Latest news with #pro-Tehran
The National
23-04-2025
- Politics
- The National
French Foreign Minister urges to keep Iraq away from Middle East conflicts
Iraq should not be dragged into regional conflicts as it emerges from decades of instability, France's Foreign Minister Jean-Noel Barrot said on Wednesday, during his visit to the capital Baghdad. Mr Barrot began his tour of the Middle East with Iraq, where he is looking to strengthen bilateral ties and lay the ground for two key conferences on regional peace. During the two-day trip, Mr Barrot will hold meetings with senior officials in Baghdad including Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al Sudani, as well as members of the semi-autonomous Kurdistan regional government. "France wants to stand firmly with Iraq during this sensitive period," Mr Barrot said in a joint press conference with Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein. "There is a principle of supporting Iraq in its political choices to build its future." After decades of conflict and political turmoil, Iraq is showing signs of improved security and growing political stability. Violence has declined significantly compared to nearly a decade ago, allowing for reconstruction efforts and a gradual return to normal life in many areas. However, the country is treading a fine line in balancing relations with the US and Iran, which are both allies. During the war on Gaza, Baghdad has been aiming not to be drawn into the fighting after pro-Tehran factions launched numerous attacks on US troops based in Iraq, as well as mostly failed strikes aimed at Israel. There have been no attacks for months now. "It is essential for Iraq not to be drawn into conflicts it did not choose," Mr Barrot said, praising the government's efforts to "preserve the stability of the country." "We are convinced that a strong and independent Iraq is a source of stability for the entire region, which is threatened today by the conflict that started on October 7, and Iran's destabilising activities," he added. Mr Hussein described Iraq's relations with France as "broad and historical", saying the two ministers discussed ways to boost them in all fields. Iraq and France have been strengthening bilateral relations in sectors including energy and security. France has stationed troops in Iraq as part of the US-led international coalition to fight ISIS, which was defeated in Iraq in 2017, although some of its cells remain active. Before his arrival, the French Foreign Ministry said Mr Barrot's visit will 'affirm France's commitment to the stability of Iraq', adding that he will discuss preparations for the third Baghdad Conference aimed at promoting regional stability and co-operation. The conference, which is attended by nations from across the Middle East and Europe, has been organised by Paris and Baghdad since 2021. Discussions will also cover France's 'commitment to continuing the fight against [ISIS], in the context of the transition in neighbouring Syria and the repositioning of the American presence', the ministry added. The US said on Friday that it would reduce its troop presence in Syria by about half, cutting the number of soldiers to fewer than 1,000 in the coming months. Washington also agreed with Baghdad last December to withdraw US troops from some parts of Iraq following their presence there for a decade to help fight ISIS. After Iraq, Mr Barrot will head to Kuwait and Saudi Arabia over three days. The French ministry said Mr Barrot will also discuss preparations for another international conference, to be held in New York in June, on the implementation of a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. France is co-organising the event with Saudi Arabia. President Emmanuel Macron this month announced France's intention to recognise a Palestinian state as part of a broader diplomatic drive aimed at securing regional peace and setting up Arab diplomatic relations with Israel. 'What we want to trigger is a series of other recognitions' of a Palestinian state, 'but also the recognition of Israel by states that today do not do so,' Mr Macron said last week.
