- South China Morning Post
China's military will need structural change to fend off drone threats: experts
Three military analysts have called for structural changes within the People's Liberation Army to counter the growing threat of drone attacks. Advertisement Writing in the PLA Daily, the experts said it was highly likely that the Chinese military would establish specialised counter-drone combat units capable of 'rapid responses' to unmanned threats while addressing the inefficiencies of multitasked traditional units. Drones have played an increasingly crucial role in recent regional conflicts, including the war in Ukraine, the India-Pakistan conflict, and the recent strikes between Israel and Iran. The article, published by the military mouthpiece on Thursday, suggests that Beijing has taken note of a US plan to deter any PLA aggression across the Taiwan Strait by deploying thousands of unmanned systems in what it calls a 'hellscape' strategy. According to the article, the establishment of dedicated counter-drone units is viewed as a 'long-term' goal, while current structural adjustments are expected to focus on integrating counter-drone capabilities into existing combat units. Advertisement For example, the writers suggested that electronic warfare units could be upgraded to become intelligent counter-unmanned units capable of AI-driven analysis and mobile jamming. The PLA's structural shift towards counter-drone capabilities dates back to as early as 2016, when Chinese state media reported the formation of a specialised PLA Air Force unit tasked with detecting and neutralising small uncrewed aircraft.
