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Iran returns to talks as ‘non-declared' nuclear power
Iran returns to talks as ‘non-declared' nuclear power

Deccan Herald

time9 hours ago

  • Business
  • Deccan Herald

Iran returns to talks as ‘non-declared' nuclear power

Hardly a month into the Israel-Iran ceasefire initiated by United States President Donald Trump, new attempts to kickstart talks have begun. In consultation with Washington, the three European powers (E3) — France, the United Kingdom, and Germany — who are signatories of the 2015 Iran deal (JCPOA) are trying to reopen negotiations over the limits of Iran's nuclear activities. But they are dealing with a transformed Iran — a veritable non-declared nuclear weapon State in secret possession of 409 kilogrammes of highly-enriched uranium enough to make 10 nuclear bombs, and answerable to admission that the damage to its nuclear sites inflicted by the US air strikes is 'serious and severe' messages that any resumption of uranium enrichment activity as such will take time. Equally, its readiness for talks with the E3 is logical, as the countdown has begun for the expiry of the JCPOA in October, and the stage is shifting to the UN Security Council by the end of August when the European powers take the call to invoke the snapback mechanism and restore UN held consultations with the senior officials of Russia and China in Tehran last Thursday. Although Russia and China cannot exercise veto to block the snapback mechanism, they hold veto power vis-à-vis any E3 move to push the deadline for extending sanctions. Tehran expects Russia and China to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any restored round of discussion with the E3 at the official level was held in Istanbul on Friday. Little emerged from the meeting, but the Iranian side said the talks were 'frank and detailed,' addressing issues including last month's war and the possible restoration of sanctions. According to Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran's deputy foreign minister, 'Both sides came to the meeting with specific ideas, the various aspects of which were examined. It was agreed that consultations on this matter will continue.' .Trump warns Iran that its nuclear sites could be bombed E3 realise that there is hardly any time left to reach an agreement by the end of August, and would rather kick the can down the road by extending the timeline for actually restoring the sanctions. Against this backdrop, Manouchehr Mottaki, a former foreign minister and an influential member of the Majlis representing Tehran, has warned in an interview on Sunday that any move by the E3 to trigger the snapback mechanism of the JCPOA to pressure Tehran will instantaneously prompt the parliament to approve a motion to pull Iran out of the main sticking point continues to be the Trump administration's insistence at Israeli behest that Iran give up enrichment of uranium altogether and Iran's refusal to do so insisting it would instead agree to strict limits on that enrichment of the kind laid out in the 2015 some of the Europeans are reportedly less adamant so long as limits on enrichment are severe and monitored more closely than they are now. Considering that E3 is in constant consultations with Washington, the Trump administration too may have an open mind. Herein, possibly, lies the 'breakthrough' that Iran's Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, in a recent interview with Fox News, claimed to have reached in his talks with US special envoy Steve Witkoff which the sudden Israeli attack on June 13 two related issues arise — first, the whereabouts of 408 kg of highly-enriched uranium [at 60 per cent] that Iran reportedly removed from its nuclear sites prior to the US bombing on July 22, and, second, Iran's revised parameters for any future IAEA has agreed to allow a technical team from the IAEA to visit Tehran in the coming weeks 'to discuss a new modality" on future interaction but 'not to go to the [nuclear] sites.' Technical level discussions on the nitty gritty of the IAEA safeguards are time-consuming. Meanwhile, what is happening to the 409 kg of 60 per cent enriched uranium is the million dollar question. In a recent podcast, the professor emeritus of science, technology, and international security at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a former Pentagon adviser, Theodore Postol, suggested that Iran must now be viewed in geopolitical terms as a 'non-declared nuclear weapon state', having shown in an experiment in early 2023 already that it could enrich uranium at 83.7 per cent, enough to make nuclear weapons. Postol points out that Iran now needs almost no enrichment effort to go to 90 per cent or above to produce nuclear bombs. There is no more monitoring of its production of centrifuges for the next several months at least, and each cascade can produce an estimated one bomb every 4-5 weeks. This can be done in total secrecy as no gigantic facility like Natanz is needed for it. A cascade can be installed in a room of 60 square meters with access to minimal electricity to operate the cascade — as little as 20 watts. Therefore, according to Postol, all that is needed is a small operation, if push comes to shove. In comparable circumstances, he recalled, Pakistan needed just 15 days after India this is a surreal situation. Look at the interplay of light and shade where images can be truths and semi-truths or quasi-truths bordering on fakes. Trump believes Iran's nuclear sites have been 'obliterated' (quasi-truth) while Iran says US bombing inflicted 'serious and severe' damage to its nuclear site (semi-truth). The E3 plans to trigger the JCPOA's snapback mechanism because Iran has violated the 2015 deal (quasi-truth) while Iran warns that if UN sanctions are restored in any such contrived manner, it will quit NPT (truth). The E3 is exploring ways and means of deferring restoration of sanctions (truth) but Iran disfavours it (semi-truth) while Russia and China will need to co-operate with the E3 and the US in the UNSC, for which the international climate is hardly conducive (truth). Iran underscores removal of Western sanctions as an absolute prerequisite (truth) while the E3 and the US remain ambivalent (truth). Iran rules out weaponisation (half-truth) while it is already a de facto non-declared nuclear power (truth) in possession of 409 kgs of highly-enriched uranium from which an estimated 10 nuclear bombs can be made in a small Russian President Vladimir Putin. On Monday, Putin had a telephone conversation with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Interestingly, Putin 'expressed its willingness to facilitate in every possible way the search for negotiated solutions to the Iran nuclear issue.' This is happening even after Trump brushed aside any scope for Russian mediation. By the way, Postol also advised Israel that it is 'absolutely reckless' on its part not to believe that Iran is already a de facto nuclear weapon state. He specifically warned that any eruption of conflict may put Tel Aviv and Haifa in danger of annihilation.(M K Bhadrakumar is a former diplomat)Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.