Yahoo
15-04-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Iran Couldn't Avoid Talking With Trump Any Longer
In the first few weeks of Donald Trump's second term, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, repeatedly rejected the U.S. president's offer of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, just as he had during Trump's first term. Tehran would not talk to this U.S. administration, Khamenei insisted. And even if it did talk, it would only do so indirectly. Talking to Washington was 'not honorable,' the supreme leader claimed. Khamenei's objections collapsed on Saturday evening when Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, chatted with Trump's Middle East envoy, Steven Witkoff, in the residence of Oman's foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, in Muscat. Prior to this hallway chat, the two sides had spent close to five hours in two different wings of Albusaidi's palatial home, exchanging written messages with Oman's top diplomat as their mediator. The direct discussion, long demanded by Trump but rejected by Iranian officials, showed just how well the initial talks via Albusaidi had gone. But it also underscored how weak, even humiliating, a position Khamenei finds himself in. The U.S. and its allies in the Middle East want to ensure that Iran won't build nuclear weapons; Iran wants to gain relief from harsh U.S.-led economic sanctions and avoid potential Israeli or American military strikes on its nuclear sites. Until recently, Khamenei was unwilling to consider making the concessions necessary for an agreement. But the pressure on Khamenei's regime—both external and domestic—has grown to the point that he had no choice but to retreat. [Read: Iran wants to talk] During the past year, Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance, a coalition of pro-Tehran militias across the Middle East, has been crushed by Israeli strikes on Lebanon's Hezbollah and American strikes on Yemen's Houthis. The Syrian revolution that brought down Bashar al-Assad, Khamenei's close ally, further eroded the Iranian leader's strategy of 'forward defense'—which is to say, relying on its Arab proxies to keep its adversaries away from the homeland. Meanwhile, Trump has also bolstered America's presence in the Persian Gulf, suggesting to Khamenei that military attacks on Iranian soil are the most likely alternative to negotiations. Inside Iran, public discontent with the regime's political repression and economic mismanagement has grown. Many in the Iranian establishment are making ever more explicit demands for an end to their country's isolation. In a remarkable display of elite dissatisfaction, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, Mohammad Bagheri, commemorated the Iranian New Year holidays earlier this month by shooting a video message outside Persepolis, the seat of the First Persian Empire, which dates back to the sixth century B.C.E. Bagheri expressed hope that Iran could follow 'the same ideals' he had witnessed in the ancient monument: 'peace, calm, friendship, and brotherhood with other nations.' Such a statement from Iran's top soldier was unprecedented: Glorifying Iran's pre-Islamic past is taboo for officials of the Islamic Republic. Bagheri also spoke of 'peace with other nations,' which in the tightly constrained vocabulary of Iranian politics is code for diplomatic engagement with the West. Proponents of such engagement are gaining strength in Tehran. Former President Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated Iran's nuclear agreement with Barack Obama's administration in 2015, has reemerged and is bitterly attacking people who oppose talking to the United States. By contrast, Khamenei's most devout anti-American followers find themselves isolated. Their preferred presidential candidate, Saeed Jalili, badly lost the election last year. Khamenei himself has taken a more conciliatory tone and openly speaks of welcoming American business. In an op-ed for The Washington Post, Araghchi said Trump could become 'a president of peace.' For Iran's foreign minister to bestow this title upon the man who ordered the killing of Khamenei's favorite general, Qassem Soleimani, is astonishing. Just like that, a new round of Iranian-American diplomacy has started. A second round of talks is scheduled for Saturday. The evidence suggests that the two sides have agreed at least on a framework for initial dialogue. Perhaps Iran is ready to make real concessions. Maybe it will accept heightened monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose head will visit Tehran this month. If Iran and the U.S. can make a deal now, it might prove more enduring than the Obama-era one that Trump backed out of in 2018. