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Daily Maverick
12 hours ago
- Politics
- Daily Maverick
Coalition governance: Will the GNU forge a new centrist political landscape?
There is the potential that the ANC and DA partnership in the GNU may provide the impetus for a new centrist political consensus for South Africa, which spans ideology, race and class in the country's politics, economics and society. Given that coalitions at the national level will from now onwards be the dominant form of governance, South Africa's Government of National Unity (GNU), whether it is successful or not, may very likely be the catalyst over time to unleash a much-needed realignment of the country's current not-fit-for-purpose political party system, with its origins in our apartheid-era divisions, into future national coalitions that could group political party coalitions into pro-constitutional versus populist ones. There is the potential that the ANC and DA partnership in the GNU may over time provide the impetus for President Cyril Ramaphosa's social democratic, constitutionalist, and non-racial wing of the ANC to partner with the DA in a long-term governing pact, like for example the post-World War 2 coalition between Germany's Christian Democratic Union and its Bavarian ally, the Christian Social Union (CSU), or they may even merge. Such a new political party arrangement could, over time, lead to the formation of a new pragmatic centrist political consensus for South Africa, which spans ideology, race and class in the country's politics, economics and society. South Africa needs such a new pragmatic, Constitution-based, evidence-based policy that is racially inclusive, with centrist governing consensus that goes beyond past entrenched apartheid-era political party divisions. South Africa's current identity-based, past-based, outdated ideology-based, narrow village-view outlook of political party politics, and slogans for policies, is not fit for purpose for the requirements of Constitutional democracy, or to ensure effective public service delivery or for non-racial unity. South Africa will not be able to tackle its complex problems based on the current flawed political party set-up. The reality is that South Africa is facing deep existential crises, which one ethnic group, party, or colour alone cannot solve. There is currently a fierce battle within the ANC between the party's constitutionalist, Social Democratic and non-racial wing that favours the ANC's GNU alliance with the DA and members of the former Multiparty Charter (MPC); and the left populist wing of the party, centred around the ANC's Gauteng provincial party, who want the ANC to align with the populist Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) and former president Jacob Zuma's uMkhonto Wesizwe (MK) party. The endgame of this internal ANC battle may be another split in the ANC, possibly this time between the party's constitutionalist, Social Democratic and non-racial wing on the one hand; and on the other hand, the remainder of its left populist wing that has not defected to either the EFF or MK party. Ironically, Zuma, immediately after the GNU announcement, angrily said that the ANC partnering with the former Multiparty Charter or 'Moonshot Pact' parties, the Democratic Alliance, Inkatha Freedom Party and the Freedom Front Plus, meant the ANC had now joined the Multiparty Charter. There is some truth in his statement. South African Communist Party Chairperson Blade Nzimande at the party's fifth Special National Congress in December 2024 said: '(The) Moonshot Pact whose aim was bringing the ANC under 50%… They attained their goal of bringing the ANC under 50%.' Moonshot and doomsday The Multiparty Charter was aimed at kick-starting the realignment of South Africa's politics. The original agreement was that the 15-party member Multiparty Charter would, if the ANC fell below 50% in the 29 May 2024 elections, form a government, if needed, with pro-constitutional, business-friendly, civil society-friendly and media freedom supportive and racial diversity supporting parties, not part of the Multiparty Charter, but part of a Multiparty Charter Plus, who would be willing to govern with the group. The idea was that if the charter was unable to put together a national government, they would go into opposition as a collective and fight the 2026 local and the 2029 elections together. By working together in a pre-electoral coalition, the Multiparty Charter's aim was, whether in power or in opposition, to lay the foundations for the possibility for some members of the charter to be in a permanent coalition, or some members even merging in the future. The outcome of the 29 May 2024 general elections were dramatically different from what Multiparty Charter members or even the ANC or EFF had projected. The ANC dropped below the psychological barrier of 40% to 39.7% after the IEC's final audit of the results. Many of the Multiparty Charter members obtained fewer votes than they thought they would get. Although the collective opposition secured 61% of the vote, the Multiparty Charter group — even with the additional Multiparty Charter Plus members, parties such as Bosa and Rise Mzansi, who were not part of the charter, but who were open to joining it in the government — could not put together a government, because they would have needed the support of anti-constitutional parties the MK party and EFF, which want anti-democratic changes to the Constitution. A key pillar of