Does Europe still matter in the Iran nuclear talks?
Does Europe still matter in the Iran nuclear talks?

Russia Today

time18 hours ago

  • Politics
  • Russia Today

Does Europe still matter in the Iran nuclear talks?

Europe still talks like a power – but it no longer acts like one. The recent meeting in Istanbul between Iran and the E3 nations – the UK, Germany, and France – was less a negotiation than a diplomatic performance. Though cloaked in formal statements and procedural optimism, the gathering resembled a carefully staged simulation of diplomacy, aimed more at signaling activity than achieving substance. For all their rhetorical commitment to dialogue, the E3 nations have long ceased to be meaningful actors in the Iranian nuclear file. Their insistence on maintaining a mediating role is no longer backed by either institutional capacity or political will. The talks in Istanbul offered no new proposals, no breakthroughs, and no signs of strategic coherence. Instead, they epitomized a pattern of 'negotiations for the sake of negotiations' – a ritualized diplomacy that conceals, rather than resolves, the underlying geopolitical rift. This was not the first time. A similar meeting held in Istanbul on May 16, 2025, produced the same optimistic rhetoric, only for the situation to unravel weeks later. By mid‑June, Israel had launched a series of strikes against Iran, and for the first time in history, the United States directly attacked Iran's Fordow nuclear facility during the '12‑day war.' That escalation demonstrated in stark terms the limits of Europe's ability to influence outcomes – and the acceptability of force in a conflict where Europe is now largely a bystander. Europe's problem is not just marginalization by the US, but voluntary irrelevance. While Paris, Berlin, and London posture as bridge‑builders between Tehran and Washington, in practice they operate within the parameters defined in Washington and West Jerusalem. The result is not constructive engagement, but an elaborate pretense – diplomacy without agency. The collapse of Europe's credibility in the Iranian nuclear file began long before these days. After Donald Trump's 2018 withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the E3 promised to shield Tehran from the shock of renewed US sanctions. Their flagship solution was the INSTEX financial mechanism – a supposed alternative channel for trade with Iran. But INSTEX never fulfilled that promise. Over its entire existence, it conducted only a single transaction – a humanitarian shipment of medical supplies in 2020 – and even that fell squarely within the categories of goods already exempt from US sanctions. There was no real test of Europe's willingness to defy Washington's restrictions, no challenge to the financial chokehold imposed on Iran's oil and banking sectors. The episode exposed INSTEX for what it was: a symbolic gesture designed to project strategic autonomy, not exercise it. By 2023, the mechanism had been quietly dismantled. This failure was not merely technical. It sent Tehran a clear message: when Washington applies pressure, Europe folds. Even the Biden administration's declared willingness to revive the JCPOA failed to change the dynamic. By March 2022, EU‑led talks in Vienna had stalled over US terrorism designations against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and other unresolved issues. European officials vaguely cited 'external factors' as the reason, but the deeper problem was an unwillingness to confront Washington on Iran's core demands. A 'final compromise draft' circulated that summer, but by September, the E3 were publicly blaming Iran for the collapse of negotiations, accusing Tehran of introducing new conditions regarding its Non‑Proliferation Treaty (NPT) commitments. For Iran, the pattern was unmistakable: Europe had the rhetoric of diplomacy but lacked the leverage to deliver. The consequences became brutally clear in June 2025, when Israel launched a series of strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities – and the US directly struck Fordow. Europe, once imagined in Tehran as a potential mediator (with France once considered a direct channel to Washington), was reduced to issuing statements of 'concern.' Trust that Paris, Berlin, or London could act independently evaporated. For Iran, these episodes confirmed what INSTEX