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had led an impassioned campaign against Obama even talking to Iran, would be less likely to undermine an agreement negotiated with Trump, with whom he is much friendlier. Saudi Arabia and other Arab powers that felt left out by Obama's focus on Iran are now welcoming the talks in Oman. The talks could fail, of course. During Trump's first term, U.S. discussions with North Korea over its nuclear program quickly collapsed despite all the buzz around his meeting with Kim Jong Un. The U.S. president's lack of patience and his preference for showmanship may not bode well for the difficult, technical talks that must precede any substantive agreement with Iran. Faced with making real concessions to the U.S., Khamenei might panic. [Read: The Axis of Resistance keeps getting smaller] When talks get under way Saturday, Khamenei will be celebrating his 86th birthday. The jockeying to succeed him has begun, and his current humiliation is visible to Iranians. His shift in position offers a sign of hope that the page can be finally turned on his disastrous legacy. Last weekend, just as the Muscat talks were going on, Asadollah Amraee, a longtime Iranian writer, posted a photo on Instagram of a woman walking on a Tehran street with her curly hair uncovered, in defiance of the regime's mandatory-veiling rules. She was passing by a building emblazoned with the slogan Death to the USA and a quote by Khamenei: 'We will not accommodate to America, not even for a moment.' 'No comment,' is how Amraee delicately captioned the picture to his 120,000 followers. But the message was clear: Just as the regime gave up on imposing the hijab on women, it will also have to give up on its anti-Americanism. In the comments section, Reza Kianian, one of Iran's best-known actors and public intellectuals, opined: 'Time and habit makes everything ordinary.' Khamenei's vision of an Islamist, anti-American, anti-Israeli Iran is unlikely to survive him. Although some opponents of the Iranian regime worry that a new nuclear deal might throw it a lifeline, Khamenei's need to negotiate more likely augurs his regime's unravelling. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
15-04-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
Iran Couldn't Avoid Talking With Trump Any Longer
In the first few weeks of Donald Trump's second term, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, repeatedly rejected the U.S. president's offer of negotiations over Iran's nuclear program, just as he had during Trump's first term. Tehran would not talk to this U.S. administration, Khamenei insisted. And even if it did talk, it would only do so indirectly. Talking to Washington was 'not honorable,' the supreme leader claimed. Khamenei's objections collapsed on Saturday evening when Iran's foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, chatted with Trump's Middle East envoy, Steven Witkoff, in the residence of Oman's foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, in Muscat. Prior to this hallway chat, the two sides had spent close to five hours in two different wings of Albusaidi's palatial home, exchanging written messages with Oman's top diplomat as their mediator. The direct discussion, long demanded by Trump but rejected by Iranian officials, showed just how well the initial talks via Albusaidi had gone. But it also underscored how weak, even humiliating, a position Khamenei finds himself in. The U.S. and its allies in the Middle East want to ensure that Iran won't build nuclear weapons; Iran wants to gain relief from harsh U.S.-led economic sanctions and avoid potential Israeli or American military strikes on its nuclear sites. Until recently, Khamenei was unwilling to consider making the concessions necessary for an agreement. But the pressure on Khamenei's regime—both external and domestic—has grown to the point that he had no choice but to retreat. During the past year, Iran's so-called Axis of Resistance, a coalition of pro-Tehran militias across the Middle East, has been crushed by Israeli strikes on Lebanon's Hezbollah and American strikes on Yemen's Houthis. The Syrian revolution that brought down Bashar al-Assad, Khamenei's close ally, further eroded the Iranian leader's strategy of 'forward defense'—which is to say, relying on its Arab proxies to keep its adversaries away from the homeland. Meanwhile, Trump has also bolstered America's presence in the Persian Gulf, suggesting to Khamenei that military attacks on Iranian soil are the most likely alternative to negotiations. Inside Iran, public discontent with the regime's political repression and economic mismanagement has grown. Many in the Iranian establishment are making ever more explicit demands for an end to their country's isolation. In a remarkable display of elite dissatisfaction, the chief of staff of Iran's armed forces, Mohammad Bagheri, commemorated the Iranian New Year holidays earlier this month by shooting a video message outside Persepolis, the seat of the First Persian Empire, which dates back to the sixth century B.C.E. Bagheri expressed hope that Iran could follow 'the same ideals' he had witnessed in the ancient monument: 'peace, calm, friendship, and brotherhood with other nations.' Such a statement from Iran's top soldier was unprecedented: Glorifying Iran's pre-Islamic past is taboo for officials of the Islamic Republic. Bagheri also spoke of 'peace with other nations,' which in the tightly constrained vocabulary of Iranian politics is code for diplomatic engagement with the West. Proponents of such engagement are gaining strength in Tehran. Former President Hassan Rouhani, who negotiated Iran's nuclear agreement with Barack Obama's administration in 2015, has reemerged and is