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Telegraph
02-08-2025
- General
- Telegraph
The majestic bombers that used to defend Britain
It's ironic that the finest hour of Britain's V-Force of strategic nuclear bombers came long after it had been stripped of its nuclear capability. On April 30 1982, a lone Avro Vulcan carried out what was then the longest bombing mission by any air force – and only surpassed recently by the US's raid on Iran's nuclear facilities – when it flew 16 hours and 6,600 nautical miles from Ascension Island to the Falklands. The target was Port Stanley airfield (then in the possession of the Argentinians, who had invaded the islands a month earlier). Dropping 21 1,000-lb bombs, Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers was able to cause enough damage to the runway to prevent Argentine fast jets from using it, if not transport planes. Jonathan Glancey describes this raid in detail – and the fact that another V-Force bomber, the Victor, played a significant role in both the Falklands and Gulf wars – in his impressive new history of Britain's nuclear bombers, V-Force: Britain's Nuclear Bombers and the Cold War. But, he tells us, that raid was the bombers' last hurrah. The Vulcans were taken out of service in 1984, the Victor nine years later. The original V bomber, the Valiant, last flew on operations in 1964. The meat of Glancey's book explains how the V-Force was developed originally as nuclear bombers, up until 1968 when the deterrent was transferred to the Royal Navy's Polaris-equipped submarines. With previous books on Concorde, the Harrier and the Spitfire, Glancey is an aviation nut who's interested as much in the technical wonder of these planes as he is in the legacy they leave in the public consciousness. His book, he writes, 'looks at these winged Cold War warriors – warts, rivets and all – through the lenses of invention and engineering, of rivalry with fellow Nato countries as well as with the Soviet Union, and of popular culture too'. It is, he continues, a 'story of success, with compromise and failure along the way', and might serve as a universal parable for most defence procurement. The author provides plenty of context. We get potted versions of the history of strategic bombing (the 'bomber will always get through,' as Stanley Baldwin said in 1932), the development of the atomic bomb, and even the technical capabilities of rival US and Soviet nuclear bombers. Glancey is at his best, however, when he sticks to the story of the V-Force, which began with Britain's decision in 1946 to build its own atomic bomb (and later hydrogen bomb). Once we had the bomb, we needed a way to deliver it. Hence in 1947, six aviation companies were invited to tender designs for long-range jet bombers. The two eventually chosen were Handley Page's reconfigured crescent-wing HP80 (Victor) and Avro's striking Delta-wing 698 (Vulcan), both marking 'new territory in terms of design and engineering'. The Victor, with its swept-back wings, high tailplane and giant air intakes, had the appearance of a 'deeply strange fish'; the Vulcan left 'elongated delta-shaped shadows' on the ground as it flew overhead with an 'unearthly howl'. The first Valiants, Vulcans and Victors were delivered to RAF squadrons in 1955, 1956 and 1957, respectively. Though less advanced technically than its sister planes, the Valiant 'carried out the entire gamut of tasks asked of V-Force, short of dropping a live nuclear bomb on an enemy target'. That included conventional bombing raids (over Aden in 1956), testing an A-bomb over South Australia that same year, and, too, Britain's first H-bomb over Malden Island in the Pacific in 1957. Ultimately, V-Force would be 'the front line of aerial cavalry' were the Soviets to ever fire the first shot of World War III. Its shelf-life, however, was relatively brief. The beginning of the end was the development of the Soviet Union's surface-to-air missiles, which could intercept enemies from the ground. Particularly the S-75 Dvina, which shot down high-altitude American U-2 spy planes in 1960 and 1962, and triggered the Cuban Missile Crisis. This forced V-Force to switch to low-level attack methods, which in turn revealed weaknesses in the Valiant's airframe. After one near-fatal accident when a rear wing-spar fractured, all 50 Valiants in service were grounded for good. There was a plan to equip them with a US-made nuclear missile, Skybolt – but then America grounded that too. Glancey has written an engaging and affectionate account of the V-bombers, not least the figures who made it all possible: the brilliant British engineers who designed the planes; the pilots who were prepared to risk (and most often sacrifice) their lives to accomplish their missions. He also explores the political chicanery that prevented many other superb aircraft designs – military and civil – from ever becoming a reality. There is, ultimately, a whiff of nostalgia and regret in these pages. Britain's nuclear deterrent has become increasingly reliant on US politics and technology; this is, says Glancey, partly thanks to an 'almost wilful deindustrialisation'. France, by contrast – with a smaller economy than Britain's – retains an independent nuclear deterrent, and makes its own multi-role fighter, the Rafale. It's not about money, 'but rather a lack of will, or interest perhaps'. Does this matter? Yes, argues Glancey – and he's right. It's not a question of guns over butter, but more about 'considered self-defence, of Britain being a dynamic Nato partner'. Such arguments have never been more timely. ★★★★☆ Saul David is the author of books including Sky Warriors. V-Force: Britain's Nuclear Bombers and the Cold War is published by Atlantic at £22. To order your copy at £18.99, call 0330 173 0523 or visit Telegraph Books