the Multiparty Charter agreement was not to work with the ANC or with unconstitutional, violent parties or those that opposed non-racialism. The combination of bringing the ANC to below the 40% floor, and the inability to put together an alternative government of opposition parties, left the Multiparty Charter with one of two alternatives. The Multiparty Charter could stick with its founding agreement not to partner with the ANC and go into opposition, using the time also to forge closer unity. The charter, in opposition, could then benefit from the country's doomsday crash and in the 2029 election come to power. However, this would leave the ANC to partner with the EFF and MK in a 'doomsday' populist coalition that could lead to capital flight, skills flight, the rand to crash, and more state failure, lawlessness and corruption. In such a scenario, the Multiparty Charter would take over an Argentinian-collapse-like country. The other option was to ditch the Multiparty Charter principle of not partnering with the ANC, in order to try to prevent a South African crash, by partnering with the ANC to create a centrist leaning growth coalition. Key members of the Multiparty Charter, such as the DA, the IFP and Freedom Front Plus, decided to co-govern with the ANC, to prevent a 'doomsday' crash government. ActionSA and the African Christian Democratic Party declined to work with the ANC, deciding to stay true to the original Multiparty Charter agreement, that if the charter could not put together a government, it must as a group oppose the ANC in opposition, and then fight the 2026 local government elections and the 2029 national elections together. Unintended realignment The GNU is likely to change the ANC — and may lead to another breakaway in the ANC, between the pro-GNU and anti-GNU groups. There is a coming fallout within the ANC tripartite alliance of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and SACP, between the factions that want to continue the ANC having a partnership with the former Multiparty Charter members; and the factions wanting the ANC to align with the EFF and MK, formed by breakaway ANC members. The SACP claimed the ANC's partnership with the DA, IFP and FF Plus was the party embracing 'white monopoly capital'. The SACP will now contest the upcoming local elections as a separate party to the ANC. Cosatu said it remained 'concerned' about the DA/IFP/FF Plus inclusion in the GNU, and that it wanted the ANC to pursue a 'different option', meaning a GNU partnership with the EFF/MK. The endgame of this internal ANC battle may be another split in the ANC, this time between the party's constitutionalist, Social Democratic and non-racial wing and the remainder of its left populist wing, that has not defected to either the EFF or MK party. South Africa desperately needs a consolidation of parties. Many of the current parties should ideally close down, fold into bigger parties, or smaller parties should merge. If a consolidation of parties is not the route taken, then South African parties should form coalitions whereby they operate almost as one party, but retain their individual identity. Most of South Africa's parties share the same policies, ideologies, slogans and even colours, which can rarely be distinguished from one another, beyond having different leaders. Despite the many parties, South African voters have little choice, as parties are all the same. This is one of the reasons why so many parties get so few votes in elections, and why many South Africans refrain from voting. Sadly, gangsters, populists, ideologues, the prejudiced, the narrow-minded, the violent, the ignorant, and the corrupt are increasingly dominating South Africa's mainstream politics, economic, public and cultural discourse. The failure of the ANC-run state, the decline of the economy and the rising fracture of society, because the ANC, before the GNU, had become increasingly racially exclusionary, gave the space to populists, the corrupt, the violent and ideologues to mobilise support based on narrow identity laager politics, and to secure parliamentary and municipal positions. It is critical that the angry, violent, ignorant, narrow-minded and populist 'leaders' and groups on both the far left and far right be prevented from dominating South Africa's mainstream politics. South Africa needs a new pragmatic centre based on the embrace of the Constitution, common sense, reality, pragmatism and racial inclusivity. Such a new pragmatic centre must be based on honesty, decency, rationality and compassion that goes across race, identity or political affiliation and on governing in the widest public interests of all South Africans. The unintended impact of the GNU could just be such a realignment of the country's political parties, which could transform components of the current GNU political parties into a long-term centrist national coalition. DM Professor William Gumede is based at the School of Governance, University of the Witwatersrand, and is the author of the bestselling Restless Nation: Making Sense of Troubled Times; and former Independent Chairperson of the negotiations to establish the Multiparty Charter (Moonshot Pact), the 15-party pre-electoral opposition coalition group before the 29 May 2024 general elections, and advised parties in their negotiations to form the Government of National Unity.
Scotsman
11-06-2025
- General
- Scotsman
When is Father's Day 2025? Why do we celebrate, what are the traditions and when did it start?