bitterly attacking people who oppose talking to the United States. By contrast, Khamenei's most devout anti-American followers find themselves isolated. Their preferred presidential candidate, Saeed Jalili, badly lost the election last year. Khamenei himself has taken a more conciliatory tone and openly speaks of welcoming American business. In an op-ed for The Washington Post, Araghchi said Trump could become 'a president of peace.' For Iran's foreign minister to bestow this title upon the man who ordered the killing of Khamenei's favorite general, Qassem Soleimani, is astonishing. Just like that, a new round of Iranian-American diplomacy has started. A second round of talks is scheduled for Saturday. The evidence suggests that the two sides have agreed at least on a framework for initial dialogue. Perhaps Iran is ready to make real concessions. Maybe it will accept heightened monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency, whose head will visit Tehran this month. If Iran and the U.S. can make a deal now, it might prove more enduring than the Obama-era one that Trump backed out of in 2018. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who had led an impassioned campaign against Obama even talking to Iran, would be less likely to undermine an agreement negotiated with Trump, with whom he is much friendlier. Saudi Arabia and other Arab powers that felt left out by Obama's focus on Iran are now welcoming the talks in Oman. The talks could fail, of course. During Trump's first term, U.S. discussions with North Korea over its nuclear program quickly collapsed despite all the buzz around his meeting with Kim Jong Un. The U.S. president's lack of patience and his preference for showmanship may not bode well for the difficult, technical talks that must precede any substantive agreement with Iran. Faced with making real concessions to the U.S., Khamenei might panic. When talks get under way Saturday, Khamenei will be celebrating his 86th birthday. The jockeying to succeed him has begun, and his current humiliation is visible to Iranians. His shift in position offers a sign of hope that the page can be finally turned on his disastrous legacy. Last weekend, just as the Muscat talks were going on, Asadollah Amraee, a longtime Iranian writer, posted a photo on Instagram of a woman walking on a Tehran street with her curly hair uncovered, in defiance of the regime's mandatory-veiling rules. She was passing by a building emblazoned with the slogan Death to the USA and a quote by Khamenei: 'We will not accommodate to America, not even for a moment.' 'No comment,' is how Amraee delicately captioned the picture to his 120,000 followers. But the message was clear: Just as the regime gave up on imposing the hijab on women, it will also have to give up on its anti-Americanism. In the comments section, Reza Kianian, one of Iran's best-known actors and public intellectuals, opined: 'Time and habit makes everything ordinary.' Khamenei's vision of an Islamist, anti-American, anti-Israeli Iran is unlikely to survive him. Although some opponents of the Iranian regime worry that a new nuclear deal might throw it a lifeline, Khamenei's need to negotiate more likely augurs his regime's unravelling.
Yahoo
25-02-2025
- Politics
- Yahoo
Even Iraq Wants to Leave Iran's Axis
The Iranian regime spent decades building the Axis of Resistance, a coalition of anti-Western militias that extended Tehran's influence deep into the Arab world. But what takes years to build can collapse seemingly overnight. Iraq is the latest country in which many leaders are attempting to move out of Iran's orbit. Last year, the Axis rapidly slid from the seeming height of its power into terminal decline. Israel battered two key members, Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad fell to its opponents. In Lebanon, the Parliament elected a new president and a new prime minister who are not on friendly terms with the Axis. Until recently, Tehran liked to boast that it controlled four Arab capitals: Damascus, Beirut, Sanaa, and Baghdad. The first two have slipped away. The third is still controlled by the Houthis, who remain loyal to Tehran. But what about the fourth? Iran's influence in Baghdad runs through the country's Shiite militias and political parties. Iraq's prime minister can hardly govern without the support of Shiite groups. And yet, the degree of Tehran's control over Baghdad is always changing. Pro-Tehran parties can't form a government on their own; they have to form coalitions with other parties, including those dominated by Kurds and Sunnis, who have little ideological affinity with the Axis. And even among Iraq's Shia, the pro-Tehran position is heavily contested—all the more so, surely, now that the region's balance of power has shifted away from Iran. In 2021, pro-Tehran parties were roundly defeated in Iraq's parliamentary elections. Muqtada al-Sadr, a charismatic Shia cleric and vociferous critic of Iran, looked set to form a government. But the pro-Iranian forces staged violent street clashes and, through clerical and parliamentary maneuvering, managed to stop this. Mohammed al-Sudani assumed the premiership in October 2022 in what was largely seen as an Iranian victory—not least because the prime