The Independent
06-06-2025
- Politics
- The Independent
Putin's desperate struggle to replace nuclear-capable bombers lost in Ukraine drone strikes
Western military aviation experts suggest it will take Russia years to replace the nuclear-capable bomber planes damaged in recent Ukrainian drone strikes. These attacks have placed additional strain on Russia's already delayed modernisation programme. Satellite imagery of airfields in Siberia and Russia's far north reveals significant damage, with several aircraft completely destroyed. While reports vary, U.S. officials estimate that up to 20 warplanes were hit, with approximately 10 destroyed. This figure is about half the number estimated by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy. The Russian government on Thursday denied that any planes were destroyed and said the damage would be repaired, but Russian military bloggers have spoken of loss or serious damage to about a dozen planes, accusing commanders of negligence. The strikes - prepared over 18 months in a Ukrainian intelligence operation dubbed "Spider's Web", and conducted by drones that were smuggled close to the bases in trucks - dealt a powerful symbolic blow to a country that, throughout the Ukraine war, has frequently reminded the world of its nuclear might. In practice, experts said, they will not seriously affect Russia's nuclear strike capability which is largely comprised of ground- and submarine-based missiles. However, the Tu-95MS Bear-H and Tu-22M3 Backfire bombers that were hit were part of a long-range aviation fleet that Russia has used throughout the war to fire conventional missiles at Ukrainian cities, defence plants, military bases, power infrastructure and other targets, said Justin Bronk, an aviation expert at the RUSI think tank in London. The same fleet had also been carrying out periodic patrol flights into the Arctic, North Atlantic and northern Pacific as a show of strength to deter Russia's Western adversaries. Bronk said that at the outset of its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia was operating a fleet of 50-60 Bear-Hs and around 60 Backfires, alongside around 20 Tu-160M nuclear-capable Blackjack heavy bombers. He estimated that Russia has now lost more than 10% of the combined Bear-H and Backfire fleet, taking into account last weekend's attacks and the loss of several planes earlier in the war - one shot down and the others struck while on the ground. These losses "will put major pressure on a key Russian force that was already operating at maximum capacity," Bronk told Reuters. Russia's defence ministry did not immediately reply to a request for comment. Replacing the planes will be challenging. Both the Bear H and the Backfire are aircraft that were designed in the Soviet era and have been out of production for decades, said Douglas Barrie, aerospace expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, although existing planes have been upgraded over the years. Barrie said that building new ones like-for-like was therefore very unlikely, and it was unclear whether Russia had any useable spare airframes of either type. Western sanctions against Russia have aimed to restrict the import of components such as microprocessors that are vital to avionics systems, although Moscow has so far been comparatively successful at finding alternative sources, Barrie added. Russia has been modernising its Blackjack bomber fleet, and Putin sent a pointed signal to the West last year by taking a 30-minute flight in one such aircraft and pronouncing it ready for service. But production of new Blackjacks is slow - one Russian military blogger this week put it at four per year - and Western experts say progress in developing Russia's next-generation PAK DA bomber has also been moving at a crawl. The Federation of American Scientists (FAS) said in a report last month that Russia had signed a contract with manufacturer Tupolev in 2013 to build the PAK DA, but cited Russian media reports as saying state test flights are not scheduled until next year, with initial production to begin in 2027. While it would be logical for Russia to try to speed up its PAK DA plans, it may not have the capacity, said Hans Kristensen, director of the Nuclear Information Project at the FAS. He said in a telephone interview that Russia is facing delays with a range of other big defence projects including its new Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile. RUSI's Bronk was also sceptical of Moscow's chances of accelerating the timeline for the next-generation bomber. "Russia will struggle to deliver the PAK DA programme at all in the coming five years, let alone accelerate it, due to budgetary shortfalls and materials and technology constraints on industry due to sanctions," he said.