had already exposed. Again, the pattern is the same: when the stakes rise, the E3 has neither the instruments nor the will to defend its commitments. By 2024, any lingering illusion that the E3 could mediate independently between Washington and Tehran had collapsed. The European powers were no longer attempting to balance interests; they were enforcing Washington's strategy. Sanctions on Iran's aviation sector and civilian fleet, adopted by the EU in November 2024, were a clear signal that Brussels had aligned itself fully with the US 'maximum pressure' campaign. Even earlier that year, a high‑profile meeting with Iranian officials on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024 underscored Europe's inability to deliver tangible results. The talks produced the usual optimistic statements but no progress. For Tehran, the message was again clear: European diplomacy was about optics, not outcomes. At the same time, the E3 pushed a series of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) resolutions censuring Iran for alleged violations of its international obligations. The latest, passed on June 12, 2025 – just one day before Israel's attacks and the unprecedented direct US strike on Fordow – was perceived in Tehran as a green light for escalation. Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi publicly warned that the resolution would destabilize the region, but European leaders pressed ahead, seemingly oblivious to the consequences. In reality, the Europeans were not oblivious; they were irrelevant. Paris, Berlin, and London had ceased to shape events and had instead become instruments for applying pressure on Iran. As one Iranian diplomat observed privately, European leaders may initially criticize US decisions, but they ultimately align themselves unconditionally and even present those policies as the 'European position.' German Chancellor Friedrich Merz has gone further, openly supporting any decision made by Donald Trump. Diplomatic gatherings such as the Istanbul meeting served less as platforms for negotiation than as reconnaissance missions: opportunities to 'test the waters' of Tehran's demands and feed intelligence back to Washington. By mid‑2025, the E3's so‑called diplomacy was no longer about building bridges. It was about delivering ultimatums. With negotiations going nowhere, Europe and the United States set an August 2025 deadline for reaching a new agreement with Iran. The implicit threat was clear: if Tehran refused, London, Paris, and Berlin would activate the 'snapback' mechanism embedded in UN Security Council Resolution 2231, restoring pre‑JCPOA sanctions. For Tehran, this was not a legal step but an act of coercion. Iranian officials have long argued that the E3 forfeited their moral and legal authority to invoke snapback when they failed to uphold their own commitments under the 2015 nuclear deal. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's warning could not have been more explicit: if Europe proceeds, Iran will consider withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non‑Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In a letter to the UN secretary‑general and the Security Council, Araghchi accused the Europeans of aligning themselves politically and militarily with the US and Israel – even to the point of tacitly endorsing direct US strikes on Iran's nuclear facilities. The snapback procedure itself is legally contentious. Since the US unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2018, many international lawyers argue that Washington forfeited the right to trigger the mechanism. But in today's geopolitical landscape, that debate is academic. Under snapback rules, permanent Security Council members have no veto; only nine votes are required to reimpose sanctions. The outcome would be predetermined. And for the E3, the activation of snapback would seal a transformation already underway: from nominal mediators to open enforcers of US policy. The Istanbul meeting, then, was never about diplomacy. It was about pressure. Europe still sits at the table, but the conversation happens elsewhere. Diplomacy is dead; what remains is an ultimatum delivered on behalf of Washington – and Iran is unlikely to mistake it for anything else.

UK-EU migration progress welcome but more must be done
UK-EU migration progress welcome but more must be done