minister he replaced, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, had been Iraq's first non-Islamist ruler since the fall of Saddam. Kadhimi had restored Iraqi ties with Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, even while keeping excellent relations with Iran and encouraging the restoration of Iranian-Saudi diplomatic relations. Yet Tehran's hold over Baghdad is far from secure. Al-Sudani relies on the support of the pro-Tehran parties, but he has also continued to pursue much of Kadhimi's regional agenda of cementing ties with Arab states. And two of his major coalition partners, the Sunni-dominated Progress Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), had previously formed a pact with Sadr. Even Sudani's own small party, the Euphrates Movement (also known by its Arabic name, al-Furatayn), once explored a coalition with Sadr. Which is to say that Sadr has lost the intra-Shia battle for now, but his previous allies still hold a good deal of power in Iraq and share it with the pro-Tehran parties at their pleasure. Many issues divide Iraqis, but one unites many of them: They don't want Iraq to be a battleground for Iran's conflicts with the United States and Israel. Nor, given the declining fortunes of Tehran's Axis, do they wish to be on the losing team in the region. When Assad fell, Tehran went into a panic. Iraqis, meanwhile, attempted to normalize relations with the new Syrian administration. On December 26, Iraq's intelligence chief visited Damascus and met with Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Iraqis have also taken part in Arab League engagements with Syria. [Graeme Wood: The fall of Aleppo was oddly familiar] Many in Iraq are now openly calling for disbanding the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of mostly Iran-backed militias formed in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. Explicitly modeled after Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the PMF has been the main vehicle for Iranian meddling in Iraq. Members of the Iraqi government have begun arguing that with the Sunni terrorist group mostly defeated, the PMF is no longer necessary. 'I hope that we can convince the leaders of these groups to lay down their arms,' Fuad Hussein, Iraq's foreign minister and a KDP stalwart, said in an interview last month. 'Two or three years ago, it was impossible to discuss this topic in our society.' Today Sadr, too, has called for only the state security forces, 'and not militias or outlaw groups,' to bear arms. More surprisingly, some figures from inside the Coalition Framework, an umbrella of mostly pro-Tehran parties, have endorsed this position—among them, Mohsen al-Mandalawi, a Shia Kurdish billionaire and the deputy speaker of the Parliament. Disbanding armed militias or incorporating them into security forces loyal to the state would effectively take away Iran's main source of leverage inside Iraq. Such a move may also be calculated to head off trouble with Washington. The new Trump administration is reportedly considering fresh sanctions against Iraq unless the PMF is disarmed. During his first presidential term, President Donald Trump launched drone strikes into Baghdad that killed the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and the PMF's deputy commander, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. As a result, the Iraqi judiciary has an outstanding warrant for Trump's arrest. But now that the former president is back in power, the Iraqi government may be looking to smooth things over. Al-Sudani and Iraq's ceremonial president, Abdul Latif Rashid, have sent congratulatory messages to the U.S. president, upon his election in November and his inauguration last month. Speaking to Reuters last month, Hussein said he hoped Iraq would 'continue [its] good relationship with Washington' under Trump. And Ali Nima, an MP with the Coordination Framework, recently said that he expected Iraqi-American relations to improve and that the pro-Iranian group was 'not concerned about Trump.' Relations with Tehran, meanwhile, seem more contentious than ever. Last month, Sudani visited Tehran and got an earful from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The elderly Iranian cleric called for Iraq to preserve and strengthen the PMF and to expel all American forces. He also called the recent change of power in Syria the work of 'alien governments.' [Arash Azizi: RIP, the Axis of Resistance] Is all of this enough to suggest that Iraq, too, is leaving Iran's Axis? The Iraq experts I spoke with did not agree on the answer to this question. 'Iran continues to wield significant influence in Iraq,' Hamdi Malik, an associate fellow at the Washington Institute, told me. He pointed out that Sudani's government initially sent the new Syrian regime 'cautious yet positive signals,' but that 'the tone in Iraq's Shia circles shifted completely after Khamenei expressed a completely hostile view of developments there.' Moreover, the Sudani government relies heavily on the support of the Coordination Framework, many of whose parties derive their power and influence from Iran. 