Father's Day is this weekend. | Canva/Getty Images It's nearly time to celebrate the dads. Sign up to our Arts and Culture newsletter Sign up Thank you for signing up! Did you know with a Digital Subscription to The Scotsman, you can get unlimited access to the website including our premium content, as well as benefiting from fewer ads, loyalty rewards and much more. Learn More Sorry, there seem to be some issues. Please try again later. Submitting... It's nearly time for Father's Day - so make sure you've got your cards and presents (ties or socks?) ready. Mother's Day in March is traditionally more of a big deal in the UK, but it's also important to pay tribute to all the dads in our lives. Here's everything you need to know about the big(ish) day. Advertisement Hide Ad Advertisement Hide Ad When is Father's Day? In the UK Father's Day is celebrated on the third Sunday of June every year - so this year that means Sunday, June 15. But depending on where your dad lives in the world it may be celebrated on a different day, as every country seems to have its own idea on when it should be. In Australia and New Zealand it's on the first Sunday of September, in Switzerland it's the first Sunday of June and in Sweden the second Sunday of November. In many Catholic European countries, it's celebrated on March 19 as Saint Joseph's Day - marking the 'legal' father of Jesus Christ. In some countries - including Lithuania, Spain, Estonia, Samoa, and South Korea - it's a national or public holiday. Advertisement Hide Ad Advertisement Hide Ad When was Father's Day invented? The celebrations of Saint Joseph's Day have taken place since the middle ages around continental Europe, but in the UK Father's Day is a relatively new celebration - making its debut post-World War 2. In contrast Mothering Sunday has been celebrated since the early 19th century. It has a longer history in the USA - which along with Canada celebrates on the same day as the UK. On the other side of the Atlantic it was first observed in 1908, when a woman named Grace Clayton organised an event to remember her father who died in a mining accident. Father's Day eventually gained significance in its own right, with US President Richard Nixon making it into a national holiday in 1972. What is the point of Father's Day? Communities worldwide celebrate Father's Day as a means of recognising and honouring the contribution of fathers. It acknowledges the importance of fatherhood and the dedication of men towards their family and wider community. What are the traditions of Father's Day? In the UK it's traditional to visit fathers, grandfathers and great-grandfathers with a card and a gift. But there are more colourful traditions in other countries. In Germany it's tradition to go for a group hike. Advertisement Hide Ad Advertisement Hide Ad In Thailand everyone wears yellow on Father's Day and presents their fathers with a Canna flower. In Japan children gift their dads handmade beer glasses and boxes of Japanese sweets.
Daily Maverick
21-05-2025
- Business
- Daily Maverick
Nato and the G7 — global power fractures that Africa must watch
Geopolitical shifts in the Western alliance could have a considerable impact on Africa's fortunes. Two major summits in June could expedite one of the most significant strategic realignments in the international system. The Group of Seven (G7) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato) summits may determine how deep current political fractures run. Their outcomes will also suggest the extent to which certain actors are willing to pivot away from a collective Western bloc identity. This could see the locus of power becoming more evenly spread across either side of the Atlantic. The implications will be profound, and although Africa is not at the table, it will be affected. A more hard-nosed understanding of global power shifts and their effect on African countries' shared security and developmental agenda is needed. The G7 wields an outsized degree of influence on global governance. Its members represent more than half of the world's economic output, account for 55% of global military expenditure, and play a central role in trade with more than 90% of global foreign exchange reserves held in G7 currencies. More importantly, this group of leading market economies and liberal democracies has influenced the global order for nearly half a century. All its members, barring Japan, are also part of Nato – a cornerstone of the post-World War 2 international system with a shared commitment to collective defence. Broad policy consensus within both groupings has given credibility to a US-led international order and Western bloc identity, which has wielded considerable authority over the world's agenda. The West's cohesion and influence have increased in recent years, with its members united by a desire to counter a revanchist Russia and a rising China. However, this upward trend evaporated after US President Donald Trump's January inauguration. Nato's current pressure points relate to military expenditure. Topping this year's agenda will be elevated defence spending targets, which new secretary-general Mark Rutte has proposed at 3.5% of annual GDP by 2032. The Trump administration had called for 5%, despite most alliance members falling short of 2% over the past decade. Nato will also be concerned about the US' commitment to 'collective defence' and the alliance's long-term viability. Washington's stance on Russia's Ukraine invasion, its wide-ranging trade tariffs, 'America First' approach to macroeconomics and right-wing turn on social policy issues have soured relations