Arab News

timea day ago

  • Politics
  • Arab News

UK-EU migration progress welcome but more must be done

Two visits to London in consecutive weeks this month, first by French President Emmanuel Macron and then German Chancellor Friedrich Merz, were a clear demonstration that the UK and leading EU countries are absolutely determined to put the debacle of Brexit behind them and embark on a healing journey, one which will enable them to deal constructively with the common challenges and opportunities they encounter — and all in a cordial spirit. The visits and the agreements and understandings reached during the talks announced the return of the informal E3 group of France, Germany and the UK as the backbone and driving force of European security. All three leaders were keen to display unity, regardless of whether the UK is inside or outside the EU, stressing that it is important not to let the past hold back close UK-EU cooperation. One of the issues that dominated both visits, particularly Macron's, was of stopping, or at least substantially reducing, irregular migration, mainly the arrival of immigrants on small boats. According to the Migration Observatory at the University of Oxford, about 37,000 people were detected crossing the English Channel in small boats last year. The first half of 2025 has seen an increasing number of people attempt this dangerous and costly journey, proving that the current deterrent measures hardly work. Tragically, the increase in the number of crossings also led to a record number of deaths — at least 82 people, including 14 children, in 2024. Migration is not a simple issue, not in terms of the reasons behind it, the legality of it or how it affects the countries of origin and destination. First, migration is a human trait — it has been part of humanity from the dawn of history and is done for economic, social, political and, increasingly, for environmental reasons. Without exploring and addressing these reasons, people will continue to look for routes to enter countries that promise them a safer and better life. Second, lumping together all the different types of migration muddles the public discourse. There are: economic migrants, which all European countries need; asylum seekers, who these countries have a moral and legal obligation to help; and those who are arriving for family reasons or to study. And, yes, there are those who arrive illegally. These are all different categories of migration that must be addressed according to their individual merits, while removing prejudices and biases against newcomers. Third, there is no escaping the fact that the discourse over migration has become toxic, divisive and fertile ground for right-wing parties and ultranationalist movements, which have no existence without it, and this endangers the stability of many societies and might lead to antimigration movements ascending to power. Lastly, it would be an illusion to believe that migration, especially the kind that most countries consider to be undermining their societies, can be stopped by legislation or by investing in better-equipped and more sophisticated border control forces without courageously investing in resolving the root causes. The 'one in, one out' migrant return deal agreed between the UK and France during Macron's visit is designed to serve as a deterrent to stop people from attempting to cross the Channel in small boats. The plan proposes that for each migrant the UK returns to France, another with a strong case for asylum in Britain will be allowed to come the other way. At this stage, it is unknown how many people will actually be sent away. And although those who are sent back to France will not be allowed to apply for asylum in the UK, one wonders how much of a deterrent this plan is. When more details surface, it will be possible to assess whether the number of migrants sent back justifies the cost and whether it can be scaled up when the pilot scheme comes to an end. But this does not, for instance, effectively deal with the smugglers who exploit the predicaments of those who are desperate enough to pay extortionate sums of money and risk their lives for a better future. Even going after the smugglers would not guarantee an end to small boat crossings, as it is too profitable a venture for more unscrupulous people not to take their place. A quick glance at the nationalities of those who attempted to reach the UK by boat between 2018 and 2024 reveals that 70 percent of them come from countries such as Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Albania, Syria and Eritrea. Fighting criminal gangs is necessary, but can provide only limited answers, as there is a demand for their services, and even securing borders and international cooperation cannot seal them hermetically. The discourse over migration has become toxic, divisive and fertile ground for right-wing parties and ultranationalist movements. Yossi Mekelberg Instead, there is a need to go beyond international cooperation and stopping irregular migration when the migrants are already en route or sending them back when they arrive. First, there must be an integral migration policy that promotes safe and orderly pathways and that establishes legal migration channels that meet the need for migration and the demand for it. But above all, the challenge — and the current record of the international community is not encouraging — is to solve the underlying political, economic, social and environmental problems that lead people to try and escape their countries of origin, whether temporarily or permanently. As long as domestic political instability, including wars, violence, oppression and corruption, is rife and there are no employment opportunities or access to basic needs, people will look for an escape route. A growing issue linked to migration is the worsening impacts of climate change. And the collective global neglect of this existential threat to humanity is bound to lead to more people attempting to escape hostile climate conditions. Programs like 'one in, one out,' as much as they are a welcome, proactive and cooperative move to stop irregular migration by small boats, do not go far enough. Only a holistic approach that recognizes the need for migration in the EU, that meets the drive for migration of those who embark on such journeys, legally and illegally, and, most importantly and drastically, that results in a substantial improvement of conditions in migrants' countries of origin can provide a chance to regulate migration to the benefit of all.