'Therefore,' Malik told me, 'any attempt by Sudani to curb Iran's influence will be merely cosmetic.' Farhang Faraydoon Namdar, a Kurdish Iraqi analyst at Missouri State University, agreed. The PMF still has some 200,000 members and an almost $3 billion budget. That force is most likely not going anywhere, he observed, the calls for disbanding it notwithstanding. And 'almost all PMF groups are loyal to Iran,' Namdar told me. 'The PMF has been able to entrench itself in Iraq's economy and politics … they are the backbone of Sudani's government.' But Iraq's position may be more complex than that of a simple vassal to a neighboring regime. Baghdad is uniquely situated to balance Iranian interests against those of the region's Sunni Arab states, and it is working hard to build partnerships with its non-Iranian neighbors. Arran Robert Walshe, an Iraq expert based in Amman, told me he believes that Sudani is 'cautiously disentangling Iraq from the Axis without fully severing ties to Tehran.' But Tehran and its Iraqi allies could spoil those efforts, Walshe cautions—for example, by attacking development projects in which Gulf states have invested. Iraq will hold parliamentary elections in October. If enough Iraqis reject pro-Tehran parties at the polls, as most did in 2021, Sudani or a successor may have the opportunity to form a government that does more to assert Iraqi sovereignty. Parties currently in the Coordination Framework could even break away from Tehran and run on new platforms. By the unwritten sectarian power-sharing deal that has ruled the country since 2003, the Iraqi prime minister must always be an Arab Shiite. But he is not guaranteed to be pro-Axis. Article originally published at The Atlantic
Atlantic
25-02-2025
- Politics
- Atlantic
Even Iraq Wants to Leave Iran's Axis
The Iranian regime spent decades building the Axis of Resistance, a coalition of anti-Western militias that extended Tehran's influence deep into the Arab world. But what takes years to build can collapse seemingly overnight. Iraq is the latest country in which many leaders are attempting to move out of Iran's orbit. Last year, the Axis rapidly slid from the seeming height of its power into terminal decline. Israel battered two key members, Hamas and Hezbollah, and the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad fell to its opponents. In Lebanon, the Parliament elected a new president and a new prime minister who are not on friendly terms with the Axis. Until recently, Tehran liked to boast that it controlled four Arab capitals: Damascus, Beirut, Sanaa, and Baghdad. The first two have slipped away. The third is still controlled by the Houthis, who remain loyal to Tehran. But what about the fourth? Iran's influence in Baghdad runs through the country's Shiite militias and political parties. Iraq's prime minister can hardly govern without the support of Shiite groups. And yet, the degree of Tehran's control over Baghdad is always changing. Pro-Tehran parties can't form a government on their own; they have to form coalitions with other parties, including those dominated by Kurds and Sunnis, who have little ideological affinity with the Axis. And even among Iraq's Shia, the pro-Tehran position is heavily contested—all the more so, surely, now that the region's balance of power has shifted away from Iran. In 2021, pro-Tehran parties were roundly defeated in Iraq's parliamentary elections. Muqtada al-Sadr, a charismatic Shia cleric and vociferous critic of Iran, looked set to form a government. But the pro-Iranian forces staged violent street clashes and, through clerical and parliamentary maneuvering, managed to stop this. Mohammed al-Sudani assumed the premiership in October 2022 in what was largely seen as an Iranian victory—not least because the prime minister he replaced, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, had been Iraq's first non-Islamist ruler since the fall of Saddam. Kadhimi had restored Iraqi ties with Sunni powers such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan, even while keeping excellent relations with Iran and encouraging the restoration of Iranian-Saudi diplomatic relations. Yet Tehran's hold over Baghdad is far from secure. Al-Sudani relies on the support of the pro-Tehran parties, but he has also continued to pursue much of Kadhimi's regional agenda of cementing ties with Arab states. And two of his major coalition partners, the Sunni-dominated Progress Party and the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), had previously formed a pact with Sadr. Even Sudani's own small party, the Euphrates Movement (also known by its Arabic name, al-Furatayn), once explored a coalition with Sadr. Which is to say that Sadr has lost the intra-Shia battle for now, but his previous allies still hold a good deal of power in Iraq and share it with the pro-Tehran parties at their pleasure. Many issues divide Iraqis, but one unites many of them: They don't want Iraq to be a battleground for Iran's conflicts with the United States and Israel. Nor, given the declining fortunes of Tehran's Axis, do they wish to be on the losing team in the region. When Assad fell, Tehran went into a panic. Iraqis, meanwhile, attempted to normalize relations with the new Syrian administration. On December 26, Iraq's intelligence chief visited Damascus and met with Syria's new leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa. Iraqis have also taken part in Arab League engagements with Syria. Graeme Wood: The fall of Aleppo was oddly familiar Many in Iraq are now openly calling for disbanding the Popular Mobilization Forces, an umbrella of mostly Iran-backed militias formed in 2014 to fight the Islamic State. Explicitly modeled after Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, the PMF has been the main vehicle for Iranian meddling in Iraq. Members of the Iraqi government have begun arguing that with the Sunni terrorist group mostly defeated, the PMF is no longer necessary. 