among its G7 and Nato allies. Traditional US partners face three general scenarios. First is appeasement and acquiescence to the US continuing to lead the Western alliance. Second is paralysis under the weight of contradictions needed to find a workable middle ground with the US. Third is greater strategic autonomy from the US overall or within smaller coalitions of states across Europe, Japan and other like-minded actors. Course-correcting won't be easy. The US accounts for more than half of the G7's combined GDP, just under 16% of Nato's budget, and surpasses all other alliance members in annual military expenditure. Accordingly, the horse-trading and foreign policy recalibration needed to speak with one voice will take time, diluting the G7 and Nato's potency in the short term. For African countries, this presents a moment of profound opportunity and challenge in equal measure. Four key issues warrant greater attention by the continent's policymakers. First, the surge in global defence spending will continue, particularly among Nato members. This will happen across all three scenarios above and is likely to reduce budgets for aid, official development assistance and other financial support to Africa. Rough calculations based on Nato members spending 3.5% of their GDP on military expenditure amount to nearly $2-trillion a year, which could otherwise be allocated to social, climate and economic development initiatives. Initiatives like the G7's Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment and the Africa Renewable Energy Initiative could lose momentum due to budget cuts, or be used to champion greater private sector financing. Second, a narrower security agenda may be pursued, linking issues such as migration and critical mineral supply chains to Western interventions in African conflicts. While specific conflicts such as in Sudan, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Libya and the Sahel may receive attention, Africa likely won't feature as a collective geostrategic concern for the West like the Indo-Pacific does. Third, the global military expenditure surge, knock-on effects in the arms industry and shifting political priorities could mean more ad hoc, militarised responses to African conflicts. Support for these direct, politically expedient and less-costly interventions may grow as the effectiveness of multilateral peacekeeping wanes along with political appetites for long-term conflict prevention and peace-building. Finally, a more fractured Western alliance will enable other major international actors to continue expanding their influence in Africa. China, Turkey, the Gulf States, India and Russia will look to expand into gaps left by Western interests, particularly regarding security cooperation. For Russia, Africa will remain central to consolidating the activities of military contractors and state-controlled paramilitaries in countries like Mali, Libya, Burkina Faso, Niger and the Central African Republic. For China, Africa represents a testing ground for its increased power projection capabilities, pointing to a greater role as a security guarantor. The Gulf countries and Turkey have also ramped up their military influence in Africa. They now play central roles in security initiatives and facilitating negotiations from the Horn to north Africa, the Sahel and even the DRC. Similarly, India has increasingly looked towards Africa to raise its profile as a security partner. This has been buoyed by India's need to safeguard its maritime domain while providing joint field training exercises and hosting coordination meetings with African defence ministers. African policymakers must identify how these four issues are related and will affect the continent's security and development agenda. Responding to these geopolitical headwinds will require bold leadership, particularly from regional anchor states, including South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia. Leaders must strengthen the resilience of the African Union and regional economic communities. They should also seek new opportunities with emerging powers, while keeping a close eye on the storm brewing further north. DM
Daily Maverick
22-04-2025
- Business
- Daily Maverick
Donald Trump's doctrine of transactionalism has seismic global implications
There is a chilling Darwinian undertone to the world's evolving global order. The principle of survival of the fittest — once confined to the natural sciences — has found disturbing resonance in contemporary geopolitics. At a time when the international system desperately needs cooperation, stability and shared responsibility, it is instead slipping back into an unforgiving jungle where only the most adaptable, ruthless, venal or well-resourced states survive. Nowhere is this regression more evident than in the foreign policy of the United States of America under President Donald Trump, whose second term has entrenched a doctrine of transactionalism with seismic global implications. Multilateralism, once the cornerstone of the post-World War 2 international order, is in retreat. The rule of law — both domestic and international — has been relentlessly assailed, weakened by the very power that helped build the edifice. Ad hoc alliances Trump's disdain for global institutions is no longer rhetorical flourish, it is a governing principle. From the United Nations, International Court of Justice, to the World Trade Organization, vital institutions have been sidelined or undermined, and replaced with ad hoc alliances based not on shared values, but on expedient deals. Trump-era diplomacy is unambiguously transactional: alliances are only as good as their immediate returns, and loyalty is expected to be bought — often literally. In such a world, diplomacy resembles a global auction more than a forum for principled negotiation. This shift has placed developing nations in a precarious position. They must now barter access to resources or strategic concessions in exchange for support from the world's most powerful nation. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, is reportedly offering access to its vast stores of cobalt and lithium — minerals crucial for the global transition to clean energy — in return for US military assistance against Rwandan-backed rebel forces. But perhaps even more revealing is who is shaping these negotiations. Businessman Massad Boulos, the father-in-law of Trump's daughter Tiffany, has been appointed to explore such deals in the DRC and across the continent under the guise of Trump's senior adviser for Africa. That a presidential in-law is acting as a quasi-diplomatic envoy, brokering access to critical minerals in exchange for geopolitical favours, reflects the growing conflation of personal networks and state power — a deeply troubling hallmark of Trump-era diplomacy. One cannot help but speculate, perhaps naïvely, that South Africa's abrupt withdrawal from its long-standing peacekeeping mission in the DRC may be more than a matter of logistics or regional recalibration. Strategic goals Could it be that the move was conjured to clear the path for the US to assert greater influence in the region, considering that there are clear areas of friction that complicate South Africa and Washington's strategic goals on the continent? This withdrawal coincides with other notable shifts in DRC policy. Not long ago, the Congolese government firmly rebuffed what it perceived as coercive tactics by Starlink, the Elon Musk-owned satellite internet provider, in its pursuit of a telecommunications operating licence. Yet, recent reports suggest a reversal in posture: DRC leaders are now said to be engaged in talks and increasingly amenable to a potential agreement with Starlink. Furthermore, it is plausible that Musk is positioning himself to secure access to rare earth minerals from the politically unstable DRC to meet the growing demands of his Tesla electric vehicle company and battery foundries scattered across the globe. Such developments raise pertinent questions about the interplay of geopolitical pressure, resource diplomacy and the recalibration of sovereignty in the face of mounting global interest in the region's strategic assets. Meanwhile, the oligarchs who played a significant role in championing Trump's re-election campaign now find themselves perilously close to the levers of US foreign policy. This proximity poses a troubling prospect, as it risks entrenching a foreign policy agenda that undermines multilateralism and erodes the sovereignty of nations. Their influence risks transforming America's global engagements into a mirror of plutocratic interest — where foreign policy is no longer a public good but a private enterprise. Multilateralism, in this context, is not simply under pressure — it is endangered. The idea that nations can come together to solve global problems, from climate change to security threats, is being supplanted by a Darwinian struggle for influence, greed and survival. For weaker states, the lesson is sobering: principles are costly, and pragmatism is the new price of entry. Profound consequences The consequences are profound and perilous. Global governance has long been imperfect, but it relied on a set of shared assumptions: that power should be tempered by law, that institutions matter and that cooperation was preferable to coercion. These assumptions are rapidly collapsing. It is more precise to frame South Africa's foreign policy positioning as one of strategic autonomy rather than, as some might think, adversarial intent. It is driven by a commitment to multilateralism, Global South solidarity and sovereign decision-making free from bloc-based coercion. This stance may frustrate US ambitions for influence or alignment on certain geopolitical issues, but it does not amount to adversarial behaviour in the sense of active obstruction or hostility. It is not beyond the realm of plausibility that strategic interests of some economic hitmen, jockeying to leverage Trump's geopolitical orientation, particularly in the Great Lakes region, collide with South Africa's foreign policy independence and national interests. In this context, President Cyril Ramaphosa's appointment of certain individuals — particularly business figures who are not universally accepted in some quarters — to strategic positions may well be perceived as a potential impediment to the pursuit of opaque and possibly nefarious agendas that run counter to South Africa's national interests. In the jungle of international affairs, where the rule of law is assailed and multilateralism mocked as weakness, only those prepared to play by the ruthless rules of transactionalism are likely to survive. But in the long run, even the fittest will find that a world without rules is a world without refuge. We have reached a new frontier, where foreign policy is no longer a public good but a private enterprise. What remains to be asked of South Africa's foreign policy orientation is this: Quo vadis? Where are we headed — and at what cost to principle, sovereignty, and strategic coherence? It is high time South Africa shed the veneer of naïveté, timidity and appeasement that seems to characterise its posture in dealings with the United States and organised business. DM