Microsoft Stock (NASDAQ:MSFT) Slips Depsite Stifel Price Hike
Microsoft Stock (NASDAQ:MSFT) Slips Depsite Stifel Price Hike

Business Insider

timea day ago

  • Business
  • Business Insider

Microsoft Stock (NASDAQ:MSFT) Slips Depsite Stifel Price Hike

It should have been a better day for tech giant Microsoft (MSFT), as Stifel analysts offered up new commentary on the stock. In fact, they also offered up a range of reasons why Microsoft is poised for gains going forward. But investors were not so sure. In fact, they sent Microsoft shares down fractionally in Monday afternoon's trading. Elevate Your Investing Strategy: Take advantage of TipRanks Premium at 50% off! Unlock powerful investing tools, advanced data, and expert analyst insights to help you invest with confidence. Stifel analysts maintained a Buy rating on Microsoft shares, and raised the price target from its previous $500 per share to $550 per share. That represents a substantial jump over current levels, and suggests Microsoft could blow through its 52-week high, which was down around $518.29. Several reasons gave Stifel confidence in this assertion, starting with enterprise spending that was starting to pick up, as well as improved execution in non- AI issues along with growing demand for generative AI systems. However, not all the news was good. Stifel analysts noted that Microsoft's '…previous supply and demand imbalance concerns…' were likely to keep going, extending into the second half of the 2026 fiscal year. Capital expenditure was also likely to increase with that. Preparing for Gamescom After the Electronics Entertainment Expo (E3) normally hit in June, the next major event for gamers was Gamescom. Called the European equivalent of E3 by some, it was the update that gave us a look at what was likely to hit with the holiday shopping season. Considering that is now about three months or so out, depending on when you start, it is worth a look. And Microsoft is getting ready for the big event with some new developments. Several games will have playable demonstrations on hand, including Hollow Knight: Silksong, Grounded 2, Ninja Gaiden 4, and Borderlands 4, among others. Opening Night Live will feature the world premiere of Call of Duty: Black Ops 7. Plus, the ROG Xbox Ally and the ROG Xbox Ally X will both be on hand with over 120 different gaming stations on hand. Is Microsoft a Buy, Hold or Sell? Turning to Wall Street, analysts have a Strong Buy consensus rating on MSFT stock based on 31 Buys and three Holds assigned in the past three months, as indicated by the graphic below. After a 20.38% rally in its share price over the past year, the average MSFT price target of $554.97 per share implies 8.48% upside potential.

Tehran pushes back on resolution ahead of critical EU negotiations
Tehran pushes back on resolution ahead of critical EU negotiations

Canada News.Net

time2 days ago

  • Business
  • Canada News.Net

Tehran pushes back on resolution ahead of critical EU negotiations

ISTANBUL, Turkey: Iran firmly dismissed proposals to extend a key United Nations resolution tied to the 2015 nuclear agreement as it entered high-stakes talks with European powers for the first time since being bombed by the United States and Israel last month. The talks, held at the Iranian consulate in Istanbul on July 25, brought together diplomats from Iran, the European Union, and the so-called E3—France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The renewed dialogue comes as the clock ticks toward an October 18 expiration of U.N. Security Council Resolution 2231, which underpins the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). That deal lifted sanctions on Iran in exchange for limits on its nuclear activities. Although the United States exited the agreement in 2018, the E3 nations, along with China and Russia, remain committed to it. If no action is taken before mid-September, all remaining U.N. sanctions on Iran—including those targeting the oil, banking, and defense sectors—will lapse. To prevent that, the E3 has set a late-August deadline to assess whether diplomacy can be revived and whether Iran is willing to make concessions in exchange for a six-month extension of the current framework. Diplomatic sources say Western negotiators want Iran to take several key steps to keep the resolution alive: fully cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), open the door to future direct talks with the United States, and provide a detailed account of roughly 400 kilograms (880 pounds) of near-weapons-grade enriched uranium, whose status and location have been uncertain since the June airstrikes. But just before the talks began, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Esmaeil Baghaei Kani dismissed any discussion of extending the resolution as "baseless and meaningless." Speaking to the state-run IRNA news agency, he reiterated Tehran's opposition to altering the deal's terms or timeline. The current round of diplomacy follows a volatile period in U.S.-Iran relations. The two countries had held five rounds of indirect nuclear talks prior to June. Still, those were derailed after President Donald Trump ordered a series of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear facilities, claiming they had "obliterated" Iran's alleged bomb-making capabilities. Iran, for its part, has consistently denied pursuing nuclear weapons. However, recent reports from NBC News, citing current and former U.S. officials, suggest the damage from the strikes may have been overstated. While one of the three targeted nuclear sites was significantly impacted, the other two reportedly suffered only limited destruction. Despite the renewed talks in Istanbul, both European and Iranian diplomats say there is little hope for a breakthrough, especially on the question of U.S. re-engagement. For now, the path forward remains uncertain, with escalating tensions, diplomatic fatigue, and the looming expiration of the U.N. resolution all complicating the fragile balance.

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