'I hope that we can convince the leaders of these groups to lay down their arms,' Fuad Hussein, Iraq's foreign minister and a KDP stalwart, said in an interview last month. 'Two or three years ago, it was impossible to discuss this topic in our society.' Today Sadr, too, has called for only the state security forces, 'and not militias or outlaw groups,' to bear arms. More surprisingly, some figures from inside the Coalition Framework, an umbrella of mostly pro-Tehran parties, have endorsed this position—among them, Mohsen al-Mandalawi, a Shia Kurdish billionaire and the deputy speaker of the Parliament. Disbanding armed militias or incorporating them into security forces loyal to the state would effectively take away Iran's main source of leverage inside Iraq. Such a move may also be calculated to head off trouble with Washington. The new Trump administration is reportedly considering fresh sanctions against Iraq unless the PMF is disarmed. During his first presidential term, President Donald Trump launched drone strikes into Baghdad that killed the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani and the PMF's deputy commander, Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis. As a result, the Iraqi judiciary has an outstanding warrant for Trump's arrest. But now that the former president is back in power, the Iraqi government may be looking to smooth things over. Al-Sudani and Iraq's ceremonial president, Abdul Latif Rashid, have sent congratulatory messages to the U.S. president, upon his election in November and his inauguration last month. Speaking to Reuters last month, Hussein said he hoped Iraq would 'continue [its] good relationship with Washington' under Trump. And Ali Nima, an MP with the Coordination Framework, recently said that he expected Iraqi-American relations to improve and that the pro-Iranian group was 'not concerned about Trump.' Relations with Tehran, meanwhile, seem more contentious than ever. Last month, Sudani visited Tehran and got an earful from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. The elderly Iranian cleric called for Iraq to preserve and strengthen the PMF and to expel all American forces. He also called the recent change of power in Syria the work of 'alien governments.' Arash Azizi: RIP, the Axis of Resistance Is all of this enough to suggest that Iraq, too, is leaving Iran's Axis? The Iraq experts I spoke with did not agree on the answer to this question. 'Iran continues to wield significant influence in Iraq,' Hamdi Malik, an associate fellow at the Washington Institute, told me. He pointed out that Sudani's government initially sent the new Syrian regime 'cautious yet positive signals,' but that 'the tone in Iraq's Shia circles shifted completely after Khamenei expressed a completely hostile view of developments there.' Moreover, the Sudani government relies heavily on the support of the Coordination Framework, many of whose parties derive their power and influence from Iran. 'Therefore,' Malik told me, 'any attempt by Sudani to curb Iran's influence will be merely cosmetic.' Farhang Faraydoon Namdar, a Kurdish Iraqi analyst at Missouri State University, agreed. The PMF still has some 200,000 members and an almost $3 billion budget. That force is most likely not going anywhere, he observed, the calls for disbanding it notwithstanding. And 'almost all PMF groups are loyal to Iran,' Namdar told me. 'The PMF has been able to entrench itself in Iraq's economy and politics … they are the backbone of Sudani's government.' But Iraq's position may be more complex than that of a simple vassal to a neighboring regime. Baghdad is uniquely situated to balance Iranian interests against those of the region's Sunni Arab states, and it is working hard to build partnerships with its non-Iranian neighbors. Arran Robert Walshe, an Iraq expert based in Amman, told me he believes that Sudani is 'cautiously disentangling Iraq from the Axis without fully severing ties to Tehran.' But Tehran and its Iraqi allies could spoil those efforts, Walshe cautions—for example, by attacking development projects in which Gulf states have invested. Iraq will hold parliamentary elections in October. If enough Iraqis reject pro-Tehran parties at the polls, as most did in 2021, Sudani or a successor may have the opportunity to form a government that does more to assert Iraqi sovereignty. Parties currently in the Coordination Framework could even break away from Tehran and run on new platforms. By the unwritten sectarian power-sharing deal that has ruled the country since 2003, the Iraqi prime minister must always be an Arab Shiite. But he is not guaranteed to be pro-Axis.
